Chapter Seven

The Invasion of France

The brief 1814 campaign in France often showed Napoleon at his best as a commander. With a small army — mostly young conscripts and old men huddled around a hard core of veterans — he struggled to hold off vastly superior Allied forces encroaching on French territory from all directions. Through wretched winter weather, he exploited his central position and unique unity of command to win a string of brilliant, if desperate, little victories over his often hesitant foes. But all the courage, endurance, spirit and sacrifice were not enough. In the end, he and his dwindling legions succumbed to overwhelming numbers, France’s exhaustion, and his own inability to set any limits on his designs and ambitions. The result was abdication and exile, but only after one of his most skillful campaigns.

Of the vast Allied host pressing slowly into France as 1814 opened, the two most important formations were Prussian Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher’s Army of Silesia (107,000 men) and the Main Army under Schwarzenberg (209,000 men).1 Both were aiming for Paris, the Army of Silesia generally following the Marne River while Schwarzenberg advanced astride the Seine. After much discussion, the Allies had decided on a winter campaign and began moving across the Rhine at the turn of the year, depriving Napoleon of the time he needed to recover.

Across the Rhine

In accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Ried, the Bavarians were employed as an independent, unitary contingent under their own commander. Wrede was thus entrusted with V Corps of the Allied Main Army including the 26,400 men of his own contingent and an Austrian corps of 17,900 under General of the Cavalry Johann von Frimont. The Bavarian Army, hastily cobbled together for this campaign, was an odd mixture of two-thirds line troops and one-third newly-organised National Guard battalions known as the Mobile Legion. Like Franz, most of the officers in the line units were veterans, but the rank and file were mainly new recruits from Bavaria’s third conscription of 1813. A large percentage of the men in the Mobile Legion battalions (later renamed ‘National Field Battalions’), on the other hand, had some prior military service, but the officers were frequently either brand new or not entirely fit for active campaign duty.2 Wilhelm Hausmann is an example of this latter category: a competent NCO elevated to the officer corps to fill a leadership position with the burgeoning militia force.3 Working to Wrede’s advantage was his own personal involvement with this army. He had raised and trained it over the summer of 1813, and he had carried it through its first, albeit unsuccessful, battle at Hanau in October. Moreover, he had a fairly strong set of relatively young, yet experienced, general officers to command his divisions and brigades (the 18-year-old Prince Karl being an exception in terms of experience).4

Like many other line regiments, the 7th Infantry had only one full battalion available for field duty in late 1813. Under Colonel Wilhelm von Rodt, therefore, only the regiment’s 1st Battalion, with 823 officers and men under arms (from a total of 1,103 effectives) on 14 December 1813, would march with Wrede in the coming campaign.5

The Bavarians spent most of November and December 1813 along the upper Rhine, incorporating the tiny remnant of Raglovich’s Division (1,250 officers and men) and welcoming the return-of Wrede, recovered from the wound received at Hanau. The corps passed over the Rhine at Basel on 22 December and headed north through Alsace in early January 1814, sending off the renowned Austrian partisan leader, Colonel Karl Baron von Scheibler with some Cossacks and one squadron each of Austrian and Bavarian cavalry to gather intelligence to the north and east of the route of march.6 As he advanced, however, Wrede had to leave off significant detachments (Beckers’ 2nd Bavarian Division and three Austrian battalions) to blockade several small but defiant French fortresses.7 With the troops remaining (approximately 27,000 men), Wrede made his slow, somewhat halting way west on 10 January, crossing the Moselle, Meuse and Marne Rivers while providing the connecting link between the Main Army to the south and the Army of Silesia in the north.

On the last day of January, Wrede thus found himself west of the Marne, wedged between the two principal Allied armies.8 His orders from Schwarzenberg called for him to move north-west, but he learned that morning that another Allied corps (commanded, ironically, by his old foe from Polotsk, General Wittgenstein) had discovered only insignificant detachments in this direction. Knowing that a major French force had gathered near Brienne and La Rothière, due west of his position, Wrede decided to ignore his orders and march toward the spot he rightly concluded to be the decisive point.

Wrede formed the right wing of the Allied army as it advanced to the attack over snow-clad fields at approximately 1 p.m. on the afternoon of 1 February. Opposing the 79,000 Russian, Prussian, Austrian and German troops immediately available were some 45,100 Frenchmen under Napoleon’s personal command.9 The French Emperor, recognising that he was in danger of being outflanked and overwhelmed, had directed his army to withdraw to the west when word arrived that the Allies were massing to his front. With no choice but to stand his ground until nightfall, Napoleon ordered his men back to their places and a bitter action soon developed along the entire battle line.

A brutal contest for the villages that formed the French right and centre had been in progress for some time when Wrede’s men came into line on the Allied extreme right. While most of Wrede’s Austrians swung right toward Morvilliers, the Bavarian 3rd Division deployed with the 2nd Brigade north of the Soulaines road and the 1st Brigade to the south with the I/7th and the two national field battalions in the first line facing the village of Chaumesnil.

Shortly before 4 p.m., Wrede ordered the 1st Battalion of the 7th and a battalion of the Austrian 1st Szekler Grenz Regiment10 forward to seize Chaumesnil and take some of the pressure off the Württemberg IV Corps next in line on his left. The men of the 7th advanced in column without firing a shot and their sudden storming attack succeeded brilliantly, quickly evicting the French from the village and securing it for the Allies at the cost of three dead and 36 wounded. The 1st Grenadier Company under First Lieutenant Karl von Bienenthal performed especially well, but suffered 22 of the battalion’s 39 casualties in the assault. Unfortunately, the casualties included Colonel von Rodt, who died the following day of a head wound received during the struggle. Major von Fortis assumed temporary command of the battalion.

Having wrested Chaumesnil from the French, the Bavarians and the Grenzer successfully defended it against several French counterattacks, including one by a brigade of the Young Guard led forward by Napoleon himself. The Allied troops were well supported by several Bavarian guns on a hill east of the village, and a well-executed charge by the Bavarian and Austrian cavalry captured 16 French guns, effectively ending the threat to Chaumesnil. This additional fighting cost the 7th Infantry 34 more casualties, making for a total loss of 73 officers and men during the course of the day. As night closed in, the French were in full retreat and the Bavarians (thanks to Wrede’s initiative) could take satisfaction in having made a significant contribution to the Allied victory.11

The Allies, however, bungled the pursuit of Napoleon’s battered force. Indeed, Schwarzenberg issued no orders at all for 2 February, with the result that Wrede set out on his own to find the enemy. Unfortunately for the Bavarian Corps, he turned toward the town of Rosnay where French Marshal Auguste Marmont had established himself in an extremely strong defensive position. For several hours, the Bavarian 1st Division and the Austrians bravely hurled themselves at Marmont’s command, but the Allies could achieve only partial successes and even those came at a heavy price. Marmont finally abandoned his position when outflanked by Austrian cavalry, but by then the Bavarians alone had lost almost 1,100 men in their fruitless attempts to storm the town. Moreover, the high losses were not justified by military necessity. The next day, Wrede was ordered to turn about and retrace his steps, leaving Rosnay and its bitter memory of pointless sacrifice behind.

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The Bavarians continued west for the next ten days, passing over the Seine twice as they made their way toward Paris: first from east to west at Troyes on the 7th and then from south to north at Bray on the 12th. At Bray, the Bavarians found the bridge destroyed and a small French force deployed on the far bank. When the Schützen Company of the 7th Infantry and a cannon drove off the few French defenders, Major von Horn of the general staff embarked on a raft (the only available water craft) with seven volunteer Schützen, rowed to the north side of the river and collected enough boats to transport the rest of the Schützen across. Under the protection of the Schützen, the bridge was restored and the advance resumed on the 13th.12

This push north of the Seine brought the corps to within 35 miles of Paris on 16 February, but Napoleon, having hammered Blücher’s Army of Silesia in three sharp victories, drove south behind V Corps and struck the Bavarians hard on the 17th. Functioning as the rear-guard, the 7th Infantry lost a few men in this action, while the 11th, more heavily engaged, suffered 270 casualties. The Allies retreated behind the Seine the following day.

