After the failure to break through the Eighth Army’s defences at Alam Halfa, a dispirited Rommel asked permission to withdraw his army off from the Alamein positions. Depressed by having realised that his final goal of reaching Suez was now well beyond his reach, Rommel knew he was forced on the defensive and wanted to shorten his supply lines, while defending a position more suitable for the mobile warfare his army had proven to be superior in. Hitler’s refusal, dictated by political reasons (abandoning ground in Egypt meant acknowledging defeat), led to the decision to defend the Alamein line. Before taking his leave of absence from Africa, Rommel left instructions as to the main feature of the Axis defences: the building of a mined main line of resistance which, in the absence of any other hindrance, was to blunt the enemy offensive. Mine laying had in fact been started already early in July, facing the first counteroffensive at El Alamein, and it was increased in September; until 20 October the German chief engineer, Colonel Hecker, estimated that a total of 445,358 mines had been laid. This figure included 249,849 anti-tank and 14,509 anti-personnel mines, plus some other 181,000-mine strong British minefields had been incorporated into the Axis defences following the withdrawal from Alam Halfa. These minefields had been further reinforced using some 180,000 British mines taken from captured dumps. This enabled the Panzer Army Africa to build a defence line echeloned in depth; stretching over some 37 miles (60km) from the Arab Gulf down to the Qattara Depression, the line was formed by a 500–1,000-metre deep series of outposts, followed by a ‘cushion’ of unmanned defences some 1–2 kilometres deep. Behind the westerly half of the minefields lay the main defence line, some 2 kilometres deep and divided in a ‘chequered’ series of minefields, each one identified with a letter, where the units were deployed in their dug-outs with every battalion covering an approximate 1½ kilometre wide area, up to 5 kilometres deep.
17. A lone Italian sentry of the Folgore Division overlooking the Qattara Depression, south of El Alamein.
Such a defence system was designed to break the waves of the enemy attacking forces, and enable the Axis positions to support each other while the ‘chequered’ minefield, running east to west, prevented the enemy units from either supporting each other or even simply combining their strengths. Basically, the idea was that the enemy forces, after they managed to break through the main line of defence, would have been counterattacked by the Axis mobile mechanised forces with the aim of blunting the offensive and restoring the defence line. This was esentially the German defence tactics, which relied on the firm protection of the main line with the aim of breaking up the attacking forces and, as soon as the ‘point of main effort’ of the enemy attack had been located, to counterattack it using the armoured units which, relying once more on their flexibility and manoeuvreability, would have defeated the enemy and put an end to his attack. Such a system had in fact worked already in July 1942, and the use of a heavily mined defence line could only bring further advantage to it. There were, on the other hand, other factors Rommel, and his temporary successor, had to take into account in their defence plans. The first factor was their sheer lack of manpower; when Operation Lightfoot started on 23 October 1942, the Axis forces had an overall strength of 152,000, 90,000 of which were Germans and 62,000 Italians (plus some other 52,000 in the rear area). These figures take into account, however, all the German and Italian personnel in the area (naval and air force included), while the actual strength of the frontline units of the army – which, in its German part, was also heavily affected by some 10,000 cases of sickness – was much lower.
18. A German engineer laying a mine in a desert track; many of those used at Alamein came from captured British stocks.
EIGHTH ARMY’S SUPPLIES
The Eighth Army required at least 10,500 tons of supplies per day of combat, including some 700 tons of rations and another 900 of water (about 5 tons of rations and 7 tons of water per division), some 900 tons of fuel for tanks and other vehicles, and 144 tons of ammunition per every single regiment of artillery.
