1. Indonesian Democracy in Theoretical Perspective
1. However, the distinguished anthropologist Robert W. Hefner has of course written an extremely valuable book on the context in which the democratization attempt in Indonesia began. See Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). An excellent volume that deserves to reach a wider audience is Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, eds., Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions, and Society, Indonesia Update Series (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). As is clear from the description of the contributors to our volume, most of them have written major works on aspects of democratization in Indonesia, but as a group we felt that we should combine our efforts to address the theme of democratic transition and consolidation. There are, of course, many books on Turkey, but their central focus is often more on issues such as modernization, the Atatürkist legacy, laïcité, the role of the military, and, most recently, the role of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) than on democratic transition and consolidation. Two volumes that relate to the issue of democracy in a Muslim country have joined this volume in a miniseries: Ahmet Kuru and Alfred Stepan, eds., Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), and Mamadou Diouf, ed., Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). However, neither of these volumes is as centrally concerned with democratic transition and consolidation as is this volume.
2. For the post-1945 Dutch challenge and secessionist movements, see Merle Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200, 4th ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008), especially chap. 5A.
7. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), esp. part I.
8. These amendments stipulated that (a) members of Parliament and regional legislatures be directly elected; (b) a new upper house, also directly elected, Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah (Regional Representative Council), be created; (c) the president and vice president be directly elected and their terms limited to 2 five-year terms; (d) a constitutional court be established for judicial review; and (e) human and political rights be strengthened.
9. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xviii, 133–172.
10. For “social imaginaries,” see Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004). For Taylor’s discussion of the idea of human “flourishing,” see Charles Taylor, The Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
11. Gramsci’s concept of a series of “moats” that protect nondemocratic regimes can also be used to help buttress a democratic regime. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International, 1971), 238.
12. For the “twin toleration” argument that democracy needs the toleration of democracy by religion and the toleration of religion by democratic leaders, see Alfred Stepan, “The World’s Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the ‘Twin Tolerations,’” in Arguing Comparative Politics, 213–253 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), esp. 215–217.
13. On the Immanent Frame blog run by the Social Science Research Council, see Alfred Stepan, “Contrasting Progress on Democracy in Tunisia and Egypt,” at http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/04/21/contrasting-progress-on-democracy-in-tunisia-and-egypt/, accessed March 30, 2012. See also Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s Twin Tolerations—Friendly Democratic Transition,” Journal of Democracy 23 (2) (April 2012): 89–103. The Freedom House blog post by Alfred Stepan after his return from a Freedom House–sponsored mission to Tunisia and Egypt in March 2011 contrasts military responses in the two countries. See Alfred Stepan, “The Recurrent Temptation to Abdicate to the Military in Egypt,” at http://blog.freedomhouse.org/weblog/2012/01/two-perspectives-on-egypts-transition.html#The%20 Recurrent, accessed March 30, 2012.
14. For much greater detail on the pro-democratic activities of these and other key Islamic actors and especially on their abilities to create important alliances with activists of other religions and with secular actors, see Mirjam Künkler’s dissertation, “Democratization, Islamic Thought, and Social Movements: Coalitional Success in Indonesia and Failure in Iran,” Columbia University, 2008. Also see Künkler’s essay in this volume, “How Pluralist Democracy Became the Consensual Discourse Among Secular and Nonsecular Muslims” (chapter 3).
15. See Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
16. The latter number is based on vote share for the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party), the Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party), and the Partai Pesatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party). PKS still supports the incorporation of sharia into public life, but after 1999 it no longer advocated using the state as the primary mechanism for its implementation.
17. A note on Indonesia’s religious landscape: 86.1 percent of the population are Sunni Muslim, 5.7 percent Protestant Christian, 3 percent Catholic Christian, 1.8 percent Hindu, and 1 percent Buddhist. Within the Muslim community, 65 percent (65–70 million people) are followers of NU and Muhammadiyah.
