Leisure is a very complex and evasive concept that has been ascribed different meanings in different epochs and cultures – from ancient to modern times. The history of leisure has been approached and described from different scholarly angles and is relatively well documented. Many handbooks of, introductions to and monographs on leisure provide chapters and sections on the history or development of leisure over time as a bedrock for reflection on the phenomenon of leisure and for building a case for its meaning and significance in society. A random selection of handbooks on and introductions to leisure shows the following picture.
Goodale and Godbey have studied the evolution of leisure concepts from the early beginnings of civilisation to modern times and conclude that it reflects the ‘ultimate measure of human progress’ (xiii) and reveals ‘human purpose’ (1988: 260). They distil from their historical analysis in their book The Evolution of Leisure that human progress has not been measured in terms of the discovery of human purpose or the need for transcendence – an ideal which forms the quintessence of the leisure idea. Leisure is a unique experience that more and more comes to ‘possess the quality of leisure’. It becomes a metaphor for the meaning of life (1988: 259–260). Shivers and deLisle dedicate a substantial part of their book The Story of Leisure to leisure and human development, stating that leisure was ‘a part of culture before civilization developed’ (1997: 5). They judge theoretical views like semi-leisure, flow, experience and state of mind (1997: 19) to be inadequate for assessing the authentic meaning of leisure and conclude quite decisively that ‘leisure can be defined only as free time’ (1997: v). ‘Leisure is simply free time, that is, the time that an individual has to dispose of in whatever way he or she sees fit’ (1997: 94). Bull et al. include a chapter on the historical development of leisure in their Introduction to Leisure Studies, which leads them to acknowledge that leisure has different meanings (e.g. free time from obligation, different kinds of activities and different kinds of qualities (e.g. recreation), and a state of mind). They choose to work with a ‘wide and inclusive definition as possible’ (2003: xiv) and regard the aforementioned meanings to be approaches which address different aspects of the phenomenon of leisure (2003: 42). Rojek et al.’s Handbook of Leisure Studies contains a part on the origins of leisure which addresses themes like culture, civilisation, anthropology, pre-history and both Western and non-Western traditions of leisure. This part of their book aims to expose the danger of labelling Leisure Studies as a Western academic discipline alone. One of the authors in this collection, Hunnicutt, shines some light on the historical development of the concept of ‘leisure’ and concludes that ‘leisure’s multiform historical manifestations are inseparable from work and its various representations’ (2006: 56). Another scholar, Bhattacharya, zooms in on context and culture and states that in order to understand leisure in the Indian context, one should ‘recognize and analyze the differential experience of leisure’ rather than merely drawing on distinctions between work and leisure time. Leisure in India is integrally connected to festivity and celebration (2006: 88).
When it comes to monographs that focus more substantially and explicitly on the meaning, purpose and conceptualisation of leisure, the following picture emerges: Holba, for instance, concentrates in her book Philosophical Leisure on the differentiation between ‘philosophical leisure’ and ‘recreation’. Philosophical leisure – the act of looking at leisure through a philosophical lens – denotes a way of being in the world, a ‘recuperative measure to the crisis of human communication’ (2007: 82). Philosophical leisure is seen as an enrichment of the inner self – the ‘nourishment of the human soul’ – as she puts it (2007: 55). Recreation and leisure are not identical. Recreation, and also relaxation and entertainment, denotes short-term interruptions of an occupied life (2007: 95). It allows people to break away from their busy lives, while philosophical leisure is conceptualised as an ontological category that signifies a way of being. Although these constructs are opposites, they are both needed to ‘cultivate and satisfy human experiences’ (Holba 2010: 51). Spracklen – in going beyond what he calls the ‘narrow focus of previous historiography and social theory’ – has made a comprehensive study of the history of leisure with the purpose of conveying a ‘much broader chronological and geographical scope for problematizing leisure’ (2011: 198). In his book Constructing Leisure he concludes that leisure ‘seems to be a human activity where communicative rationality is at work’ (2011: 5). Spracklen’s historical exposé is meant to create awareness of the ‘paradox between freedom and constraint’ (2011: 5, 193) and to demonstrate that leisure is a universal human phenomenon rather than a product of (post)modernity. The meaning and purpose of leisure ultimately refer to human agency and identity. The last scholar to be mentioned here is Stebbins. Although the historical basis upon which he builds his case in The Idea of Leisure is not that comprehensive, a brief review of his position will be given since he claims to have grasped the principles of leisure by providing a detailed definition of leisure that supersedes definitions found in dictionaries (2012: 3). His definition has two dimensions: the individual and the contextual (2012: 3). Leisure in connection with the individual is seen as unforced, voluntary and positive activities that are pursued in free time (2012: 6, 17–18). With regard to leisure in relation to the contextual, Stebbins holds it to be a unique social institution that represents a vast array of places and spaces related to the phenomena of work and leisure (2012: 44). The main thesis he defends in this book is that the idea of leisure ultimately refers to the idea of progress (2012: 99). Stebbins believes that leisure fosters positive developmental outcomes for both the individual and society.
