The year 1808 afforded the Bavarian Army twelve months of much-needed recuperation. The only interruption was a brief mobilisation in the late summer and autumn when Napoleon called out the larger Rheinbund contingents to discourage Austria from any aggressive action.1 Royal orders of 10 and 12 August directed the mobilisation of the army and its concentration in three divisions at Plattling (Deroy), Augsburg (Wrede’s Division, including the 7th Infantry) and Nuremberg (Ysenburg) under the guise of autumn manoeuvres.2 By the end of August, the three divisions were assembled and opened their exercise period with formal parades, reviews and artillery salutes.
Though Napoleon had commanded the Bavarian mobilisation as part of a larger effort to overawe Austria, the army took good advantage of this opportunity to increase its combat readiness. Closely monitored by officers of the general staff, the training was divided into three phases, starting with fundamentals to accommodate the numerous recruits recently called up (as many as 25 per cent in some regiments). The first phase progressed from individual instruction to company, battalion and regimental drill and exercises. This was followed by brigade and division level manoeuvres in the second phase. Unfortunately, the third phase, field duties, was curtailed by dreadful weather, so the army was not able to practice the outpost and security tasks which had been its weakest points in previous campaigns.
The poor weather — incessant, torrential rain — also forced a change in living conditions. To spare the populace, the infantry was initially established in large tent camps across the countryside but, by 29 September, Deroy was reporting that some tents were under water and that even in those which had escaped the flood the men’s straw bedding was completely soaked through and was giving off an intolerable odour. In addition, one of Deroy’s regiments, the 1st Infantry, complained of being overrun by an invasion of mice. Conditions in the other camps were no better. Under these circumstances, Max ordered the infantry into billets on 1 October, and on the 12th cancelled the exercises entirely. Even so the 1808 mobilisation served the monarchy well as it allowed the army and the state bureaucracy to practice at some leisure the measures they would need to implement in haste four months later. Likewise, the ensuing exercise period, though not completed, not only improved the army’s level of training, but also provided an opportunity to integrate new recruits and to familiarise units and commanders with the order of battle they would use in the coming war.3
Like Berlin in 1806, Vienna was all abuzz with talk of war in 1808-09.4 For many in the Habsburg capital, Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in the spring of 1808 seemed to offer an irresistible opportunity to launch a sudden offensive into Germany and Italy, soundly defeat the reduced French forces in both areas, and thereby re-establish Austrian influence along the Rhine and the Adige. Through a bold strike, the Habsburg monarchy would thus revenge itself upon France’s parvenu emperor and recoup the humiliating loss of status and resources inflicted on it since the beginning of the Wars of the Revolution.
Moreover, many in Austria were convinced that their state would be Napoleon’s next target as soon as he was finished with his affairs on the Iberian Peninsula. A pre-emptive attack seemed to them the only conceivable remedy to their intolerable situation. Like Prussia in 1806, therefore, Austria’s approach to the coming conflict took on a desperate character, and Austria’s leaders entered into offensive planning with little clear idea of what they wanted from the war or how their still unprepared army would achieve its undefined objectives.5 Nonetheless, the men of the Austrian Main Army (Hauptarmee) under the Archduke Charles were in hopeful good spirits when they crossed the River Inn into Bavaria on the morning of 10 April 1809 to open what would be Franz Hausmann’s third war in four years.
Repelling the Invasion
Aware of Austria’s armaments, but uncertain of its intentions, Napoleon had written to the Rheinbund princes from Spain in January 1809 to ‘invite’ them to mobilise their contingents. Thanks to its recent experiences, the Bavarian Army’s transition from a peacetime to a war footing proceeded fairly smoothly and, by 20 March, its three divisions were posted along the River Isar from Munich to the Bohemian border as the strategic advance-guard of Napoleon’s army. Indeed, unlike in the two previous conflicts, the French Emperor found himself relying heavily on his German allies when the war of 1809 began. With most of the former Grande Armée committed for the moment to the Iberian imbroglio, the number of immediately available French troops, particularly veterans, was limited.6 The German contingents, above all the Bavarians, thus found themselves in the forefront of the fighting in April 1809.
As in the 1808 manoeuvres, in the spring of 1809 the Bavarians were organised into three mixed divisions, this time under the Crown Prince (1st), Wrede (2nd) and Deroy (3rd). Each composed of two infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade, the divisions were placed under the overall command of French Marshal François Lefebvre, the Duke of Danzig, as VII Corps of the ‘Army of Germany’. Lefebvre, an Alsatian who spoke German (albeit with an unfamiliar accent as far as the Bavarians were concerned), was a good choice for this post and Napoleon bolstered the corps command team by assigning the experienced and thorough General de Division Jean-Baptiste Drouet, Comte d’Erlon, as Lefebvre’s Chief of Staff. The selection of a Frenchman for the command disappointed King Max, who had hoped to see his son at the head of the monarchy’s corps, but Napoleon was adamant,
I must speak to you frankly. The Crown Prince, whatever advantages he may have by nature, has never learned or made war; he cannot know it. You give me the privilege of utilizing your 40,000 men, but not of putting at their head a man who is sure and firm. I have named as commander the Duke of Danzig, who is an old soldier. The Bavarian troops are too numerous and the situation is too grave for me to conceal my thoughts from Your Majesty. If the Crown Prince had been through six or seven campaigns, then he could command them.7
As in 1807 and 1808, Franz’s regiment was included in Wrede’s 2nd Division, this time as part of the 2nd Brigade commanded by Major General Karl Count von Beckers (who had served in the 4th Grenadiers as a junior officer before Franz was born). Colonel von Stengel and the 45 officers and 1,929 men of the 7th Infantry departed Neuburg on 17 March to occupy their allotted position at Pfatter near Straubing. Stengel, however, did not long remain with the regiment he had commanded since 1806. Promoted to Major General on 1 April, he was posted to lead the 2nd Brigade of Crown Prince Ludwig’s 1st Division, and Colonel Friedrich Count von Thurn und Taxis, elevated from command of the 6th Light Battalion, took his place at the head of the 7th Infantry on the 19th.
