A Japanese strike is prepared from the deck of the carrier Shokaku. (US Navy)
Fortunately for the Americans, none of the Pacific Fleet’s aircraft carriers were present at Pearl Harbor. With these ships, and an entirely new doctrine, the US Navy pondered how to reverse the tide of Japanese expansion. Even the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was caught unaware by its success at Pearl Harbor. The concept of massing all of the fleet’s large carriers into a single cohesive unit, combined with the excellent aircraft and superb aircrews of the carriers themselves, had created a revolution in naval warfare. The destruction of the American battlefleet had clearly demonstrated that air power was now the dominant factor in naval warfare. As with the Americans, this development rendered the IJN’s pre-war calculations irrelevant. The IJN was also built for a decisive clash of dreadnoughts for mastery of the Pacific, but this clash would never occur. However, with its decided edge in aircraft carriers, the IJN could now conduct a war of expansion with the hopes that it could construct an unassailable position in the Pacific.
As part of the agreed expansion plan of both the Japanese Army and Navy the first operational stage of the war called for the occupation of the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and Rabaul. One of the hallmarks of the early campaigns was the virtually uncontested success of the IJN’s carrier force or Kido Butai. Following the Pearl Harbor operation, the Kido Butai was used to cover the capture of Rabaul in January 1942 and the Dutch East Indies in February. In April, Japanese carriers moved into the Indian Ocean to conduct a rampage against British naval forces and shipping.
Allied naval forces were unable to stop the Japanese advance. The US did conduct some offensive operations, such as the carrier strikes against Japanese forces on the Marshall and Gilbert islands, as well as a raid on Tokyo itself. Whatever the psychological results were for American morale or for Japanese fears of further raids on their homeland, the commitment of half of the Pacific Fleet’s carriers to this operation meant that the US could not respond to the next Japanese offensive move in the South Pacific in early May. During the second operational stage, the Japanese envisioned further expansion into eastern New Guinea, New Britain, the Fijis, and Samoa in the South Pacific. With the Japanese now ready to execute these plans, the unavailability of Enterprise and Hornet, the two US carriers assigned to the action against Tokyo, meant that the commander of the Pacific Fleet could deploy only two carriers to the South Pacific by the time the Japanese offensive was predicted to begin in early May. With part of the Kido Butai committed to support the South Pacific operation, the scene was set for history’s first carrier battle.
By early 1942, following the success of the Pearl Harbor attacks, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s primacy in shaping Japanese naval strategy was assured. Despite his opposition to further operations in the South Pacific, which he viewed as contrary to his preferred Central Pacific drive in order to bring the US Pacific Fleet to a decisive battle, Yamamoto grudgingly gave his approval to the attack on Port Moresby (designated Operation MO) and even contributed a significant proportion of the Kido Butai. This act was to have massive consequences not only for the Coral Sea battle, but also for the subsequent battle of Midway.
Vice-Admiral Takagi Takeo was charged with the most important role in the MO Operation as commander of the Carrier Striking Force. He squandered several chances to deal a devastating blow to the American carriers and ultimately failed either to protect the Invasion Force or to destroy the American carriers. (US Naval Institute)
Vice-Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi was commander of the 4th Fleet, also known as the South Sea Force. He was the former chief of the Aeronautical Department and was therefore fully aware of the role aircraft now played in naval warfare. He aggressively pushed to expand Japan’s operations in the South Pacific and he was the designer of the Japanese operations into the Coral Sea.
Rear-Admiral Takagi Takeo was commander of the MO Carrier Striking Force, the attack on Port Moresby, and had previously enjoyed success with the 5th Cruiser Division during the battle of Java Sea. Because Takeo’s cruisers were never assigned to work with the IJN’s carrier force during the early part of the war, Takeo had no experience with carriers. The unfamiliarity of Takeo and his staff with carrier operations led him to delegate full authority for carrier operations to Hara, the commander of the 5th Carrier Division.
Rear-Admiral Chuichi Hara was given command of the 5th Carrier Division consisting of the IJN’s two newest and most modern carriers. This division had taken part in the Pearl Harbor attack and the Indian Ocean raid. Thus by May 1942, Hara had accumulated a wealth of carrier experience in a short time.
The paramount figure behind all US naval strategy during World War II was Ernest J. King. In the command shake-up after Pearl Harbor, King was promoted to Commander-in-Chief US Fleet. In March, he was also appointed as Chief of Naval Operations, giving him ultimate authority over all US naval strategy and operations. With this sweeping authority, he quickly sought to expand the Navy’s freedom of action in the Pacific, which under the “Germany First” strategy was clearly defined as a secondary theater. He was determined to fight for the South Pacific and to begin offensive operations as soon as possible.
The commander of the US Pacific Fleet, effective December 31, 1941, was Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. His calm, determined demeanor saw him selected over many more senior admirals to assume the role of Pacific Fleet commander in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor disaster. On April 3, Nimitz was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas (including the North Pacific, Central, and South Pacific Areas) in addition to his duties as commander of the Pacific Fleet. This meant that Nimitz was responsible for the execution of King’s plans to launch offensive operations as soon as possible.
It remains unclear why Yamamoto was so highly regarded by his peers as he engineered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the most politically disastrous naval operation in modern history; the invasion of Midway, a stunning and avoidable setback; and the catastrophic air war of attrition against US forces in the South Pacific. (US Naval Institute)
The most important American naval command personality in the battle was Rear-Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. Despite his lack of aviation experience, by the time of Coral Sea he was one of the US Navy’s most seasoned carrier commanders. During the actual carrier battle phase, Fletcher gave tactical control of the carrier task force over to Rear-Admiral Aubrey Fitch. At the time, Fitch commanded one of the two carrier divisions in the Pacific Fleet. (The other was commanded by the US Navy’s senior naval aviator, Vice-Admiral William F. Halsey.) Fitch was junior to Fletcher but had considerable carrier experience. He qualified as a pilot in 1930 at age 47, and thus became known as a “Johnny Come Lately” to officers who had spent their entire career as aviators.
