Warrant Officers
WHEN THEY WERE AT SEA, most seventeenth-century warships carried eight warrant officers. Of these, five were the ‘standing officers’ who continued to serve aboard the same ship when she was laid up in ordinary: the boatswain, the gunner, the carpenter, the purser and the cook. Three were appointed, like commissioned officers, solely for the time that the ship was actually in service: the master, the chaplain and the surgeon.* The names of candidates for warrant posts were entered in books kept by the Admiralty, which gave details of their patrons.1 Most of those who recommended warrant officers were fellow naval men, usually former captains or dockyard officers, but some had unexpectedly stellar connections: the gunner of the Royal Oak in 1673 was recommended by the Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Shaftesbury, while the purser of the Antelope in 1678 owed his place to the efforts of the king’s mistress, the Duchess of Portsmouth.2 The king himself ordered the appointment of Thomas Sutton as purser of the Woolwich in 1681; Sutton’s qualifications for the post are obscure, as he had previously been one of the Yeomen of the Guard.3
MASTERS
In earlier times, and as his title implied, the master was the most important officer on the ship. This was still his role in the merchant service, where the master commanded (and often owned) the ship, and a survival of the original meaning could also be seen in the term used for a commissioned officer commanding a small, unrated vessel, ‘master and commander’. But the universal influx into the navy of captains (and, later, of lieutenants) had diminished the role of the master. In theory, he remained in charge of the navigation of the ship, and for as long as gentlemen captains remained largely ignorant of this skill, masters retained something of their earlier pre-eminence. In the 1650s, though, many captains had previously been masters themselves, and from the 1660s onwards many more gentlemen mastered the arts of navigation. Inevitably, this led to clashes between captains and masters: in 1672, Pepys noted how ‘this ill usage of masters, and their work taken out of their hands by commanders grows thick upon us, and may prove fatal’, as it had already led to the loss of more ships in the previous year than in the whole of the preceding two decades (although this last point was Pepysian exaggeration).4 On his voyage to Tangier in 1683, Pepys observed how captains often overrode the master when berthing their ship, but if any accident occurred the master would automatically be held responsible.5
The traditional importance of the master’s role was reflected in a unique system of appointment. Prospective masters were examined by two or three members of Trinity House, who provided them with certificates specifying the rates of ship and (from 1667) the geographical areas in which they were competent to serve.6 As they gained experience, they could be re-examined and their certificates updated to qualify them for larger vessels or different seas. Equipped with these qualifications, masters were then appointed by Navy Board warrants directing them to individual ships for individual voyages. James Fry was first examined in 1672, and found to be a fit master of a Fourth or Fifth rate. He was again examined in 1682, after which he moved up to Third and large Fourth rates; in 1690 he was found qualified to be master of any ship, of any size.7 Trinity House guarded its part in the appointment system jealously: for example, there was an expectation that the masters of the navy’s largest ships would be elder brethren of the order.8 Despite such apparently rigorous professional qualifications, many masters were at best barely competent. In 1665, the master of the Portsmouth was responsible within a matter of days for two collisions with the Plymouth and others with the Essex and Leopard, and there were many other cases of masters committing basic navigational blunders. Some claimed that men were being promoted to mates, and thus to masters, too quickly, before they had built up a sufficient bank of experience.9
The career structure for masters was particularly fluid. A typical candidate would have served several years as a master’s mate, and perhaps as a midshipman, before passing his examination. He may have gained some experience in merchant ships, and returning to the merchant service was always an option if employment opportunities in the navy were limited, as they usually were outside wartime. Some masters went on to gain commissions, but these opportunities became few and far between in the 1670s and 1680s as the competition from increasingly competent gentlemen captains increased (although such opportunities opened up again to a degree when the fleet expanded once more in the 1690s, permitting such stellar careers as that of Admiral John Benbow). A few gained dockyard positions, notably as master-attendant, but such opportunities could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Superannuation was introduced on 6 December 1672, as it was for the standing officers; masters qualified after eight years of intermittent service, rather than the fifteen years of continuous service specified for standing officers. Half pay for the former masters of First and Second rates was introduced in 1675. In fact, very few masters actually benefited from these innovations, as by 1687 only four masters were drawing half pay and six were superannuated.10