18. See Alfred Stepan, “The Contribution by Muslims to the Multiple Secularism of Modern Democracies,” in The Boundaries of Toleration, edited by Alfred Stepan and Charles Taylor, page nos. not yet available (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
19. For Linz and Stepan, “behaviorally, democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political groups attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state.” See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 5.
20. Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). See also the review of Mietzner’s book in “The Burmese Road to Ruin,” The Economist, August 13, 2009, at http://www.economist.com/node/14210809, accessed November 1, 2012.
21. Personal discussion between Alfred Stepan and the Indonesian minister of defense Juwono Sudarsono, Jakarta, September 25, 2009.
22. For the substantially more constraining role of the military in Brazil, Chile, and Portugal, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, esp. chaps. 7, 11, and 13.
23. Examples of the few residual prerogatives are the army’s territorial command structure, which still remains intact, and the army’s de facto impunity from legal trials in regard to human rights abuses.
25. Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz went to Indonesia in August 1999 shortly after the fall of Suharto to participate in a conference about constitutional futures for a democratic Indonesia. Upon arrival, they were unexpectedly met at the Jakarta airport by military officials who told them to go with them to military headquarters. Once Stepan and Linz were there, leading officials from the military discussed their extreme reservations about federalism and their concerns about Stepan and Linz’s conference paper, which discussed at length federalism as a possible formula for managing large diverse countries such as India and Indonesia.
26. “Observations on Indonesia’s Fiscal Decentralization from a Panel of International Experts,” n.d., at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Decentralization/Panel_thoughts_on_IndonesiaII.pdf, accessed November 1, 2012. The Expert Panel consisted of Richard Bird (University of Toronto), Roy Bahl, Jorge Martinez (Georgia State University), Roy Kelly (Duke University), and Dana Weist and Bert Hofman (World Bank). The panel also highlighted the “brand new inter-governmental fiscal system [that] was put in place—all of this without major disruption in government services. Over time, the regional share in spending is likely to rise to 45–50 percent, making Indonesia one of the most decentralized countries in the world—and much more decentralized than would be expected on the basis of the country’s structural characteristics.”
27. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200, 388.
28. See chapter 7, “Federacy: A Formula for Democratically Managing Multinational Societies in Unitary States,” in Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011).
29. In addition to Aspinall’s chapter in this volume, see his invaluable book on Aceh: Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009).
31. For Pakistan and Indonesia, see the indispensible volume that reviews madrasas in eight different countries: Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 85–86.
32. See David Dainow, “Montreal Jewish Court of Arbitration,” Bulletin of the National Conference of Jewish Charities 6 (1) (August 1915): 6–7.
33. Many Catholics around the world similarly seek marriage annulment from the Vatican just as much as a civil divorce because civil divorce is not sufficient in making Catholic remarriage possible. From a Catholic point of view, all those divorced by civil law who wish to remarry in the Catholic faith are bigamists until their previous marriage has been lawfully annulled by the Vatican. To annul the marriage, Catholic councils collect evidence, hear the case, and send the annulment for certification to the Vatican, which makes the final decision. Therefore, regarding Catholic marriage, too, in most countries a situation of de facto legal pluralism exists where Catholic canon is made use of in addition to state law. Here, too, this coexistence of religious and state law can be rights enhancing while not being state eroding.
34. This is a central finding of a study of the breakdown of democracy in twelve different European and Latin American countries: Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), esp. viii–x.
35. Article 7(1) of Law No. 10 of 2004 on Lawmaking.
36. Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators:1996–2008, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 4978 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 29, 2009).
38. For an excellent review of these events, see Donald K. Emmerson, Exit Sri Mulyani: Corruption and Reform in Indonesia (N.p.: East Asia Reform, 2010).
39. Ever since the Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 1 (Regulation on Building Houses of Worship), a joint decree by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, was issued in 1969, it has been extremely difficult to obtain the permission to build churches. Many Sunday services of smaller Christian groups are therefore held in school halls, hotels, or rented premises.