By the time Colonel von Thurn und Taxis took command of the 7th, however, the war was already into its second week, and the Bavarian Army had fought its first significant engagement. Defending the line of the River Isar against the slowly advancing Austrians at Landshut on 16 April, the men of Deroy’s 3rd Division proved themselves both tough and tactically competent, delaying the crossing of the river by the main body of Archduke Charles’ army and then conducting a model withdrawal under pressure against vastly superior numbers.
The Bavarians, along with the other Rheinbund contingents and their French allies, kept frantically busy from 10 to 18 April as Marshal Alexandre Berthier, in de facto command in Bavaria until Napoleon could arrive from Paris, marched and counter-marched the Army of Germany’s constituent elements in a vain effort to obey his Emperor’s instructions. Wrede’s men thus dashed all about the area south of Regensburg for several days and were trudging drearily across the Danube at Vohburg late on the night of the 17th when there was a sudden stumbling, shouting and cursing as the long lines halted in the midst of their passage. New orders had arrived directing the 2nd Division to occupy positions above the Abens River and prepare for battle. It was 2 a.m., and considerable confusion ensued as the weary men were turned round and marched back to the line they had left only four hours earlier. But the cold, damp night air was also full of decision and expectancy; Napoleon had arrived and there would be no more retreats.
The next five days were a whirlwind of rapid marches and brutal combats across hilly, wooded terrain where the enemy situation was usually vague or unknown. The success that crowned these engagements despite formidable obstacles and frequent misperceptions is a testimony to Napoleon’s genius, the tactical skill of his army, and the spirit he instilled in his men, French and German alike.
As the sun rose on 19 April, Lefebvre’s mission was to tie down as many Austrians as possible along the Abens so that Napoleon could assemble the dangerously separated pieces of his army. For the 7th Infantry and the most of Wrede’s Division, this meant long hours spent helplessly enduring Austrian artillery fire, while the 1st Division sparred with Austrian probes off to their left at Arnhofen.
Napoleon renewed the struggle the following day in a series of actions known collectively as the Battle of Abensberg. This time, however, his intent was entirely offensive. While the Bavarians struck the Austrian line from the front, Marshal Jean Lannes would drive in the enemy’s right flank with a powerful ad hoc force of veteran French infantry and heavy cavalry. Before launching them against the Austrian positions the Emperor gathered the Bavarian commanders together on a low hilltop and delivered an energetic speech,
Bavarian soldiers! I stand before you not as the Emperor of France but as the protector of your country and of the Rheinbund. Bavarians! Today you fight alone against the Austrians. Not a single Frenchman is in the first line, they are in reserve and the enemy is unaware of their presence. I have complete faith in your bravery. I have already expanded the borders of your land; I see now that I have not yet gone far enough. I will make you so great that you will not need my protection in any future war with Austria. For 200 years, the Bavarian flag, supported by France, has fought heroically against Austria. We will march to Vienna, where we will punish Austria for all the evil it has caused your fatherland. They want to divide your land and enroll you in Austrian regiments!
Bavarians! This war will be the last one you fight against your enemies. Attack them with the bayonet and destroy them!8
The effect on the Bavarian troops was immediate. A Bavarian artillery lieutenant recalled the scene,
Around this time [approximately 9 a.m.] the most remarkable event of my life occurred. A general jubilation announced the arrival of His Majesty the Emperor of the French and, as if struck by a bolt of lightning, the entire army was suddenly filled with joy and hope. From every eye shone forth the purest, most unmistakable joy, the certainty of an imminent victory. Never before had my eye beheld this rare mortal, and yet I recognised him - not so much from the similarity to the busts of him which I had seen — rather from the simplicity of his uniform.9
Inspired by the speech (translated by Crown Prince Ludwig and relayed to the troops by their officers), the Bavarian corps advanced with vigour and, in a fine display of tactical ability, steadily pushed the Austrian left wing under Feldmarschall-Leutnant Johann von Hiller out of its strong defensive positions. The 7th Infantry was in the centre of the action and, having thrown the Austrians back some six miles, the men were settling in for a well-deserved rest when new orders arrived at around 10 p.m. for Wrede to seize the town of Pfeffenhausen on the Laaber River that very night.
With the 6th Light in the lead, supported by a squadron of the König Chevauxlegers and the II/7th Infantry, Wrede set off into the dark, wet woods, chased away some nervous Austrian pickets, and surprised the town, which quickly fell into his hands with a large haul of prisoners and baggage. Thoroughly exhausted but satisfied with their success, the men snatched a few precious moments of sleep in the predawn hours. Wrede praised the regiment in his battle report,
This regiment stood under fire without a break from noon until 7 in the evening, resisted the attacks and renewed attacks of the enemy, and chased the enemy from wood to wood with a courage I cannot adequately describe.10
The 2nd Division drove south to Landshut on the 21st in the wake of Hiller’s hurriedly retreating troops, and participated in the seizure of the town, the Bavarians competing with the French and Württembergers to be the first to enter. The next day, Wrede was detached with General de Division Gabriel Molitor’s French division under Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessières to pursue the broken Austrian left wing to the south, while Napoleon and the bulk of the available troops turned north to engage Archduke Charles and the remainder of the Habsburg host. To the surprise of the French and Bavarians, however, Hiller was able to restore order to his wounded command and return to the attack on the 24th. The result was a tough battle at Neumarkt on the Rott River. Bessières having sent the Bavarians forward across the river where Molitor could not support them effectively, Wrede’s men were outnumbered when Hiller’s columns appeared from the south at approximately 9 a.m. With desperate bravery and considerable skill, Wrede and his division held off the Austrians for several hours but, by noon, retreat had become the only viable course of action. The 7th Infantry, assigned as the rear-guard to protect the rest of the division as it struggled over the one narrow bridge across the Rott, lost 120 men killed and wounded, including its new commander, Colonel von Thurn und Taxis, as Wrede led it forward repeatedly to gain time for the withdrawal.