THE STANDING OFFICERS
Candidates for the five standing posts were examined by the Navy Board, which recommended suitable names to the Admiralty; the Admiralty then appointed the successful officers by warrant.11 In general, vacancies in large ships were filled by deserving candidates from lesser ones, clearly an attempt to encourage ‘upward mobility’ and to establish a principle of promotion by seniority.12 This system was not adhered to rigidly. After 1660, Charles II and the Duke of York sometimes intervened directly to promote even quite lowly officers. Thomas Laith, candidate for the boatswain’s place on the Swiftsure, obtained the place after petitioning King Charles in person; Edmund Blood, made purser of the Jersey in 1673 ‘by his Majesty’s particular order’, may have been a brother of the notorious Colonel Blood.13 Fathers were sometimes allowed to resign their positions to their sons, but only if the latter were appropriately qualified. Bribery of officials at the Admiralty or the Navy Board and the more subtle offers of‘gifts’ were commonplace, and there was even some covert purchase of office: the purser of the Sovereign in the 1660s admitted that he had bought his place from his predecessor.14 Famously, William Bagwell owed his carpenter’s place aboard the Rupert in no small part to his wife’s illicit liaisons with Samuel Pepys – liaisons connived at by William for precisely that reason.15
Promotion opportunities for standing officers were limited by the fact that for much of the period, many of the posts were seen as sinecures for life. Standing officers were at the hearts of the skeleton crews that manned warships in ordinary, and some grew very old indeed in these positions. This inevitably caused problems when their ships were required for active service at sea, and veterans either had to be ejected or exchanged. In 1672 a system of superannuation was introduced. Standing officers who were incapable of further service became eligible for these grants after fifteen years’ continuous service. Even so, few grants were made in the early years, and the ordinary continued to resemble something of a floating geriatrics’ ward. In 1689 Giles Shelley, boatswain of the Duke, was at least seventy-nine and had been a warrant officer since 1650. Far from slipping into a well-deserved retirement, he transferred to the Duchess for further service.16 A post as a standing officer was very attractive in many ways, and some sought to make it even more so. The standing officers were meant to sleep on their ships, but as early as June 1661 the Duke of York had to upbraid them for failing to do so, and the evidence of regular injunctions thereafter suggests that matters did not improve significantly.17 The officers sought to make themselves as comfortable as possible and often moved into the great cabins, the preserve of the captains when the ships were at sea; again, the authorities attempted to restrict the practice, but seem to have had little success in confining the officers to smaller quarters.
The Boatswain
Traditionally, the boatswain was responsible for the ship’s long boat, ropes, sails, flags and anchors. In practice, though, his most prominent day-to-day function aboard ship was as the enforcer of discipline, armed with a silver whistle and a rattan cane, ensuring that all men did their duty and carrying out the punishments on those who did not.18 Boatswains could move on to positions in the dockyards (as masters-attendant or boatswains of the yard); some were also competent to serve as gunners, some became masters, and a few eventually went on to commissioned posts. During the long peace of the 1670s and 1680s it was more common for officers to move the other way, with former captains or lieutenants taking up posts as boatswains or gunners.19 Others spent years in the same office; John Oakley had already been a boatswain for twenty-eight years when he was given the same position on a fireship in the 1670s.20
The Gunner
As his title implied, the gunner was responsible for all the ordnance aboard ship, and for the security of the magazine. He therefore had a form of dual responsibility to his captain and to the Ordnance Office, and was expected to keep meticulous records of the amount of shot and powder expended.21 The status of the gunner declined in later years, but until the 1650s and 1660s, at least, it was ‘esteemed a genteel employment’, with the gunner being next in line to take command of the ship if the commissioned officers and the master were killed.22 Gunners had similar career opportunities to boatswains; although the dockyards had no obvious position open to them, they had the alternative option of service ashore under the auspices of the Ordnance Office. William Maiden was gunner of the Coventry in 1661, commanded fireships during the second Anglo-Dutch war, and was appointed gunner of the new Breda in 1679.23 Richard Leake, father of the future admiral Sir John Leake, learned the gunner’s trade under the Dutch in the 1650s, then entered the merchant service, before gaining his first naval warrant after the Restoration. He was gunner of the Prince in 1673, and in 1677 became master gunner of England. John, in turn, served in merchant ships and as the gunner of several ships before gaining his first command, a fireship, in 1688.24
