Unfortunately, we have neither letters nor diaries from Franz for the 1806-07 war against Prussia and Russia. However, a review of Bavarian participation in this conflict will serve to round out our understanding of Franz’s military career and to place his other experiences in context.
Between the conclusion of the Austrian war of 1805 and the opening of the struggle with Prussia nine months later, Bavaria’s relationship with France had altered significantly. Where Max Joseph’s troops had marched against Austria under the terms of a strictly bilateral treaty arrangement with Napoleon, by the autumn of 1806 the kingdom had entered into a multilateral security organisation under French leadership, the Confederation of the Rhine or Rheinbund. The Rheinbund provided Napoleon with a means to expand his influence in central Germany at the expense of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern monarchies.
In essence, the Rheinbund was a military organisation. Although Napoleon’s original plans called for the confederation to embrace political, social, economic and judicial institutions, as well as military, from the very outset, the security aspect was paramount and the other proposed features quickly fell into dormancy, never progressing beyond the concept stage. According to the ‘constitutional act’ signed by France and .the other fifteen original members on 12 July 1806, each member state committed itself to providing a contingent for the common defence in case of crisis or war. These ranged in size from the 200,000 Frenchmen promised by Napoleon as the ‘Protector’ of the confederation to the 29 owed by the Prince von der Leyen’s miniature monarchy. Bavaria, as the largest of the German states, was assessed the largest military contingent and was thus required to supply 30,000 men when called upon to meet supposedly common dangers. These troops were Napoleon’s chief concern; as he told Montgelas in December 1807, ‘The only thing that matters is having the 30,000 Bavarian soldiers.’1
In ratifying the Rheinbund agreement, Max Joseph gained a myriad of territories that brought some 500,000 new citizens into his kingdom. He also bolstered thereby his centralising monarchy’s internal sovereignty and integrity by sweeping away the last trammels of the Holy Roman Empire. These benefits had their price, however, and by entering the confederation, Max had to accept two painful, if unstated, conditions: tight constraints on his external sovereignty and almost inescapable involvement in any war Napoleon should decide to undertake.2 October 1806 thus found Bavarian battalions en route to war with Prussia, a state which, unlike Austria, did not pose an immediate and vital threat to Bavaria’s interests, a state, indeed, toward which the Bavarians had looked for help (albeit in vain) as recently as 1805.
The creation of the Rheinbund was also one of the causes of the war that now arose between Prussia and France. In Berlin, this step toward consolidation of French power east of the Rhine was considered a dangerous affront and, combined with the continued presence of the Grande Armée in southern Germany, was taken as a direct threat to Prussian interests. Moreover, many in Prussia were convinced that Napoleon intended a war of conquest against their state as soon as such a campaign was practicable. For this body of opinion the only recourse was an immediate pre-emptive offensive against the French forces in Germany.
The final straw came in the form of reports from the Prussian ambassador in Paris indicating that Napoleon was considering depriving Prussia of Hanover, the coveted province which the French Emperor had handed to the Prussian king only several months earlier.3 Desperately bellicose, the Prussian government issued an ultimatum demanding, among other things, the immediate withdrawal of all French troops west of the Rhine. Napoleon answered by directing 200,000 men toward Berlin.
Opening Marches
In the late summer of 1806, the Bavarian Army was organised in three divisions, each with a separate and distinct mission (see Appendix 7, pages 255-6). The 1st Division, under Deroy, was initially detailed to watch the border with Austria. The 2nd Division, on the other hand, was immediately called to join the Grande Armée on the march into Prussian territory. Wrede had been designated for this command, but a sudden illness kept him at home, and it was March 1807 before he was fit enough to join the army. Napoleon, who showed Wrede much favour, was disappointed, writing to the Bavarian general on 3 November,
I am most annoyed with your illness, I had counted on you in this campaign as I know your zeal and your talent, proofs enough of which you gave me last year.4
In Wrede’s stead, Major General Mezzanelli (Franz’s brigade commander at the beginning of the 1805 campaign) led the division in the initial weeks of the war. Finally, a Reserve Division was established under Lieutenant General Georg Count von Ysenburg-Büdingen to garrison the Tyrol and key fortresses.5 This organisation changed significantly several times during the war, and, by the time hostilities ceased, almost the entire Bavarian Army had been committed to one or another of the theatres of war.