South of the Seine once again, Wrede’s men trudged gloomily east as the soldiers wondered why they were withdrawing from a numerically inferior foe. Inadequate provisions contributed to sagging Allied morale. Marching through regions already exhausted by the repeated comings and goings of the armies, the men found little food, little wood, less fodder and no straw for bedding in the cold, damp weather. When they arrived at Bar-sur-Aube on the 25th, for example, the troops were able to settle in and cook a proper hot meal for the first time in ten days.13

In addition to debilitating privations, the long, demoralising retreat also brought a sharp engagement for 7th Infantry. Serving as the army’s rear-guard on the afternoon of the 24th, the battalion was under pressure as it held a bridge east of Troyes against the French pursuit. When the French finally forced their way across the bridge, Captain von Hacke of the 1st Company resorted to a desperate deception. With the darkness hiding his true weakness, he had his men sound cavalry and infantry attack signals on bugles and drums to the accompaniment of loud cries and exclamations. The ruse worked. The French believed themselves in danger of being overwhelmed and pulled back, allowing the Bavarian withdrawal to Bar-sur-Aube to continue undisturbed. This brief engagement, however, cost the battalion 89 casualties.14

At Bar-sur-Aube, the Bavarian soldiery again paid the price for the hesitancy, poor intelligence and weak decision-making in Allied headquarters. Ordered to continue with the retreat on the 26th, V Corps evacuated Bar at approximately 5 p.m. that evening and headed east. The last of Wrede’s men had barely departed when new orders arrived directing Wrede to hold the town at all costs and to prepare for a major action on the 27th. By this time, however, the French had occupied Bar and were already busy fortifying it. Wrede’s attempt to carry out his orders resulted in a fruitless night assault on the French defences which destroyed the 1st Battalion of the 8th Infantry as an effective fighting force (344 casualties left it with only around 100 men under arms) and gained the Bavarians nothing.15

The following day, however, ended with an undeniable Allied success. Schwarzenberg’s plan called for Wrede, reinforced to 32,000 men by the addition of several Russian battalions, to fix the French from the front while Wittgenstein swung round the enemy’s left flank with his 20,000 Russians. The French, numbering some 30,000, were under the command of Marshal Oudinot, so the ensuing battle brought together the three protagonists from the First Battle of Polotsk in August 1812.

Unfortunately for the Allied cause, the relationship between Wrede and Wittgenstein was characterised by tension and mistrust. Wittgenstein was thus slow to move on the morning of the 27th, and Schwarzenberg had to intervene personally to get the attack rolling. Because of this delay, Wittgenstein’s outflanking move had hardly begun when the fog lifted and disclosed the Russian columns to the French outposts. Curiously, Wrede was also slow to enter the fight. Although his Russian reinforcements and some of his Austrians were committed early in the day, he did not send his Bavarians forward until 4 p.m. The Bavarians attacked with courage, but the French, though outnumbered, were determined and grimly contested every house and street corner, finally breaking off the struggle late in the evening.

Some 52,000 Allied troops thus defeated 30,000 Frenchmen, inflicting 3,500 casualties while losing only 1,900 of their own (791 Bavarians). Oudinot had again demonstrated his incapacity for any independent command. The fall of night, the tenacity of the French infantry and the absence of any coherent Allied pursuit plan saved the marshal from a much greater disaster, however. The Bavarians had again performed bravely, if not very successfully, and Wrede was rewarded with a field marshal’s baton.16 For the Allies, although the battle displayed the confusion and poor coordination that so often dogged their efforts, it also brought the painful and discouraging retreat to an end. With Napoleon focussed on the Army of Silesia, the Allied Main Army could resume its slow advance on Paris.17

To Paris and Peace

As March opened, V Corps, with the rest of the Main Army, marched west along the now-familiar road from Bar-sur-Aube to Troyes, reaching the latter on 4 March after some brief skirmishing with the retreating French. Wrede left one brigade to garrison Troyes and dispersed the remainder of the corps in villages to the west. Here the men (elements of the cavalry excepted) enjoyed a well-deserved and much-desired week of recuperation as Schwarzenberg probed gently toward Nogent and Bray on the Seine.

On the 14th, learning of successes by Blücher’s Army of Silesia far to the north, the Main Army finally resumed its tentative move on Paris, and Wrede received orders to concentrate his corps at Arcis-sur-Aube. But the offensive ran into problems almost immediately and for the next several days, V Corps marched and counter-marched back and forth across the Seine near Arcis as the Allied leaders vacillated between advance and retreat in the light of Napoleon’s latest actions. The French Emperor was indeed heading south with all speed in the hopes of getting behind the Main Army and crushing one or more of its individual corps. On the 19th, aware of Napoleon’s approach but grossly overestimating his strength, Schwarzenberg directed Wrede to hold the line of the Aube against the oncoming French while the rest of the Allied host assembled at Troyes. That day, the French crossed the Aube in force west of Arcis, while Schwarzenberg, this time thinking offensively for a rare moment, drafted orders to position the army to launch a concentrated attack on the 20th.

The morning of 20 March thus found the bulk of the Allied army (III, IV and VI Corps and the Russo-Prussian reserves) moving on Arcis from the south and south-east. Wrede, on the other hand, had withdrawn from the town in obedience to his instructions and was assembling his men some six miles to the east. The French lost no time in occupying Arcis and the outlying villages the Allies had so obligingly evacuated, and Wrede, as at Bar-sur-Aube three weeks earlier, was soon forced into costly assaults against a strongpoint which his men had given up without a fight only hours before. Similarly, as at Bar and La Rothière, the corps would be caught in vicious village fighting during the upcoming battle.

The Allied plan called for Wrede’s Austrians and Bavarians (with some attached Cossacks) to attack along the south bank of the Aube while Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm of Württemberg led the Allied III, IV and VI Corps against Arcis from the south. As usual, the combined Russo-Prussian Guards and reserves would form the army’s second echelon. In all, approximately 88,000 Allied troops were in the process of descending upon some 53,000 French, of whom only 34,000 were truly available for the two-day battle.18 On the 20th, however, Friedrich Wilhelm led his three corps astray and, with the exception of a grenadier division, a cuirassier division and some artillery, the Russo-Prussian reserves remained out of the brutal affray. As a result, Wrede’s V Corps bore the brunt of the fight and suffered far and away the bulk of the casualties.

The Allied offensive ran into problems even before it started when the late arrival of the Crown Prince’s troops forced Schwarzenberg to delay the start of the attack by three hours. The signal to advance was finally given at 2 p.m. and by 3 p.m., Wrede’s command was heavily engaged all along its battle line: Austrians on the right, the 1st Bavarian Division in the centre with the 3rd Division 300 paces to its rear, and the combined Austro-Bavarian cavalry under Frimont on the left. While a lively mounted contest swirled over the rolling hills south-east of Arcis, the Austrian infantry attempted to gain control of Torcy-le-Grand, the key to the French position.

Although the Habsburg soldiers seized the village in their first onslaught and began to move on Arcis itself, the timely arrival of several battalions of Napoleon’s Old Guard stopped them in their tracks. Before long, most of Torcy was again in French hands and a fierce struggle had begun which would continue until after 11 p.m. Fought with the utmost bravery and ferocity on both sides, the battle for Torcy consumed first an Austrian brigade (over 500 casualties) then the Bavarian II/lst Infantry and 3rd Light Battalion (163 casualties total). The combat swung back and forth, but repeated Allied assaults were never able to wrest the village from the French completely.

It was fully dark when the Austrians withdrew, exhausted and out of ammunition. Wrede decided to make yet another effort, this time throwing Franz’s brigade, the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Division under Major General Georg Baron von Habermann, at Torcy. Like their predecessors, the men of the brigade fought courageously but were only able to capture and retain a few buildings on the edge of the flaming village. The battered brigade pulled back at 10.30 p.m. after losing 414 men (109 of those from the 7th Infantry), including General Habermann (badly wounded). Among the killed was Lieutenant Carl Sartorius, Franz’s companion in the 7th Infantry’s charge at Polotsk.19 Two Russian grenadier battalions drawn from the reserve made a final attempt to take Torcy but, having no more success than the Austrians and Bavarians, they called off their attack sometime around midnight.20

The furious fighting on 20 March cost the Bavarians more than 800 men dead, wounded or missing, half of those from Habermann’s 1st Brigade alone. Austrian casualties in the corps were also high and Wrede retired to his starting point that night as directed, leaving Torcy-le-Grand in the hands of the French. With no help from the Crown Prince, whose command had wandered far off to the left, and precious little assistance from the cherished Russo-Prussian reserves, V Corps had carried the main weight of the battle on the 20th, and the men now looked for an opportunity to recuperate while Schwarzenberg and his staff tried to craft orders for the following day.21

Although the Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube continued on 21 March with the Allies hastening Napoleon’s retreat from the town, V Corps did not take part in that day’s fighting. Instead, Wrede was sent back to the east to establish himself in a position to block any French effort to turn the Allied right. This march to the east, when the prize of Arcis seemed so close, apparently stirred considerable resentment among the men of the corps.22 They did not yet know it, but the campaign was rapidly drawing to a close, and the first day’s battle at Arcis would be their last significant encounter of the war.