This brief and selective review of scholarly hermeneutical-deductive interpretations of the meaning and purpose of leisure based on their historical reconstruction harvest an array of dimensions of leisure. These are: measuring human progress, revealing human purpose, reflecting the meaning of life, free time, free from obligations and commitment, different kinds of activities, different kinds of qualities, recreation, a state of mind, work-related representations, festivity and celebration, recuperation, nourishment of the human soul, relaxation, entertainment, communicative rationality, paradox between freedom and constraint, agency and identity, unforced and positive activity, and the representation of place and space. This list of meanings of leisure as put forward in our times shows it to be multilayered and therefore quite complex. Therefore, in an attempt to unravel these layers and uncover the very idea of leisure, a rational-conceptual reconstruction of leisure in different epochs will be explored next. This is to say that, where the theoretical-historical reconstruction of leisure above displays methodological approaches and affiliated results (dimensions of leisure) that are commonplace within Leisure Studies, the following paragraphs will reflect a philosophical-conceptual analysis in an attempt to tease out those leisure ideas from their historical bedrocks – a method that usually belongs to the domain of the humanities. This does not suggest that philosophical analysis should replace social-scientific methods, but it is an attempt, from another perspective, to permeate the walls of Leisure Studies by way of contrast, dialogue and complementation in the hope that a ‘universal philosophy of leisure’ (Spracklen 2011: 198) could be developed that could serve this field of study. Hopefully the result will lead to a ‘history of leisure ideas’, so to speak.
The starting point for philosophical reflection on the history of leisure ideas will be the birthplace or origins of Western civilisation – ancient Greece. Philosophers started to conceptualise and consciously reflect on the phenomenon of leisure. Some scholars suggest that leisure existed before ancient Greek philosophers introduced the idea of leisure. They base their point of view on activities like art and music which were performed in preliterate and primitive cultures (Shivers and deLisle 1997: 10–11; Edginton et al. 2002: 54–57). However, it is questionable whether these activities can be labelled as leisure activities, because it is highly speculative to presuppose that people living in those times had consciously lead and structured their lives based on an idea of leisure. Historical, sociocultural and archaeological evidence of practices that indicate play, art, music, storytelling, religious activity, festivities, sport and dancing does not change that. It does tell us something about ancient culture and the experience of time or seasons, but without a clearly articulated idea of leisure that existed in these contexts themselves, these activities will remain contested.
Although the analysis in the following paragraphs will start, as said, with the ancient Greeks and follow the line of history into modern times, its focus will be substantial, rather than temporal. This is to say that the ways in which the idea of leisure has been conceptualised, expressed, preserved and changed over time will be leading and not the time periods themselves, although they naturally cannot be divorced from the themes. Time periods are the historical bedrocks in which the idea of leisure slumbers. But it is the ideas that have to be teased out. In philosophy, an idea could be seen as an abstract concept or a mental representation of an object in reality. Yet, in conceptualising the idea of leisure, one should also keep the leisure ideal in mind, which is seen as the ‘centre or core of the idea’ of leisure (Barret 1989: 18).
Much has been debated about the way in which the ancient Greeks conceived leisure. They were the first to develop a positive idea of leisure which was deemed a necessary condition for fulfilling the purpose of life, i.e. living the ‘good life’. The ‘good life’ was a lifelong pursuit of wisdom, virtue and leisure (Torkildsen 2000: 67) whereby leisure was the first principle for searching for the ‘wisdom of life’ or having a worthy and virtuous ‘way of living’ (Goodale and Godbey 1988: 2, 11) that leads to true pleasure. Two Greek philosophers whose reflections on leisure have been discussed most widely by leisure scholars were Plato and Aristotle. Their views on leisure will briefly be explicated next.