The captains of the two American carriers at Coral Sea were both naval aviators, as were all carrier skippers per US Navy regulation. The captain of USS Yorktown was Elliott Buckmaster, known for his excellent seamanship and his willingness to let his aviators experiment. Yorktown’s air group had become one of the best in the fleet. Captain Frederick “Ted” Sherman had been commanding officer of Lexington for two years and had worked the ship into a high state of efficiency. He was one of the first US naval officers to realize the value of concentrating multiple carriers into a single task force and these principles were used during the Coral Sea battle even though this strategy was against prevailing US Navy doctrine of the day.
In early 1942, the IJN’s carrier force was at its zenith. The Kido Butai (literally “mobile force” but better understood as “striking force”) had accomplished every mission it had been assigned and had smashed all Allied opposition before it without the loss of a single carrier. However, it had yet to meet the US Navy’s carrier force. In May 1942, the IJN’s carrier force held both a numerical and qualitative edge over its American counterpart. Had the force remained massed as it had been during the first part of the war, it would have retained a numerical edge in any battle with the US Navy’s carrier force. However, for the Coral Sea operation only three carriers would be committed.
Admiral Chester Nimitz (left) receiving the Distinguished Service Medal from Admiral King aboard USS Pennsylvania on June 30, 1942. The award was given for his leadership of the Pacific Fleet during the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. (US Naval Historical Center); Admiral Frank Fletcher in September 1942. Despite criticism from many quarters, he was the victor at the battle of the Coral Sea and the first Allied naval commander to inflict a strategic defeat on the IJN during the Pacific War. (US Naval Historical Center); Captain Frederick Sherman in 1938 before assuming command of the Lexington. His career was not affected by the loss of his ship at Coral Sea and he went on to command carrier task forces. (US Naval Historical Center)
The heart of the MO Operation was the two ships of the Shokaku class, the Shokaku and the Zuikaku, which made up the Kido Butai’s 5th Carrier Division. They were the epitome of Japanese carrier design and the most powerful and best-balanced carrier design in the Pacific at the time. Huge, yet incredibly fast, they also carried a heavy defensive armament with eight Type 89 twin 5in guns fitted in pairs, each with its own fire-control director. They were supported by Shoho – originally a high-speed oiler converted very successfully into a light carrier. She was capable of adequate speed but lacked sufficient defensive armament.
Unlike the Americans, no Japanese carrier began the war fitted with radar. This situation persisted until after the battle of Midway. This made the task of controlling defending fighters very difficult. In the early-war period, half of the 18-aircraft fighter squadron was dedicated for defense. With no radar, air defense was accomplished by conducting standing patrols. However, only a few aircraft (usually a section of three) would be airborne at any time with the remaining aircraft standing by to be scrambled if adequate warning was gained. Adding further difficulty to the fighter defense problem was the inferior quality of Japanese aircraft radios, which made it virtually impossible to control aircraft already airborne.
A close-up shot of the cockpit and the Type 91 air-launched torpedo carried aboard a Type 97 carrier attack plane. The combination of this relatively fast torpedo plane and an excellent torpedo provided the IJN with a superb shipkilling capability. (US Naval Historical Center)
The primary defense against air attack was mounted by fighters or by the ability of a carrier’s captain to maneuver skillfully under attack. When exposed to air attack, Japanese carrier escorts maneuvered independently to give the carrier maximum room for maneuver. In contrast, American carrier escorts also gave the carrier room for radical maneuvers, but were still expected to stay close enough to the carrier to provide anti-aircraft support.
One important advantage exercised by the Japanese at the start of the war was their ability to mass carrier air power. In April 1941, the Japanese brought all their fleet carriers into a single formation, the 1st Air Fleet. The Kido Butai was the operational component of the 1st Air Fleet. Three carrier divisions made up the Kido Butai, including the 5th with the newly completed Shokaku and Zuikaku. Throughout 1942, including at Coral Sea, the IJN was able to integrate operations from different carriers far better than the US Navy and routinely achieved a higher level of coordination.
Each Japanese carrier had its own air group. This air group was named after its parent ship and was permanently assigned to the ship. The aviators of the air group as well as all of the personnel required to support the aircraft were assigned to the ship’s company.
Shokaku-class carriers had air groups made up of three different types of flying units: fighter, dive-bombers, and torpedo bombers. Even with relatively light aircraft losses, by May 1942 the IJN was unable to provide the two ships of 5th Carrier Division with approximately 63 aircraft. As a light carrier, Shoho embarked only two types of squadrons, fighter and carrier attack and only embarked 18 aircraft in total due to previous losses.
The carrier force was untouched in the Pearl Harbor attack. Enterprise and Lexington were both in the area of Pearl Harbor, but were not actually in the harbor on December 7. Numerically, the US Navy had a fleet carrier force equal to the Japanese in 1942, but in terms of employment, aircraft capabilities, and personnel training, the two opposing carrier forces were very different.
The Lexington was the first true US Navy fleet carrier. Converted from a battlecruiser, she displaced over 36,000 tons. Her most salient feature (shared with her sister ship the Saratoga) was the huge smokestack on the starboard side located just behind the separate island. Lexington was fast but not very maneuverable due to her length. However, in 1940 a CXAM air search radar was installed on the forward part of Lexington’s stack. For anti-aircraft protection there were 5in/25 gun mounts and a large battery of automatic weapons including .50cal machine guns.