The Allied Main Army now turned, albeit hesitantly at first, toward Paris. Along the way, Lieutenant General Osarovsky’s Light Cavalry Division of the Russian Imperial Guard attached to V Corps surprised a French artillery park and captured a number of guns (23 March). Wrede, hurrying forward, spotted the tail end of Marshal MacDonald’s retreating command and ordered his infantry to quicken its march, but decided not to employ the available cavalry until the foot soldiers came up in sufficient strength.23 Although the Bavarian and Austrian infantry pressed ahead in an effort to catch the fleeing French, they arrived too late and the opportunity passed.

Similarly, the Austro-Bavarian cavalry under Frimont pushed ahead of the rest of the corps on 25 March in search of French troops withdrawing on the roads to Paris. Other Allied forces caught the French, however, and Frimont, sweeping far to the right, missed the battle at Fère Champenoise. Nor was the V Corps infantry present for this crucial engagement; it only reached the battlefield after darkness had fallen. Wrede himself, on the other hand, did play a role at Fère Champenoise. Arriving with a small escort of Bavarian chevauxlegers, he was given command of all the Russian cavalry in the area and thus made some contribution to organising the charges that finally destroyed the gallant French ‘divisions’ of Généraux de Division François Amey and Michel

Pacthod.24 As the army’s rear-guard (Napoleon had marched east after Arcis and thus posed a danger to the army’s rear), V Corps also missed the Battle of Paris on 30 March and the triumphant entry of the Allied monarchs into the French capital the following day. Franz and his compatriots were finally afforded a view of Paris on 2 April when V Corps made its own parade through the city. Four days later, Napoleon abdicated. The war was over.

The Bavarians remained in France as part of the Allied occupation force until mid-May. During this brief sojourn, Franz’s regiment learned of the death of its proprietor, Lieutenant General Prince Dominik Konstantin von Löwenstein-Wertheim, on 18 April, and the consequent change in the regiment’s official title to the simple ‘7th Line Infantry Regiment’ (no new proprietor was named). The regiment also had a new commander, Colonel von Herrmann of the 5th Light Battalion having taken over in late March while the 7th was making its way toward Paris.

The homeward march began on 16 May, but the contingent went into cantonments between Mainz and Frankfurt until the peace was formally announced in early June. While resting along the Rhine, Wrede reorganised his forces, and the I/7th came under the command of Major General Franz Xaver von Deroy (son of the renowned old war-horse who had been killed at First Polotsk) as part of the 2nd Brigade of the new 1st Division (Rechberg).

With the arrival of peace, there was no cause to keep the entire Bavarian contingent in its forward deployment on the French border, and the battalion soon headed for home. The men of the 7th thus gratefully returned to Neuburg in late June, but the battalion remained on a war footing pending the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna.

The enormous manpower costs of the kingdom’s wars since 1812, however, meant that the 7th Regiment, as most other regiments, could not organise a viable 2nd Battalion during 1814. For the remainder of the year, therefore, the regiment consisted of a staff (14), the 1st Battalion (1,010 officers and men) and the 3rd (Reserve) Battalion (306).25 The 2nd Battalion finally came into being on 1 January 1815, but was still slightly under strength with only 822 officers and men.

The regiment’s internal organisation also changed in 1814. In July King Max directed the creation of a Guard Grenadier Regiment, to be formed from the combined grenadier companies of the line regiments. New fusilier companies were formed to replace the missing grenadiers, so that under the new establishment each battalion within the 7th came to comprise one Schützen company and five fusilier companies.

The year 1814 brought one additional significant moment for the Bavarian Army — the return of the men captured during the Russian campaign. A total of 143 Bavarian officers and 680 men who had survived their harrowing captivity in Russia arrived safely at their old garrisons during the course of the year. Of that number, the 7th Infantry could welcome home three captains, three lieutenants and 57 NCOs and men. It is interesting to note that, the privations of their experience as prisoners of war notwithstanding, most of the officers and doubtless many of the men soon resumed their places within the regiment.26

The Bavarian contingent had therefore played a central and honourable role in the 1814 invasion of France. Together with their Austrian allies, the Bavarians under Wrede’s command had made a significant contribution to each of the Main Army’s victories. It was the V Corps attack that compromised Napoleon’s left at La Rothière; it was the Bavarians who wrested Bar-sur-Aube from the tenacious French defence on 27 February; and it was V Corps — nearly alone — which carried the lion’s share of the horrific house-to-house combat on the first day at Arcis-sur-Aube. Moreover, the senior Allied leaders clearly respected Wrede’s capabilities and gave heed to his advice, repeatedly entrusting him with semi-independent missions that placed a premium on operational skill.

Given the disproportionate combat participation of V Corps as compared with the other corps of the Main Army (especially the sheltered Russo-Prussian Guard and reserve formations), one is forced to wonder if perhaps the Allied high command was intentionally using the Bavarians as cannon fodder. As Wrede himself caustically observed to one of the Tsar’s adjutants after the Battle of Bar-sur-Aube,

if it is desired that the troops fight every day and that it is always the same corps who are continually engaged with the enemy, then there should at least be bread and meat to give the soldiers and fodder to feed the horses...27

These misgivings notwithstanding, Wrede generally displayed the energy and enthusiasm that had marked his service under Napoleon. Even when his men could not reach the battlefield (as at Fère Champenoise), the field marshal himself endeavoured to take a hand in the action.

Despite the new-hammered nature of the contingent in 1814, despite the large numbers of new recruits, the inexperienced officers, the admixture of line and militia units, the miserable weather and the often severe logistical shortfalls, the Bavarian Army fought well during this difficult winter war, adding new lustre to the honours it had gained as a French ally. The campaign in France was thus a fitting close to the army’s combat history in the Napoleonic epoch.

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Military Diary of
FRANZ JOSEPH HAUSMANN

for the

FRENCH CAMPAIGN

of the

1st Battalion of the Royal Bavarian 7th (Löwenstein) Line Infantry Regiment 1813-1814

August 1813

14 AugustThe battalion marched along byroads via Ingolstadt and Neustadt near Neuburg; crossed the Danube near Vobburg.
15 AugustPfeffenhausen, Landshut, Vilsbiburg to Neumarkt on the Rott.
16 AugustContinued through Eggenfelden to Marktl near Braunau.
17 AugustBack to Untertürken near Braunau into close cantonment. Today the battalion was incorporated into the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Division.
20 AugustThe battalion was inspected by its brigade commander, Colonel von Rodt.
26 AugustHis Royal Highness Prince Carl, commander of the 3rd Division, happened to see the battalion parading and expressed his satisfaction.
30 AugustThe order was received to separate the unit that belonged to the Thorn Garrison from the battalion.
31 AugustThe detachment belonging to the Thorn garrison went to Burghausen, where from it the 4th Company of our battalion formed one battalion, and a portion [of this battalion] was given to our 1st Company along with one officer [so as to form a second new battalion]; these two newly formed battalions immediately proceeded on to the Tyrol.28

September 1813

1 SeptemberThe remaining group of officers and non-commissioned officers to Mühldorf.
2 SeptemberTo Haag.
3 SeptemberTo Schwaben.
4 SeptemberTo Dachau.
5 SeptemberTo Odelzhausen.
6 SeptemberTo Augsburg, where the 7th was a day of rest.
8 SeptemberTo Breitenbrunn.
9 SeptemberTo Krumbach.
10 SeptemberTo Weissenhorn.
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[The following material concerns Franz’s leave from the battalion and was inserted in the diary.]

October 1813

8 OctoberI began my leave, going from Weissenhorn to Kempten.
14 OctoberFrom there to Munich, where I arrived on the 15th and left again on the 23rd. On the 24th I arrived back in Kempten.
27 OctoberLeft there again and via Aichholz-Memmingen to Osterberg. In Memmingen two and in Osterberg two rations of forage.
28 OctoberThrough Weissenhorn to Günzburg; here received two rations of forage.
29 OctoberNear Dillingen, two rations of forage from the quartermaster. To Donauwörth.
30 OctoberVia Rain to Neuburg on the Danube. Here received four rations of forage.