The several reorganisations notwithstanding, Franz’s 7th Infantry Regiment remained in Major General Franz Xaver von Minucci’s 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division throughout the conflict. When it marched to war, however, the 7th Infantry had both a new proprietor and a new commander. On 31 May Lieutenant General Dominik Prince von Löwenstein-Wertheim had become the regimental proprietor, and Colonel Karl Baron von Stengel was named to command the regiment just before it left Neuburg for the campaign. Although the previous commander, Colonel von Pierron, soon moved on to assume command of the 4th Infantry, more than five months would pass before von Stengel was able to join his new regiment deep in Poland.
Like many other Rheinbund troops, the Bavarian contingent played a decidedly secondary role in the first phase of the war. While the 1st Division observed the Austrians, the 2nd Division followed the right hand column of the Grande Armée. Arriving in Bayreuth on 9 October, it was placed under the command of Napoleon’s youngest brother, Jérôme, charged with the task of reducing Plassenburg, a Prussian-occupied fortress on one of the principal roads leading into Thuringia. The blockade, however, did not require an entire division, so the 13th Infantry was detached to observe the tiny fortress (which finally surrendered on 25 November), while the rest of the division hurried ahead to reach Schleiz on 13 October. The division spent several days in this town, guarding the road to Leipzig in Napoleon’s rear during the Battle of Jena-Auerstädt on the 14th and giving Jérôme an opportunity to inspect his first land command, reporting to his brother,
I have reviewed 4,367 infantry and 1,235 cavalry and have found them in good condition, excellently trained and full of the desire for combat.6
On 18 October the Bavarians marched for Dresden to occupy the Saxon capital and protect the army’s right. Enjoying a few day’s rest in Dresden, they learned that Napoleon had placed Jérôme in command of the Allied Army’ to consist of the 1st and 2nd Bavarian Divisions and the Württemberg contingent. The 1st Division was already en route for Dresden, having left Ingolstadt on 19 October, but the fast pace of the war was dragging the Grande Armée east into Poland, so the 2nd Division could not await the arrival of its compatriots. Instead, it left Dresden on the last day of October and pushed on to reach the Oder River at Krossen [Krosno] on 4 November. Here Jérôme was finally able to unite his new command, because the Bavarian 1st Division and a Württemberg Division under Lieutenant General von Seckendorff arrived on the 7th and 8th.7 Rapidly reorganising by pulling the Bavarian and Württemberg light cavalry regiments out of their various mixed formations and forming them into three independent brigades (Mezzanelli was designated to lead one of these new cavalry brigades, so command of the 2nd Division devolved to Minucci), the ‘Allied Army’ left Krossen between 5 and 9 November for Silesia.
Silesian Sieges, 1806-07
Jérôme and most of his command spent the remainder of the war in Silesia, reducing Prussian fortresses and conducting a ‘lieutenant’s war’ of small but vicious meeting engagements and ambushes.8 The first target was Glogau [Glogow] which was invested on 10 November and fell on 2 December. From Glogau, the Bavarians shifted to Breslau [Wroclaw], with the 2nd Division arriving before the city on 8 December followed by the 1st Division ten days later. The Schützen of the 7th Infantry participated in an attempt to storm the walls in the predawn hours of the 23rd along with Schützen from the 3rd Light Battalion, the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Regiments, and a Württemberg detachment. Unfortunately, the materials available to cross the fortress’ wet ditch proved inadequate, and by the time more had been brought forward, the morning light had revealed the struggling Schützen to the city’s defenders. Deluged with artillery fire, the Bavarians and Württembergers were forced back to their trenches. The failed assault cost the Bavarians 76 casualties and Jérôme settled into a desultory siege, fending off several Prussian relief efforts before the fortress surrendered on 7 January.
Most of the 2nd Division remained in Breslau as its garrison while the other elements of Jerome’s command, now honoured by Napoleon with the title ‘IX Corps of the Grande Armée’, proceeded to invest Brieg, Schweidnitz and Kosel [Brzeg, Świdnica, Kozle]. Brieg fell on 17 January and Schweidnitz a month later, but the commandant of Kosel did not sign a capitulation until June and the fortress was still in Prussian hands when the war ended in July.
