One of the peculiarities of the war in the Western Desert, hardly to be found in any other theatre of war, was how both sides were to take advantage of the booty taken from their adversaries. This ranged from simple clothing and uniform down to weapons (from the machine guns to the tanks), not to mention supplies – fuel for a start, but also food and water whenever possible. Indeed, sometimes it was quite hard to distinguish one side from the other, in many ways both armies were so similar.
The Western Desert campaign was, more so than many others of the war, characterised by being largely dominated by modern mechanised warfare and, as such, was also heavily influenced by tactics, unit organisation, supplies and weaponry. However, one of the lessons of the 1940 campaign in the West was that no matter how superior an army may be in some or even all these fields, like the French Army was in many respects toward the Germans; still, superior command and leadership proved to be the decisive factors on the battlefield. This was particularly true during Operation Compass, when the stronger Italian Army was defeated by the Western Desert Force simply because its commander, Field Marshal Graziani, was not only a feeble leader but also still stuck to the nineteenth-century style of warfare, and was thus easily outmanoeuvred by the fast, mobile forces led by the British General Richard O’Connor, who managed to concentrate his forces against the Italian strongholds, taking them one by one.
Erwin Rommel
Born in 1891 near Ulm from a family with no military background, he was commissioned in 1910. During the First World War he distinguished himself on the battlefield, and, in 1917 he earned the highest award – the Pour le Mérite – for his role during the breakthrough of the Italian lines that led to the defeat at Caporetto. The fact that somebody else was at first given the award instead of him probably contributed to him in the future publicising his own successes as much as possible. A captain at the end of the war, he remained in the post-war army. Never a staff officer, his book ‘Infantry Attacks’ (1937) earned him fame and Hitler’s attention. After commanding his headquarters, he was given command of the 7th Panzer Division, which he led successfully in France in 1940. Given command of the Afrika Korps on 3 February 1941 (he, like Montgomery, was a second choice too), and from 15 August of the newly formed Panzer Army Africa, the victory at Tobruk earned him the promotion to field marshal. Relentless, ambitious and energetic, Rommel became popular amongst his troops for his attitude to sharing their difficulties, but was often in trouble with both his subordinates and his superiors. Always a field commander but not a strategist, he was given command of Army Group B in France, and fought in Normandy in 1944 until he was wounded on 17 July. He committed suicide on 14 October because of his alleged involvement in the plot against Hitler.
4. Rommel aboard his half-tracked command vehicle, named ‘Greif’ (griffin).
ROMMEL’S REPLACEMENT
General Georg Stumme, who replaced Rommel at the head of the Panzer Army Africa up to his death on 24 October, fought in the Balkans and on the Eastern Front until June 1942, when he was found guilty of the loss of some restricted documents that had fallen into Soviet hands. Sentenced to five years, he was released thanks to his superiors and sent to Egypt.
There was a crucial factor in command and leadership during the Western Desert campaign, and that was the fact that practically none of the leaders stationed there actually possessed either an exact knowledge, or any kind of experience, with mechanised warfare in such an area. Experience gained during the first half of 1941 was therefore important, even more so than that gained during the last months while fighting in Operation Crusader. In this respect the Axis were, following the arrival of General Rommel, greatly advantaged over their adversaries for the very simple reason that Rommel soon turned into some kind of ‘generalissimo’, and was to lead both the German and the Italian units for most of the campaign, before sickness forced him to take leave in September 1942. Upon his arrival in Libya, Rommel was in fact subordinated tactically to the Italian theatre command, while also bound strategically to the German High Command’s directives. Rommel’s personality, part of his command and leadership qualities, soon brought him either to ignore orders or directives, or to bend them to suit his own needs, no matter where these actually came from. This enabled him not only to become a sort of leading commander, which he actually was following the creation of the Panzer Army Africa (which practically put the Italian units under his command) in August 1941, but also to gain experience from his own mistakes.
The opposite was true on the British side. Not only were commanders in the Western Desert subordinated to the Middle East Command, responsible for the entire theatre and its many needs as well, but also their frequent shifting meant that hardly any commanders could turn experience – including mistakes – into new lessons, and take advantage of them. In 1940–41 Middle East Command was held by General Archibald Wavell, with General Richard O’Connor in command of the Western Desert Force; Wavell was replaced shortly after O’Connor’s capture during Rommel’s drive into Cyrenaica in spring 1941 and, by the summer of 1941, there were both a new Middle East commander – General Claude Auchinleck – and a new Eighth Army commander, General Alan Cunningham. The latter’s poor performances during Operation Crusader led to him being replaced right in the middle of the battle by General Neil Ritchie, who was himself eventually sacked after the Tobruk disaster in 1942. General Auchinleck took over command of the Eighth Army on 25 June.
Regardless of any possible evaluation of British generalship in the Western Desert, one ought to remark on the fact that Rommel was to face five different commanders on the field (not including Middle East Command) before General Bernard Law Montgomery was eventually appointed Eighth Army’s commander in August 1942. Without comparing Auchinleck’s and Montgomery’s command and leadership qualities, it is undoubtedly true that the latter’s strong-willed, simple and straightforward method of command would bring a rather necessary, not to say also welcome, change to an otherwise crippled situation, until then largely dominated by uncertainty, dispersion and infighting.
Bernard Law Montgomery
When he took over command of the Eighth Army, ‘Monty’ knew well he had two enemies: the Panzer Army Africa and its commander, Rommel.