Among the wounded was Franz’s father, Sergeant-Major Wilhelm Hausmann, who took a ball in his right foot. In the congestion and confusion of the retreat, the regiment might have lost its colours as well, had a Sergeant Schmidt not had the presence of mind to leap into the water with the standard and swim to the opposite bank. He received Bavaria’s Military Service Medal in Silver for his quick thinking and courage. Wilhelm Hausmann also distinguished himself in the battle and was rewarded with the Cross of the Legion of Honour for his bravery. Casualties for the division totalled 795 for the day, and the now chastened Bessières allowed the Austrians to slip away on the 25th.
The pursuit resumed in earnest several days later and Wrede, operating virtually as an independent commander at this point, drove his men hard to seize Salzburg at the end of the month. The other two Bavarian divisions of VII Corps reached the city shortly thereafter, having marched from Regensburg via Munich. Both had participated in the Battle of Eggmühl on the 22nd while Bessières and Wrede were chasing Hiller, and the 1st Division had marched through Munich with prisoners and captured guns to the acclaim of patriotic crowds.
Using Salzburg as a base, the entire VII Corps now launched an offensive to reconquer the Tyrol. In a long-planned move, Tyrolean militia had risen up against Bavarian rule as soon as the first Austrian regulars crossed the border on 10 April. In a matter of days, the Bavarian garrisons had been killed or captured almost to a man, and the jubilant Tyroleans even succeeded in surrounding and forcing the surrender of a column of raw French conscripts en route to join the Army of Germany. With the assistance of a small detachment of Habsburg troops, the Tyroleans began to organise a defence and even launched a few raids into southern Bavaria.
The arrival of VII Corps at Salzburg, however, presaged the end of this first Tyrolean ‘liberation’. Instructed to clear out the Austrians, quell the rebellion, and open the lines of communications between Italy and Germany, Lefebvre sent his divisions up the Inn valley on 10 May. What followed was a war of the utmost bitterness. Although they easily scattered the poorly handled Austrians and were generally successful in driving off the Tyrolean insurgents, the Bavarian soldiers encountered fanatic opposition from the entire populace. Men, women and children took up arms against the ‘invaders’, annihilated isolated detachments and murdered anyone who strayed from his battalion,
I saw boys of 12 to 14 years who fired at us with pistols; I noticed men and women on rooftops who hurled tiles and stones at us.11
The Bavarians, appalled at this ‘unfair’ and ‘dishonourable’ way of making war, treated the rebels as criminals who were resisting the lawful rule of their due sovereign. The result was ‘theft, murder, plunder, etc.’ as a private in the 5th Infantry recalled.
The advancing Bavarian divisions left a swath of destruction and death in their wakes and, through malice or accident, Tyrolean towns such as Schwaz and Wörgl were almost completely razed by uncontrolled fires. As Franz noted, ‘wherever the slightest resistance was encountered, everything was devastated and burned down’. Nine days after launching their offensive, Lefebvre and the Bavarians made their formal entry into Innsbruck, the Tyrolean capital. Resistance seemed to have dissipated and in late May the 1st and 2nd Divisions left the Tyrol to assume responsibility for the defence of Linz.
Napoleon’s long line of communications from Vienna (entered by his army on 13 May) through the Danube valley was vulnerable at many points and he posted the two Bavarian divisions at Linz to ensure uninterrupted contact with France and to hold in check various Austrian forces north of the river. The 7th Infantry was involved in a skirmish on 4 June that cost it 12 men wounded and there were occasional Austrian probes to repulse, but otherwise its sojourn around Linz was a story of poor provisions and the dull drudgery of guard duty. However, the 7th did finally receive a new commander. On 27 June Colonel Nikolas Baron von Maillot de la Traille transferred from the 2nd Infantry to take over from Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Rodt who had led the 7th since Colonel von Thurn und Taxis’ death in April. Maillot arrived just in time, for three days later, Wrede’s Division, as a mark of particular Imperial favour, was called to Vienna to participate in Napoleon’s second attempt to cross the Danube and destroy the Austrian Main Army.
Wagram and Znaim
While the Bavarians had been struggling with the Tyrolean rebels, Napoleon, hoping to locate and defeat Archduke Charles and his army, had endeavoured to throw his principal force across the Danube at Vienna. This bold stroke led to the costly Battle of Aspern-Essling on 21 and 22 May, in which Charles succeeded in repulsing Napoleon’s thrust and in forcing the French to withdraw to an island near the north bank of the river. An operational pause then ensued during which the Austrians vacillated while Napoleon carefully strengthened himself for a second attempt to drive across the Danube.