Panzer Army Africa’s actual strength was about 110,000, with 53,736 men in the German and 56,123 in the Italian units. The actual combat strength of the German units (including the four German divisions and the parachute brigade, plus corps and army troops) was 48,854, showing how these enjoyed a much more favourable ‘tooth to tail’ ratio. Italian combat strength was 46,174, with 15,386 men in the XXI Corps deployed to the north, 12,195 with the X Corps deployed to the south and 18,593 with the mobile XX Corps. Some other 9,949 men were deployed in the rear area, down to the Sahara, for security duties (these included the Pavia and Young Fascists divisions). Lack of infantry was one of the biggest issues, since only 13,969 German soldiers (belonging to both the 164th Division and the parachute brigade) could be deployed at the front along with the 27,581 Italians, thus giving an average strength per kilometre of about 700 men, although the actual disposition gave a much better ratio to the northern area while to the south of the Deir el Abyan, the front (occupied by the Ramcke parachute brigade and the Italian Bologna, Brescia and Folgore divisions) was only thinly held with an average strength per kilometre of about 550 men. Such a disadvantage was further aggravated by the fact that it was not possible to deploy units according to the ‘corset rods’ principle, which meant interposing German and Italian battalions, thereby avoiding any ‘weak’ (i.e. Italian-held) sections of the line, as in the northern area. There were also other serious issues: German units, regardless of their proximity to the Italian units, could not issue orders to them (these had to be issued by Panzer Army’s command via the appropriate chain), but only at best could they submit a request. Also, the fact that most of the mines laid were anti-tank, rather than anti-personnel devices, meant that a well-organised attack could only be slowed down, but that removal of those mines was only a matter of time. Further along the line, lacking any wood or concrete, the defence positions were simple holes dug in the desert; though very hard to see from ground level (but the Royal Air Force managed to spot them thanks to air reconnaissance), they offered no protection against artillery and air attacks.
19. Italian 75mm self-propelled guns in the desert; the most effective Italian armour was only available in small quantities, and was also hampered by its slow speed.
Problems also afflicted the mobile reserves; with two groups deployed in the north (15th Panzer and Littorio divisions) and in the south (21st Panzer and Ariete), it was possible to promptly face any threat from every direction although the necessary dispersion of reserves also meant that concentrating them to deliver a massive counterattack would have been a clumsy and time-consuming procedure. This was particularly true given the supply conditions of the Panzer Army; with the British naval and air interdiction of the sea lanes back into action, supplies reached Libya and Egypt only on a small scale. Fuel was the most important issue at the time; the German fuel reserves on the eve of the battle were limited to only three ‘consumption units’ (each estimated for a day of battle), one of which was still in Benghazi. That meant the mobile reserves could counterattack any enemy breakthrough but, once one of the two groups was moved from its positions and switched either north or south, it would have been impossible to reverse the move if necessary. This effectively meant the two groups were in fact to fight mainly as separate bodies. Tank availability was, on the other hand, another problem especially in comparison with the Allies: there was a total of 234 German tanks (plus another thirty under repair), and 289 Italian tanks and self-propelled guns (plus another ninety under repair). Quality was the main issue – thirty of the 234 German tanks were the light Panzer II type, while eighty-one were outdated short-barrelled 50mm Panzer IIIs, and eight were short-barrelled 75mm Panzer IVs. The only modern tanks were eighty-five long-barrelled 50mm Panzer IIIs and thirty long-barrelled 75mm Panzer IVs. The 255 Italian M14/41 tanks were outdated as well (like the fourteen L6 light tanks, also available), and only the thirty-three self-propelled 75mm guns possessed a certain degree of efficiency.
20. A short-barrelled 75mm Panzer IV German tank in the desert.
This did not mean the two mobile groups were completely inefficient; the northern group included the 15th Panzer which, along with 110 operational tanks (twelve Panzer IIs, thirty-eight short-barrelled and forty-three long-barrelled Panzer IIIs, two short-barrelled and fifteen long-barrelled Panzer IVs), also had seventy 50mm anti-tank guns, eight 88mm anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, sixteen self-propelled 76.2mm anti-tank guns, forty-one Italian guns (probably the 47/32 anti-tank), and four captured 6 pounder guns. The Littorio Division had 212 medium tanks and sixteen self-propelled guns. In the south the 21st Panzer had 124 tanks (eighteen Panzer IIs, forty-three short-barrelled and forty-two long-barrelled Panzer IIIs, six short-barrelled and fifteen long-barrelled Panzer IVs), while the Italian Ariete Division had 234 medium tanks and seventeen self-propelled guns. The large amount of anti-tank guns available partly compensated for the lack of suitable armour; the Axis forces possessed a total of 1,063 anti-tank guns which, if partly outdated and unsuitable (like the Italian 47/32 gun), also included a rather large number of German 50 and 76.2mm guns. The 164th Division had, for example, 180 of the former, while the Italian Trento Division had seventy 47/32 guns. The amount of field artillery was, on the other hand, rather poor with just 552 pieces.