Born 1887 in London, but of Anglo-Irish descent, as son of a bishop he was quite an outsider in the still socially restricted Army Officers Corps. After the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, he was commissioned in the Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 1908. His first four years of service were spent in India, and he was severely wounded shortly after the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Awarded a DSO, he served then as a staff officer and, after the Staff College at Camberley, became a major in 1920 and was eventually promoted major general in 1938. In 1939 he was given command of 3rd Division, and he was to briefly command II Corps at Dunkerque. For the next two years he was in Britain with the Home Army, until he took over command of the Eighth Army as a second choice (General Gott, chosen for the command, died in an air crash). His self-confidence, coupled with an irksome personality, largely contributed to his unpopularity with subordinates and fellow commanders, even though his strict handling of discipline and training were amongst the factors that contributed to his military successes. Promoted general and knighted after Alamein, he became a field marshal on 1 September 1944 and was raised to peerage in 1946, when he became Chief of Imperial General Staff. Retired in 1958, he died at his home near Alton, Hampshire, in 1976.
5. General Montgomery, wearing the Australian bush hat, standing atop a Crusader tank.
Also, Montgomery’s lack of innovative or broadsighted views, coupled with his lack of experience with Western Desert warfare, would come at the right moment for Alamein was, for the first time since the war had started in this theatre, an area not really suitable for mobile, mechanised warfare, especially given the conditions of the two opposing armies. This eventually led ‘Monty’ to beat Rommel using a very simple command method: sticking to what he knew his forces could do without even trying to face the ‘Desert Fox’ on his terms, which many other British commanders had mistakenly tried to do.
One of the reasons behind the success of O’Connor’s offensive of 1940–41 was the availability of some of the finest men and units in the British Army. The 7th Armoured Division (famously nicknamed the ‘Desert Rats’) had been formed in fact from the Mobile Force, itself created by General Percy Hobart, one of the leading innovative minds of the interwar period. Formed by a small group of pre-war regular, professional soldiers, the Western Desert Force also relied on the contribution of the 4th Indian Division first, and of the 6th Australian in the second part of the offensive.
The role played by the Commonwealth, Imperial and Dominion forces can hardly be underestimated for, until the summer of 1942, they provided about the half of the combat units that faced the Panzer Army Africa. Being reorganised after Dunkerque, the British Army would in fact mostly provide armoured units, those most suited for the battlefeld, while the others were mainly infantry formations. It ought to be said that they actually excelled in that role, demonstrated by the excellent performances of the Australian infantry during the early phases of the siege at Tobruk in April–May 1941.
In 1939 the Australian Army only comprised a very small number of regulars, less than 3,000, out of an army numbering some 83,000. Given the reluctance of the Australian government to impose sacrifices again to a population already suffering from the losses of the First World War, the four divisions eventually raised for overseas service (6th, 7th, 8th and 9th) were made exclusively of volunteers, while conscription was introduced only for service in the home defence force. In June 1940 the 1st Australian Corps (with 6th, 7th and 9th divisions) were deployed in the Middle East and, from February 1941, part of the 6th Division joined British and New Zealand forces in Greece, eventually fighting alongside them at Crete the following May.
The Australian forces were to suffer most from the constant shifting of units to and from the front; while the 9th Australian Division held the Tobruk fortress (relieved in October by the rebuilt British 70th Infantry Division), the 7th Australian Division fought in Syria before being eventually withdrawn, along with the 6th Division early in 1942. The 9th Division only returned to the front in July 1942, and was actually withdrawn back to Australia after the Alamein battle.
Losses suffered by the Australian Army in the war against Germany totalled 19,351 troops, which included 3,552 killed (2,610 of which in action), 6,874 prisoners and 8,925 wounded or injured, clearly demonstrating the true extent of its involvement in the Western Desert war.
HOBART’S ‘FUNNIES’
General Sir Percy Hobart formed the 7th Armoured Division in Egypt, but retired in 1939. Rescued from retirement by Churchill in 1941, he first formed the 11th and then the 79th Armoured Division, the latter equipped with special Royal Engineers armoured vehicles (nicknamed ‘Hobart’s funnies’), used to open passages across minefields and other obstacles.
A similar fate was to befall other non-British forces. The Indian Army, which in 1939 was an all-volunteer force, still largely led by British officers, rose from an initial strength of 352,000 in 1939 (comprising 205,000 Indians), to a total strength of 2,500,000 by the end of the war, making it the largest all-volunteer army. India’s relative proximity to the Middle East, coupled with the ongoing reorganisation of the British Army, led to the early deployment of the 4th Indian Division in Egypt, which in December 1940 was to take part in O’Connor’s offensive, before being relieved by the 6th Australian Division. The 4th Indians were transferred to the frontline again in November 1941 and were deployed during Operation Crusader, but were replaced by the 5th Indians (who had fought the Italians in East Africa), plus elements of the 10th Indian Division, in May 1942 at Gazala. However, the 4th Indian Division was ordered back to the frontline in June–July 1942, while the 5th was withdrawn to Burma. Meanwhile, 4th, 8th and 10th Indian divisions fought until 1945, eventually taking part in the Italian campaign.
Unlike the Indian Army, the South African Army was only a small contingent that in September 1939 totalled just 5,385 men. Recruited on a voluntary basis too, although black soldiers were excluded from combat duties, the South Africans eventually formed three infantry divisions and first saw action in East Africa before being redeployed to Egypt, just in time to take part in Operation Crusader. By September 1941 there were some 60,000 (plus some other 15,000 black) South African soldiers in Egypt, in fact the peak of South Africa’s war effort. Not a lucky one, since Crusader was the first of a series of unfortunate engagements which saw the South African forces suffering heavy losses; during the battle of Sidi Rezegh the 1st South African Division lost one-third of its strength, while the 2nd Division lost more than 10,722 at Tobruk in June 1942, being practically wiped out. Like the Australian 9th Division, the 1st South Africans were withdrawn after Alamein, eventually to be used to create the 6th Armoured Division that fought in Italy from April 1944.