By late June Napoleon’s preparations were nearing completion and on the 30th, Wrede at Linz received instructions to take his division to Vienna to join the army for the coming battle. Wrede responded with alacrity and by 2.30 a.m. on 1 July, the 2nd Division, reinforced by twelve guns from the Crown Prince’s Division, was on the road toward the Austrian capital. Writing to Berthier from Enns that day, Wrede assured the French marshal that, after a month of ‘very fatiguing outpost duty’ at Linz, ‘there is not a soldier who does not show a great ardour to conduct forced marches in order to have the pleasure of fighting under the eyes of His Majesty the Emperor.’12
Franz’s diary gives a vivid sense of the daily effort Wrede expected of his men. Marching an average of 25 miles per day, the division reached St Pölten on the evening of 3 July. Here a courier arrived with a new message from Berthier, ‘My dear General, if you desire to participate in the affair before us, you must arrive on the Isle of Lobau, near Ebersdorf at 5 a.m. on the 5th.’13 Wrede thus set his weary men on another long march on 4 July (30 miles), bringing them to Purkersdorf just outside Vienna. Here again, new orders changed his plans. He was now to rest his division at Schönbrunn on the 5th after marching another 6 miles. In all, the Bavarian 2nd Division had covered more than 112 miles in slightly more than four days - a remarkable feat of marching by any standard.14
Nor did the division’s exertions cease with its arrival near Vienna. On the contrary, to the demands of marching there were now added the dangers of combat as the Bavarians awaited the moment to play their part in the titanic Battle of Wagram.15 Completely exhausted and soaked through from the tremendous thunderstorm that had swept over the Austrian capital on the night of 4/5 July, the men waited at Schönbrunn while Wrede went in search of orders. These were a long time in coming and the sun was already rising on 6 July when Wrede returned to his men and led them, dressed in their parade uniforms, across the Danube to stand next to the French Imperial Guard in reserve. The veteran Guardsmen greeted them with hearty cheers, and Napoleon himself spoke a few words to them, praising their courage and emphasising the importance he attached to their arrival on the battlefield. Indeed, when General de Division (soon to be Marshal) Etienne MacDonald’s attack against the Austrian centre began to falter under the weight of pitiless artillery fire, the Emperor sent for Wrede. Napoleon’s orders were brief, ‘Now I unleash you. You see MacDonald’s awkward position. March! Relieve his corps; attack the enemy; in short, act as you think best!’16
With his guns in the first line, infantry in the second and cavalry following, Wrede moved forward at about 2 p.m. By that hour, however, Archduke Charles had already ordered his army to withdraw. The Bavarians thus pursued a retreating enemy, but cautiously, endeavouring to inflict as much damage as possible through artillery fire. With its active part in the battle mostly limited to bombardment and a few brief cavalry skirmishes, the 2nd Division’s losses for the day only amounted to 32 men. Franz’s 7th Line and the other infantry units came through the battle entirely unscathed. One of the few casualties was Wrede himself, wounded by a cannon ball during the attack. Minucci took his place, and Napoleon, on learning of the change, replied ‘Let him command as Wrede did and he will enjoy my complete confidence.’17
If the Bavarians had suffered few losses through the brutality of Wagram, the subsequent clash at Znaim would cost them dearly. As one of Napoleon’s few relatively fresh units, the 2nd Division was in the forefront of the pursuit as the French slowly sought after the retreating Austrians. The troops were thus up and moving by 5 a.m. on the 7th for a relatively short (8 miles) but difficult march. Attached to General de Division Auguste Marmont’s Army of Dalmatia that night, the division continued north at 2 a.m. on the 8th. For the next two days, Marmont’s command chased after the enemy, finally stumbling unexpectedly upon the Austrian Main Army near Znaim at about noon on the 10th.
While the French infantry and cavalry deployed to the right to engage what Marmont thought was a mere rear-guard, the Bavarians advanced against the village of Tesswitz on the left of Marmont’s line. The 6th Infantry, led by Major General Beckers, succeeded in taking the town, but could not hold in the face of a heavy Austrian counterattack. The determined Beckers, however, gathered up the I/7th and some other troops (two companies of the 13th Infantry and two companies of French voltigeurs) and stormed into Tesswitz again. This attack was met by fresh Austrian reinforcements and the struggle raged back and forth through the streets with great ferocity until late in the afternoon as each side committed new units to the fight.
Most of Minucci’s division was drawn into the vicious maelstrom as the hot day wore on. The only troops left were several companies covering the artillery on the heights south of Tesswitz and the II/7th, which crossed to the south side of the River Thaya late in the afternoon to clear out Austrian skirmishers. Finally, as darkness began to fall, the Austrians retired and left the burning village to the Bavarians. Relieved in the town by two French regiments, Minucci took his exhausted division some distance to the rear and counted his losses. These amounted to more than 900 men (184 of these from the 7th Infantry), making 10 July the most costly day experienced by any Bavarian division during the entire war.18
The battle around Znaim continued on 11 July, but the Bavarians, with the exception of some Schützen and the artillery, were held in reserve and saw no further active combat. Indeed, 11 July was the last day of the regular campaign and staff officers rode between the two armies that evening to announce that an armistice had been signed. Although peace was not yet assured, Napoleon ordered Minucci to return to Linz and, with Napoleon’s and Marmont’s praise in their ears, the 2nd Division left Znaim on the 13th. All of its units had reached their destination ten days later.19
Ces Misérables Tyroliens
While the 2nd Division was marching to glory at Wagram and Znaim, and the 1st was passing tedious days at Linz, Deroy’s 3rd Division was committed against the Tyrolean insurgents. The region had appeared pacified in early May when Wrede and the Crown Prince had marched off to Linz, but the rebellion broke out anew at the end of the month. Heartened by news of the Austrian success at Aspem-Essling and by reinvigorated patriotic appeals, the Tyrolean militias took up arms again in great numbers and converged on Innsbruck. Although a battle fought outside the city on the 29th was a tactical draw, Deroy knew he could not linger in the Inn valley and accordingly withdrew to more secure positions along the southern border of Bavaria proper. As May closed, therefore, the rebels could celebrate their second ‘liberation’ in as many months.