November 1813

1 NovemberVia Monheim (two rations of forage) to Oettingen.
2 NovemberTo Dinkelsbühl (two rations of forage).
3 NovemberVia Crailsheim (two rations of forage) and Ellwangen to Hall (2 rations of forage).
4 NovemberVia Oehringen (two rations of forage) to Heilbronn. Since I left two boxes in the chaise that I took from here, Police Commissioner Schiko or Tax Director Milius will have kept them in custody.
5 NovemberVia Möckmühl (two rations of forage) to Buchen. Here two rations of forage, and wrote to the above police commissioner.
6 NovemberVia Walldürn to Miltenberg. Here two rations of forage.
7 NovemberVia Obernburg (one ration of forage) to Aschaffenburg (two rations of forage).
8 NovemberTo Dieburg (two rations of forage), because I did not receive my marching route until the afternoon.
9 NovemberVia Darmstadt (two rations of forage) to Bensheim (two rations of forage).
10 NovemberVia Weinheim to Heidelberg. Here eight rations of forage, and met up with the battalion.

[End of insertion.]

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October 1813

21 OctoberThe remainder of the Thorn garrison marched to Dillingen.
22 OctoberTo Donauwörth. Here across the Danube.
23 OctoberTo Nördlingen.
24 OctoberTo Dinkelsbühl.
25 OctoberTo Ansbach.
26 OctoberTo Rothenburg.
27 OctoberTo Würzburg. Here crossed the River Main.
28 OctoberTo Miltenberg.
29 OctoberTo Aschaffenburg. Here crossed back over the Main.
30 OctoberTo Hanau. Here the battalion engaged in a battle and was forced back by a Cossack volley.29 Lost three officers dead and five officers wounded.
31 OctoberThis unit joined up with the 1st Battalion, which was in bivouac before Hanau.

November 1813

1 NovemberTo Frankfurt on the Main, and crossed that river.
4 NovemberTo Pfungstadt.
5 NovemberTo Darmstadt.
6 NovemberTo Lauterbach.
7 NovemberTo Weinheim.
10 NovemberTo Heidelberg.30
11 NovemberVia Bruchsal to Langenbrücken.
12 NovemberTo Grünwettersbach near Durlach.
13 NovemberTo Kuppenheim near Rastatt.
14 NovemberTo Bühl.
15 NovemberTo Pappelwied near Appenweier.
16 NovemberTo Griesheim 1½ hours from Kehl.
18 NovemberTo Ichenheim and Dundenheim (and into cantonment).
21 NovemberThe battalion staff to Dundenheim.

December 1813

1 DecemberKittersburg and Goldscheuer.
2 DecemberBivouacked near Sundheim in support of the outposts.
4 DecemberBack again to Goldscheuer in the evening. Into cantonment.
6 DecemberWent into cantonment in Kippenheim near Lahr and Mahlberg for the time being.
8 DecemberThe battalion arrived in Herbolzheim.
9 DecemberThe battalion was quartered in Forchheim.
10 DecemberThe battalion was quartered in Neuershausen near Eichstetten. Day of rest there on the 11th.
12 DecemberThe battalion to Kiechlingsbergen into the new cantonment.
18 DecemberOur battalion entered into the new cantonment as follows: the staff and four companies to Bötzingen, and the 3rd and 7th Fusilier Companies to Oberschaffhausen.
19 DecemberArrived at Tunsel, and on the
20 Decemberday of rest there.
21 DecemberIn Hertingen.
22 DecemberCrossed the Rhine at Basel, and then into quarters in Allschwill.
23 DecemberTo Nieder-Ranspach [Ranspach-le-Bas].
24 DecemberTo Dannemarie.
25 DecemberTo Fontaine et Chèvremont, Phaffans, Menoncourt, Lacollonge.
27 DecemberTo Ballersdorf near Dannemarie.
30 DecemberFrom Ballersdorf back again to Dannemarie.

January 1814

1 JanuaryTo Niederspechbach.
2 JanuaryTo Wattwiller.
3 JanuaryTo Wintzenheim.
5 JanuaryTo Dambach.
10 JanuaryBivouacked on the mountain behind the village of Wisembach.
11 JanuaryAt St Dié, outpost duty on the Lunéville road.
12 JanuaryBack to St Dié, and into quarters.
13 JanuaryTo Rambervillers, the whole division into quarters.
16 JanuaryTo Socour.
17 JanuaryTo Haroué.
18 JanuaryTo Pleuvezain.
19 JanuaryTo La Neuveville [-sous-Châtenois].
21 JanuaryTo Vrécourt.
27 JanuaryTo Daillecourt.
28 JanuaryTo Bologne.
29 JanuaryTo Doulaincourt.
30 JanuaryTo Mussey.
31 JanuaryTo Trémilly.

February 1814

1 FebruaryA battle31 took place, in which our battalion came to be positioned at the centre. Toward 2.30 the battalion received the command to support a battalion of the Imperial Austrian [1st] Szekler Infantry Regiment, which had been ordered to storm the village of Chaumesnil. We advanced en colonne as far as the village and then immediately drove the two French battalions from their position by storm. In this were wounded Colonel von Rodt, Captain von Hacke, Lieutenants Count von Voltolini, Heilmann and Benzel, as well as one non-commissioned officer and 31 men, and further, one corporal and one private remained on the field. At night the battalion bivouacked near this village.
2 FebruaryThe battalion advanced and went into bivouac near Brienne. On this day Colonel von Rodt died at Trémilly.
4 FebruaryIn Jessains-sur-Aube.
5 FebruaryBivouac near Vendeuvre [-sur-Barse].
7 FebruaryEchemines.
9 FebruaryAvon-la-Peze.
11 FebruaryTrainel.
12 FebruaryCrossed the Seine near Bray and on outpost duty before the village of Mouy.
13 FebruaryA half hour from Donnemarie the battalion joined the troops near Luistaines and remained in position in the field on outpost duty.
14 FebruaryBivouac near Gurcy-le-Chatel.
17 FebruaryThe Army Corps was attacked near Villeneuve and forced back. The battalion received the command to observe the right flank from its bivouac. Toward 4 o’clock in the evening the corps retreated back to our battalion, and here the battalion assumed the position of rear-guard, fighting as it withdrew; the battalion remained before Donnemarie for another three hours, crossed back over the Seine near Bray, and on the at
18 February2 o’clock in the morning went into its bivouac one hour the other side of Bray.
19 FebruaryCamp near Macon close to Nogent [-sur-Seine].
20 FebruaryCamp near Fontaines [-les-Gres]. Here the battalion took up battle position with the full Army.
22 FebruaryAt 4 o’clock in the morning withdrew in this order until two hours before Troyes.
23 FebruaryStarted out at 2 o’clock in the morning, marched through Troyes and across the Seine, and then immediately behind the latter took up position.
23 FebruaryAt 12 o’clock midnight started out and marched into camp at Lusigny [-sur-Barse],
24 FebruaryHere the battalion was placed under the command of General of the Cavalry Baron von Frimont, who had ordered this same village on the left of the road occupied. At 5 o’clock in the afternoon the battalion withdrew en colonne as far as the bridge before Montiéramey and received the order to defend it. The entire [Allied] cavalry crossed over this bridge, and the enemy cavalry also wanted to use it to cross, but it was thrown back by [our] musket fire.
At 7 o’clock in the evening the enemy attempted to force this bridge en colonne, but he was again stopped by the well-aimed crossfire from our muskets, and it was not until after 9 o’clock that our battalion received the command to withdraw, defending itself by firing in irregular order, whereupon the enemy gave the battalion a hard chase until beyond Montiéramey, and from there allowed this battalion, which formed the rear-guard, to continue unnoticed, and thereupon the latter
25 Februaryproceeded into camp at Bar-sur-Aube at 7 o’clock in the morning.
26 FebruaryTook up position behind the city in the afternoon. Toward evening the enemy took the city, pushed through the centre, to where the battalion was positioned, and was again forced back into the city by lively artillery fire.
27 FebruaryThe enemy was beaten back by the right flank of the Allies, and so he again abandoned the city. In the evening the battalion again moved into camp outside the city.