Last, but not least, New Zealand’s contribution to the Western Desert campaign was to turn into quite an important one; with a population of only 1,630,000, New Zealanders were to suffer more losses than any other part of the British Empire. The 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF), as opposed to the 1st NZEF in the First World War, eventually represented the equivalent of twenty-five British divisions in proportion to the population. The first echelons of the New Zealand Division (officially redesignated 2nd New Zealand Division in June 1942) arrived in Egypt in February 1940, and until March 1941 the division was scattered between the Middle East and the United Kingdom. Subsequently, it fought in Greece and at Crete, taking part in the relief of Tobruk during Operation Crusader in November 1941. This first period saw the loss of some 10,000 men, which was followed by further severe losses in June and July 1942, when the division was deployed in the battles at Mersa Matruh and the first at Alamein – its total strength shrinking from 20,000 to 13,000 in a single month. Called the spearhead of the Eighth Army, the 2nd New Zealand Division should have been withdrawn after Alamein, but it eventually fought all the way until the end of the war in Italy.
One of the greatest problems the Eighth Army faced during the Western Desert campaign was the constant shifting of its forces, all too often redeployed elsewhere for other duties or simply withdrawn from the frontline, with the consequence of an ever-changing order of battle. With some twenty divisions under command in 1941–42, it is quite remarkable that no more than four to five of them actually fought in more than two battles for a prolonged period of time. Such a state of affairs led on the one hand to the eventual rest and refit of some divisions, which would be returned to the front fully restored; on the other hand, this prevented those units from gaining – and making a good use – of the same experience and hardship that characterised the German and elite Italian forces.
These problems were particularly true for the British Army which, apart from the units previously mentioned, was (since September 1939) a conscript force. Whatever advantage this may have been in terms of manpower availability, this was to be largely wasted because of a series of factors. Firstly, men (either volunteers or drafted) were allowed to choose a branch of service, which meant that the keener ones, and often best fitted, chose either the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force. The creation of a large number of special forces, such as the Commandos, also drained and eventually dispersed a large number of the men more suitable for combat. Furthermore, infantry was no longer seen as the queen of the battlefield and, by October 1941, only three out of ten soldiers were serving in it. Armoured units were not the only ones to receive a large intake, for the proportion of ‘tooth to tail’ (the ratio between combat (tooth) and service, supply and support (tail) troops) also increased to the latter’s favour and, at the same time, about a quarter of the men in the army belonged to supplies, services and technical units.
All these factors largely contributed to a widespread dispersion of the army units and the divisions in particular, only a portion of which would actually see action on the battlefield (nine out of the eleven armoured divisions formed, twenty-five out of a total of thirty-four infantry divisions formed). The developments of the Western Desert Force, or the Eighth Army from 26 September 1941, are meaningful; in April 1941 the inexperienced and understrength 2nd Armoured Division, that had been sent to the Middle East in October 1940, was destroyed during Rommel’s first offensive into Cyrenaica. The lack of experienced units was clear by November 1941, when Operation Crusader started and the Eighth Army only deployed two British divisions on the frontline: the experienced 7th Armoured Division and the 70th Infantry Division, which was the rebuilt (and renumbered) 6th Division reformed from the Western Desert Force. The fact that, after Crusader, this was sent to the Far East and eventually split up to form special forces units is a clear waste of the experience those men had gained.
By the time of the Gazala battle in May 1942, the situation had barely improved since the British Army had at the front only two armoured (1st and 7th) and one infantry divisions (50th, first time in action since the redeployment to the Middle East in April 1941), plus another three armoured and one motor infantry brigade. The fact that the 10th Armoured Division, which had been formed in August 1941 from the 1st Cavalry Division deployed in the Middle East early in 1940, only saw first action in June–July 1942 is revealing of the delay with which the British Army was able to face the needs of the Western Desert war.
The Eighth Army Soldier
In October 1942 the Eighth Army was a mixture of all kind of troops, only partially accustomed to the desert either because many were newly arrived replacements, or fresh units transferred from Britain. It did not take long before personal experience, or the valuable lessons given by veterans, quickly led to adaptation in a whole variety of matters. Dress turned from formal to practical, with large use of desert boots and shorts during the day along with the useful scarf and sand goggles, the only protection actually available. Sand was in fact everybody’s nightmare for it was everywhere, not just around the soldiers but also on their clothes, and above all in their food. Availability of large quantities of canned food, particularly canned beef, made Eighth Army soldiers’ diet satisfactory, although not always palatable. Water was a sore subject, with all too often less than five litres per man per day, inclusive of cooking, washing and drinking which, generally, was limited to a single litre per day. The basic rule of ‘if in doubt, brew it’ was also a necessity, since tea was more drinkable than water. Regardless of lack of water, personal hygiene was more than just a commodity in the desert; hot weather and sand would turn any scratch, cut or graze into an infected ‘desert sore’ spreading all over the body. In such conditions, even small comforts like adequate shelters, some ‘V’ cigarettes and Stella beer were much appreciated, though not as much as leave to Alexandria or Cairo.