Skirmishes and small sieges continued in southern Silesia from March through June 1807 as the 1st Bavarian Division and the Württembergers endeavoured to overcome or neutralise Prussian forces around the fortresses of Glatz, Neisse and Silberberg [Kłodzko, Nysa, Swieciechow], Despite the energetic leadership of the Prussian Governor General, Major Friedrich Wilhelm Count von Goetzen, Jerome’s men were generally successful, winning most of the engagements in the open field and forcing the surrender of both Glatz and Neisse. Though constantly reduced by drafts sent to the 2nd Division in Poland, they therefore accomplished their mission of securing Napoleon’s right flank, and, when the peace treaties with Russia and Prussia were signed at Tilsit in July, only the insignificant citadel of Silberberg remained unconquered.9
While the Bavarian 1st Division and the Württembergers were establishing control over the southern half of Silesia, the 2nd Division was participating in operations in Poland.10 The division departed Breslau approximately 7,000 strong on 22 February 1807 to join General de Division Anne-Jean-Marie-René Savary’s thinly stretched French V Corps shielding Napoleon’s far right flank along the Vistula [Wisla] and Narew Rivers. Arriving in Warsaw on 8 March, the 2nd Division was granted two days of rest before moving to its assigned sector running from Praga through Sierock [Serock] to Pułtusk.
Several important changes in the division’s command and structure took effect during this period. In the first place, Crown Prince Ludwig, Napoleon’s inveterate and intemperate foe, had arrived in Warsaw in late January, and now assumed titular command of all Bavarian forces in Poland. Wrede, however, having recovered from his illness, was the true guiding hand once he appeared on the scene on 4 April. Secondly, after long delay, the 7th Infantry was able to welcome its new commander, Colonel von Stengel. Former commander of the 4th Light, von Stengel had been appointed to take over the 7th Line back in October, but was diverted to temporary assignment with the headquarters in Silesia and only joined the regiment on 13 April.
Finally, the entire division underwent yet another reorganisation in order to accommodate the numerous reinforcements it had received. Its 15 battalions and 8 squadrons were now divided among three infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade, with a total strength of some 13,300 men supported by 24 guns. As for the 7th Infantry, it numbered 38 officers, 74 NCOs, 17 musicians and 1,571 soldiers in the two field battalions in Poland and an additional 7 officers, 7 NCOS, 3 musicians and 342 men with the two depot companies in Bavaria.11
March and April passed quietly for V Corps, now under Marshal André Massena, but Russian movements prompted Napoleon to seek a firmer grip on the Narew. He therefore ordered Massena to cross the river, secure the far bank and attack any Russian force that sought to impede his advance. Under the overall command of French Général de Division Jean Le Marois, Colonel Pierron’s Brigade therefore crossed the Narew at Sierock on 10 May, established a bridgehead, constructed a bridge over the river and pushed three battalions forward in an advanced position. The Russians did not react immediately, but waited until the night of 13/14 May to launch a powerful attack against the Bavarian brigade. In heavy fighting that cost over 100 casualties (including Pierron, former commander of the 7th Infantry, mortally wounded), the Bavarians were driven back on the works of the bridgehead before they could bring the Russian attack to a standstill. The 14th Infantry, only formed the preceding autumn, manned the defences and was instrumental in repelling the Russian attack.
At 4 a.m. on the 14th, Colonel Lessel’s 2nd Brigade (including the 7th Infantry) crossed the river near Pułtusk under the eyes of the Crown Prince.12 Surprising the Russians, the Bavarian infantry quickly overcame light resistance to clear the eastern bank. As at Sierock, the Russians again gave the 3,000 Bavarians time to construct a bridge and to begin securing their position with field works; moreover, competent reconnaissance carried out by the Bavarians during the 15th had provided advance warning that their enemies might undertake something the next day. As a result, the Bavarians were not entirely unprepared when strong Russian columns (totalling some 10,000 men in five infantry regiments, a hussar regiment, a Cossack regiment, and two or three artillery pieces) debouched from a large wood to advance against the bridgehead around noon on the 16th.