Plato held that the goal of humanity was the discovering of truth (Sylvester in Jackson and Burton 1999: 19) and the key to the ‘good life’ was the dialogical-collective search for meaning (Hunnicutt in Rojek et al. 2006: 65). It entails the time taken for thinking, contemplating, philosophising and developing oneself. He called the time taken for pursuing these activities ‘leisure’ and saw the activities themselves as the constituents for happiness (Torkildsen 2000: 66). In addition, Plato put forward that living the ‘good life’ was best done through play and dedicating one’s life to God (Shivers and deLisle 1997: 40). There was a moral connection between the aims of human life and play and also between play and the influence of the divine on ordinary life. Play was a means to a social end: self-transcendence, growing into an adult and a good citizen. This means that children’s play had to be directed towards developing into rational citizens (D’Angour 2013: 307), into moulding character, into self-improvement. Where play was essential to educating children, leisure was essential to the education of adults. ‘Adult play’ consisted of philosophising, public debating and playing sports and music (Hunnicutt in Rojek et al. 2006: 55). In sum, Plato’s concept of leisure essentially amounts to the moral goodness of activities like sports and intellectual inquiry, contrasted with the ‘messy and immoral world of the shadows’ (Spracklen 2011: 20). Living a ‘good life’ boils down to making the right choices and doing the right things.
Aristotle’s idea of leisure (skholē) revolves around the pursuit of a life (the ‘good life’) that leads to happiness, human flourishing, well-being. In order to enjoy the pleasures a happy life could bring, one should be free from work and other obligations (Wise 2014: 17). Work exercises serious restrictions and limitations to living a life that is fundamentally meant to engage in ‘speech, music, friendship, gymnastics and citizenship’ (Stebbins 2012: 25). These activities are different from children’s play. Aristotle regarded work as the antithesis of leisure and etymologically defined it as ‘non-leisure’ (askholē). Leisure is the very first principle of engaging in virtuous activities. The good life brings forth moral excellence and noble intellectual achievements, insights and wisdom. He holds that human happiness is especially enhanced by intellectual excellence, because it involves ‘contemplation of god’ (Jackson and Burton 1999: 20). Work does not have that capacity, because it diverts people from cultural and civic participation and therefore offers no potential or grounds for contemplation and therefore for reaching excellence. To summarise, Aristotle states that leisure is related to the expression of the most important or most excellent of a human life through freedom from work and freedom to exercise, and to developing one’s most essential human capacities. Leisure leads to subjective pleasure and objective happiness (Sylvester 2005: 2).
Ancient Greek philosophy, art and architecture have influenced ancient Roman thinking and culture to a large extent (Russell 2009: 25). As far as the philosophical idea of leisure is concerned, ancient Roman writers also conveyed a dichotomy of concepts that were each other’s opposite, or rather each other’s negation: otium and negotium. Otium refers to leisure and negotium to business. However, the Romans conceived these concepts differently from the ancient Greeks. Torkildsen puts forward that, for the Romans, leisure consists in generating physical fitness and health through sports, engaging in activities organised in amphitheatres and arenas, and visiting bathhouses in order to be ready to fight in wars (2000: 68). Entertainment and spectacle were central to ancient Roman culture (Russell 2009: 17). Reflections on these activities are found in the writings of leading classical Roman philosophers. Cicero, for instance, relates business, being busy, being occupied to human involvement in activities of the military, commerce or the state, while leisure is related to being free from business, being at rest and re-creating oneself – even in old age (De Grazia 1962: 22). Yet, although ‘leisure’ was seen as a contemplative activity, it was still primarily done for the sake of ‘business’ and not for its own sake. The idea of leisure as contemplation was also embraced by the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius. He believed that contemplating his place in the world and reading philosophy and history would optimally prepare him for running the Empire adequately (Spracklen 2011: 21). Seneca had a different opinion and, being influenced by ancient Greek philosophy, held that leisure was a condition that ‘supports the life of philosophy and thus … the care for one’s soul’ (Ildefonso 2012: 32). His view of leisure resembles the Greek idea of self-development and education: only those who take time to study philosophy are really alive or living the good life. Leisure is an end in itself.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church were decisive for civil leisure life. In particular, the doctrine of abstinence from worldly pleasures was imposed on society (Russell 2009: 23). The only acknowledged leisure activities were related to worship and other religious responsibilities. Against this background the Church proclaimed the purpose of life to be the preparation of oneself for life hereafter. With the development of monasticism, the maxim ‘leisure is the enemy of the soul’ was conveyed as a rule of life, while work was allocated higher esteem (Jackson and Burton 1999: 25). Idleness was seen as evil and contradictory to hard work. Doing good deeds and depriving oneself from worldly pleasures were preached as virtues to be held high (Torkildsen 2000: 69). Work had thus become a moral act because it was deemed to promote ‘sobriety, discipline and industry’ (Stebbins 2012: 26). The tables of the ancient Greek leisure ideal were turned. However, it was the late medieval Roman Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas who, strongly influenced by Aristotelian thinking, removed the sting from the idea that leisure was by definition idle and bad. He revived the idea that the contemplative life is the highest form of living (Holba 2007: 60). Holba noticed that Aquinas essentially argued that people who studied the sciences and the arts – and thus were not working – were actually engaged in leisure. This is because study, contemplation, is superior to work and leads to wisdom (2007: 60). Virtue cannot be obtained without contemplation.