6. Eighth Army’s infantry advancing First World War style, with bayonets fixed.
In fact, it was only after the summer of 1942 that the British Army committed a large number of its units to this area and it is well worth noting how those units – which included the 1st, 7th and 10th Armoured, 44th, 50th and 51st Infantry divisions – were eventually to form its backbone during the campaigns that followed in Tunisia, Italy, Normandy and North-West Europe.
The Italian Army was made exclusively of draftees, and since, from an Italian strategic perspective, Libya and Italian East Africa would be lost in the event of war against France and Great Britain, the area was filled with second-rate infantry units only intended to hold the colony as long as possible. Few changes took place after the fall of France, and while the actual army organisation remained the same – with its two field armies (Fifth and Tenth), and twelve infantry or equivalent divisions (‘Pavia’, ‘Bologna’, ‘Brescia’, ‘Savona’, ‘Sabratha’, ‘Sirte’, ‘Marmarica’, ‘Catanzaro’, ‘Cirene’ and three Blackshirts divisions), plus two Libyan divisions – one ad hoc armoured brigade (‘Babini’, after its commander) was formed using two medium tank battalions shipped from Italy. The destruction of the Tenth Army at Sidi Barrani and Beda Fomm also meant the annihilation of seven infantry divisions and of the two Libyan divisions, leaving only some four operational divisions (Pavia, Bologna, Brescia and Savona, all lacking artillery), plus the badly mauled Sabratha. The belated acknowledgement of the Western Desert as a ‘mechanised’ theatre of war, along with the readdressing of the Italian strategic priorities, meant that new units sent to Libya were either armoured or motorised; these included, between January and September 1941, the armoured Ariete, and the motorised Trento and Trieste divisions. Although far from being the real elite, a status both the Ariete and the Trieste would earn on the battlefield, they still were the bulk of the Italian strategic reserve and, given their actual equipment, had been better trained than the rest of the army.
7. Italian medium tanks of the Ariete Division.
The Italian forces in the Western Desert formed thus two different armies: one army made of mobile, mechanised units roughly comparable to the German Afrika Korps – the Ariete and the Trieste, forming the mobile army corps (later renamed XX Army Corps) – and the other one made of footslogged infantry, used initially to lay siege around Tobruk and, in 1942, to hold the line and deliver feint attacks against the Gazala line. Manpower and organisation were only one of the many problems afflicting the Italian Army in Libya; lack of motor vehicles meant that losses could hardly be replaced, and so the Trento Division was downgraded to an infantry one in autumn 1941. On the other hand, infantry were well down the requirements list with the consequence that, between June 1940 and October 1942 only some 195,000 men were sent to North Africa (which was about one-fourth of the total strength sent to Albania). Taking into account the fact that the Italians also had to secure Libya and the Sahara, losses and attrition meant that, by early 1942, frontline units lacked strength and a major reorganisation was needed; this led to the new ‘type 1942’ divisional organisation based on the ‘less men, more weapons’ concept which the Germans developed at the same time. However, on the Italian side that actually meant that infantry divisions were to shrink to a total strength of less than 7,000, and even the Ariete and the Trieste were to have an established strength of 8,300 and 6,700. In fact, actual strength was always much lower than the established strength: between May and June 1942 both the Bologna and Brescia divisions only had an average of some 4,500 men, while both Pavia and Sabratha’s strengths fell down from some 4,400 to about 3,000. The Trento Division did maintain a strength of some 5,000, while that of the Trieste dropped from 6,700 to 4,700, and the Ariete actually increased from 6,800 to 7,200. Considering that by mid-1942 most of the Italian soldiers in Libya had not had any period of leave back home, it is hardly surprising that the Italians were to gravely suffer from a manpower crisis during the first Alamein battle.
‘MORE WEAPONS, LESS MEN’
After the heavy losses suffered during Operation Crusader, the Axis forces in the Western Desert were reorganised by reducing personnel in their establishments, given the scarcity of replacements. In the meantime, units were allotted more and heavier weapons, which led to the ‘more weapons, less men’ concept.
In July the Sabratha (now some 2,000 strong) was annihilated by an Australian attack and subsequently disbanded, while the badly mauled Pavia was downgraded as fit for rear area duties only. Like the Germans, the Italians brought reinforcements to Egypt as well; these included the ‘Littorio’ Armoured Division, which since the spring had been deployed at Tripoli ready to seize Tunisia in case of need (needless to say, this was a task the division was not able to perform when actually required to do so), and the ‘Folgore’ Parachute Division, which had been formed to be part of the assault force against Malta. At the time of the second Alamein battle, the Italians had a nucleus of experienced and battle-worthy divisions like the Ariete and the Trieste, one single real elite unit like the Folgore Division and a large number of understrength infantry divisions, able only (at the best) to hold the line.
INFANTRY IN THE DESERT
Often referred to as a mobile and mechanised war, the campaign in the Western Desert also included a great deal of footslogged infantry – soldiers lacking any form of motor transport. Most of the Italian infantry units did not have their own vehicles, and soldiers were required to march on foot unless these could be provided.