MONTY AND ROMMEL
Although their names are often associated in the desert war, they actually faced each other on this battlefield for a relatively short period only. Montgomery took over command of the Eighth Army on 12 August 1942, one and a half years after Rommel’s arrival in North Africa; Rommel left North Africa on 9 March 1943.
German intelligence had no clear picture of the situation; according to its reports the likely areas of enemy attack were around the Deir el Munassib in the south, in the area of the Ruwesait Ridge, and to the south of the coastal road in the north. Such uncertainty certainly contributed to the splitting up of the mobile forces, although the actual disposition on the frontline suggests that a possible threat to the northern area was taken more seriously than a possible breakthrough in the south. No actual defence plan was developed; on the eve of the battle General Stumme (Rommel’s replacement) had the commanders of the two Panzer divisions start a series of defence exercises based on prompt counterattacks against a breach of the defence line, but Operation Lightfoot was launched before these went beyond the planning stage.
On paper, Montgomery’s Eighth Army was largely superior to the Axis forces: its total strength was more than 220,000, 195,000 of which was made up of combat units, and it had a total of 1,351 tanks (not including some other 1,000 in the workshops), 1,136 of which were with the field units. However, only 1,029 of these were serviceable with the following break down: 170 M3 Lee/Grant (fifty-nine with 10th Armoured, seventy-one with 7th Armoured and thirty-seven with 9th Armoured Brigade attached to the New Zealand Division), 252 M4 Sherman (ninety-two with 1st Armoured, 124 with 10th Armoured; thirty-six with 9th Armoured Brigade), 216 Crusader with 2 pounder gun (forty-seven with 1st Armoured, sixty-eight with 10th Armoured, forty-nine with 7th Armoured divisions, thirty-seven with 9th Armoured Brigade and fifteen with the 9th Australian Division), seventy-eight Crusader III 6 pounder guns (twenty-nine with 1st Armoured, twenty-nine with 10th Armoured and eight with 7th Armoured divisions), 119 M3 Stuart (eighty-six with 7th Armoured, twenty-nine with the New Zealand and four with the Australian divisions), 194 Valentine tanks, all with the 23rd Armoured Brigade attached to the Australian, New Zealand and British 51st Infantry divisions. A total of 1,451 anti-tank guns included 554 2 pounder and 849 6 pounder guns, while 892 artillery pieces (mostly the excellent 25 pounder) outnumbered those in the Axis armoury. Air superiority, with 530 serviceable aircraft against 350 Axis aircraft (though some other 150 could be mustered from the Mediterranean bases), was attempted but not achieved.
21. M3 medium Lee/Grant tanks moving in the desert; its high silhouette made it an easy target.
Actual combat strength was in fact something quite different; given their unfavourable ‘tooth to tail’ ratio, the infantry divisions of the Eighth Army – with an overall establishment of 17,298 all ranks – were somewhat at a disadvantage since each one of their infantry brigades could only field less than 3,000 men, of which 2,358 actually were in the three infantry battalions. Since these would have been in the lead, each with four companies of 124 men, every battalion would have had an actual combat strength of about 500 men in all. Although the recent intake of some 41,000 replacements brought some units, in particular the 51st Infantry Division, to be overstrength, some others were on the other hand understrength; actual strength of the infantry battalions in the 9th Australian Division (in spite of the arrival of reinforcements on 10 October, who were not used because they could not be trained in time) ranged from 650 to 780 out of an established strength of 848, although weapons were available in large quantity. The New Zealand Division still suffered from the losses of the previous months and one of its brigades, the 4th, was being reorganised as an armoured brigade while handing over some 600 men to the two others. Given its lack of strength and replacements, the division was not deemed capable of facing sustained action, just like the 1st South African Division (itself lacking strength and due to be reorganised into the 6th Armoured Division) and the 4th Indian Division, that only had one brigade fit for offensive actions. Shifting available men was also quite impossible since, for political and organisational reasons, men from different nationalities could only fight in their own units (thus the Greek and Free French brigades were kept as such, in spite of Montgomery’s decision to concentrate only on divisions). The basic attack scheme developed by the infantry commanders also put great strain on individual companies; simplistically, the attack was to be lead by two infantry companies which, once they had seized their objective, were to shift to defence while two other fresh units were to pass through them in order to maintain momentum. Such an attack developing into four waves, while designed to bring new and fresh units forward, also meant that the first waves (those likely to face the early enemy reaction and suffer more casualties) would in fact be facing an equally strong enemy, with the unenviable perspective of being worn out during the early stages of the assault.