With Napoleon’s attention and most of his force concentrated on arranging the defeat of the Austrian Main Army, the situation in the Tyrol stagnated. Deroy and other local Bavarian commanders tried to repel insurgent raids while the Bavarian kingdom raised new forces to prosecute the war. Among the new units called into existence were 12 reserve battalions created by an Army Order of 25 June. Each line infantry regiment (with the exception of the 11th) was now to have its own reserve battalion, and it was to the 7th’s reserve unit that Franz was posted in August as a newly-promoted second lieutenant.20 Serving as the battalion adjutant, Franz would thus spend the remainder of the war in south-western Bavaria, taking part in the effort to subdue a rebellion in the Vorarlberg district, where unrest had flared into open insurrection as in the neighbouring Tyrol.
Determined to remove this annoyance in his rear while he conducted peace talks with the Habsburg court, Napoleon directed Lefebvre to launch a second offensive into the Tyrol. The 1st and 3rd Divisions, bolstered by a division of other Rheinbund troops under General de Division Marie-François Rouyer, thus marched up the Inn valley for a second time at the end of July. Other French and German troops moved against the Vorarlberg. But the grand effort was again in vain. Although Innsbruck fell to the advancing Bavarians, Rouyer’s men were badly handled when caught in a trap on 1 August, and a Bavarian attempt to push further up the Inn was thrown back with heavy losses. After another drawn battle outside Innsbruck, Lefebvre withdrew his corps and, by 20 August, the Bavarians and their German allies had once again evacuated the Tyrol.
The failure of the second offensive generated tension between the Bavarians and the French as each tried to lay the blame for defeat upon the other. While the army settled into the business of protecting the monarchy’s long southern borders, therefore, Lefebvre bickered with his Bavarian subordinates and morale sank. By October the friction had reached crisis proportions, highlighted by Lefebvre’s accusations that the former commander of the 7th Infantry, Major General von Stengel, had failed in his duties and unnecessarily retreated in the face of the enemy. Stengel’s exoneration by a military tribunal did nothing to dispel the poisonous atmosphere and Napoleon, whose central interest was the repression of the insurgency, finally stepped in and relieved Lefebvre of his command. General Drouet, the VII Corps Chief of Staff, replaced Lefebvre and relations soon began to improve, but the bitter recriminations of late summer and early autumn 1809 left permanent scars that troubled Franco-Bavarian relations for the remainder of the Napoleonic epoch.
Under Drouet, the corps participated in the third offensive against what Napoleon termed ‘these miserable Tyroleans’ as soon as the peace treaty with Austria was signed on 14 October. With all three Bavarian divisions (Wrede’s was brought down from the Danube valley) involved, the offensive made steady progress against sporadic and occasionally desperate resistance. There was one final battle outside Innsbruck on 1 November, but it was brief and ended in a clear Bavarian victory. By the beginning of December, the Bavarians had succeeded in making contact with French troops pushing north out of Italy. Simultaneously, French, Bavarian and other Rheinbund troops (including Franz and the
Reserve Battalion of the 7th Infantry) extinguished the last sparks of insurrection in the Vorarlberg. With the exception of a few isolated incidents, therefore, the rebellion was crushed as 1809 came to a close, and the Bavarian Army set about the demanding task of occupying the recalcitrant region.
Observations
In reviewing the Bavarian Army’s role in the 1809 campaign, two general points stand out. In the first place, the army had honed its tactical skills to a fine edge. If not perhaps as vigorous and durable as some other German contingents or as impetuous as the French, the Bavarians proved solid, courageous and reliable soldiers. Under fine leaders, infantry, cavalry and artillery alike displayed an excellent grasp of flexible tactical manoeuvre in open, conventional combat, against an experienced foe.
Even in the dreadful struggle against the Tyrolean rebels, the Bavarians eventually learned hard lessons about mountain warfare against an insurgent population. They could never match the native cunning and local knowledge of the Tyroleans, but they learned to attack at night, to outflank or bypass difficult resistance and to control the heights with swarms of light troops. They also learned that they could not take irregular forces such as the Tyroleans for granted. The third offensive into the Tyrol was thus planned and executed with great thoroughness, the army advancing with careful reconnaissance, secure lines of communication and an eye toward pacifying, not simply suppressing, the Tyrolean people.
Secondly, this campaign highlights both sides of the Franco-Bavarian military relationship. On the one hand, the Bavarian soldiers responded with enthusiasm to Napoleon’s appeals to their patriotic sentiments and to the honours he dispensed. The cheers at Abensberg were not feigned and it is clear that the men felt privileged to fight under the great Emperor’s eye. Three months later, at Wagram, the eagerness to distinguish themselves before Napoleon had not diminished. The results of this attitude are evident in the determination and persistence with which the Bavarians fought at places as distant in space and time as Abensberg and Znaim.
On the other hand, when the officers and men felt slighted, their view of the French alliance shifted. It was not a sudden change, and it was probably not irreversible in 1809, but a gradual accumulation of grievances began that year that slowly eroded Bavarian tolerance and their willingness to exert themselves for the French. This friction is mostly associated with the disappointments and defeats in the campaigns against the Tyroleans, where the difficulties of coping with a tenacious insurgency were compounded by internecine quarrels between French and Bavarians.