Lexington in February 1933 pictured off the Hawaiian Islands. The ship’s battlecruiser lineage and the large stack aft of the small bridge are evident. The US Navy’s emphasis on embarking a large air group can be seen by the large numbers of aircraft spotted forward and aft on the flight deck. (US Naval Historical Center)
Yorktown, alongside her two sister ships, was the first of the truly modern US Navy fleet carriers. These 20,000-ton ships were large enough to permit the incorporation of protection against torpedo attack. A 4in side armor belt was fitted over the machinery spaces, magazines, and gasoline storage tanks. Vertical protection was limited to 1.5in of armor over the machinery spaces. The main deck was the hangar deck with the unarmored flight deck being built of light steel. The primary design focus of the class was to provide adequate space to operate a large air group. The Yorktown class also received a heavy defensive battery to counter enemy air attack including the new 5in/38 dual-purpose guns, which proved to be the best long-range anti-aircraft weapon of the war in any navy. Another important improvement was the addition of radar. Yorktown was one of the ships to receive one of the first CXAM air search radar sets.
As the Americans believed their carriers to be extremely vulnerable to air attack, prewar doctrine dictated that carriers should be separated so as to avoid potential simultaneous detection and destruction. But radar did provide a huge advantage, although its inability to give reliable altitudes, combined with a general lack of experience and wider communication problems, would greatly complicate fighter direction.
Dauntless dive-bombers of Yorktown’s Bombing Squadron Five shown on deck in April 1942. The Dauntless dive-bomber was the primary offensive weapon of US Navy carrier air groups, as events during the battle of the Coral Sea would demonstrate. (US Naval Historical Center)
Typically, half of a carrier’s fighters would be retained for fleet air defense. These were used to mount standing combat air patrols (CAP) of two to three hours’ duration during daylight hours above the carrier. The remaining fighters would be fueled and armed on deck ready for launch to augment the existing patrols.
Early 1942 American carrier strike doctrine was less mature than that practiced by the IJN. Typically, in the morning, a number of dive-bombers would be launched to perform reconnaissance. If a target was located, a strike was launched as soon as possible with every available dive-bomber and torpedo plane. The fighter squadron was usually divided, with half providing strike escort and the other half providing CAP. The problem with US Navy strike doctrine was that it remained focused on the operations of a single air group from a single carrier, while the Japanese had made the mental leap to mass all their fleet carriers into a single unit and could operate aircraft from multiple carriers as a single entity in combat. The ranges of US aircraft were also inferior to those of the Japanese.
The first part of the second operational stage went smoothly when Lae and Salamaua in Papua New Guinea were captured on March 8. However, the Japanese illusion of a continued run of unchallenged successes was shattered on March 10 when American carrier-based aircraft struck the Japanese invasion force, preventing additional advances until Japanese forces in the region were reinforced to deal with potential future intervention by American carriers.
The heavy cruiser Myoko was the lead ship of a four-ship class. Two of these powerful ships were assigned as the primary screening units for the MO Carrier Striking Force. With ten 8in guns and 16 24in torpedoes, they were more heavily armed than any Allied cruiser in 1942. (Yamato Museum)
The continued expansion in the South Pacific therefore depended on the willingness of Yamamoto to contribute some of the Combined Fleet’s carriers to the effort. But Yamamoto preferred to put off any South Pacific expedition until his decisive clash at Midway could be finished. During the first week of April, the issue of future strategy was decided in Yamamoto’s favor and his plan to attack Midway approved. However, in a move to placate the Naval General Staff, it was also agreed that the Kido Butai’s 5th Carrier Division would be made available to support the Port Moresby operation before it was used in the Midway operation.
The attack on Port Moresby, the largest town in Papua New Guinea, was codenamed the MO Operation. The primary job of the two fleet carriers assigned to the MO Striking Force was to take out the Allied air bases in Australia, not to engage US carriers. After their surprise attack on Townsville, the carriers would refuel and move into position in the center of the Coral Sea to intercept Allied naval forces, which were only then expected to respond to the invasion. Additional air raids could be conducted on other air bases as required. The carriers (including Shoho) would eventually return to Japan to be incorporated into the huge force being gathered for the MI Operation – the invasion of Midway.
Aircraft on an IJN carrier prepare for attack. (akg-images)
The whole MO Operation featured a force of some 60 ships assigned to Vice-Admiral Shigeyoshi’s South Seas Force. This included two large carriers, one light carrier, six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and 15 destroyers. The balance of the force was composed of a variety of auxiliaries. Altogether, some 250 aircraft were assigned to the operation (not including floatplanes) and of these, some 140 were aboard the three carriers.
As was typical in Japanese operational planning, the MO Operation’s plan depended on close coordination of widely separated forces. Any delay in any aspect of the plan had the potential to throw the entire operation into jeopardy. This was amply demonstrated by the example of the MO Carrier Striking Force’s mission of ferrying nine Type Zer0 fighters from Truk to Rabaul. The delay in executing this seemingly simple mission in turn delayed the arrival of the carriers into the Coral Sea, imperiling the entire operation. Even before its execution, the MO plan had met severe resistance from the admirals expected to execute it, who had a growing suspicion that American carriers could be present in the area. This prompted Lieutenant-Commander Shigeharu Murata to authorize Takeo on April 29 to cancel the Townsville raid if surprise could not be achieved. The same day, Yamamoto weighed in and ordered that all strikes from the carriers against targets in Australia be cancelled and that the MO Carrier Striking Force be prepared instead to engage enemy carriers. This effectively meant that there would no longer be adequate air cover for the MO invasion fleet despite the overwhelming Allied land-based aircraft which were in range.