March 1814

2 MarchTo Vendeuvre.
4 MarchTo Troyes, crossed the Seine.
5 MarchTo Pavilion [le Pavilion Ste Julie] near Troyes.
13 MarchTo Premierfait.
14 MarchTo Allibaudières.
15 MarchTo Saron [-sur-Aube].
16 MarchTo Fait. Halted here for one hour, then marched directly to near Villenauxe, took up outposts there, and at 9 in the evening again set forth, and on the
17 Marchat 4 o’clock in the afternoon to Pouan f-les-Vallées]. Here crossed the Aube near Arcis.
18 MarchTo Allibaudières. Crossed back over the Aube near Arcis.
19 MarchAt 7 o’clock in the morning to Coclois.
20 MarchAdvanced toward Arcis, and at some distance took up various positions. Toward 6 o’clock in the evening the battalion was directed to storm the village of Torcy-le-Grand. This was repeated three times, and each time repulsed with considerable loss, but between 8 o’clock and 9 o’clock at night entered into bivouac near Vaupoisson.
21 MarchIn the morning again took up battle order, and late in the evening marched across the Aube to Lesmont.
22 MarchTo Donnemont.
23 MarchNear Bréban.
24 MarchNear Courdemanges.
25 MarchNear Maisons [-en-Champagne].
26 MarchNear Fère Champenoise.
27 MarchNear Meilleray.
28 MarchNear Chailly.
29 MarchNear Quincy.
30 MarchNear Meaux. Here crossed the River Marne.
31 MarchNear Chelles.

April 1814

1 AprilNear Charenton close by Paris.
2 AprilNear Rongis.
10 AprilNear St Maur.
11 AprilNear Gouvernern (in quarters).
12 AprilIn Couilly near St Germain.
14 AprilTo Mouron into quarters near Coulommiers.
15 AprilTo St Simeon near la Ferté Gaucher.
16 AprilTo Réveillon near Esternay.
17 AprilTo Sézanne.
19 AprilTo Ecury-le-Repos near Sommesous.
20 AprilTo Maisons near Vitry [-le-François].
21 AprilTo Contrisson.
23 AprilTo Bazincourt near Bar-le-Duc.
24 AprilTo Vaux-le-Grand near Ligny.
25 AprilTo Vouthon-Haut.
26 AprilTo Rouvres-la-Chétive.
28 AprilTo Grimonviller.
29 AprilTo Nancy.
30 AprilTo Hellimer.

May 1814

1 MayTo Wattweiler near Zweibrücken.
2 MayTo Saargemünd [Saareguemines].
4 MayTo Leywiller and Altripe.
5 MayTo Nebing and Torswilier.
6 MayTo Chateau Salins into cantonment.
16 MayTo Bissting.
17 MayTo Lüchsheim.
18 MayTo Buchsweiler [Bouxwiller].
19 MayTo Haguenau.
21 MayTo Sallenbach.
22 MayTo Wörth and Pfortz close to the Rhine.
23 MayTo Germersheim.
25 MayTo Dudenhofen and Harthausen.
26 MayTo Frankenthal.
27 MayTo Eppelsheim and Hangenwiesheim.
30 MayTo Bingert and into cantonment at Ebernburg.

June 1814

7 JuneTo Bacharach, Mannbach, Stenge, and into cantonment in Kleindibach.
10 JuneTo Wöhrstadt close to Mainz.
11 JuneThrough the city of Mainz and crossed over the Rhine at 11 o’clock in the morning; then the battalion took up quarters in Frefordt.
12 JuneIn Grolzimmern.
13 JuneIn Grossostheim.
14 JuneIn Milteburg.
15 JuneIn Wesebach.
16 JuneIn Würzburg.
17 JuneIn Ochsenfurt in the Würzburg district.
18 JuneErmatshofen close to Uffenheim in Bavaria.
19 JuneIn Ansbach.
21 JuneIn Kronheim near Gunzenhausen.
22 JuneIn Weissenburg.
23 JuneIn Dollnstein near Eichstätt.
24 JuneIn Neuburg on the Danube.
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LETTERS FROM
THE CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE
32

Letter No. 5

Dannemarie

The last day

of 1813

Best of Parents,

[Yesterday] I duly received your letter of the 16th of this month, and I shall not delay in informing you at once of my [complete] good health. From a sense of filial responsibility and the certain conviction that I can never sufficiently prove to you my indebted thanks for all the things you have done for me and the good advice you have given me on every occasion, 1 send you my most heartfelt good wishes for the present new year. I cannot say more than to beseech the Almighty for your continuing health. I must remain silent about the feelings that fill my breast for your happiness, because I am too weak to express them. May Heaven grant us peace soon, so that I may return to the arms of my dearest parents.

By now you have probably received my Letter No. 4 of the 23rd of this month. In it I told you that we crossed the Rhine at Basel. On the 23rd we marched from Allochwier to Nieder-Ranspach, the 24th Dannemarie, and the 25th to Fontaine near Belfort, where the fortress was besieged by the First Division, while the Second Division remained by Hüningen and undertook the siege there. On the 26th, however, the well-known adventurer Colonel Scheibler, who had 600 Cossacks, 300 Szekler hussars and 300 chevauxlegers from the 7th Bavarian Regiment with him, was attacked near Colmar by 3,000 French cavalry. Because of this, on the 27th we had to retreat a quarter hour from here to Ballersdorf, in order to observe the road from Colmar, and yesterday we arrived back here.33

Yesterday and last night Hüningen was fired upon by 42 and Belfort by 28 heavy pieces, such as 24-, 36- and 12-pound cannon as well as howitzers. The noise has been continuously pounding around here in the midst of these fortresses all night long.

At the moment we have no news at all. With Scheibler’s corps there are the following chevauxlegers left: Captain Hirschberg and a first lieutenant, as well as 60 soldiers. In short, our people have suffered most. Some sorties were made against the fortresses, in which much was lost, but, as with most sorties, their success was negligible. We did take a few prisoners, but not many.

It appears that I expressed myself poorly in my letter of the 11th of this month, for you know my nature and my principles too well than to think that I would allow myself to be beaten down by a chance occurrence. It is true that many unpleasant things can make a momentary impression on me, but I shall nevertheless stand like a man, and, moreover, to me it does not seem a tragedy that I was even more content in battle than before. In addition, I assure you, dear Father, that I shall in any case act with reason and like a man.

I freely admit that if there were no overriding circumstances I could bring myself to marry Fanny, whom you know about, and I am convinced that you, my dear Parents, would have no objections to my choice and would not withhold your approval, if you knew her. She comes from a good family, has been brought up in a truly exemplary manner, and has the most noble nature in the world. In short, I do not want to say too much, or else you might think my prejudice spoke in her behalf. If I ever come back, God willing, it will be time enough to [speak] of this.

My idea of having the seal sent to me was only in case one of you was going to Neuburg. I am again sending this letter to Seipelt, so it will not cost so much postage. By the way, I have decided to set aside 25 francs per month, beginning in January, and if it is feasible I shall allot this amount to you. On no account shall I use it myself.

If you can get the money for the Legion of Honour, then you need only send me the receipt, which I shall sign and send back to you.

If you should have occasion to go to the chief military cashier, please ask him if the package that I mailed on the 18th of November has arrived. This enclosed the separate receipts from Bienenthal and me for the money received in Munich in recompense for the baggage lost by the officers in question. It was addressed to the Chief Military Finance Officer, and if he has not received it, please ask him to set our minds at rest by returning the original receipt.

The disturbances of the Tyrolean rebels are indeed disgraceful, and we have already read about this in the newspapers.

If after six months the capital has been correctly repaid by taxes, then one can look forward to the interest.

Mr Caro is well and still is a clown.

My saddle is in the large package, and the gold watch is in the box.

We, too, are terribly plagued with work.

Farewell. Give my regards to Mrs Wisner, and rest assured that I shall always be,

Your most devoted son,

Franz

The air and climate are very healthful here, in spite of the fact that for a few days now we have had snow a knife-blade high. Incidentally, if we remain in France for another three months, I shall learn French. I can already get along in it.

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Letter No. 8

Camp near Brienne

in Champagne

3 February 1814

Best of Parents,

We had a very hot day on the first of this month. Our battalion, together with a Szekler infantry battalion, had to storm the town of Chaumesnil. General Count Wrede and His Excellency Baron Frimont were very satisfied with the battalion’s performance. Our good Colonel von Rodt was unfortunately wounded in the head and died of his wounds yesterday. Captain Hacke and Lieutenants Voltolini, Heilmann and Benzel were all only lightly wounded, however. Our battalion has one non-commissioned officer and one private dead, as well as one non-commissioned officer and 31 men wounded, in spite of the fact that we had only four companies, as the light infantry formed one battalion and the 7th Company had to cover the artillery.34

If the courier were not about to leave, I would give you a detailed description of the battle, which turned out so well for our arms. It was really fine, although also murderous. Our left flank under the Crown Prince of Württemberg seized 41 cannon, and we in the centre captured 15 cannon. Few prisoners were taken. The emperor himself was in command against us. At 300 paces he himself set three pieces against our battalion when we were in the town.