The Carpenter
The carpenter was responsible for the repair of the ship, including her caulking and the stopping of leaks. He was expected to have a sufficient range of tools and stores to handle virtually any emergency that befell the ship; during and after a battle, he and his crew were responsible for making good damage to the masts, yards and hull, and for getting the ship operational again as quickly as possible.25 Carpenters regularly moved between service afloat and in the dockyards, with the master shipwrights of the yards often acting as their patrons. In 1678 Ambrose Fellows was recommended by John Shish, master shipwright of Deptford, for the carpenter’s place on the new Third Rate he was building there, the Lenox, and Fellows was duly appointed. Francis Wye served as foreman to the master shipwright at Chatham for seven years before he was recommended for a carpenter’s place on a First Rate.26
The Purser
The purser was responsible for the victualling of the ship’s company, for the proper storage of victuals on board and for much of the paperwork relating to the pay and upkeep of the crew. Inevitably, the purser had a bad press in the sailing navy. He was the obvious candidate to take the blame for rotten victuals, and allegations of pursers feathering their own nests in a variety of corrupt ways were legion. Few contemporary commentators appreciated the other side of the equation: pursers were poorly paid, but often had to lay out their own credit to obtain supplies, thanks to failings in the victualling system and the state’s finances – failings for which they often unfairly took the blame.27 The office of purser was even abolished in 1653, and its responsibilities divided between the steward and the dockyard clerk of the cheque, but the experiment was unsuccessful and the office was restored in 1655.28 The naval administration subsequently attempted to prevent peculation on the part of the pursers by insisting that they provide a substantial bond before taking up their office: this was fixed at the Restoration as £600 in First Rates, £500 in Seconds, £400 in Thirds, £300 in Fourths and £200 in Fifths and Sixths.29 The purser’s autonomy was also eroded by a series of administrative innovations. His responsibility for musters and pay was largely transferred to the captain under the terms of the General Instructions to Captains of 1663, and the captain was also given a more explicit responsibility for the quality of the victuals supplied to the ship’s company.
Pepys devoted much attention to the conditions of service of the pursers. On 1 January 1666 he presented Sir William Coventry, the Lord High Admiral’s secretary, with his so-called ‘New Year’s Gift’, a detailed examination of ways in which pursers could be made more accountable on the one hand and could experience fairer conditions on the other. This was adopted and led to a fundamental change in the pursers’ responsibilities, making them accountable for wages but allowing them to benefit from short-allowance victuals and absences.30 Even so, the stereotype of the corrupt purser persisted.31 Despite this, a few pursers advanced to greater things; by definition, their trade demanded considerable competence in numeracy and literacy, so pursers were often better educated, or of higher social status, than their fellow warrant officers. Some moved on to clerkships in the dockyards or (like Pepys’s friend and informant Richard Gibson) at the Navy Office itself, and a handful even gained commissions; Thomas Hardy, purser of the Newcastle in 1688, eventually rose to flag rank. But not all had such pretensions to gentility. In 1665 the vicar of Barking was abused by a drunken innkeeper of the town, John Barnard, who claimed immunity from arrest because he was also the purser of the Henrietta.32
The Cook
The cook was invariably a wounded sailor, given the post as a means of maintaining himself. A few cooks were blind or had lost both hands, and had to employ a mate to actually execute their duties: the cook of the St Andrew in 1674 had begun his naval service under James I but finally had to relinquish his duties to his servant because ‘an old foul ulcer on the stump of his left thigh dismembered six inches above the knee’ rendered him incapable of work.33 The cook of the Royal Oak had lost ‘all the lower part of his face’ in battle, so he could not eat any biscuit or meat, which somewhat limited his ability to sample his own cooking.34 Unsurprisingly, few, if any, naval cooks had genuine culinary ability, but the relatively limited nature of the naval diet meant that he did not have to master a particularly extensive menu. Arguably, his more important role was to ensure that each man, and each mess, got a fair share and no more.35
* The surgeon is covered in Part Eight, Chapter 33, and the chaplain in Part Eight, Chapter 35.