The Italian debacle of winter 1940–41 made the German intervention in Libya necessary, at first with the simple aim of delivering a ‘blocking force’ to halt the British advance. The first German unit sent to Libya in February 1941 was the 5th Light Division, in fact an ad hoc unit built around the bulk of 3rd Panzer Division’s armoured units (this was the unit that in 1940 should have been sent to Libya) and a rather large amount of anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. Hitler’s decision to create the Afrika Korps was followed by the decision to send to Libya the newly formed 15th Panzer Division as well, although its actual arrival in the area was delayed and it could not help to prevent the Australians from holding the Tobruk fortress. In August 1941, shortly before the creation of Panzer Army Africa Command, both divisions were reorganised, and the 5th Light was renamed 21st Panzer Division: their established strength stood at about 13–14,000, although it was actually lower. Facing a shortage of infantry, the reorganisation had actually seen 21st Panzer Division reinforced with some of 15th Panzer Division’s infantry units, already in late June, and those of the 90th Light ‘Africa’ Division, with both newly arrived units and others already available on the spot; in fact, at the time of the Gazala battle it was still forming and it was not until August 1942, after the reorganisation undertaken in early 1942, that it reached its peak established strength of some 14,500. Both 15th and 21st Panzer divisions were also reorganised on the ‘more weapons, less men’ concept, their actual strength dropping to some 11,000.
Like the Italian Army, the German units were to suffer from attrition too; the fast advance into Egypt, and the battles fought at Matruh and Alamein, depleted a rather small force and, in July, Rommel was to face a crisis in the Afrika Korps too. Replacements and reinforcements were brought in, this time focusing on infantry; in July and August both the Parachute Brigade ‘Ramcke’ (named after its commander, intended to attack Malta like the Folgore Division) and the 164th Light ‘Africa’ Division, formed from units deployed at Crete, were sent to Egypt to add some 18,000 men to the Panzer Army Africa strength. However, their hurried redeployment, right in the middle of the desert in full summer, made any kind of acclimatisation impossible. The consequence was that while the Germans reached their peak strength in the desert, they also suffered from a similar increase in sicknesses. To this was added the poor overall quality of some of the replacements, which eventually led Rommel to notice how, at the time of Montgomery’s offensive at El Alamein, the Panzer Army seriously suffered from a shortage of personnel; not only did it lack some 17,000 men, but of those available no more than a third were desert veterans, or the kind of soldiers Rommel was used to relying on.
The Panzer Army Africa Soldier
Largely unaccustomed to tropics and the desert, the Germans faced many troubles from their arrival in Libya. Their situation actually worsened in Egypt, mainly because the overstretched supply lines and the priority given to fuel and ammunition soon led to a widespread lack of food and water. During the summer of 1942 both German and Italian soldiers experienced hunger for the first time since the beginning of the Western Desert campaign. Only from late September–early October did the situation improve, but a heavy toll had already been paid. During the last months of the campaign the Panzer Army had an average of more than 10,000 cases of sickness, mostly due to the hot weather and the inadequate diet (water too was scarcely available, and the daily ration to drink was limited to a single canteen per soldier, which is three quarters of a litre). Lack of most of the commodities and the comforts largely available to Eighth Army soldiers, at least that was the general perception, further aggravated the miserable life of the German and Italian soldier, who considered any kind of canned food, drink or liquor captured from the enemy an enviable booty! Additionally, unlike the Eighth Army, most of the Axis veterans in the desert had no chance at all to enjoy anything like leave to Cairo, and could only partly comfort themselves with the popular tune ‘Lili Marlene’, which was aired every night on the radio.
8. German soldiers in the desert. Second El Alamein was the first infantry battle to be fought in the Western Desert and in North Africa.
One of the characteristics of the soldiers in the British, Australian, Indian, South African and New Zealand armies that fought in the Western Desert campaign was that, regardless of their nationality and the unit they belonged to, their appearance was practically always the same, with the most notable exceptions of the headgear used by the Australian and New Zealand, not to mention the Indian, soldiers.
However, in spite of first appearances, there were peculiar differences in their uniforms and equipment: a noticeable difference was the steel helmet used by the Australians which, in spite of a remarkable similarity to the British Mark II helmet, was in fact home produced. At their arrival in the Middle East soldiers were given a sort of ‘tropical kit’, which included a tropical pith helmet, a khaki drill shirt and shorts, long woollen socks and woollen hose tops, cloth puttees or gaiters, leather ankle boots (ammunition boots), and a woollen cardigan, while retaining the European uniform made of battledress blouse and trousers, and the greatcoat. A khaki drill service dress was also issued, made of an open collar jacket with four pockets and long trousers. The cardigan, like the European battledress and greatcoat, was used as protection from the cold at night, and items such as leather jerkins and sheepskin coats were also used during the winter in temperate areas like northern Cyrenaica. Pith helmets were replaced in battle by the steel helmet, and during service by forage caps, berets (mainly tank and armoured units), bonnets (Scottish units), and the usual Australian bush hat and the Indian turban when necessary.
The 1937 pattern web equipment was used in the Mediterranean and Europe as well; it was made of canvas with a large belt to which two universal web pouches were fitted (these could carry magazines for the Bren gun, as well as ammunition clips for the rifle and hand grenades), with two braces worn over the shoulders, crossing at the back and buckled to the rear of the belt. A bayonet ‘frog’ (a leather or canvas sheath) and canteen, both secured to the web, were usually worn along – since 1942 – with an entrenching tool made of a spade and separate handle; packs (either small or large) were also used to carry other items, as well as the anti-gas equipment, never popular and seldom used. Officers had the customary pistol holster and ammo pouch. The most common weapons did not differ much from those used during the First World War, these were the Webley .38 revolver, the Mark III Short Magazine Lee Enfield .303 rifle, and the US Thompson M1928 .45 sub-machine gun; heavy weapons included the .303 Bren light machine gun (with a 29 round magazine, which could fire 500 rounds per minute), the .303 Vickers Mark I heavy machine gun (firing 400–500 rounds per minute), 2in. and 3in. mortars and the .55 Boys Mark I anti-tank rifle that could penetrate some 14mm of armour at 500 metres. The No. 36 Mills hand grenade, with different weights, was standard. The gap between the light Bren gun and the heavy Vickers made both German and Italian machine guns, whenever available, much appreciated; on 23 October the 9th Australian Division had seventy-one German machine guns, twenty-eight light and nine heavy Italian machine guns.