Major von Fortis of the light battalion is now in command of our battalion. Both brothers are well, and neither has had the slightest thing happen to him. All of us have only our colonel to mourn - how his good wife must be suffering.

The major begs you to tell his sister-in-law that her husband and his brother are well at the moment. Hacke and Heilmann were hit by ricochets, and Voltolini and Benzel were grazed.

I am, thank God, as healthy as a fish, although I had one misfortune. Five days ago I left my purse in my quarters that morning, because I was not feeling well. As soon as I noticed it was missing, I immediately sent someone back for it, but it was no longer there, because some Austrians had come into the quarters right afterwards. I thereby lost five or six louis d’or. Fortunately I had some silver in my belt, so I still have something at least.

All the same, I am content. God has given, and He can also take it away from me again. After all, I survived the battle, so what more can I ask? I owe God many thanks for that.

Dearest Parents, the departing courier tells me to hurry. So I wish you well. Rest assured that we shall now no longer become involved in affairs, for many Russians and Austrians have marched on ahead, and the French are constantly retreating.

I am, as always, my dearest parents’ ever faithfully obedient son,

Franz

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Letter No. 9

Vendeuvre

3 March 1814

Best of Parents,

Thank God, I am again able to write to you. The newspapers will have already told you about our fortunate and unfortunate incidents. In my last letter of the 3rd of February I had no time left to enclose the route we had taken, because the departing courier practically had to wait for me to finish. I therefore belatedly include it here. From Vrécourt we marched on the 27th of January to Daillecourt, where, because I did not feel well in the morning as we were leaving and even during the night, I had the misfortune of leaving behind my purse with all my gold, which consisted of about five louis d’or, and two rings that I valued highly. The next morning I immediately sent someone back to see the pastor with whom we had been quartered, but there was nothing to be found, since some Austrians had moved into quarters there right after us.

On the 28th to Bologne, the 29th to Doulaincourt, the 30th to Mussey. Here began our poor living in bivouac. On 31 January we already came across the enemy at Trémilly, where in the evening we took part in a small skirmish between the outposts, because as the First Battalion of the Third Division we usually act as vanguard, and then we remained at the outposts in Trémilly with the cavalry.

On the 1st of February we advanced to Chaumesnil, where the famous battle of Brienne35 started, in which our battalion undertook the brilliant storming of Chaumesnil, successfully carried it through, but lost its good colonel. After the town had been completely taken, the battalion was ordered to assemble behind the last house, and the colonel, who was behind this house facing backwards, looked on, satisfied with the outcome of the attack. However, as the battalion was assembling, in what was thought to be a safe place, he was shot in the back of the head, and this caused his death.

On the 2nd the army corps advanced to Brienne, the 4th to Jessains-sur-Aube, the 5th to Vendeuvre, the 7th through Troyes and across the Seine to Echemines, the 9th to Avon-la-Peze, the 11th to Trainel, and on the 12th we advanced to Bray, where the bridge over the Seine was destroyed, crossed in boats under the thunder of cannon that the French outposts maintained on the opposite bank, and set up outposts outside the village of Mouy. On the 13th an affair began at Luistaines, wherein we again stood in the middle. According to the orders of the day the 1st Grenadier Company lost their plumes because of cowardice in this affair.36

During this night we remained at the outposts, the likes of which I have never seen. The entire battalion was distributed to the right and left along the road in such a way that three men stood at every 50 paces, so that we were strung out in an outpost line of three hours’ march in length. On this day the enemy had taken up a very fine position, in which he could not be attacked frontally. But during the night he withdrew of his own accord, and a large number of deserters came over to us and stated that the enemy force was made up of three divisions of the army from Spain, who had been brought to this affair in wagons.

On the 14th we advanced through Donnemarie to Gurcy, up to which point the battalion continued to occupy the vanguard. On the 15th the other battalions advanced to Villeneuve. On the 17th the Russian corps under the command of Count von Wittgenstein, which had pushed on ahead of us on the right side of the road, was defeated and, at the same time that ours was attacked at Villeneuve, was thrown back on our battalion. We then took over the rear-guard, withdrew fighting to Donnemarie, held this town for two hours longer so that all the wagons and artillery had time to cross the bridge, and then withdrew that same night to Bray.

During the night of the 19th we withdrew, as the bridge had previously been destroyed, back to Macon near Nogent, and during the night of the 20th back into camp at Fontaines, where three army corps were drawn up in battle formation. Since, however, the enemy did not dare attack us but rather went around us, on the morning of the 22nd we then set out before daybreak and marched back in this formation to two hours away from Troyes.

In this same manner on the 23rd we marched through Troyes at 2 o’clock in the morning and crossed the Seine to take up a position on the other side of the river. We set out again at 12 midnight and arrived at Lusigny on the morning of the 24th. Here our battalion, and an Austrian one, were put under the command of General Baron Frimont and, with the cavalry, constituted the rear-guard as far as the bridge by Montiéramey, where the cavalry passed over the bridge in greatest haste. As the last of them crossed, the enemy cavalry also wanted to cross in our direction, but they were driven back by our fire. At night the enemy infantry came on in column and forced the bridge, but were driven back again. Since we could not sustain ourselves, however, we had to withdraw, and the enemy pursued us sniping at our heels, until after an hour we were met by others.

On the morning of the 25th we reached Bar-sur-Aube. On the 26th the enemy took the town, and we took up a position behind it. Here we met with the enemy without flinching. On the 27th quite a stiff battle took place, in which the enemy forces were defeated by the Russians on the right flank. They had to leave the city and were pursued by the Russians. We moved into our camp and stayed there until yesterday, when we marched here. Today heavy cannon fire can be heard at Troyes, and we are now standing in reserve.

I had the great good fortune to be preserved in all these dangerous moments.

Continuation on 5 March 1814 at Pavilion

Yesterday we marched out of Vendeuvre for Troyes, where we crossed the Seine and went into quarters. Today we came here, three hours’ march from Troyes, where we are to remain in cantonment (as the order says), except everyone is in bivouac, because most of the houses are burned down. Only the officers may stay in the ruined houses. Here are also the division commander, General Delamotte, the brigade commander, General von Habermann, as well as General of the Cavalry Baron Frimont. Our stay here may last five or six days. On the 10th Napoleon will pronounce the ultimatum for the peace negotiations. Probably the battle in which he engages Blücher (on whom he is advancing with 40,000 men) will dictate the outcome. The weather here is still fairly raw.

Sergeant Kaiser will receive the Imperial Russian Order of St George, 5th Class, in a few days. This consists of a silver cross that has on one side the member’s number and the initials of Tsar Alexander and on the other side a picture of the knight St George. Six of these decorations were given to the division. From the newspapers and army orders you will probably have seen who have received Austrian, Russian and Prussian medals.

Our battalion has again gone down quite a lot, for according to today’s report there are 405 men in the field hospital. I would never have believed that such shortages could occur in this country. During the withdrawal for over one week we received no bread, no meat, no salt; in short, no food at all. And here we sustain ourselves very meagrely by foraging parties. In spite of this, those of us who are with the staff (Major Fortis, Captain Schmid, now brevet major, the battalion physician, Dr. Knittelmeier, and I) still live well, especially since we are near Troyes.

On the retreat almost all the villages on and near the road were burned down. If we have to go back the same way, it will go hard with us for two days. Bar-sur-Aube was totally plundered, because the inhabitants shot at our people with window lead. Troyes also suffered considerably at the beginning.

If only we are not forced to withdraw any farther, for otherwise we shall lose a great deal. During the affair and withdrawal of the 24th our battalion lost more than 100 men. We had two dead and 52 wounded.

When you have occasion please write me whether you have already received the 25 francs that I have had deducted since January, or why not. Captain Schenk of the Leib Regiment [1st Infantry Regiment, renamed König in 1811, but still known by its old title] was shot through the throat at Bar-sur-Aube and he cannot talk. I saw him and he asked me in writing to tell you that he sends many regards to you both. Also Captain Schmeckenbecher, First Lieutenant Zinn, in short, all the gentlemen whom you know, especially the administration chief, Economic Counsellor Knopp, asked me to send you their compliments. Lieutenant Lachner (who was shot through the cheek and nose on the 24th) also sends you his regards; he has gone back to Neufchâteau.