Irritants arose from both sides, from Lefebvre unwisely insulting entire battalions, to Crown Prince Ludwig overlooking and perhaps supporting virtual insubordination. The acrimonious relationship between Napoleon and Ludwig made all these difficulties more acute and less susceptible to amelioration. Though the army still fought well, the Tyrolean war of 1809 left deep and bitter memories, and many Bavarians came to see first Lefebvre, and then Napoleon and all things French, as symbols of oppression. France’s formerly willing friend slowly began to regard itself as an ally in chains.
Military Diary of
FRANZ JOSEPH HAUSMANN
for the
SECOND AUSTRIAN CAMPAIGN
From when the Regiment marched ont on 17 March 1809 until the return of the Reserve Battalion on 18 June 1810.
March 1809
| 17 March | Neuburg on the Danube, in Bavaria. Today crossed the Danube. Marched ten hours, into cantonment. |
| 18 March | Regensburg. Marched nine hours, into cantonment. |
| 19 March | Pfatter the 1st Battalion; Mintraching the 2nd Battalion. Marched five hours, into cantonment. |
| 26 March | Niederwalting near Straubing. Marched seven hours, into cantonment. |
| 27 March | Dingolfing on the Isar the 1st Battalion; Landau the 2nd Battalion. Today crossed the Isar. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
April 1809
| 2 April | Neufahrn the 1st Battalion; Geiselhöring the 2nd Battalion. Today crossed back over the Isar. Marched eight hours, into cantonment. After word was received on 9 April that the Austrians had crossed the Inn near Braunau and invaded Royal Bavarian territory, and that thereby Austria had officially declared hostilities, the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division therefore assembled on the heights of Neufahrn and in the night marched out to Vohburg, where it joined up with the division. |
| 10 April | Vohburg. Marched all night. Marched 14 hours, into cantonment. |
| 12 April | Langquaid. Marched eight hours, into cantonment. |
| 14 April | Sünching. Marched all night. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 15 April | Back to Langquaid. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 16 April | Bachl, at 8 o’clock in the evening into camp. Marched two hours, into bivouac. |
| 17 April | Near Abensberg. Marched three hours, into bivouac. |
| 18 April | Near Neustadt. Marched one hour, into bivouac. Here Marshal Bessières reviewed the Bavarian 2nd Division, and a proclamation from General Wrede was also announced. On that same evening at 4 o’clock the 2nd Division marched out along the Landshut road as far as Siegenburg. Near the village of Mühlhausen the enemy was attacked with a strong cannonade and forced back. |
| 19 April | Allersdorf near Abensberg. Marched one hour, into bivouac. Today His Majesty Emperor Napoleon arrived at the army. On this day the Royal Bavarian 1st and 2nd Divisions marched out in battle order. The 7th Regiment stood on the heights by the Biburg monastery; close to the monastery there was an artillery battery. At 11 o’clock in the morning the Austrians were seen in full retreat from Regensburg, and a heavy cannonade could be heard coming from the village of Thann. Marshal Davout followed hard behind the enemy, coming from Regensburg toward us. At 3 o’clock in the afternoon the enemy began heavily cannonading the Royal Bavarian battery that was positioned near the Biburg monastery, and his fire was sharply returned. |
| 20 April | Ludmannsdorf near Pfeffenhausen. Marched ten hours, into bivouac. On this day the enemy was attacked near Abensberg. The 7th Regiment stormed across the bridge near Biburg. The 2nd Division thereupon advanced in battle order, closely pursuing the enemy to Pfeffenhausen. Near the village of Ludmannsdorf the enemy wanted to remain in place in bivouac, but at 9 o’clock in the evening he was chased out of the village by two battalion volleys, and he set out in retreat toward Landshut later that night. |
| 21 April | Mariburg, a farm near Landshut. Marched ten hours, into bivouac. Today crossed the Isar. On this day the Austrians were again attacked near Landshut, and a large number were closed off in that city. The enemy was attacked in such haste, that he did not have time to burn down all of the bridge; he was pursued by storm across the bridge while it was still burning. |
| 22 April | Frontenhausen on the Vils. Marched ten hours. Here the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Division, along with a squadron of French cavalry, was ordered to march downstream along the River Vils to Frontenhausen, to which place several scattered members of the Austrian Landwehr had retreated, and to take them prisoner.21 The enemy retreated without stopping, however. |
| 23 April | Neumarkt on the Rott. Marched eight hours, into bivouac. |
| 24 April | Vilsbiburg. Marched four hours, into bivouac. On this day at 10 o’clock we were supposed to march out again from Neumarkt on the Rott. One hour from Neumarkt, however, the 2nd Division was unexpectedly attacked by a much superior enemy force. The fighting was heavy, neither side wanting to give in, until finally the division received the order to retreat back to Vilsbiburg. Our regiment covered the retreat. Our regiment’s loss of prisoners, missing and dead was considerable. According to the admission of our enemy prisoners, their loss was also very great, as could not be otherwise from such a scene of murder, where neither side wants to give in.22 |
| 26 April | Mühldorf on the Inn. Marched eight hours, into bivouac. |
| 28 April | Tittmoning. Marched all night. Twelve hours, into bivouac. |