The standard 5in gun aboard all US heavy cruisers at the battle of the Coral Sea was the 5in gun. This is the No. 3 mount aboard heavy cruiser Astoria. (US Naval Historical Center)
The most damning aspect of the plans for the MO Operation was its utter disregard for the actions of the enemy. By committing only a portion of the Kido Butai, Yamamoto not only jeopardized the success of the MO Operation, but exposed those units to defeat in detail. If those carriers, the decisive edge the IJN held over the US Navy’s carrier force, were lost or damaged, they would be unable to participate in Yamamoto’s decisive assault on Midway.
King’s first orders to the commander of the Pacific Fleet were to hold the key Central Pacific positions at Hawaii and Midway, but also to protect the sea-lines of communications from the US to Australia. King was determined that the “Germany first” strategy would not prevent him from local offensive operations. Japanese expansion into the South Pacific virtually ensured that King would get his way. The Japanese seizure of Rabaul on January 23 heightened fears that the Fijis or New Caledonia would be next.
On April 22, Nimitz sent his orders to Fletcher. He warned Fletcher about the impending Japanese offensive and gave him an idea of the size of the enemy force (three or four carriers). The heart of the directive was contained in this phrase: “Your task is to assist in checking further advance by enemy in above areas [New Guinea–Solomons] by seizing favorable opportunities to destroy ships shipping and aircraft.” The order is noteworthy in that Nimitz did not tell Fletcher how to accomplish the mission. This was totally up to Fletcher.
Nimitz issued detailed instructions to commanders on April 29. By this time, additional intelligence was also provided to Fletcher. It now seemed all but certain that the enemy intended to strike at both Port Moresby and Tulagi. To take on the Japanese, Fletcher had the carrier Yorktown, which with her escorts of three cruisers and four destroyers comprised Task Force 17 (TF-17). After a short stop in Pearl Harbor beginning on March 26, the carrier Lexington (with her escorting two cruisers and five destroyers making up TF-11) was ordered to rendezvous with Fletcher in the eastern Coral Sea on May 1. Fletcher would assume command of the combined carrier force. With his two carriers, Fletcher had the basic mission of covering Port Moresby and the Solomons. After meeting with TF-11 on May 1, 300 miles northwest of New Caledonia, Fletcher decided to move to a point 325 miles south of Guadalcanal to be prepared to react to any Japanese movement. Supporting Fletcher was General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Naval Forces organized into TF-44. This force would rendezvous on May 4, 350 miles southwest of Guadalcanal, and come under Fletcher’s overall control. Four US Navy submarines were also provided by MacArthur and assigned patrols in Japanese areas.
Overall, Fletcher’s plan was simple and showed flexibility. With half of the Pacific Fleet’s operational carriers entrusted to him, he displayed a prudent combination of caution mixed with opportunistic aggressiveness. His focus was on protecting Port Moresby as it was here that the greatest threat seemed to be. He was hamstrung by inadequate air reconnaissance and logistical resources, but both were beyond his control. If there was a fault with his planning, it was the focus on the Coral Sea and the approaches to Port Moresby. No air searches were focused on the area east of the Solomons where, unknown to Fletcher, the greatest danger lay.
Both Nimitz and King were overconfident regarding the capability of US carriers, and were willing to accept battle on inferior terms. Even when it appeared that the Japanese force would contain as many as four carriers, Nimitz was determined to bring the Japanese carrier forces in the Coral Sea to battle. If he could reduce their strength, the offensive power of the entire IJN would be blunted.
The first blow of the battle was delivered on the morning of May 3 when the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force landed unopposed on the islands of Tulagi and Gavutu. However, by the end of May 3, the tightly synchronized MO plan was already running into trouble. The Carrier Striking Force was tasked with the seemingly simple mission of ferrying nine Zero fighters from Truk to Rabaul to increase their chances of securing air superiority over the region. This was to occur on May 2 when the carriers would be closest to Rabaul on their way south. However, when the nine fighters took off, they were forced to return to the carriers because of bad weather. An attempt to repeat the operation the following day was also thwarted by weather with one of the planes being lost in the attempt. The carriers were now two days behind schedule. This episode shows the basic weakness of a plan that hinged on a factor as small as nine fighters in the first place.
A map showing the movement of US and Japanese forces between May 2 and 6. (Osprey Publishing Ltd.)
A Douglas Devastator from USS Enterprise over Wake Island on February 24, 1942. The highlight of the Devastator’s early war career was at the battle of the Coral Sea when the aircraft put several torpedoes into the Japanese light carrier Shoho. A month later, at the battle of Midway, the aircraft’s true vulnerability was revealed. (US Naval Historical Center)
As the Japanese carriers attempted to complete their ferry mission, Fletcher was just getting reports of the occupation of Tulagi around 1900hrs on the evening of May 3. Early on May 3, TF-17 was slowly moving westward into the central Coral Sea. Fletcher and TF-17 had become separated from Lexington as TF-11 completed its refueling. Actually, Lexington had completed refueling early and was close to Fletcher’s position. Strict radio silence denied Fletcher this knowledge, so when reports came in of the invasion of Tulagi, he decided to react immediately with TF-17 alone. Fletcher turned his force north by 2030hrs and worked up to 27 knots to be in a position to attack Japanese forces off Tulagi at dawn on May 4. He was aware that this would reveal the presence of a US carrier in the area, but Fletcher was more concerned with surprising the Japanese and delivering some punishing blows.