40. Article 29 reads “(1) The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God. (2) The State guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief.” In 1999, the guarantee of religious freedom was reinforced by the enactment of Law No. 39 on Human Rights, which provides that every individual is at liberty to follow his or her religion and to perform religious services in manners relevant to his or her religion.
2. Indonesian Democracy: From Transition to Consolidation
1. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3.
3. In Freedom House’s annual rankings, Indonesia moved from Not Free to Partially Free after the 1999 elections. It became Free in 2006 and has remained so since then. Today’s rankings are: Political Rights, 2, and Civil Liberties, 3, meaning Free. See http://www.freedomhouse.org, accessed May 2, 2013.
4. R. William Liddle, “Indonesia’s Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules,” in Andrew Reynolds, ed., The Architecture of Democracy, 373–399 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
5. The Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) was an addendum to the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, seven words stating that Indonesian Muslims, in addition to believing in God, were obliged to follow sharia. The charter was a famous compromise adopted by a committee of nine nationalist and Muslim leaders on June 22, 1945, in the dying days of the Japanese occupation. It quickly met opposition from eastern Indonesian Christians and others. The Muslim leaders then agreed to strike the seven words, leaving just the statement that all Indonesians believe in “the oneness of God” (“ketuhanan yang maha esa”) in the Constitution as adopted on August 18. See Merle Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1200 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 258, 262.
6. Under Indonesia’s unique threshold law in effect for the 1999 and 2004 elections, a party receiving less than 2 percent of the national vote in 1999 (or 2004) could hold seats in the 1999–2004 (or 2004–2009) Parliament but was not allowed to contest the 2004 election. The solution, adopted by several parties, was to change their name enough to satisfy the national election commission but not so much as to confuse the voters. In 2008, the law was changed so that parties receiving less than 2.5 percent of the total number of parliamentary seats in 2009 (or 3 percent of the popular vote) do not hold seats in the 2009–2014 Parliament. The new law is consistent with international practice.
7. Secular parties, led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat (Democrat Party) with 21 percent, swept the 2009 parliamentary elections with a total of 70 percent of the vote. Among Islamist parties, only PKS (8 percent of vote) and PPP (5 percent of vote) reached the threshold for parliamentary seats.
8. The best analyses of Jemaah Islamiyah are those by the International Crisis Group coordinated by Sidney Jones, a contributor to this volume. See in particular International Crisis Group (ICG), Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous, Asia Report no. 63 (Brussels: ICG, 2003). For more recent evaluations, see ICG, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status, Asia Briefing no. 63 (Brussels: ICG, 2007); and ICG, Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base, Asia Briefing no. 95 (Brussels: ICG, 2009).
9. Greg Fealy, “Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking a Total’ Islamic Identity,” in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri, eds., Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West, 151–164 (London: Tauris, 2007).
10. Authors’ interview with Ismail Yusanto, HTI spokesperson, Jakarta, September 20, 2008. The interview was cut short so that Yusanto could attend a meeting with other Islamist groups to plan lobbying strategy concerning the antipornography bill.
11. ICG, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, Asia Briefing no. 78 (Brussels: ICG, 2008).
12. Blair King, “Empowering the Presidency: Interests and Perceptions in Indonesia’s Constitutional Reforms, 1999–2002,” Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2004.
13. Chapter 3 of King’s “Empowering the Presidency” is the best account of PDIP’s attempts under conservative leadership to limit the extent of constitutional reform between 1999 and 2002.
14. Salim Said, Legitimizing Military Rule: Indonesian Armed Forces, 1958–2000 (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 2006).
15. Human Rights Watch, Unkept Promise: Failure to End Military Business Activity in Indonesia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010).
16. “Hingga kini gerakan ABS belum ditemukan” (Until Now the “Anybody but Susilo” Movement Can’t Be Found), February 2, 2009, at http://www.vivanews.com, accessed February 5, 2009.
17. Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009).
18. “Aceh Party Wins Election, Without Celebration,” Jakarta Post, May 19, 2009.