Outnumbered, the foremost Bavarian troops (3rd Light, I/3rd and I/7th from left to right) formed squares on Wrede’s orders and coolly fell back to their half-completed breastworks. Once behind this partial protection, the infantry halted and redeployed to turn a steady musketry on the advancing Russians. Combined with excellent support from their superior artillery in the bridgehead, on an island and across the river, the Bavarian foot soldiers proceeded to break up three attempts to storm their field fortifications. Unable to throw the Bavarians back across the river, the Russians withdrew in the late afternoon, cautiously followed by the Bavarians who were content to re-occupy their original positions. The repulse of this attack at Pułtusk cost the Bavarian brigade 322 men (of these 3 dead, 72 wounded, and 22 captured were from the 7th Infantry), but represented a tidy little victory which ensured the security of Napoleon’s flank, substantially enhanced the confidence of the troops and provided the Crown Prince with his first combat experience.13
The second half of May passed with only a few skirmishes as Bavarian reconnaissance probes attempted to gather information about Russian strength and intentions. In June, however, when Massena learned of Napoleon’s decisive victory at Friedland on the 14th, V Corps began to advance. Leaving the 7th Infantry behind at Pułtusk, the corps slowly followed the retreating Russians toward the borders of the Tsar’s realm.14 Although the Bavarian division led the advance, there were no encounters of any significance and the campaign came to a close when news of the Franco-Russian armistice (signed on 21 June) reached Massena on the 27th.
For both Bavarian divisions, there now followed a long period of occupation duty. Placed under Marshal Adolphe-Édouard Mortier’s VIII Corps in Silesia, Wrede’s Division filled its days with intensive training and numerous inspections, highlighted by a 22 September divisional exercise at Leuthen where Wrede had his men re-enact Frederick the Great’s famous oblique assault on the Austrian left flank during the Battle of Leuthen in December 1757; a battle in which the linear ancestor of the 7th Infantry, the Churprinz Regiment, had participated. Deroy’s men, on the other hand, left Silesia in late August 1807 for the area between Berlin and Stettin [Szczecin], but not before the 2nd Chevauxlegers had been accorded the special honour of escorting Napoleon on his return trip from Glogau to Saxony (mid-July).
The two divisions remained in these locales until November and finally returned to their garrisons in late December after an absence of some 16 months. The return of the 7th Infantry provided Neuburg with an occasion for a day of festivities. Cannon thundered, people cheered, the militia paraded, the city and the Danube bridge were caparisoned with flags, and the regiment passed in review before two royal princesses and other dignitaries. Immediately thereafter, however, the the regiment returned to its peacetime strength with numerous men being sent off on furlough.
Distant Diversions
Although not directly related to Lieutenant Franz Hausmann and the 7th Infantry Regiment, the little-known actions of two other Bavarian units deserve mention.
While the bulk of the Bavarian contingent was occupied in Silesia and Poland, a single regiment represented the kingdom in the larger battles and manoeuvres of the Grande Armée. When the Bavarian contingent was reorganised in Krossen in early November 1806, the 1st Chevauxlegers had been detached to form a light cavalry brigade with the French 11th Chasseurs à Cheval. Initially commanded by General de Brigade Pierre Watier, the brigade participated in the main army’s December offensive to the Narew, in the winter campaign of 1807 that culminated in the ugly struggle at Eylau, and in Napoleon’s concluding summer offensive. Assigned to the cavalry reserve under Marshal Joachim Murat, the 1st Chevauxlegers thus fought at Eylau and Heilsberg, but missed the final triumph at Friedland. Bavarian veterans fondly recalled Napoleon saying T value the Bavarian cavalry as highly as the infantry of my Guard, it is the best in the world.’15
The other unit was the brigade of Major General Karl von Vincenti which served briefly on the Baltic coast. Composed of the 9th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Light Battalion, the 4th Chevauxlegers and an artillery battery, the brigade was called north to reinforce Marshal Guillaume Brune’s ‘Observation Corps of the Grande Armée’, a multinational command containing French, Dutch, Spanish and German (from Bavaria, Berg, Hesse, Nassau, and Würzburg) troops posted in northern Germany to counter enterprises by Prussia’s allies, Britain and Sweden.16
On leaving Bamberg on 5 June, Vincenti reported that his 3,200 soldiers were motivated by ‘the best will and true patriotic feeling’.17 The brigade, however, found almost no opportunity to express its patriotism on the field of battle. Other than some brief and minor skirmishing on 13 July, during Brune’s invasion of Swedish Pomerania (the Swedish king persisted in maintaining the war even after learning of the peace treaties and despite the departure of his British and Prussian allies), Vincenti’s men spent their weeks in guard, patrol, occupation, and other support duties along the Baltic and on the island of Rügen. Finally departing in the second half of November, Vincenti’s Brigade returned home in late December 1807 like the other elements of the Bavarian contingent.