| 29 April | Salzburg. Marched nine hours, into bivouac. Today crossed the Salzach and, after some skirmishing, Salzburg was taken by storm. |
| 30 April | Strasswalchen. Marched six hours, into bivouac. |
May 1809
| 3 May | Timelkam. Marched seven hours, into cantonment. |
| 8 May | Strasswalchen. Marched seven hours, into cantonment. On this day the 2nd Division was ordered to march back out of Austria and to the Tyrol. The 2nd Brigade had to set out at midnight from near the town of Oberrain in order to cross over the mountains to Lofer, which was a very difficult march for the troops. |
| 9 May | Wieshausen near Salzburg. Marched eight hours, into cantonment. |
| 10 May | Oberrain near Lofer. Marched eight hours, into bivouac. |
| 11 May | Lofer. Marched one hour, into bivouac. The two mountain passes near Lofer were taken on this day. |
| 12 May | At Going near St Johann, in the Tyrol. Marched nine hours, into bivouac. |
| 13 May | At the Kleiner Zoll [toll house], near the Gratenbrück [bridge]. Marched eight hours, into bivouac. On this day we attacked the Austrians and Tyrolean insurgents at the Kleiner Zoll near the Gratenbrück. |
| 14 May | We attacked near Rattenberg, and the city, which was defended by the Austrians and insurgents, was taken by storm. |
| 15 May | Schwaz was entirely devastated today, and today we also crossed the River Ziller and attacked the insurgents near the Ziller bridge. Also, after several howitzer salvos, they had to abandon the St Christoph chapel, which sits on one of the mountains. Marched ten hours, into bivouac. |
| 16 May | Heavy attack in and around Schwaz. In Schwaz there was shooting at the division from the houses and windows; nevertheless, the city and bridge over the Inn were taken by storm. In general, the Tyrolean insurgents here demonstrated the greatest persistence, after having been abandoned by the Austrians right at the start of the fighting. Their persistence was poorly recompensed, however, for the peasants had to give way everywhere, and wherever the slightest resistance was encountered, everything was devastated and burned down. The fate that befell the city of Schwaz and several villages can be seen today in the ruins that are still standing there. |
| 18 May | The insurgents began negotiations, after Austrian troops had withdrawn to Innsbruck and from there to Styria. |
| 19 May | Innsbruck. Today crossed the Inn. Today a deputation with a trumpeter came from Hall and asked for mercy. The peasants also returned home quietly. The division marched to Innsbruck. Marched six hours, into bivouac. |
| 22 May | The 2nd Division was relieved by the 3rd, in order to march to Linz. Marched six hours. |
| 23 May | Rattenberg. Today crossed back over the Inn. Marched ten hours. |
| 24 May | St Johann. Marched ten hours, into cantonment. |
| 25 May | Unken near Lofer. Marched ten hours, into cantonment. |
| 26 May | Salzburg. Marched eight hours, into cantonment. |
| 27 May | There was a public religious service, to celebrate the birthday of His Majesty the King of Bavaria. The division along with the Salzburg city guard paraded before Marshal Lefebvre. |
| 28 May | Strasswalchen, in Upper Austria. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 29 May | Vöcklabruck. Marched eight hours, into cantonment. |
| 30 May | Kremsmünster. Today crossed the River Traun. Marched ten hours, into cantonment. |
| 31 May | Outside of Linz. Today crossed the Danube. Marched seven hours, into bivouac. |
[There are no diary entries for June 1809.]
July 1809
| l July | Strengberg, in Lower Austria. Today crossed the Danube. Marched ten hours, into bivouac. |
| 2 July | Kemmelbach. Marched ten hours, into bivouac. |
| 3 July | St Pölten. Marched twelve hours, into bivouac. |
| 4 July | Purkersdorf. Marched twelve hours, into bivouac. |
| 5 July | Vienna. Marched four hours, into bivouac. |
| 6 July | Gerasdorf on the battlefield of Wagram. Today crossed the Danube. Marched ten hours, into bivouac. |
| 7 July | Wölkersdorf. Marched eight hours, into bivouac. |
| 8 July | Schwabenthal. Marched ten hours, into bivouac.23 |
| 9 July | Near a large mill close to Laa. Marched eight hours, into bivouac. |
| 10 July | Tesswitz near Znaim, in Moravia. Marched eight hours, into bivouac. On this day and the following days the regiment participated in an important battle. On the 11th an armistice was concluded. |
| 11 July | Zarandl. Today the River Thaya was crossed. Marched one hour, into bivouac.24 |
| 13 July | Obermakersdorf. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 14 July | Breitenelch near Horn, in Lower Austria. Marched five hours, into cantonment. |
| 15 July | Altpölla near Steupils. Marched five hours, into cantonment.25 |
| 16 July | Zwettl. Marched 7 hours, into cantonment. |
| 17 July | Arbesbach. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 18 July | Zell. Marched eight hours, into cantonment. |
| 19 July | Steyregg. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 20 July | Linz. Here crossed the Danube. |
August 1809
| 8 August | To the regiment at Ottensheim. Marched two hours, into cantonment. |
| 12 August | Here crossed the Danube and marched via Eferding to Peuerbach. Marched nine hours, into cantonment. |
| 13 August | To Passau, in Bavaria. Crossed the Inn. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 14 August | To Eggenfelden. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 15 August | To Ampfing. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 16 August | Via Haag to Parsdorf. Marched nine hours, into cantonment. |
| 17 August | Munich. Crossed the Isar. Marched four hours, into cantonment. |