19. For a nuanced treatment focusing on conflicting loyalties to state and nation since Dutch colonial times, see Donald K. Emmerson, “What Is Indonesia?” in John Bresnan, ed., Indonesia: The Great Transition, 7–74 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).
20. All three points of view are represented in Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).
21. Authors’ interview with Eko Subowo, director of capacity building and regional performance evaluation, Ministry of Home Affairs, Jakarta, September 2008.
22. Saiful Mujani founded and is executive director of LSI, and R. William Liddle is a member of its board of directors. LSI’s website is lsi.or.id. The data reported on in the text are from Saiful Mujani, Masalah konsolidasi demokrasi dan pemilu 2009 (The Problem of the Consolidation of Democracy and the 2009 Elections) (Jakarta: Lembaga Survei Indonesia, 2009).
23. The questions were worded as follows: “In your opinion, how is the freedom to speak or have an opinion [to form or join an organization] under the present government compared to the previous Suharto New Order government? Is it much better, better, the same, worse, or much worse now?” “Much better” and “better” were coded as support for the current government; “worse” and “much worse” were coded as support for the Suharto government.
24. Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition: The Case of Indonesia 1990–2001 (Jakarta: United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery, 2002), 58, 30.
25. Jacques Bertrand, “Ethnic Conflicts in Indonesia: National Models, Critical Junctures, and the Timing of Violence,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8 (2008), 441.
26. Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser, and Menno Pradhan, “Understanding Variations in Local Conflict: Evidence and Implications from Indonesia,” World Development 37 (2009): 698–713. See also Ashutosh Varshney, “Analyzing Collective Violence in Indonesia: An Overview,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8 (2008): 341–359. One of Varshney’s conclusions is that “the scale of ethnocommunal violence in Indonesia does appear to be enormous” (346).
27. Authors’ interviews with nongovernmental organization activists in Medan, Jakarta, and Surabaya in March and April 2008. See also Eric Bjornlund, R. William Liddle, and Blair King, Indonesia: Democracy and Governance Assessment: Final Report (Bethesda, Md.: Democracy International, 2008).
28. Stephen Sherlock, The Indonesian Parliament After Two Elections: What Has Really Changed? Centre for Democratic Institutions Policy Papers on Political Governance (Canberra: Centre for Democratic Institutions, Australian National University, 2007).
29. Only 29 percent of Indonesian voters strongly agree or somewhat agree that they have the ability to participate in politics. In Asia, this number compares unfavorably with that for Thailand (76 percent) but is only slightly lower than for Taiwan (35 percent), about the same as for Korea (28 percent) and the Philippines (27 percent), and higher than for Japan (19 percent). See Saiful Mujani, “The State of Indonesian Democratic Governance: A Popular Assessment,” unpublished manuscript, 2008.
30. R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “Indonesia in 2005: A New Multiparty Presidential Democracy,” Asian Survey 46 (2006):132–139.
31. A valuable collection of articles on this topic is Tim Lindsey, ed., Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd ed. (Annandale, Australia: Federation Press, 2008). See also Lindsey and Simon Butt’s essay in this volume, chapter 9.
32. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996–2008, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 4978 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 29, 2009), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424591, accessed October 28, 2012. The Indonesian data on rule of law are in appendix C, p. 93.
33. Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), Prospek kepemimpinan nasional: Evaluasi publik tiga tahun presiden (The Prospect for National Leadership: Public Evaluation of the President’s Three Years) (Jakarta: LSI, 2007).
34. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 11.
35. Rizal Mallarangeng, Mendobrak sentralisme ekonomi (Battering Down Economic Centralism) (Jakarta: KPG–Freedom Institute, 2002).
37. LSI, Prospek kepemimpinan nasional.
38. The Economic Freedom Network is sponsored by the Canada-based economically liberal Fraser Institute. The key ingredients of economic freedom, operationalized in forty-two variables, are “personal choice, voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, freedom to enter in and compete in markets, and protection of persons and their property from aggression by others.” See http://freetheworld.com, accessed February 16, 2009.
39. Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
3. How Pluralist Democracy Became the Consensual Discourse Among Secular and Nonsecular Muslims in Indonesia
1. The NU has an estimated 35 to 40 million followers and is one of the largest Islamic organizations in the world. A 2002 survey found that more than 50 percent of Indonesian respondents identified themselves as part of or close to NU.
2. Starting in 1935, Zainal Abidin Ahmad (1911–1983) was the editor of the magazine Pandji Islam, which featured the debates between Sukarno and Mohammad Natsir on the nature of the state. Zainal later became president of the prestigious Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu al-Qur’an (Institute of Qur’anic Science) in Jakarta. A lifelong academic deeply interested in political philosophy, he wrote his most elaborate work, Membentuk negara Islam (Building an Islamic State) (Jakarta: Widjaya, 1956), discussed here, as a vision of a state that reconciles religion and democracy.
3. Zainal, Membentuk negara Islam.
4. Zainal Abidin Ahamad, extract number 12-2 in Greg Fealy, “Islam, State, and Governance,” in Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker, eds., Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 214.
5. Zainal, Membentuk negara Islam, 177, my translation.
6. Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, “Address to the Konstituante 1957,” in Debat dasar negara Islam dan Pancasila: Konstituante 1957 (Debate on Islamic and Pancasila-Based State: Constitutional Assembly) (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 2001), 98.
7. For a very thorough discussion of when and how “promoting the good and preventing evil” and “commanding right and forbidding wrong” have been invoked by Muslim thinkers in a variety of historical and geographical contexts, see Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For notions of maslahat, which took on particular significance in questions of government in postrevolutionary Iran, see, for instance, Felicitas Opwis, “Islamic Law and Legal Change: The Concept of Maslaha in Classical and Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory,” and Said Amir Arjomand, “Shari‘a and Constitution in Iran: A Historical Perspective,” both in Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel, eds., Shariʿa: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context, 62–83 and 156–165 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007).
8. In 1952, Chasbullah was the main protagonist behind NU’s decision to break off from Masyumi. A faction around Mohammad Natsir had succeeded in persuading Masyumi delegates to limit the power of the NU-dominated Majelis Syuro (Advisory Council) within Masyumi, of which Chasbullah himself had been the chairman. This decision to limit the council’s power, made at the 1949 Annual Convention of Masyumi in Yogyakarta, created the first instance of tensions between NU and Muslim modernists. At the forefront of this intra-Masyumi disagreement was the distribution of cabinet posts, of which NU, according to internal Masyumi decision making, should not receive any. In particular, this meant that NU would lose its preeminence in the Department for Muslim Affairs in the Ministry of Religion and thus an important source of patronage. By separating from Masyumi, NU succeeded in retaining control over the Department for Muslim Affairs. As the 1955 elections showed, NU did probably account for nearly half of Masyumi’s pre-1952 strength, and Masyumi’s decision not to allocate any cabinet posts to NU seems inappropriate in hindsight. NU received 18 percent of the vote in 1955, Masyumi 20 percent.
9. The Mutazilite school was the dominant theological school in the ninth and tenth centuries that, crudely put, facilitated a synthesis between reason and revelation. The school employed rationalism in the service of scripture and theology.
10. It is not clear whether the regime placed Nasution in this strategic position as rector of the IAIN Jakarta in full knowledge of the likely ramifications. Nevertheless, once Nasution proposed the thorough curriculum reforms, he had the support of Mukti Ali, the minister of religious affairs at the time and a graduate of McGill University, and Mulyanto Sumardi, for a time the director of the Department of Religious Affairs, and an Ed.D. graduate of Columbia University’s Teacher’s College (with a dissertation on the Indonesian language titled “A Sector Analysis of Modern Written Indonesian”).