By May 4, the Tulagi Invasion Force was without air cover. Shoho had moved north to cover the Port Moresby invasion convoy then departing Rabaul, and the MO Carrier Striking Force was still in the area of Rabaul attempting to complete its ferry mission. When American carrier aircraft appeared over the skies of Tulagi on the morning of May 4, the Japanese were caught completely by surprise and were essentially defenseless.
At 0630hrs, Yorktown began launching what would be the first of four strikes at 0820hrs. The results of this intense effort were very disappointing. Fletcher claimed that two destroyers, one freighter, and four patrol craft had been sunk and a light cruiser driven aground. The real tally was much less. In fact the destroyer Kikuzuki, three small minesweepers, and four landing barges had been sunk. Perhaps the most important result was the destruction of the five Type 97 flying boats. Total Japanese casualties were 87 killed and 124 wounded.
Following his strike against Tulagi, Fletcher headed south at high speed. The Japanese had no idea where the carrier was that had mounted the raid, so Fletcher was easily able to escape retaliation. Meanwhile, the Japanese carrier force was groping in the dark. The American raid on Tulagi found the Japanese carriers refueling north of the Solomons. In response to reports of the American attack, Takeo rushed his force to the southeast expecting to find an American carrier east of Tulagi. After finding nothing, Takeo confirmed his intention of entering the Coral Sea from an area east of the Solomons.
Fletcher was receiving extensive reporting from MacArthur’s air units on the location and movement of a number of Japanese units active in the Solomon Sea. This included reports of carriers. On May 4 at around noon, an American bomber reported a force, with a carrier, off Bougainville. On May 5, another report was issued of a Japanese carrier operating southwest of Bougainville. What MacArthur’s airmen had sighted was the Shoho headed north to cover the MO Invasion Force, which had departed Rabaul on May 4.
On May 6, Fletcher exercised his authority from Nimitz to merge all three task forces into TF-17. His total strength was two carriers, eight cruisers (two Australian), and 11 destroyers. Fletcher ordered his combined force to head southeast throughout the day. With the Allied Air Forces’ reconnaissance efforts still focused on the Solomon Sea and the Louisiades, Fletcher remained ignorant of the true location of the Japanese carrier force, now located to his northeast. At 1015hrs on May 6, radar revealed the presence of a snooper in the area of TF-17 that fighters on CAP were unable to locate. Signals intelligence from Nimitz also indicated that Japanese carriers were tasked with a strike on Port Moresby on May 7.
The Japanese were the first to get solid information on the location of the enemy carriers and reported TF-17 420 miles southwest of Tulagi. Hara decided not to launch a long-range strike or mount his own air search not wanting to reveal his presence to the Americans. He continued to head south until 1930hrs on May 6, coming to within 60–70 miles of TF-17.
On the morning of May 7, TF-17 was positioned approximately 150 miles south of Rossel Island. This placed it between the two main Japanese forces – the MO Invasion Force and the MO Carrier Striking Force. Fletcher was still focused on striking the Japanese carriers but had no idea of their true location. The Japanese also found themselves in a not entirely favorable position. While they still hoped to stage an ambush on the unsuspecting American carriers, they had yet to adjust the MO plan to the fact that the Carrier Striking Force was behind schedule and that an American carrier force was now blocking the advance of the Invasion Force. While Fletcher had the option of waiting and reacting to Japanese moves, the Japanese would have to force a decision quickly if the operation was to stay on schedule.
For both sides, the key to success was reconnaissance. On May 7, both commanders were severely let down by the efforts of their reconnaissance aircraft and crews and these series of mistakes would shape the battle. Allied Air Forces’ aircraft continued to focus their efforts on the area north of the Louisiades and into the Solomon Sea, augmented with flights of Dauntlesses from Yorktown. The Japanese also made a large-scale scouting effort using land and carrier based aircraft. The first side to receive solid contact reports would probably be the first to launch its strike, thus grabbing victory.
USS Neosho refueling Yorktown on May 1. Neosho was bombed by Japanese carrier aircraft on May 7 and was finally scuttled on May 11. Throughout the battle, Fletcher devoted considerable attention to maintaining proper fuel levels for his forces. (US Naval Historical Center)
“We have awakened a sleeping giant and instilled in it a terrible resolve.”
— ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO
Also at dawn on May 7, Fletcher decided to detach TG-17.3 under the command of British Rear-Admiral J. G. Crace. Under his command Crace had three cruisers and three destroyers. Crace’s mission was to prevent the MO Invasion Force from passing south of the Louisiades. This was a controversial move as it removed one third of Fletcher’s already weak carrier screen and placed a force with no air cover within range of Japanese land-based aircraft. But Fletcher’s rationale was that if the carrier battle neutralized both forces, as often happened in US Navy prewar exercises, then Crace would be positioned to contest the Japanese advance into the Coral Sea. Under the circumstances, this seemed a good insurance move by Fletcher.
Given the relatively small area of operations and the numbers of ships and aircraft in motion, contact reports quickly filtered up to the respective commanders. At 0722hrs, two Type 97 carrier attack planes from Shokaku reported an American force of one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers only 163 miles south of the Japanese carriers and Hara made preparations to launch a full strike. By 0815hrs, a total of 78 aircraft (18 fighters, 24 torpedo bombers, and 26 dive-bombers) were on their way to destroy the carrier under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Takahashi Kakuichi.