9. Two ‘Tommies’ manning a 2in. mortar wearing the full kit, including backpacks and entrenching tools.
COMFORTABLE OR NOT?
Two items of tropical clothing became famous, for different reasons. The Italian ‘sahariana’ jacket was well cut and could be easily worn with or without a shirt which, along with the good cotton used, made it popular. British ‘Bombay bloomers’ – trousers, cut to be folded into shorts, were too large and unpractical, which made them unpopular.
The Italian tropical uniform was slightly different from the British version; made of khaki cotton, it was cut in a way similar to the grey-green European uniform (also used in winter and temperate areas) with an open collar jacket and four pockets, a shirt, breeches worn with cloth puttees, and ankle boots. Unlike the British, the Italians liked their tropical pith helmet and wore them for almost every occasion, often preferring them to the model 1933 steel helmet. A much welcome addition in 1942 was a peaked field cap, similar to the German version. The most interesting, and widely appreciated, item of Italian uniform was the ‘sahariana’ jacket, with its typical ‘winged’ chest pockets; very comfortable in every condition, it was used by officers and a variant (a blouse) was also produced for the other ranks. Folgore Division paratroopers wore the special forces’ collarless version of the sahariana, although at Alamein they were seen mostly barebacked wearing only shorts and the pith helmet (paratroopers were issued with rubber-soled jump boots, a unique rarity in the Italian Army, but these had to be replaced with standard boots while in Egypt because the rubber melted). Italians greatly appreciated, like the Germans, items captured from the British and in particular the shorts, which were longer and more comfortable than their (and the German) version.
Personal equipment was quite different; soldiers only had a small brown leather belt, with an inverted ‘U’ shaped loop running around the neck to support two magazine pouches worn on the front. The belt was also used to carry the bayonet frog, but both the canteen and the canvas gas mask canister, or alternatively a breadbag (a small haversack), were worn with their own straps. Officers used a leather ‘Sam Browne’ style belt and sling, which ran across the chest, over the right shoulder and carried the pistol holster. Weapons included the semi-automatic 9mm Beretta 34 pistol (which, according to a popular joke, was more lethal if thrown at the enemy), as well as different versions of the 6.5mm Mannlicher-Carcano 91 muskets, the most typical one with a foldable bayonet. The 6.5mm Breda 30 light machine gun was the equivalent of the Bren with a 20 cartridge magazine and a rate of 400–500 rounds per minute, although it lacked reliability, while the 8mm Breda 37 and Fiat 35 heavy machine guns (with a rate of fire of 450 rounds per minute) were preferable to the Vickers, being air cooled. Paratroopers only were issued the Beretta 38 9mm sub-machine gun. Additionally, 2in. and 3in. mortars were available, along with different types of anti-tank rifles. Italian hand grenades were too light and scarcely effective.
The Germans were latecomers to tropical warfare, and heavily relied on their First World War experience; in 1940–41 a tropical uniform was issued, made of olive-coloured cotton with an open collar field blouse with four pockets, a cotton shirt, long and short trousers (too short and not very popular, unless at rest), lace-up canvas and leather boots, either knee or ankle length (the latter being preferred), and a greatcoat. Pith helmets were issued and used for a while, replaced by the standard Model 35 steel helmet in combat, but both the standard forage cap and the newly issued field peaked cap were much more popular. A canvas waist belt and ‘Y’ shaped suspenders were made to match their European equivalent; cartridge pouches were two groups of three (leather), and normal equipment worn on the belt included an entrenching tool, bayonet frog, breadbag and canteen, while on the back an ‘assault’ kit could be worn to carry a tent quarter and a mess kit. The characteristic metal, round gas mask canister was worn with its own straps. In the field, these uniforms proved uncomfortable and scarcely resistant, and whenever possible either Italian or British items were used.
10. German infantry marching in the desert, all well laden. The man on the left is carrying a MG34 light machine gun.
Standard weapons in use included the 9mm semi-automatic Walther P38 or Luger P08, the 7.92mm Mauser carbine 98K, and the 9mm MP38/40 machine pistol (the ‘Schmeisser’), a reliable and much appreciated weapon. The Germans did not have light or heavy machine guns, but rather a single, standard machine gun which was used either as a light machine gun when firing from its own bipod, or as a heavy machine gun if mounted on its foldable tripod mount. The standard machine gun was the ‘Spandau’ or 7.92mm MG34 that could fire 800–900 rounds per minute. This already very effective weapon was matched by the new version, the MG42, some samples of which were also used at Alamein; similar in its design, this could fire 900–1,200 rounds per minute, making it one of the most lethal weapons used in the Western Desert. On the other hand, the 7.92mm PzB38 and 39 anti-tank rifles were not quite as effective, while both the 50mm and 81mm mortars were. The German hand grenades were quite different from all others, with their characteristic stick and rounded cap, 36cm long, these were very effective too since the stick enabled soldiers to throw them over longer distances, and their explosive charge made them lethal in a 20-metre radius.