11. Nasution’s renovation of the education offered in the IAIN was matched in its profundity only by the work of Azyumardi Azra in the 1990s, who significantly expanded instruction in the sciences and transformed the IAIN into a university, from then on called the Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University).
12. Quoted in Refleksi pembaharuan pemikiran Islam: 70 tahun Harun Nasution (Renewed Reflections of Islamic Thought) (Jakarta: Pasar Minggu, 1989), 47, my translation.
13. One of the most important twentieth-century Islamic scholars, Fazlur Rahman, is particularly known for his acknowledgment of the contextual revelation of the Qurʾan.
14. The full thesis title was “Ibn Taimiya on Kalam and Falsafah: A Problem of Reason and Revelation in Islam.”
15. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the HMI was closely associated with the ideas of the Masyumi. The HMI was the driving force behind student movements in the 1960s and 1970s and attracted an extensive membership, establishing chapters in almost every university. By the 1980s, the Islamic student association had an estimated membership of 150,000. In addition, it is estimated that once the regime opened up to allow more (highly qualified) modernist Muslims in the state bureaucracy and political office, the majority of the civil servants came from an HMI background. Edward Aspinall cites figures from the magazine Umat to the effect that 250 of 500 members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council) in 1997 were HMI members. See Edward Aspinall, “Opposition and Elite Conflict in the Fall of Soeharto,” in Geoff Forrester and R. J. May, eds., The Fall of Soeharto (Bathurst, U.K.: Craford House, 1998), 133.
16. See Martin van Bruinessen, “Nurcholish Madjid, Indonesian Muslim Intellectual,” ISIM Review 17 (2006): 22–23, and Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, 3rd printing (Singapore: Talisman, 2004), 358–363.
17. See van Bruinessen, “Nurcholish Madjid.”
18. From translated extract number 12-5 in Fealy, “Islam, State, and Governance,” 222.
19. In the translation by Yusuf Ali, one of the three major translations of the Qur’an in English: “The Religion before Allah is Islam (submission to His Will): Nor did the People of the Book dissent there from except through envy of each other, after knowledge had come to them. But if any deny the Signs of Allah, Allah is swift in calling to account.”
20. See Andi Faisal Bakti, “Islam and Modernity: Nurcholish Madjid’s Interpretation of Civil Society, Pluralism, Secularization, and Democracy,” Asian Journal of Social Sciences 33 (3) (2005), 493.
21. Translated by Yusuf Ali.
22. See Komaruddin Hidayat’s discussion of this aspect of Madjid’s theology in “Contemporary Liberal Islam in Indonesia, Pluralism, and the Secular State,” in Chaider S. Bamualim, ed., A Portrait of Contemporary Indonesian Islam, 53–66 (Jakarta: Sankt Augustin, 2005). Hidayat writes, “Islam, as said by Cak Nur [Nurcholish Madjid], is a generic value that can be Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Konghucu, Jewish or Tao and may even be found in Marxist philosophy. … Each religion, he says, is a vehicle, wasila, the means by which to reach the main goal: self-surrender to the All-Mighty” (58).
23. Van Bruinessen, “Nurcholish Madjid,” 22.
24. From the translated extract in Fealy, “Islam, State, and Governance,” 204–206. See also Olaf Schumann, “Offentliche Verantwortung der Religionsgemeinschaften in Indonesien, dem Land der Pancasila” (Public Responsibility of Religious Communities in Indonesia, the Country of Pancasila), in Christine Lienemann-Perrin and Wolfgang Lienemann, eds., Kirche und Offentlichkeit in Transformationsgesellschaften (Church and Public in Transitional Societies), 359–402 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006).
25. Nurcholish Madjid, “The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and Reinvigorating Religious Understanding,” in Charles Kurzman, ed., Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 286.
26. See Fauzan Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century Indonesia: A Critical Survey (The Hague: Brill, 2001).