| 19 August | Holzkirchen. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 20 August | To Tegernsee, where I encountered the Reserve Battalion. Marched eight hours, into cantonment. Here the battalion, together with the Mountain Rifle Corps, faced the insurgents.26 |
| 26 August | The 4th Bavarian Infantry Regiment arrived from the Tyrol, and our Reserve Battalion marched to Tölz. |
| 27 August | Wolfratshausen. Marched five hours. In cantonment here until |
September 1809
| 5 September | Seefeld. Marched four hours, into cantonment. |
| 6 September | Greifenberg. Marched five hours, into cantonment. |
| 7 September | Landsberg. Marched three hours. Garrisoned here until |
| 15 September | to Mindelheim. On this day crossed the Lech. Marched four hours, into cantonment. |
| 16 September | Memmingen. Marched four hours, into cantonment. |
| 17 September | Leutkirch. Marched four hours, into cantonment. |
| 18 September | Wangen. Marched four hours, into cantonment. |
| 19 September | Lindau. Marched four hours. Garrisoned here. |
November 1809
| 29 November | Hohenems. Marched five hours, into cantonment. |
| 30 November | Altenstadt near Feldkirch. Marched five hours, into cantonment. |
December 1809
| 1 December | Feldkirch. Marched one hour, into cantonment. |
January 1810
| 11 January | Bregenz. Marched nine hours, into cantonment. |
March 1810
| 20 March | Weiler. Marched five hours, into cantonment. |
| 21 March | Immenstadt. Marched four hours, into cantonment. |
| 22 March | Kempten. Marched three hours. Garrisoned here. |
June 1810
| 12 June | Kaufbeuren. Marched six hours, into cantonment. |
| 13 June | Buchloe. Marched five hours, into cantonment. |
| 14 June | Schwabmünchen. Marched four hours, into cantonment. |
| 15 June | Göggingen. Marched three hours, into cantonment. |
| 16 June | Through Augsburg and crossed the Lech, to Affing. Marched four hours, into cantonment. |
| 17 June | Pöttmes. Marched five hours, into cantonment. |
| 18 June | Neuburg on the Danube, garrisoned. Marched four hours. |
1 Letter of 25 July 1808 from Toulouse, Correspondance, no. 14230.
2 Paulus, pp. 98-99.
3 See Paulus and the following unit histories: Auvera, pp. 407-08; Berg, p. 202; Prielmayer, p. 139; Zoellner, p. 53; Joseph Dauer, Das Königlich Bayerische 10. Infanterie-Regiments, Ingolstadt: Ganghofer, 1901, vol. IV, p. 217; Oberstlieutenant Döderlein, Geschichte des Königlich Bayerischen 8. Infanterie-Regiments, Landshut: Rietsch, 1898, vol. II, p. 106; Max Ruith and Emil Ball, Kurze Geschichte des K. B. 3. Infanterie-Regiments, Ingolstadt, 1890, p. 151.
4 This chapter is largely condensed from Chapters 2 and 7 of John H. Gill, With Eagles to Glory, London: Greenhill, 1992.
5 See John H. Gill, ‘What Do They Intend? Austrian War Aims in 1809’, in Selected Papers of The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1996, series editor Donald D. Horward, Florida State University, 1996.
6 The Grande Armée had been disbanded by Imperial decree on 12 October 1808, Correspondance, no. 14376. The principal French army in 1809 was thus known as ‘The Army of Germany’.
7 Napoleon to Max Joseph, 14 March 1809, Correspondance, no. 14901.
8 There are several versions of this speech; this one is quoted from Junkelmann, pp. 13-14.
9 Christian Schaller, Fragmente aus dem Feldzuge gegen Oestreich im Jahr 1809, Augsburg: Bürgeln, 1810, pp. 26-7.
10 In Auvera, p. 419.
11 Friedrich Mandler, Erinnerungen aus meinen Feldzügen, Franz Joseph Schneidawind, ed., Nuremberg: Lotzbeck, 1854, p. 29. Mandler was a soldier in the 6th Light Battalion.
12 Wrede to Berthier, 1 July 1809, France, Archives de la Guerre, carton C2/93.
13 This order is reprinted in many places, but the best is Hasso Dormann’s biography of Wrede which includes French and German texts as well as a facsimile of the actual note and the bibliographic reference to the Bavarian War Archives (Feldmarschall Fürst Wrede, Munich: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1982, p. 65).
14 For this march, in addition to Gill, Eagles, see Sauzey, pp. 158-9; and Gustav Wolf, Der Eilmarsch Wrede’s von Linz bis Wagram, Innsbruck: Wagner, 1909.
15 Note that these elements of Wrede’s Division (including the two additional artillery batteries from the 1st Division) were the only Bavarian units present at Wagram. Some other sources erroneously place a cavalry regiment and two artillery batteries with Massena’s IV Corps.
16 Dormann, p. 67.
17 Ibid.
18 Auvera, pp. 435-8.
19 Napoleon personally congratulated Lieutenant Dobl on the performance of his battery on 11 July (Rudolf Ritter von Xylander, Geschichte des 7. Feldartillerie-Regiments, Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1909, p. 187) and Marmont’s 12 July Order of the Day expressed his satisfaction with ‘the valour shown by the Bavarian Division in its attacks on the village of Tesswitz and with the determination shown in the defence of the same’ (in Sauzey, p. 169).
20 An earlier order had established six reserve battalions, but these had just begun to form when the new instructions doubled the number and permanently affiliated each reserve battalion with a regular regiment.
21 The Landwehr was the Austrian national militia.
22 It was during this battle that Franz’s father was wounded.
23 Schwabenthal not located; Marmont’s command bivouacked near Mittelsbach on the night of the 8th.
24 Zarandl not located; perhaps Franz meant Gnadlersdorf, about five miles south-west of Znaim.
25 Steupils not located.
26 The Gebirgsschützen Korps (Mountain Rifle Corps) was an irregular formation organised in times of emergency to defend the mountainous southern border of the kingdom. It proved to be of questionable value (see Gill, Eagles, Chapter 7).