What appeared to be a promising situation for the Japanese quickly turned into a potential disaster. Upon arriving at the reported contact just after 0900hrs, Kakuichi found only an oiler and its escort. An enlarged search of the area found nothing. Things got worse when Hara received reports that American carriers southeast of Rossel Island had been spotted. The force consisted of a Saratoga-class carrier and a second carrier, and at 1008hrs they were in the process of launching a strike. Faced with this alarming turn of events, Hara recalled his strike at 1100hrs but not before Kakuichi’s dive-bombers had successfully sunk the destroyer and badly damaged the oiler.
The Japanese had squandered an opportunity to ambush the Americans and had sunk only two minor ships in return. The last of the strike had not returned until after 1500hrs, so the prospects of launching another strike that day on the real American carriers looked doubtful. Fortunately for Chuichi Hara, the strike on the oiler group did not fatally compromise his position. Later in the day, Fletcher was aware that the oiler had been attacked, but neither ship had radioed a distress signal before it was sunk or put out of action.
As the Japanese struggled to clarify their situation, an almost identical situation developed for the Americans but more favorably. As early as 0735hrs, Fletcher received word from his scouts of Japanese activity. The first sighting was of two cruisers northwest of Rossel Island. The location of the force was 225 miles northwest of TF-17, which put it beyond the range of the fighters and torpedo planes. However, with the Japanese force reported moving south and Fletcher moving north, a full attack was judged to be possible. Fletcher waited over an hour to launch, but beginning at 0926hrs Lexington began to put her strike of ten fighters, 28 dive-bombers, and 12 torpedo bombers into the air. At 0944hrs, Yorktown began the first of two launches, committing eight fighters, 25 dive-bombers, and ten torpedo bombers to the attack.
However, as soon as the planes were headed north, things began to go wrong. The return of the scout plane that had reported the two carriers revealed that the actual report had meant to report the spotting of four light cruisers and two destroyers. Confronted with the same dilemma that Hara had faced, Fletcher declined to recall his strike. He knew from Allied Air Forces’ reporting that there was heavy Japanese activity in the planned strike area. The situation brightened when Fletcher received a report at 1022hrs from Port Moresby that two hours earlier a B-17 had reported a large force including a carrier just south of the false carrier report. Fletcher passed this new information to the airborne strikes and let them proceed to the target area in the hope that they would find suitable targets.
Located in clear weather, and with a total of 93 American aircraft headed her way, Shoho’s first and last battle was destined to be a quick one. Lexington’s aircraft spotted her around 1040hrs about 40 miles to the north. Shoho had just landed her four-plane CAP and a carrier attack plane and just three other aircraft were airborne while several others were being readied on deck. Lexington’s air group was the first to attack and at 1118hrs, two hits with 1,000lb bombs were scored. These caused massive fires on the hangar deck that were fed by the fueled aircraft on deck. Simultaneously with the dive-bomber attack, a torpedo attack was launched at 1119hrs. Five hits were gained, enough to cause fatal damage.
The light carrier Shoho was attacked on the morning of May 7 by a total of 93 aircraft from two American carriers. Within 15 minutes, the carrier was ripped apart by some 13 bombs and at least seven torpedo hits. Shoho quickly sank with heavy loss of life. (US Naval Historical Center)
The Yorktown’s aircraft then arrived to begin their attack on the listing Shoho. Fifteen hits were claimed against the non-maneuvering target and Japanese sources confirm as many as 11 hits. This brought Shoho dead in the water. Shoho had been literally torn apart by a barrage of bombs and torpedoes. Of her crew of 834, only 203 survived. US losses were just three aircraft.
By 1450hrs, both American air groups had recovered and were spotted on their carriers for additional strikes. Fletcher’s aviators had done a good day’s work, sinking the first Japanese carrier of the war. Given the impossibility of launching and recovering a strike before dark, and the bad weather in the area, Fletcher decided not to launch a second. While Fletcher escaped a Japanese air attack, TG-17.3 did not as it was within range of land-based aircraft. But Crace’s skillful maneuvering and heavy anti-aircraft fire avoided disaster, although the Japanese were still confident they had scored heavily.
With the loss of Shoho, Shigeyoshi delayed the Port Moresby landings by two days and moved the invasion convoy out of range. The attack on Shoho did succeed in putting a greater sense of urgency into Takeo and Hara. Given the number of aircraft involved in the attack on Shoho, it was clear that two American carriers were on the loose. With the MO Operation in shambles, everything depended on the ability of the Carrier Striking Force to sweep the American carriers from the scene and get the operation back on schedule. Accordingly, Hara was now inclined to take a risk with a dangerous dusk strike. From Zuikaku, nine carrier attack aircraft and six carrier bomber crews were selected to participate, joined by six more carrier attack aircraft and six carrier bombers from Shokaku. The fact that there was more than a small degree of desperation involved in this venture was obvious. Some of the crews had just returned from a seven-hour strike earlier in the day and now these crews were expected to take off again in increasingly terrible weather conditions against an unlocated target.
The burning Japanese aircraft carrier Shokaku takes evasive action to avoid American bombs during the battle of the Coral Sea. The line of her wake shows the sharp turn she took, but to no avail. (Photo by Keystone/Getty Images)
Predictably, the operation did not go well. Unknown to the Japanese, the American carriers were only some 150 miles away but hidden under heavy clouds. When the Japanese strike arrived at its designated area, nothing was there. After an incomplete reconnaissance of the area, the three groups headed home after jettisoning their ordnance. On their return, the Japanese ran afoul of the US carriers. Wildcats directed by radar intercepted the first group, and six carrier attack planes and one carrier bomber were shot down for the loss of three Wildcats. The second and third group arrived over the American carriers in the dark and, certain they were their own ships, attempted to land. Antiaircraft fire from the Americans accounted for another attack plane. Of the 27 aircraft launched, 18 eventually returned, a remarkable achievement. However, the loss of nine precious carrier attack planes would be felt the next day. Once debriefed, the Japanese aviators reported that TF-17 was a mere 40–60 miles to the west. Both sides now knew the other was close. The next day would certainly bring the deciding clash of the battle.