27. Roem had taken part in the negotiations for Indonesian independence and had served as minister of the interior and minister of foreign affairs in several cabinets from 1945 to 1953. Parts of the correspondence are reprinted in Fealy and Hooker, eds., Voices in Southeast Asian Islam, 226–299. For a short commentary on the exchange, see also van Bruinessen, “Nurcholish Madjid,” 22.
28. Madjid, “The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought,” 294.
29. Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, “Tracing the Roots of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals: A Bibliographical Survey,” Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia 8 (March 2007), 5.
30. Both Nurcholish Madjid’s Islam kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan (Islam, Modernity, and Indonesianness) (1999) and M. Dawam Rahardjo’s Intelektual intelegensia dan perilaku politik (Intellectuals, Intelligentsia, and Political Behavior) (1993) were published by Mizan, as was the work of other thinkers discussed here, such as Harun Nasution’s Islam rasional (Rational Islam) (1999), M. Amien Rais’s Cakrawala Islam (Islamic Horizon) (1995), and Syafii Maarif’s Peta bumi intelektualisme Islam Indonesia (A Map of Indonesian Islamic Intellectualism) (1995).
31. Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad notes that young Muslim intellectuals such as Saiful Mujani, Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, Arief Subhan, Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi, Agus Wachid, Edy A. Efendy, Dewi Nurjulianti, and Nurul Agustina were products of the Philosophy and Religion Study Circle and Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education, and Information networks and later became major thinkers in their own disciplines. See Bustamam-Ahmad, “Tracing the Roots of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals.”
32. Greg Fealy notes that Siddiq played a major role in coordinating the pogrom against Communist Party members and sympathizers carried out by NU death squads in East Java in 1965–1966. See Greg Fealy, “Ahmad Siddiq,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 3rd ed., part 1, 75–76 (The Hague: Brill, 2007).
33. The group became known as the “Tim Tujuh,” the seven young NU cadres who decided in 1983–1984 for a renewal of NU thought.
34. Siddiq remained NU’s president until his death on January 23, 1989; Aburrahman Wahid held the chairmanship until he assumed the country’s presidency in 1999.
35. See Fealy, “Ahmad Siddiq.”
36. Abdurrahman Wahid, “Baik belum tentu bermanfaat” (The Good Is Not Necessarily Beneficial), Tempo, November 1, 1980, 61, translation in Greg Barton, “The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid’s Thought,” in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy, eds., Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam, and Modernity in Indonesia (Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 213.
37. From Abdurrahman Wahid, “Dinamisasi dan modernisasi pesantren” (Dynamization and Modernization of Islamic Schools) (1981), quoted and translated in Barton, “The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid’s Thought,” 211.
38. See the chapter on Wahid in John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam, 199–216 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
39. Abdurrahman Wahid, “Kyai ikhlas dan ko-edukasi” (Coeducation and the Sincere Kiai), Tempo, July 19, 1980, 33, translated in Barton, “The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid’s Thought,” 216.
40. Abdurrahman Wahid, “Menjadikan Hukum Islam sebagai Penunjang Pembangunan,” Prisma 4 (August 1975): 53–62, translated as “Making Islamic Law Conducive to Development,” Prisma 1 (November 1975): 87–94; also translated in Barton, “The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid’s Thought,” 202.
41. Wahid, “Menjadikan Hukum Islam,” 62, as translated in Barton, “The Liberal, Progressive Roots of Abdurrahman Wahid’s Thought,” 207.
42. Edward Aspinall, Political Opposition and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Indonesia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 72.
43. Maintaining interreligious and intercommunal peace as a fundamentally Islamic value was certainly of great concern to Wahid. Other NU members may have had NU’s future in mind more than intercommunal peace when deciding for the acceptance of Pancasila as the sole foundation of the state.
44. Compare Wahid’s viewpoint with that of Abshar-Abdallah, who believes that universal religious values should contribute to creating and informing public values, but religious practice should be fundamentally private.
45. Abdurrahman Wahid, “Indonesia’s Mild Secularism,” SAIS Review 21, no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2001), 28.