Aquinas’ focus on a contemplative life as an activity of leisure was challenged and fundamentally revised during the Protestant Reformation. The cultural norm of allocating positive moral value to hard work, as imposed by the Roman Catholic Church in the period following the fall of the Roman Empire, was revitalised by the Protestant Reformers. It has been said that the Protestant work ethic, which persisted throughout the twentieth century, was crucial for the change of views on work and leisure, if not the quintessential factor (Jackson and Burton 1999: 26). The basis of this work ethic is found in the theologies of Martin Luther and John Calvin, which boiled down to the notion that work was the main purpose of life and that the faithful were called to devote their lives to labour. They could be recognised by doing good, denying themselves and devoting themselves to duty (Argyle 1996: 19). The focus was on religious matters. Leisure was not important at all and was even regarded as evil when leisure activities were performed on Sundays. The Aristotelian idea of leisure as the first principle of the good life which leads to pleasure and happiness was rejected as idle and useless. According to the Protestants, the good life was embodied in labour. Work was seen as a virtue, a religious duty and leisure was either rejected as idleness, because it leads to vice, or degraded to a mere precondition for work (recreation) (Jackson and Burton 1999: 27).
Parallel with the development of the Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance movement emerged. Renaissance means ‘rebirth’ and marks the transitory period following the Middle Ages and preceding the dawn of modern times in Europe (Russell 2009: 23). Where the Reformation brought about a transformation in moral values and the appreciation of labour, the Renaissance caused a revolution on the level of culture (Torkildsen 2000: 69). Its hallmark was the revival of the humanistic arts and liberal thinking. Creativity, the pursuit of realising one’s full human potential and the generation and spread of knowledge were held in high esteem. The study of art, music, poetry and science became accessible to a broader public. Religious dogmas that reigned over the minds of the people and steered public life were increasingly relativised, which lead to a liberalisation of the idea of leisure. As far as leisure activities are concerned, some scholars point to the development of places for public entertainment and relaxation such as parks, festivals, plazas, gardens, theatres and exhibitions (Russell 2009: 23; Torkildsen 2000: 71), while others concentrate on the philosophy underlying the new leisure practices, namely, that leisure is instrumental to the eradication of idleness (Holba 2007: 62). Renaissance philosophers held that leisure was a part of life and ‘cultivating one’s mind with solitude’s contemplative reflection’ (Montaigne) was a remedy against vice, and taking time to think reflectively would lead to intellectual stimulation, knowledge, wisdom, inner transformation and life satisfaction (Petrarch) (Holba 2007: 62–64). Aristotle had also left his footprints in this period: leisure was related to contemplation and avoiding being busy.
The values and ideas that came forth from the eras of the Reformation and the Renaissance were in conflict with one another. The work ethic introduced by the Reformers stood in strong contrast with the focus of the Renaissance on creativity, self-development and the freedom to engage in leisure. All the intellectual and creative energy that was freed in this period led to technological breakthroughs in various domains, which changed society for good. This era was called the Industrial Revolution and was characterised by the development and growth of the mining, textile and iron industries; people flocking to overcrowded cities in search of work; people working twelve-hour days, six days a week; people having poor housing; child labour and worker exploitation; practically no holidays and free time with all its impacts on families and society, and work becoming sharply contrasted with leisure (Argyle 1996: 20; Torkildsen 2000: 71–72). The nature of work changed for many and the urban, industrial setting of life changed the face of leisure as well. Leisure became a ‘separate and precious commodity’ (Bull et al. 2003: 7), which was increasingly embraced as a time for recreation and a compensation for unsatisfactory work circumstances. Yet work was still proclaimed as a virtue by the Church.