Both sides knew that quick and accurate reconnaissance was the key to deciding events on May 8. During the night, both sides attempted to place themselves in a favorable position for the forthcoming battle. Crace ordered his force to head west in order to remain southeast of Port Moresby in position to intercept any Japanese forces advancing on Port Moresby in the wake of the carrier battle. On the morning of May 8, TF-17 possessed 117 operational aircraft (31 fighters, 65 dive-bombers, and 21 torpedo bombers). A full 360-degree search was required which would take 18 SBDs. The northern part of the search pattern was carried out to 200 miles while the southern part was limited to 125 miles. Each carrier allocated eight fighters for CAP missions during the day and Yorktown dedicated eight SBDs for anti-torpedo bomber patrols. On both carriers, the remaining aircraft were ready to conduct the strike when locating information was received.
Compared with TF-17, the MO Carrier Striking Force could muster 21 fewer aircraft, with the primary difference being the marked American edge in dive-bombers. By 0600hrs, the MO Carrier Striking Force was located some 220 miles northeast of TF-17 under heavy weather. Weather played an important role in the events of May 8. The edge of the weather front had moved 30–50 miles to the north and northeast. This brought TF-17 out from under the heavy weather that offered a degree of protection from enemy reconnaissance and placed it in an area of light haze with greatly increased visibility. Conversely, the Japanese carriers now operated in an area of heavy weather with thick clouds and squalls. This would make the job of the American aviators more difficult.
Japanese search aircraft were in the air by 0615hrs, followed by the 18 TF-17 SBDs at 0635hrs. It did not take long for each side to find what they were looking for. The Japanese were the first to have success. At 0802hrs, Yorktown’s radar reported a contact 18 miles to the northeast, but TF-17’s CAP was unable to find or intercept the snooper. At 0822hrs, a report was issued by the Japanese search plane that two American carriers had been spotted and reported at 235 miles from the MO Striking Force on a bearing of 205 degrees. Radio intelligence units on Lexington and Yorktown both confirmed the fact that the Japanese aircraft had spotted TF-17 and had issued a report.
The first report received by Fletcher and Fitch was at 0820hrs when a SBD spotted the MO Carrier Striking Force in bad weather. When plotted out, the contact was 175 miles from TF-17 on a bearing of 28 degrees and was headed away from the American carriers. At 175 miles, the Japanese carriers were at the edge of the striking range of the TBDs; nevertheless, it was decided to launch a full strike and head TF-17 toward the contact to reduce the distance the strike would have to fly back to their home carriers.
The Americans were the first to get their strikes in the air. At 0900hrs, the Yorktown began launching her strike of 39 aircraft (six fighters, 24 dive-bombers, and nine torpedo bombers), followed at 0907hrs with a 36-aircraft strike from the Lexington (nine fighters, 15 dive-bombers, and 12 torpedo bombers). With the air battle now beginning, at 0908hrs Fletcher gave Fitch tactical control of TF-17. Per American doctrine, the two air groups were widely separated with no single strike commander. Additional reports placed the Japanese carriers 191 miles from TF-17 at 0934hrs. Immediately after recovering his morning reconnaissance aircraft, Fitch planned to head to the northeast to reduce the distance to the Japanese carriers.
When the Yorktown strike arrived in the area of the MO Carrier Striking Force, the Japanese force was separated into two sections. Zuikaku, escorted by two heavy cruisers and three destroyers, was some 11,000 yards ahead of the Shokaku with her two cruisers. As the dive-bombers maneuvered into position for attack, the Zuikaku group disappeared into a squall. Shokaku, remaining in an area of clear visibility, took the brunt of Yorktown’s attack. The 24 SBDs scored two hits with 1,000lb bombs although the torpedo attack completely failed. Some 30 minutes later, Lexington’s attack commenced. Storms had scattered Lexington’s strike force, and the overall results were even more disappointing than Yorktown’s. Most of the aircraft missed their target altogether in the bad weather, although another 1,000lb bomb did hit Shokaku.
Damage to Shokaku, in the form of three 1,000lb bomb hits, was severe, but she was in no danger of sinking. Casualties totaled 109 dead and another 114 wounded. While the fires aboard Shokaku were quickly extinguished, the damage left her unable to operate aircraft. She was ordered to depart the area at 30 knots under the escort of two destroyers. But Zuikaku had escaped.
As the American strike neared, on board Shokaku and Zuikaku 18 Type Zero fighters, 33 Type 99 carrier bombers, and 18 Type 97 carrier attack planes equipped with torpedoes were spotted in readiness. Unlike American doctrine, the entire force departed at 0930hrs and proceeded in a single group under the control of Kakuichi. Takeo followed his strike group south at 30 knots. Had he maintained his position, it would have been unlikely that any of the short-ranged American TBDs would have been able even to reach the area of the Japanese carrier force.