22. The 2 pounder British anti-tank gun, outdated at the time of El Alamein.
OPERATION BERTRAM
Led by Colonel Charles Richardson, this operation was aimed at deceiving Rommel as to the real area of the attack. Jasper Maskelyne (an officer of the engineering corps, formerly a stage magician) had tanks in the northern area masked with canvas to look like lorries, while reversing the process in the south along with creating dummy guns and dumps.
Training was another major issue; British 51st (Highland) Infantry Division was sent to the Middle East in August and, having not been in combat, was allowed two months to acclimatise and train for the incoming offensive, which contributed to it becoming a very effective unit. However, this was not the norm and the other divisions, which to different degrees had been involved in the battles fought since early summer: the 9th Australian Division, which temporarily shifted its frontline positions with the units of the 51st Division to allow them to gain experience, could only take each brigade at a time out of the line for a week of intensive training. The same happened with the 1st South African Division, which only trained two of its brigades since the third was not going into action. The New Zealand Division started its own training from 18 September, when the 9th Armoured Brigade was first attached to it. At the end of the month divisional exercises were held, which were altogether successful apart from revealing problems in cooperation and coordination with the 9th Armoured Brigade which (in spite of further training and experiments) were not fully resolved, probably in part because the brigade only received its Sherman tanks on the eve of the offensive. The 1st and 10th Armoured divisions started to train in late September, facing several problems that included lack of experience with night movements, the late arrival of some of the new tanks, the need to integrate the new motor brigades into their organisation, with the latter also needing to acquire minefield clearing skills and practice. Above all, there was an almost complete lack of training in the field of tank–infantry coordination on the battlefield. On the other hand, training with mine removal practice was quite effective; since the specially converted Matilda tanks, which used a flail to detonate the mines, were neither available in large quantity nor really reliable, this was a task still to be undertaken by infantry and engineers with the old methods (though some magnetic mine detectors were available). A special training school was set up, and intensive training was undertaken for what was to be one of the main tasks on the first day of the battle.
MINES
Different types of mines were used at Alamein: anti-tank mines were filled with three to five kilos of explosive and only detonated under the pressure of a heavy vehicle, like a tank. The anti-personnel mines were lighter and detonated either under the pressure of a single man, or if triggered by a tripwire when walking near them.
Training, like the return to detailed planning with battles fought under a centralised command by divisional level units, was a key factor in Montgomery’s view. Under Auchinleck’s command the Eighth Army made an attempt to match the German’s flexibility and mobility by decentralisation, mainly relying on brigade-sized units and allowing a greater degree of independence to its commanders. Following Montgomery’s arrival there was a step back to the old, well-known methods. Divisional integrity was restored, like the customary ‘top down’ command system which, in this case, hinged around Montgomery himself who – given his lack of confidence in subordinate commanders – exercised close control over all the phases of the planning and of the combat. Well conscious of the limitations of his troops, he strongly opposed any fluid or mobile action, while emphasising accurate planning and a very simple doctrine based on close cooperation between tanks and infantry. Tanks were to be employed in large numbers with the basic aim of securing and holding the ground, provided with close support by the infantry units. A concentrated employment of armour, close infantry support and artillery firepower were, in Montgomery’s view, the foundation upon which success on the battlefield was to be obtained. And this foundation was to be secured by unit reorganisation, security and intensive training, as it was written in his 30 August memorandum:
MINE CLEARING
The most effective way to remove a mine was to check the terrain using a bayonet and, when the mine was found, remove the fuse. The main problem in this task were the anti-personnel mines, like the German S-Mine which, when triggered, discharged a shrapnel-filled canister that exploded at chest height.