Renaissance values also formed the grounds for the divorce between philosophy and religion. Both Empirism (Bacon) and Rationalism (Descartes), for example, despite their opposite methods of reasoning, rejected the authority of the Church dogmas as sources of knowledge (Goodale and Godbey 1988: 54). Scores of philosophers, including Locke and Hume, took the human being as their object of reflection. Religious tolerance, inequality, commerce, human experience, science and the existence of God were popular points of discussion. Yet it is unclear what these philosophers thought about leisure. Goodale and Godbey read between the lines and concluded that the freedom to engage in reflective thinking and opposition to idleness, recreational activities and other amusements were greatly valued (1988: 58).Yet, which activities were related to leisure remains obscure.
It is clear from the previous section that leisure as a positive and articulated philosophical idea led a rather dark existence during the times of the Industrial Revolution. The work ethic of the Reformation still prevailed after this period. Some Enlightenment philosophers, like Rousseau and Kant, continued to think along the lines of work versus leisure. For example, they both disapproved of idleness. Rousseau links idleness to a luxurious life, which leads to the impoverishment of both individuals and the state, while Kant links it to laziness, which is contrary to work and unproductive for both body and mind. Work has a purpose since it contributes to society, and leisure could only be of worth if one did not get addicted to it (Holba 2007: 66–67). However, Kant did identify a kind of playful leisure (games of chance, harmony and wit) that was acceptable, especially because these games facilitate moral satisfaction (Spracklen 2011: 25). Yet, the void in theoretical and scholarly reflection on leisure as a positive idea, as having an end in itself, still remained during this period. Even the utilitarian thinker, Bentham, was not able to divorce leisure from idleness due to his premise that being busy was productive, while being at leisure was not (Holba 2007: 67).
Society developed and changed dramatically. A schism between rich and poor became more and more visible in a society where the wealthy (called the leisure class) devoted their lives to ‘conspicuous consumption’ and other non-work-related activities as symbols of status and power (Veblen 2009: 49–69), while the less fortunate had to work and live under inhumane conditions with little time for recreational activities, if any at all. The ‘leisure class’ spent a lot of time on building their identities on symbols of wealth (e.g. gold, time, richly decorated houses, expensive forms of hospitality, sports). This led social reformers and the Church, out of concern for the workers, to promote the social good of recreation. Initiatives like sports clubs, art galleries and travel were stimulated, instigated in the hope that the underdog would experience a sense of community and get more pleasure and rest from work (Argyle 1996: 27). In closing: scholars equated leisure in this period with recreation (time free from work) and related the forming of identity to supererogation and the display of wealth. This notion seems to support Argyle’s argument that a Grecian leisure ethic existed in this period, since ‘the rich spent most of their time at leisure’ and depended on others to do the hard work (1996: 21). It might structurally be correct, but it is substantially rather speculative. His argument does not reflect the fundamental view of ancient Greek philosophers on the idea of leisure, namely that leisure’s true pleasure existed in the pursuit of wisdom and leading a worthy and virtuous life.
The views on leisure as relaxation, recreation, pleasure and being wealthy explicated in the previous section also prevailed in the twentieth century. However, recreation as a dimension of leisure rose to greater prominence due to the working class’ increasing demand for more time free from work. Free time was spent on recreational activities that were gradually performed for the sake of enjoyment alone (Torkildsen 2000: 72). In addition, people started to realise how important play was – not only for children, but also for adults. Even a ‘play movement’ emerged – especially in Canada and the United States (Edginton et al. 2002: 80–83). Many facilities like playgrounds and parks, swimming pools, music halls, pubs and cinemas were established and increasingly became commercialised. The dominant idea of leisure in roughly the first half of the twentieth century was related to the notion of play. Leisure theorists found a companion in Johan Huizinga who posed play as the foundation of human civilisation. He held that every cultural expression has its roots in the phenomenon of play (Van der Poel 2002: 22). Play is, in the words of Spracklen, ‘free; self-contained, regulated or rule-governed, limited in space and time, make-believe and tension’ (2011: 30). It is a non-serious activity that is performed on the basis of freedom and for its own sake. It does not involve the pursuit of interest or gain, but results in pleasure and aesthetics. Pleasure, according to Huizinga, is the essential purpose of play (Lengkeek 2009: 6) and is performed outside the domain of ordinary life. This relates play, on a higher level of abstraction, to the Vita Contemplativa (withdrawal from the order of ordinary life) as opposed to the Vita Activa (ancient Greek doctrine of everyday life) (Lengkeek 1994: 21). Homo ludens (the playing man) is a serious-cheerful person (Rahner 1965: 4).