Observations
As in 1805, the Bavarian campaign experience in 1806-07 was almost exclusively associated with protecting the flanks and rear of the Grande Armée. Deroy’s and Wrede’s men were afforded no opportunities to test their mettle in a major combat, and none of the army’s leaders had a chance truly to display his skills. At the same time, the experience was different from that of the preceding campaign. Where the war against Austria and Russia in 1805 had been primarily one of arduous marches and swift manoeuvres, for the Bavarian contingent the conflict with Prussia and Russia was characterised above all by siege warfare. Small-scale forays which placed a premium on junior-level leadership were also an important feature of this war and the Bavarians consistently showed themselves in good light during the many little engagements that punctuated their Silesian sojourn. They also did well in Poland, where even the newly-formed 14th Infantry demonstrated admirable firmness. As Bavarian historian Max Leyh points out, the consistently good performance of the Bavarian troops was founded on confidence in themselves and in their leaders, based on their previous experiences in 1805 as well as the glowing reputation of Napoleon and his army.18
Outpost duty remained, however, a significant exception to this generally favourable picture. The Prussians seem to have surprised and seized Bavarian pickets and guards with relative ease, and French commanders continued to lament the Bavarian Army’s lax approach to field security and reconnaissance.19
Although not without the frictions attendant upon almost any military alliance or coalition (particularly with Jérôme’s Chief of Staff, Général de Division Gabriel Comte d’Hedouville), Bavarian relations with their French allies remained generally good.20 The Bavarians rightly felt that the French frequently treated them like second-class soldiers, and this sentiment brought occasional expressions of disgruntlement but, with minor exceptions (such as the Crown Prince), these complaints were not manifestations of some pervasive, deep-seated anti-French ire. Indeed, beyond the annoyance with inadequate logistical arrangements and preferential treatment for French troops, much of the Bavarian displeasure arose from the perception that they were sometimes denied their fair share of honour and glory for their achievements. That is to say that, even in this war where the issue had no relation to Bavarian national interests, the army in general did not object so much to fighting for Napoleon, as to not having an opportunity to demonstrate its martial prowess in the principal theatre of operations (Vincenti’s Brigade, for example), or to not receiving its due rewards and recognition for its role in the victory.21
If the Bavarian Army’s combat performance was satisfactory, its comportment off the battlefield was often less than admirable. Every army of the era had units or individuals whose treatment of civilian populations was questionable if not disgraceful, but the Bavarians acquired an especially poor reputation during this war, most notably during their march through Saxony.22 There were important exceptions, however, and Vincenti’s men earned sincere gratitude from their French commanders, as well as from civilian authorities, for their discipline and honourable behaviour.23
Gaining steadily in experience and tactical skill, if still weak in outpost duties, the Bavarian Army could take pride in its contributions to the successful conclusion of the 1806-07 conflict with Prussia and Russia. Most of its laurels, however, had been gathered in dull siege work on secondary fields, far from the eye of the Emperor, far from the great battles. Officers and men thus felt frustrated and looked forward to an opportunity to prove themselves in a major contest in close association with the Grande Armée. Their moment would not be long in coming.
1 Quoted in Junkelmann, p. 155.
2 However, it is important to note that Bavaria was not entirely a vassal of France. It was, for example, one of the few Rheinbund states that did not end up sending a significant part of its army to Spain.
3 As part of the territorial settlement following the victory over Austria, Prussia gave up Ansbach to Bavaria and gained Hanover, while Bavaria passed over its remaining Rhenish lands to Napoleon who turned them into Marshal Murat’s Grand Duchy of Berg.