While no great improvement was seen in infantry weapons, tanks and anti-tank guns were constantly improved during the whole Western Desert campaign. In 1940 the Italian Army was quite behind in tank development, in spite of producing relatively large numbers; in 1940 about half of its tank strength in Libya was made of the light L3 tankette, weighing 3 tons and armed with twin 8mm machine guns in the hull. The rest was made of the medium M11 tank (100 produced), 11 tons of weight armed with a 37mm gun in the hull and two 8mm machine guns in the turret, and of the newly produced M13/40 tanks, weighing 14 tons, with a frontal armour of 30mm, armed with a 47mm gun in the turret and two 8mm machine guns in the hull. British tanks were roughly equivalent with the light Mark VI (5.2 tons, armed with a twin Vickers machine guns in the turret), and the Marks I, II and IV Cruiser tank (13–14 tons, one 2 pounder gun and two to three Vickers or Besa machine guns, armour 14–30mm). The arrival of the Matilda II Infantry Tanks, which equipped 7th Royal Tank Regiment during O’Connor’s offensive, was to make the difference; this 27-ton tank with a frontal armour of 78mm, though still armed with a 2 pounder gun and one machine gun, was virtually invulnerable to the Italian tanks and anti-tank guns, the latter being the 47/32 gun which was roughly equivalent to the British standard 2 pounder (40mm) gun. Actually, the latter could penetrate up to 40mm of armour at 1,000 metres, a performance which the Italian gun could only achieve at some 500 metres.
11. A Universal Carrier and a Matilda infantry tank; early British victories against the Italians in 1940–41 came thanks to this tank, practically invulnerable to Axis anti-tank guns.
12. A German Panzer IV tank blown up from the inside.
The German tanks brought some innovations to the armoured warfare in the Western Desert, though they were hardly superior to their British equivalent. Apart from the light Panzer II tank (9 tons, armed with a 20mm gun and a 7.92mm machine gun in the turret), used along with the few Panzer I tanks in a reconnaissance role (the latter roughly the equivalent of the Italian L3 tankette, 21st Panzer Division had twenty of them in August 1941), the bulk of German armour was provided by the medium Panzer III tank, which in its version ‘G’ weighed 20 tons, had a 50mm gun, two 7.92mm machine guns and a frontal armour of 30mm, and was the standard main battle tank. The medium Panzer IV (weight 20–21 tons, armed with a short-barrelled 75mm gun and two 7.92mm machine guns, armour 30mm thick in the ‘D’ and ‘E’ versions) was intended to provide support, although it was also used against enemy tanks. Even the Italian tanks saw some improvements, although the Ariete Division arrived in Libya still equipped with some 120 light L3 tankettes (twenty-four of them armed with a flamethrower), by the autumn of 1941 it had been re-equipped with both the M13/40 and the new M14/41 tanks, the latter an improved version with a more powerful engine and slightly thicker (42mm) frontal armour. The British tank inventory also saw some changes; the light Mark VI was soon withdrawn, followed in late 1941 – mostly after Operation Crusader – by the Mark I, II and IV Cruiser tanks, and the Mark II Matilda. Early the same year the new Mark VI Crusader tank was introduced, weighing 20 tons, armed with a 6 pounder (57mm) gun and one or two Besa 7.92mm machine guns, and with a frontal armour 51mm thick. This was followed in July 1941 by the American-built M3 ‘Stuart’ or ‘Honey’ tank as the British tank crews renamed it (thanks to its reliability and handling) which, although a light tank weighing 12 tons, was armed with a 37mm gun and two .30 or .50 machine guns, and had a frontal armour up to 57mm thick. Later on the Mark III Valentine was introduced; an infantry tank weighing 16 tons and armed with a 2 pounder gun (6 pounder since spring 1942), and with frontal armour 65mm thick.
As a matter of fact, the German (not to mention the Italian) armour did not enjoy any kind of superiority against their British adversaries, rather the opposite in many cases since the 6 pounder gun was able to penetrate their armour even at more than 1,000-metre range. On the contrary, the German 50mm gun could only penetrate some 36–42mm (the latter only when using the improved, tungsten-core, armour piercing grenade) at the same range. German armour could only effectively deal with the more heavily armoured British tanks at a range of 100 metres using the short-barrelled 75mm gun of the Panzer IV tank. Even the German anti-tank guns available, the 37mm 35/36 and the new 50mm 38 guns, were scarcely effective; the former, only able to penetrate some 29mm thick armour at 500 metres, was virtually useless and was therefore nicknamed ‘door knocker’. The latter, able to penetrate 59–72mm at 500 metres, was quite a good weapon though mainly useful at close range. Only the dual purpose anti-tank and anti-aircraft 88mm gun, able to penetrate more than 120mm armour at 2,000 metres, was a real tank killer, but it was available in very limited quantities and only thirty-nine of them were at the front in August 1942. The Germans were, on the other hand, the first to recognise the need for an improved anti-tank capability, and reacted promptly even if mostly with impromptu solutions; using the Soviet-built 76.2mm gun, large quantities of which had been captured during the early stages of the attack against the Soviet Union, they managed to provide a suitable anti-tank gun able to deal with the British tanks. Available either as a towed gun or on a self-propelled mount (either on the chassis of the Czech-built Panzer 38 tank, or on that of the German 7-ton prime mover), it could penetrate 82–94mm thick armour at 1,000 metres, being still very effective at a 1,500-metre range (up to 2,000 metres).