Thus, there is more to play than activity alone. Although it is fundamentally not concerned with good or bad, it does have an implicit morality because of its demand that the rules of a game should be obeyed (Kraus 1996: 32). It is thereby contained in a time capsule that transcends the limits of clock time. The make-believe quality of play can also be instrumental to innovation and transcendence (Rojek 2005: 46). Play frames a sense of inner meaning. The ‘completeness of the play event’, as Gray puts it, could even evoke the same sense of leisure as explicated by the classical Greeks (2015). This wasn’t strange to Huizinga. He was well aware of the analogy and connection that exists between play and worship (Ruckenstein 1991: 239). This dimension of play has not received a predominant place in the often mono-disciplinary approaches to the study of leisure. However, there was a scholar in the first part of the twentieth century – a contemporary of Huizinga – who specifically addressed the transcendental meaning of leisure from a philosophical-anthropological perspective. He was Josef Pieper.
Pieper famously stated that leisure is basically a condition of the soul (1998: 30). It is a ‘non-activity’ that is void of any preoccupation. Leisure is ‘an ability to let things go, to be quiet’, to have a ‘disposition of receptive understanding, of contemplative beholding and immersion in the “real” ’, to treat things in the spirit of celebration and embrace it as the opposite of work (Pieper 1998: 31–34). Pieper reaches back to Aristotle’s position on leisure by conveying the precondition for authentic leisure as ‘being at leisure’ which resembles ‘doing leisure’ in the Greek sense of the word (skolen agein). It is a ‘space of freedom, of true learning, of attunement to the world-as-a-whole’ (Pieper 1998: 37). As a contemplative activity Pieper regards leisure to be of a higher order than the Vita Activa because, to his mind, the nature of authentic leisure entails ‘non-idleness’ (1998: 35, 48–49). Leisure is a form of ‘silence’, meaning an attitude of receptive, reflective and contemplative listening through which human beings find answers to the questions of life. In confirming this essentialist line of thinking, Kraus summarises leisure as ‘a spiritual and mental attitude, a state of inward calm, contemplation, serenity and openness’ (1996: 38), while De Grazia holds that the leisure idea transcends the notion of time and entails a state of being that many people do not necessarily pursue or achieve (Heintzman 2015: 8). Blackshaw confirms this perspective as well by saying that ‘the meaning of life is the meaning of leisure’ (2010: 152). He states that leisure has a secret centre, it can be seen as a ‘devotional practice’, a ‘spiritual practice’ and sensed as something ‘holy’ (2010: 142–143). Leisure embraces and affirms the meaningfulness of life through celebration. Celebration is, according to Pieper, the ‘very centre of what leisure really means’. It is at the core of the human endeavour of self-realisation and longing for wholeness (Holba 2007: 72).
Pieper’s positioning of leisure brought Bregha to state that leisure has to be seen (like freedom) as an end in itself (1991: 52), while Parr puts forward that it enables scholars to ‘argue the benefits of leisure for its own sake, rather than its instrumental benefit in service to a work-determined environment’ (2009: 93). He thereby ascribes ontological value to leisure as opposed to a utilitarian conceptualisation. However, Scruton (2008) convincingly argues that ends and means are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to value the same phenomenon both as an end and as a mean. Leisure could only have instrumental value to human beings because it is valued as an end, ‘for the very thing that it is’. Even leisure as a spiritual attitude, a contemplative state, finds expression in and is instrumental to something else. It finds expression in the celebration of life and it is instrumental to human happiness – a theme that receives some scholarly attention from the turn of the twenty-first century onward.