4 Quoted in Leyh, p. 116.
5 Note that one Bavarian military historian claims that he could find no reference to Ysenburg’s Division in the Bavarian archives (G. Paulus, ‘Bayerische Kriegsvorbereitung, Mobilmachung und Einleitung zum Feldzuge 1809’, Darstellungen aus der Bayerischen Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, Heft 2, Munich: 1893, pp. 99-100). Max Leyh, on the other hand, writing some 30 years later with equal access to archival materials, includes Ysenburg’s Reserve Division in his account of Bavaria’s preparations for the war with Prussia. As the units intended to comprise this division were quickly distributed elsewhere and as Ysenburg retained his regional command, the answer may be that the ‘Reserve Division’ was merely a concept that was never actually implemented.
6 Leyh, p. 71.
7 Left behind in Bavaria, the officers of the 4th Chevauxlegers appealed (in vain) to their king to be allowed to join one of the divisions destined for combat (Georg Leisner, ‘Die Bayerische Brigade Vincenti in Schwedisch-Pommern und auf Rügen im Jahre 1807’, Darstellungen aus der Bayerischen Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, Heft 16, Munich: 1907, p. 121).
8 The following drawn primarily from Leyh, pp. 71-101.
9 Note that in June the commandants of Glatz and Kosel had both signed agreements to surrender their fortresses in July if there was no sign of relief. The expiry dates of both agreements fell after the 9th when Prussia signed the peace treaty, so both were still occupied by Prussian troops when hostilities ended. In Jerome’s area of operations, therefore, only tiny Silberberg had the honour of finishing the war without a capitulation (ibid.).
10 Ibid., pp. 101-8.
11 Auvera, p. 391.
12 The force that actually crossed the river and participated in the battle the following day consisted of the I/3rd Infantry, 7th Infantry, 13th Infantry, 3rd Light, two squadrons of the 3rd Chevauxlegers and three guns (Völderndorff, Book 4, pp. 169-73).
13 Description drawn from Auvera, pp. 390-4; Völderndorff, Book 4, pp. 170-4; and the Crown Prince’s battle report to Massena, 17 May 1807 (in Jean Baptiste Koch, ed., Mémoires d’André Masséna, Paris: Bonnot, 1966, vol. V, pp. 434-6). Völderndorff details the Russians as one grenadier regiment, one Jäger regiment, three infantry regiments, a cossack pulk, the ‘brown hussars’ (presumably the Akhtyrsk Hussars), one gun and one howitzer under General Count Schuvalov; the Crown Prince’s report estimates the Russian strength at 7,000 to 8,000 and lists the artillery as two guns and a howitzer; Auvera says there were 10,000 Russians.
14 For this operation, the 2nd Division was reinforced by the French 34th Ligne and 15th Dragoons (Leyh, p. 107).
15 Ibid., p. 109. If accurate, this recollection demonstrates Napoleon’s extraordinary sense of leadership; even if it is apocryphal, it serves to highlight the honour and pride German troops gleaned from their association with Napoleon and the Grande Armée.
16 The brigade had been Major General Marsigli’s up to the spring of 1807. The 8th Infantry joined the brigade in mid-August in northern Germany.
17 Leisner, p. 134.
18 These observations are based primarily on Leyh’s analysis (pp. 115-7).
19 Sauzey, pp. 92-3.
20 The Bavarians were especially irritated at Hedouville for allowing French officers to receive the capitulations of several fortresses even though the besieging troops were exclusively or mostly Bavarian (Uebe, pp. 30-2).
21 I agree here with Leyh’s assessment that ‘These small frictions, which necessarily appear in all coalitions, particularly in a long war and especially in siege warfare, should not be accorded too much importance. They were overcome without damaging the general political situation...’ (p. 117). Uebe (pp. 25-41), on the other hand, highlights every Bavarian complaint (sometimes to the point of exaggeration - he overlooks, for instance, the fact that many French regiments were suffering the same privations) in an effort to conclude that 1806-07 represents the first indication of broad Bavarian dissatisfaction with the Napoleonic alliance.
22 Bezzel, p. 187; Sauzey, pp. 55-7, 92-3; Uebe, pp. 25-41.
23 See Leisner.