A some what indistinct but compelling photo of Lexington as seen from one of the attacking Japanese aircraft. Lexington is already burning and the number of splashes around the ship suggests this shot was taken during the dive-bombing attack. (US Naval Historical Center)
Survivors of the sinking of Lexington climb aboard another ship following the battle of the Coral Sea. (Photo by Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)
Fully expecting a Japanese morning attack, Fitch had done his best to mount a robust CAP. Eight Wildcats were already aloft supported by 18 SBDs on anti-torpedo plane duty. At 1055hrs, radars on Lexington and Yorktown reported a large group of aircraft. Immediately, nine more Wildcats and five additional SBDs were launched. The nine new Wildcats were ordered to proceed down the line of bearing to intercept the Japanese aircraft as far as possible from TF-17. But the aircraft failed to intercept the Japanese dive-bombers.
Of the 18 Type 97 carrier attack planes, 14 were assigned to attack Lexington with only four remaining to attack Yorktown. Despite the efforts of the defending CAP, 15 of the 18 Type 97s survived to launch attacks. The four allocated to attack Yorktown all missed for the loss of two aircraft available to attack available to attack. With 14 Type 97s available to attack Lexington, and the limited maneuverability of the huge ship, the Japanese achieved much better results. Two scored hits on the port side. The first, at 1120hrs, buckled the port aviation fuel tank and caused small cracks. In turn, this caused gasoline vapors to spread. The second hit was scored under the island near the firerooms.
Kakuichi’s orders for the dive-bombers to take a position upwind placed them several minutes behind the torpedo attack. He ordered 19 dive-bombers from Shokaku to deal with Lexington with the balance of the dive-bombers from Zuikaku to attack Yorktown. Despite bravely pressing their attacks against increasingly heavy anti-aircraft fire, the results were very disappointing for the Japanese. Both American carriers were deluged in a series of near misses, but only a total of three bombs hit their targets. Against Yorktown, a combination of attacks by two defending Wildcats, good ship handling by Captain Buckmaster, and a crosswind drop meant the 14 Zuikaku dive-bombers scored only a single hit. The Japanese strike had not been as devastating as the Americans had expected. Yorktown’s crew had quickly put out the fires and the firerooms were re-manned bringing her speed up to 28 knots. Even Lexington, recipient of much greater damage, seemed to be battleworthy and in no danger of sinking. After the strike, Kakuichi radioed back at 1125hrs that a Saratoga-class carrier had sunk as a result of nine torpedo hits and ten bomb hits. Despite the best efforts of the American CAP, Japanese losses were relatively light although the strike leader Kakuichi himself was lost.
Both the Japanese and American air groups had been shattered by events of May 8. Neither was in a position to resume the battle immediately. Concerned about the damage to Lexington and the fuel status, Fletcher proposed at 1315hrs that TF-17 retire to the south. At this point, the battle of the Coral Sea was effectively over, but the reckoning for the US Navy was not done. The torpedo damage to Lexington proved mortal. The escaping vapors caused further explosions and fires. Eventually it had to be abandoned and finally sunk at 1952hrs.
However, the failure of the Carrier Striking Force to crush the American carriers meant the end of the MO Operation. When Yamamoto heard of the progress of the battle he took immediate action. At 2200hrs, he ordered Shigeyoshi to continue to pursue the American forces and to complete their destruction. The MO Carrier Striking Force spent May 9 refueling, then re-entered the Coral Sea on May 10 to reopen the battle with additional aircraft provided. By dawn on May 10, Takeo was some 340 miles southwest of Tulagi. From this position, he conducted a search but gained no contact. On May 11, the futility of continuing operations was obvious and the Carrier Striking Force headed north.
MacArthur’s aircraft had already reported the northerly movement of the invasion convoy, so Fletcher could safely assume that the threat of invasion at Port Moresby was over. For the remainder of May 8, he moved south into the Coral Sea and continued to retire at high speed.
Both sides paid a high price in the first carrier battle of the Pacific War. The invasion of Port Moresby had been turned away, but the Japanese did add Tulagi to their list of conquests. Losses to the IJN had been high, in fact more severe than any battle to date in the war. The light carrier Shoho was sunk, the largest ship lost thus far in the war. In addition, a destroyer and several minor ships were lost in the American carrier raid on Tulagi. Most importantly, the bomb hits on Shokaku kept her in the shipyard until July 1942. Carrier aircraft losses were also very severe. US losses were highlighted by the loss of Lexington, constituting 25 percent of the Pacific Fleet’s operational carrier strength. Yorktown suffered minor damage, but her survival allowed the Americans to rightfully claim a strategic victory.
An explosion rocks the burning USS Lexington with a force that pitches a plane from her deck. (Corbis)
It has become commonly accepted that the battle of the Coral Sea, while an American strategic victory, was also an American tactical defeat. This might be true if the battle is considered in isolation. While sinking only a light carrier and damaging a fleet carrier, the US Navy lost one of its four operational Pacific Fleet carriers. However, this view lacks credibility as the battle cannot be examined in isolation. For the Japanese it may have been a subsidiary operation, but its impact was decidedly strategic. Yamamoto’s main goal in early 1942 was to attack what he considered to be the American center of gravity in the Pacific – the US Navy, and more specifically its carriers. This was not the aim of the MO Operation, but it was the principal objective of the MI Operation (the codename for the attack on Midway), which was scheduled for less than a month after the intended Port Moresby invasion. To conduct the MI Operation successfully, Yamamoto’s plan depended on maintaining superiority in fleet carriers. Violating the principle of mass, Yamamoto committed one-third of the Kido Butai’s carriers to the MO Operation. Though neither was sunk in the operation, both were removed from his order of battle for the MI Operation. Down to only four carriers, Yamamoto had lost his decisive edge in carriers so necessary to guarantee success for the coming decisive clash with the US Navy. The turning of the Japanese tide begun at Coral Sea led eventually to Japan’s surrender in August 1945.