The bitter cold, which, along with incredible discomfort, we have to endure in this primitive cantonment, forces me to close, and I am, as always, unto death,

My dearest and best father’s and mother’s ever most obedient son,

Franz

When you have a chance, please tell Mrs Fortis that both Majors Fortis are hale and hearty, and give my respects to my friend Wisner and all who know me.

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Letter No. 11

Couilly near Crecy

13 April 1814

Dearest Father and Mother,

Today I again have a chance to write, and this time I can do so in somewhat greater detail than on the 30th of last month, when I wrote quickly on my lap in the rain under a hut in order to communicate to you the happy event of the taking of the city of Paris.

Now we are on the way to our cantonment, which our corps will occupy in the two departments of Meurthe and Vosges, and it appears that there is no longer any possibility of war.

Upon the proclamations of the Parisian Senate, which are surely already well known, the majority of the French marshals defected with their corps, and the rest will follow, for, according to the deserters who have come to us, the whole army seems to have dissolved. Officers of all ranks, marshals, soldiers, in short everyone, ran away and came to Paris, from where everyone can go on leave.

My letter of the 5th of last month was the last time I informed you of our marching route. I shall thus continue it. We remained in Pavilion near Troyes until the 13th, when we crossed the Seine at Méry to Premierfait. The 14th we marched across the Aube at Arcis to Allibaudières, the 15th to Saron, and the 16th through Faux to near Villenauxe. Since, however, Napoleon was meanwhile moving from Chalons toward Arcis, on the evening of the 16th we then had to withdraw from Villenauxe, and on the 17th we reached Pouan, after having gone through Arcis and crossed the Aube. On this march many members of the train remained behind, all of whom were captured.

On the 18th we again advanced through Arcis to Allibaudières, . where we were driven back by the enemy in the evening, and we again marched through Arcis on the morning of the 19th to Coclois. On the 20th we advanced toward Arcis and took up various positions in battle formation under the loudest cannon fire imaginable. At about six o’clock in the evening the battalion, as well as the 1st and 2nd Regiments, were commanded to storm the village of Torcy-le-Grand. Although we had the support of the Austrians of our corps, the 3rd Battalion of the Mobile Legion,37 and numerous artillery, it was nevertheless impossible, after being driven back three times by the French guard and foot gendarmes, for us to take this village, and we therefore left it to the enemy. I told you last time what our battalion suffered on this occasion. In Paris we saw Major Gneis, who had been wounded three times, and Lieutenant Kaiser has already come back from captivity, and Major Fortis is to arrive tomorrow.

At dawn on the morning of the 21st, as also the day before, we went into battle formation and advanced in this manner. But since during the night the whole of Barclay de Tolly’s38 Corps had joined us and had raised our numbers to 110,000 men and 120 cannon, and Napoleon had only 60,000 men and 80 cannon to oppose us with, he therefore rejected this proffered battle and immediately withdrew back through Arcis toward Vitry. The Crown Prince of Württemberg pursued him, and that same evening we marched across the Aube at Lesmont, the 22nd to Donnemont, the 23rd to Bréban. On the 24th we saw the entire French army defiling along the road from Dosnon to Sompuis toward Vitry, and we accompanied them as far as Courdemanges near Vitry, keeping to their right flank. This caused Napoleon to push through at Vitry and move toward Brienne and Bar-sur-Aube, in order to mislead us, because Blücher was coming toward us from St Manhoult.

It is true that, on the 25th when we came to Villers via Loisy and could no longer find the enemy, we were in doubt over whether to pursue the emperor or not, but on our marshal’s suggestion it was decided to send 20,000 men of the cavalry and artillery after him. We spent the night at Maisons and set out for Paris on the 26th. Between Coole and Soudé Ste Croix we met the enemy force, consisting of 35,000 men under the command of Marshal Marmont, who were trying to get through to the emperor, and they were then overthrown by the vanguard and relentlessly pursued. Two squares were crushed, and a total of over 10,000 men, 55 cannon and nearly 300 wagons filled with munitions, baggage, field equipment and other supplies fell into our hands.

We spent the night at Fère-Champenoise, on the 27th at Meilleray, and on the 28th at Chailly between la Ferté Gaucher and Coulommiers. On the 29th we learned that Napoleon was again pursuing us, and we remained at Quincy. On the 30th we arrived at Meaux, where it developed that Napoleon had taken the route on the other side of the Seine toward Fontainebleau. On the 31st we learned of the fall of Paris at Chelles, where we spent the night. On April 1st we camped at Charenton, half an hour from Paris. On the 2nd we passed through a part of the suburbs and across the Pont d’Austerlitz to Rongis, where we camped, and we remained there until the 10th. On this day we marched out of Paris across the Seine to St Maur in bivouac, the 11th to quarters in Gouvern near Lagny, and yesterday to here, where we have a day of rest today.

Continuation on 18 April 1814 at Sezanne

On the 14th we marched to Mourou near Coulommiers, the 15th to St Simeon near la Ferté Gaucher, the 16th to Reveillon near Esternay, and yesterday here. Today we again have a day of rest. We now know our marching route for the future. We shall go to an extended cantonment in the departments of Meurthe and Vosges. Our march there will go on the 19th to Sommesous, the 20th to Vitry, the 21st to Berthes, the 23rd to Bar-le-Duc, the 24th to Ligny, the 25th to Comercy, the 26th to Toul, which is the first town in the Department of the Meurthe. Not until we are there shall we learn of our cantonment post.

Up to now I have not received your Letter No. 5 of 26 January, and No. 6 of 12 February is also the last one I got. I hasten to answer the latter herewith.

I now no longer doubt that peace will ensue, for in the orders that we received it says that His Excellency Marshal Count Wrede will remain with the court camp of the supreme allied powers, in order to attend to the interests of His Majesty the King of Bavaria, and that we are to march into the above-mentioned cantonment during the armistice and until the subsequent final peace treaty. Further news or reports from His Excellency go so far as to say that we shall not move into this cantonment at all but shall even sooner be given the command for the final march home. This is truly most to be desired, for I am pretty fed up with war. May God in His mercy only grant that we see each other soon, and that my wishes may be fulfilled.

It is true about Steidel, and I would rather not even mention this weakness to you, because I consider it too petty.

I recall that on the address side of one of your letters there was a notation in an unfamiliar hand asking if I wanted to sell my sash, and for how much. Although I do not know who wrote this, I still wanted to ask you about it, and I forgot about it because of the hostile incidents that were still going on. But now I do want to reply to you about this, and to assure you that you well know that you can do what you wish with my things. I no longer need this sash, and you also know what it cost, so get rid of it, if you have someone who wants it.

From my Letter No. 10 from Meaux you will have seen what more we lost in the affair at Arcis. I thus add only that Major Fortis and Lieutenant Kaiser have been released from captivity.

I greatly bemoan the fate that has until now deprived me of the possibility of having the certificate issued that you wanted. I saw General Maillot only while we were under fire or en route. Major Fortis will certainly object if I ask it of him, in view of his timid nature, and furthermore you have probably already obtained it from Major Andrian, who can issue it more easily, because all the registers are with the Reserve Battalion, and it would be too late now anyway. Nevertheless, should you still not have it, please write me. I shall then approach Major Fortis about it in our new cantonment.

Captain Schmid is quite well. I spoke with him several times, and he told me much about you. He sends you his regards.

I do not lack for money, and I have all I need. Sergeant von Schmitz also joined us in time to go to Paris, for all hostile incidents were over, and he was present for only the most enjoyable part.

Now I want to tell you briefly that I liked Paris quite well. This city is fantastically large; it is more than 10 hours in circumference, and more than 800,000 people live in it. Everything that one can imagine can be bought there. It is illuminated day and night by innumerable shops or boutiques. The Palais Royal, a large rectangular square surrounded by many buildings, is a world unto itself, because there alone everything can be had. In short, I shall tell you much more about it orally, if the Almighty permits. You will have already read in the newspapers all the proclamations that were published in Paris.

Since another courier is leaving from Vitry, you will receive this letter by this opportunity, and I remain as ever and for always,

My dearest parents' most faithfully obedient,

Franz

If we should remain in the new cantonment for some time, then I shall send you my receipt for the credited half-year's pension for the decoration and ask you to withdraw it. Please extend my warmest regards to Wisner and all who know me.