13. A German 88mm dual purpose gun in action, still mounted on its wheeled carriage.
14. Loading ammunition into an M3 Lee/Grant tank.
It was in fact thanks to this ‘tank buster’ that Rommel’s Afrika Korps was able to deal with the British armour during the Gazala battle in May–June 1942. At the time, the latter had seen a major improvement thanks to the arrival of the American-built M3 medium Lee/Grant tank, weighing 29 tons, armed with a hull mounted 75mm gun and a turret mounted 37mm gun (plus one to three .30–.50 machine guns), and with a frontal armour 57mm thick. First met at Gazala, it came as an immense shock to the Germans who managed to deal with it mainly thanks to their 76.2mm guns. In the meantime, new Axis armour became available; the Italians introduced their 75mm self-propelled gun (15 tons, 50mm thick armour), along with the first samples of the German long-barrelled 50mm and 75mm guns, Panzer III ‘J’ and Panzer IV ‘F’ arrived and, thanks to their improved guns (the former could penetrate 57–72mm of armour at 500 metres, the latter 72mm at 1,500 metres) and armour (50mm thick), gained an edge over their adversaries.
MONTY’S ‘SECRET WEAPON’
The American-built M4 medium Sherman tank was Montgomery’s ‘secret weapon’ at El Alamein. With good armour and a top speed of some 30km per hour on rugged terrain, it was armed with a 75mm M3 gun which could fire and destroy the enemy tanks at a range of more than 2km. A first batch of 300 Shermans was withdrawn from American tank units and sent to North Africa after Gazala. Although one of the vessels carrying them was sunk en route, by 11 September 1942 a total of 318 Shermans had been delivered.
Thanks to the arrival of the American-built M4 medium Sherman tank (50 tons, 75mm main gun and two machine guns, 76mm thick armour), along with the 6 pounder anti-tank gun, the British Army regained that edge in time for the Alamein battle. Using the capped shell, which enabled the 75mm gun to penetrate the steel-hardened armour of the German tanks, the Sherman was able to deal with them at a 2,000-metre range (the 6 pounder was mainly effective at 1,000 metres). With the Panzer definitively outgunned, not to say largely outnumbered too, the Eighth Army held the decisive advantage at Alamein.
The basic innovation in the tactics used in the Western Desert campaign was introduced by the Afrika Korps, which took best advantage of the German ‘mission tactics’ command system. This was based on a simple method; commanders were given orders simply stating their mission, not how to accomplish it. The high level of flexibility and manoeuvreability this system allowed was integrated by the large use of ‘combat groups’, formed around basic units of the divisions (like the Panzer or the infantry regiments), made up of a mixture of tanks and infantry, and integrated with anti-tank guns and artillery. Close inter-arms coordination and cooperation was also a key factor in the German Army; armour would not operate alone but in close relation with both the infantry and the artillery, in order to be able to face any possible kind of enemy unit.
15. Close inspection of an abandoned German 88mm anti-aircraft and anti-tank gun, note the Thompson machine pistol carried by the soldier.
These innovative tactics meant that the Germans were able to compensate for the difference between their own and the enemy tanks; a simple tactic largely used in the Western Desert saw the German tanks used as ‘bait’ against the British tanks. They would attack and, if outnumbered or outgunned, withdraw behind an anti-tank gun screen, which was left to deal with the enemy tanks. They would then outmanoeuvre the British tank formations, already badly mauled, attacking them in the flanks and the rear. Such tactics were quite effective not only thanks to the advantage the Germans had due to their 88mm and 76.2mm guns, but also because of the ineffective British response to them. In fact, the British Army mainly relied on the ‘top down’ command system which, to the contrary of the German system, saw commanders issuing detailed orders to their subordinates, who had to carry them out according to plans. This greatly lessened flexibility, and a good deal of manoeuvreability, in combat, with the fatal consequence that the Germans were quicker in reacting to the British moves.
The British Army greatly suffered from insufficient inter-arms cooperation; armoured formations would often attack alone without infantry (and artillery) support and, also given the fact that early British tanks only had armour piercing shells for their main gun (practically useless against infantry and guns), they were simply unable to deal with the German anti-tank screens, which also enjoyed the protection of infantry. The opposite was true for the Eighth Army’s infantry units that, all too often lacking armoured support (and adequate anti-tank guns), were easily overwhelmed by the German ‘battlegroups’, comprising a mixture of tanks, infantry and guns. The harsh lesson, learned during Operation Crusader, saw – in spite of the eventual victory – the loss of 40 per cent of the British armour, against the loss of 38 per cent of the enemy armour (Italians included). Such a serious shortcoming, also a consequence of faulty field communications, led to the creation of brigade groups and the use of ‘Jock columns’ (a rough equivalent of the German battlegroups) which, without any real change in doctrine and fighting methods, proved largely unsuccessful.
16. The officer leading his men holds a Webley pistol in his hand.
At Gazala the Eighth Army was to suffer its greatest tank defeat when the 1st Armoured Division attacked, on 12–13 June, the Afrika Korps in what has been described as a ‘series of confused actions’; this led to the loss of 121 British tanks (against three German tanks), and to the eventual overrunning of the 6th New Zealand Brigade. It is hardly surprising how, following Montgomery’s take over of the Eighth Army, the return to the old tactics and command methods was largely approved and appreciated. But at Alamein, Montgomery was to take full advantage of the fact that now Rommel had to fight on his terms, and was no longer able to benefit from the superior flexibility and manoeuvreability in the open that he had previously enjoyed.
Improved British tactics were a deciding factor in the Alamein battle. Montgomery’s decisive influence was to avoid a battle in the open; rather, the British forces were to break through the enemy defence line and face the counterattack, this time using the anti-tank gun screen tactic against the Axis forces in order to wear them down. This was made possible thanks to the availability of better and improved tanks and anti-tank guns, but was also a decisive innovation which overturned any possible advantage Rommel may have had in the tactical field.