With the emergence of positive psychology as a new branch of psychology, a counter voice to the traditional, mainstream focus on human deficiency, mental illness and pathology has been raised. It calls for the study of the preconditions for individual and organisational flourishing and directs its focus towards – among others – topics like personal growth, optimism, wisdom, personal strengths, subjective well-being and happiness. Positive psychology advocates greater emphasis on good and fulfilling lives, based on the anthropological assumption that human beings have the ‘potential for “good” and … are motivated to pursue a “good life” ’ (Linley and Joseph 2004: 714). The roots of this movement, which in the meantime has developed into a fully fledged academic discipline, can be traced back to not only psychological sources such as the Humanistic Psychology, but also to religious (e.g. Judaism, Christianity) and ancient philosophical sources (e.g. Plato and Aristotle) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positive_psychology). All these traditions emphasised – to greater or lesser extent – the promotion of human flourishing and happiness. This development within the field of psychology – and in the meantime also in the fields of economy and sociology – brings the subject matter of human happiness back into scholarly study and debate.
The emphasis on ‘positivity’ and happiness also found its way into the study of leisure. Stebbins, for instance, holds leisure to be an inherent positive activity that forms the basis for a positive lifestyle (2012: 9–10, 16–17). He puts forward that: ‘leisure can generate happiness, but is not itself happiness’ (2014: 32). This statement rests upon his proposition that leisure is an activity whereas happiness is a state of mind. Serious (and project-based) leisure activities can lead to long-term happiness, self-fulfilment, well-being and quality of life (2014: 37). Another leisure scholar, Elkington, confirms Stebbins’ position on the positivity of leisure and its influence on human life. ‘Leisure activities … make our existence rewarding and attractive and, therefore, worth living’ (2014: 12). Nawijn and Veenhoven, in investigating the relationship between leisure and happiness, follow the same line of thinking by stating that leisure might contribute to happiness through the pursuit of goals that are congruent with one’s needs (2013: 199). Leisure is seen as a relatively robust determinant of human happiness (Peterson 2006: 93).
In closing this section, it is clear from the explication above that leisure scholars adhering to the ‘positive’ movement predominantly describe leisure as an activity, a means to an end, as instrumental to happiness. However, Freire and Caldwell pointed out that the contribution of positive leisure science to the conceptualisation of leisure is also inseparably connected to time. Leisure activities are not always positive. They assert: ‘time is needed to have leisure, but having time, per se, does not guarantee the perception of having or being in leisure’ (2013: 218, 222). The ultimate objective of leisure is advocated as human thriving and optimal human well-being.
This chapter conveys a bird’s-eye view of historical representations of the idea of leisure. It starts with a brief review of scholarly conceptualisations and interpretations of leisure through history which shows quite an array of different, complementary and also apparently contradictory dimensions of leisure. Conceptualisations are after all influenced by the disciplinary interests of the scholar, be it sociology, cultural studies, geography, economics, psychology or philosophy. As far as sociology – the principle discipline from which leisure is generally studied – is concerned, scholars seem to agree on the notion that leisure has three basic characteristics: time, activity and a state of mind/being (Russell 2009). Torkildsen puts forward that leisure is a way of living based on freedom. It represents an ‘all-pervading, holistic concept’ that embodies existential meaning and also has an end in itself (2000: 73).
This brief review of scholarly interpretations of leisure is, by way of contrast and support, followed by a review of the way in which the idea of leisure has been profiled in different historical epochs. The analysis starts with a substantial description of leisure as conceived by the ancient Greek philosophers, with their emphasis on the centrality of the good life and human happiness, and ends with the modern view of leisure as a positive science that is instrumental to human flourishing and happiness. In the epochs between those two historical markers leisure is also identified with (public) entertainment, pleasure, self-development, fitness, health, luxury, contemplation, idleness, recreation, relaxation, consumption, play, thriving, well-being, spirituality, inner meaning, worship and celebration.
Whatever the conceptualisations of leisure might be, an essential feature of leisure seems to be a relationship with the very essence of being or becoming human. It is about what is important to human beings. The historical reception portrays a manifold of ideas of leisure and apparently supports this notion. Further reflection and philosophical analysis are needed in order to uncover deeper foundational and existential layers associated with the idea of leisure. Therefore, a dialogue between classical philosophical themes such as freedom, meaning, identity and ethics will be set up in the second part of this study. Yet, to bridge the historical exercise undertaken in this chapter and the following section, an intermezzo will be included which depicts an assessment of the nature of the times we are currently living in.
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