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Notes to Chapter Seven

1 These Allied figures, drawn from Esposito/Elting, reflect numbers in late December; combat strength soon dropped as detachments were left off to blockade fortresses and secure lines of communication.

2 Initially, only those Mobile Legion battalions which had participated in the Battle of Hanau were honoured with the title ‘National Field Battalion’; in March 1814, all Mobile Legion units were renamed.

3 For the difficulties encountered in filling leadership positions in the new militia see Erich Freiherr von Guttenberg, ‘Die bayerische Nationalgarde II. Klasse in den Befreiungskriegen’, Darstellungen aus der Bayerischen Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, Heft 22, Munich: 1913.

4 Strength figures and notes on composition drawn from Lothar Schmidt, ‘Das K. B. Korps Wrede im Feldzuge 1814’, Darstellungen aus der Bayerischen Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, Heft 17, Munich: 1908. Note that these figures represent officers and men ‘present under arms’, the total of ‘effectives’ (which included those detached or in hospital) was 32,441. The most significant detachment was the force blockading Würzburg (1,314).

5 In early 1813, the Bavarian Army administration designated each battalion still serving in the field (that is, the remnants of VI Corps: Zoller’s Brigade at Thorn and Rechberg’s small division) as the 1st Battalion of its regiment; the battalions remaining in Bavaria were thus considered the 2nd Battalions of their parent regiments. Most of the battalions that marched off with Raglovich for the autumn campaign in Saxony were therefore 2nd Battalions (the II/7th for example), and the battalions reconstructed from reserves, new recruits and the returning members of Zoller’s and Rechberg’s commands became the new 1st Battalions. See Heinrich Demmler, ‘Die Neubildung des bayerischen Heeresabteilung nach dem Rückzuge aus Russland 1812 und die Ereignisse bis zum Rückkehr in die Heimat 1813’, Darstellungen aus der Bayerischen Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, Heft 15, Munich: 1906; Demmler, ‘Anteil der Bayerischen Division Raglovich am Frühjahrsfeldzuge 1813’, Darstellungen aus der Bayerischen Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, Heft 16, Munich: 1907; and Georg Gilardone, ‘Bayerns Anteil am Herbstfeldzuge 1813’, Darstellungen aus der Bayerischen Kriegs- und Heeresgeschichte, Heft 22, Munich: 1913.

6 These are the Bavarian chevauxlegers Franz mentions in Letter No. 5, 31 December 1813: the 6th Squadron of the 7th Chevauxlegers Regiment (formerly the National Chevauxlegers Regiment). Scheibler’s detachment was roughly handled by a strong French cavalry force on 24 December (not the 26th as Franz writes); Scheibler himself suffered three wounds, and the Bavarian squadron lost both its officers and more than half of its troopers. Scheibler’s detachment was disbanded on 16 January 1814. Note that Schmidt says the detachment also included a squadron of Hessians. See Schmidt, pp. 5-7, 19; and Constant von Wurzbach, Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich, Wien: Zamarski, 1856-91.

7 Blockades were established at Hüningen, Schlettstadt [Sélestat] (both observed by Bavarians) and Neufbrisach (Austrians). The total force detached was eight Bavarian battalions, eight Bavarian squadrons and three Austrian battalions. See Schmidt, pp. 14-15.

8 The Army of Silesia and the Main Army actually overlapped each other at this point, so that Wrede and Wittgenstein were to Blücher’s right rear.

9 Strength figures from F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon at Bay, London: Arms and Armour, 1977, p. 30. Another 34,000 men were posted behind the Allied main line (Russian and Prussian Guards and reserves); of these, at most perhaps 7,000 were engaged. Had the Allies wanted to develop La Rothière into a truly decisive battle, a total of some 125,000 men (possibly up to 140,000!) could have been brought to bear against Napoleon’s paltry 45,000.

10 Grenz Regiment/Grenzer: troops from Austria’s ‘military border’ in the Balkans (Grenze = border).

11 Account compiled from Auvera (pp. 547-8) and Schmidt (pp. 29-40); supplemented by Friederich, Janson and Max Ritter von Hoen, Die Hauptarmee 1814, vol. V of Oesterreich in den Befreiungskriegen 1813-1815, Wien: Patriotische Volksbuchhandlung, 1912.

12 The 7th Infantry was also present for an engagement on the 13th that ended in a French withdrawal. Auvera, pp. 549-50.

13 Ibid., p. 552. Allied complaints about poor logistic support were common in this campaign.

14 Auvera, p. 551-2.

15 Schmidt, p. 65.

16 The 7th Infantry was not engaged at the Battle of Bar-sur-Aube.

17 Compiled from Schmidt supplemented by Friederich, Hoen and Janson.

18 Janson, vol. II, pp. 275-6.

19 Habermann survived his wound and died in 1825. See Chapter 5 for Franz’s description of the 7th’s charge at Polotsk.

20 Timing from Schmidt; Hoen’s account places the Russian attack much earlier in the night (approximately 8 p.m.). The Russians were from Lieutenant General Tschoglikov’s 1st Grenadier Division.

21 Schmidt (p. 111) points out that there are no reliable figures for V Corps’ strength under arms on the 20th; nor was he able to uncover reasonable data on Austrian losses from the corps; the figure available (1,382) seems much too high unless it includes numerous missing and stragglers who later found their way back to their battalions.

22 Ibid., p. 110.

23 This account reflects Schmidt’s interpretation. Janson severely criticises Wrede for not taking advantage of this moment to attack MacDonald’s force (vol. II, p. 301).

24 Wrede’s actual role here is not clear. Janson (who shows little regard for the field marshal) dismisses his presence and Friederich does not even mention him. Regardless of his actual contribution, the fact that the Allied monarchs saw fit to place a large mounted force under his orders is testimony to the respect they held for him.

25 Strengths as of 1 October 1814 (Auvera, pp. 563-4).

26 At least five of the officers were listed with the regiment on 1 October 1814; the fate of the other is not clear from the regimental history, nor does Auvera specify how many of the NCOs and other ranks returned to their duties with the 7th. (ibid., pp. 562-5).

27 Wrede to Max Joseph, 5 March 1814, Schmidt, p. 79.

28 Although Franz’s diary entry is unclear, it is known that the returned survivors of the Thorn garrison were used to form two provisional battalions in August 1813. Known as the 1st and 2nd Thorn Battalions, they were commanded by Lieutenant Colonels Herrmann and Merz (formerly of the 7th Infantry) respectively and were used to quell unrest in the Tyrol. Though desperately needed to rebuild his army, Max Joseph personally decided that the men from Thorn could not rejoin their home units because they had given their pledge not to fight against the Allies. There was no hindrance on using them against the rebellious Tyroleans. See Gilardone.

29 The reference to a Cossack volley (Kosacken décharge) is unclear. A ‘friendly fire’ situation? Franz misunderstanding events he only heard of secondhand (he was not present at the Battle of Hanau)? According to Auvera’s regimental history, the battalion was roughly handled by some French cavalry during the battle, but there is no mention of Cossacks.

30 Here Franz rejoined the battalion.

31 The Battle of La Rothière.

32 From this series of letters only Nos. 5, 8, 9 and 11 have been preserved.

33 The Bavarian 7th Chevauxlegers Regiment was formed in 1813 as a militia unit with the title ‘National Chevauxlegers Regiment’. It was granted the numeral and placed in sequence with the regular line chevauxlegers regiments before embarking on the campaign. The fight to which Franz refers actually occurred on 24th December, not the 26th.

34 The Bavarians apparently formed an ad hoc light battalion for at least part of the 1814 campaign by pooling the Schützen companies of several battalions.

35 Although Franz refers to this engagement as the Battle of Brienne, it is known to military history as the Battle of La Rothière. Brienne, which is nearby, gave its name to a series of engagements between Napoleon and the Army of Silesia in the closing days of January.

36 The company involved in this incident was the 1 st Grenadier Company of the 8th Infantry Regiment. The grenadiers were accused of withdrawing from a defensive position unnecessarily, and Wrede punished them by publicly denying them the right to wear the coveted red plumes (Huppen) on their helmets which distinguished them as grenadiers (Schmidt, p. 52; Auvera, p. 550). See illustration.

37 Franz’s use of the title ‘Third Battalion of the Mobile Legion’ is unclear.

38 Prince Michael Barclay de Tolly (1761-1818) commanded the Russo-Prussian Guards and Reserves.