23. Eighth Army’s ‘secret weapon’ in the second battle of Alamein: the American-built M4 Sherman tank.
It cannot be emphasised too strongly that successful battle operations depend on the intimate co-operation of all arms, whether in armoured or unarmoured formations. Tanks alone are never the answer; no one arm, alone and unaided can do any good in battle.
Actual planning for Operation Lightfoot was clearly influenced by all these factors; the first draft dated 15 September envisaged a two-pronged attack, with a main effort in the north and a minor push in the south. The strategy was based on the infantry and engineers opening passages across the enemy defences, and allowing the armour to pass through these gaps unopposed to establish a defensive perimeter ‘on a ground of their own [the armour] choice’ (as specified in orders for Operation Lightfoot), close to the north–south main communication tracks. Here they were to face the enemy’s armoured counterattacks, thus denying Rommel any benefit from the mobile tactics he was used to, wearing down his forces in a battle of attrition, which allowed the Eighth Army an advantage because of its superiority. Lack of training, as well as the criticisms addressed to this plan by sceptical subordinate commanders concerned about its feasibility, suggested it might not have worked. This led to a revision dated 6 October which emphasised to an even greater extent the tanks–infantry cooperation; the plan, built on the basic scheme of the previous one, was based on infantry breaking into the enemy defences (this time with the main effort in the north, the southern prong being mainly reduced to a feint) and the armoured formations passing through them to form a screen to face the enemy armour. This would separate the enemy armour from the enemy infantry which, in the meantime, could be destroyed by Eighth Army’s infantry formations and the breach on their northern and southern shoulders widened further. Deprived of a defensive line, what was left of Rommel’s mobile reserves – already depleted by having counterattacked Eighth Army’s armoured units – could then be easily destroyed in the field.
24. A column of Valentine tanks crossing a mine-cleared lane at Alamein; congestion was one of the main problems Eighth Army’s units faced in the early stages of Operation Lightfoot.
In its actual layout, the plan envisaged a 10-mile (16km) wide attack by the four infantry divisions under XXX Corps’ command (from north to south: 9th Australian, 51st, New Zealand and 1st South African), each moving into a 3.5km wide corridor that was to be cleared from mines in order to create two further corridors (each one about 1.5km wide) to the north and to the south through which the 1st and 10th Armoured divisions were to pass. Infantry units were to reach the ‘Oxalic Line’ (running approximately from the Kidney Ridge to the Miteirya Ridge), penetrate some 2.5–5km deep into the enemy defence line, and establish themselves there. The armour were to reach the ‘Pierson Line’, which was just some 1.5–3km beyond the Oxalic Line. Once both lines had been reached and secured, by dawn on 24 October, a ‘dog fight’ was to ensue (and last for about a week) during which the enemy infantry would have been dislodged from its positions and destroyed, while the bulk of the enemy armoured and mobile forces’ counterattacks would have been defeated by Eighth Army’s armour and anti-tank weapons. The subsequent breakout and advance to the objective ‘Skinflint’, right across the Rahman track running north–south around Point 44 (Tell el Aqqaqir), would have ensured the definitive destruction of what was left of the enemy forces.
On the eve of the battle, Montgomery issued an order of the day that clearly stated the aim to ‘destroy Rommel and his Army’:
The battle which is now about to begin will be one of the decisive battles of history. It will be the turning point of the war. The eyes of the whole world will be on us, watching anxiously which way the battle will swing.
SPECIAL MATILDA TANKS
Called the ‘Scorpion’, the Matilda flail tank was equipped with protruding arms in front of the hull where a series of chains, tied to a cylinder, were rotated by an engine (prone to breakdowns) to detonate mines. Matilda CDL (canal defence light), a battalion of which was intended to take part in Alamein, was equipped with a searchlight.