4. Christian and Muslim Minorities in Indonesia: State Policies and Majority Islamic Organizations
1. I discuss some of the sources and practices of tolerance in Java in my book Javanese Ethics and World-View: The Javanese Idea of the Good Life (Jakarta: KDT, 1997), first published in German.
2. Because these traumatic events are a crucial point in Christian–Muslim relations in Indonesia, they should not be politely glossed over, as happens so often in “interreligious dialogues”; on the contrary, they should be faced squarely but unemotionally and realistically, even if a completely satisfying solution may be some time away. A list by the Forum Komunikasi Kristiani (Christian Forum for Communication) names 938 churches (up to June 1, 2004) that had been closed by violent attacks since 1945, many of them destroyed or burned down: 2 churches during Sukarno’s presidency; 456 under Suharto, most of them after 1990; and the rest under the following three presidents. Even not counting the approximately 250 churches that were destroyed during the civil wars in Sulawesi and the Maluku Islands, some of which, as Sidney Jones makes clear, involved military or police complicity (where also mosques were destroyed), we still can count 688 churches that have been attacked.
3. The situation in the Maluku Islands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is described in Adolf Heuken, Be My Witness to the Ends of the Earth: The Catholic Church in Indonesia Before the 19th Century (Jakarta: Cipta Loka Caraka, 2002).
4. One can only speculate about the deeper reasons for the climate of communal violence surrounding the democratic transition. Under President Suharto, people were not allowed to voice their grievances; they often felt themselves to be “victims of development”—for example, because they were driven from their land in favor of a government project with insufficient compensation, which often evaporated before reaching its rightful receivers. Complaining would have exposed them to accusations of being Communist, which since 1965 has been the same as being threatened with death. Thus, these “development victims” have had to accept and keep silent. Communal conflicts, too, were silenced and thus could not be resolved. Feelings of being the victim of injustice steadily accumulated. People were disappointed and felt isolated and abused, and their anger grew. After the democratic opening following the fall of President Suharto, their anger burst to the surface. They now remembered all the injustices of occurring over more than thirty years. In addition, rapid modernization, with its breakdown of traditional social structures, made a plural society unstable. In other words, we have just begun to realize how big a task it is to unite such a number of different social components within the boundaries of a national state in such a way that they all feel at home, can evolve a positive commitment to each other as members of the same nation, and are reconfirmed in their respective social identities.
5. The term Islamists is misleading; by it, I mean not ideologues or fanatics, but, according to the Indonesian use of the word Islam in a political context, those who define their political participation according to Islamic ideas and pursue them through Islam-based parties.
6. Religiously motivated terror had been obvious since 1999 but was played down and never seriously investigated by either the state or Islamic authorities. The first bomb in a religiously motivated attack exploded in April 1999 at Istiqlal Mosque; the people hired to place the bombs were easily caught, but, strangely enough, information on whoever gave them the bombs and paid them never came to light—although the media reported that the house in western Jakarta where the transactions were made was quickly identified. The first climax of religiously motivated terrorism was, of course, the Christmas bombings of 2000, which, as I mentioned, were not investigated seriously. Only Bali changed the situation.
5. Veto Player No More?
1. Scott Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues, Working Paper no. 130 (Notre Dame, Ind.: Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1989), 17.
2. Richard Gunther, “Opening a Dialogue on Institutional Choice in Indonesia: Presidential, Parliamentary, and Semipresidential Systems,” in R. William Liddle, ed., Crafting Indonesian Democracy (Bandung, Indonesia: Mizan, 2001), 151.
3. Larry Diamond, “Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2) (2002), 31.
4. Bertlesmann Stiftung, Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008—Indonesia Country Report (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008), 5, 11, 29, 31.
5. George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 19.
6. Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945–1967 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982); Salim Said, Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945–49 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan; Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).
7. Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 37–67.
8. Ian McFarling, The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996), 37.
9. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952).
10. The end of the war also terminated the tenure of many military emergency administrators across the archipelago. In the areas in which fighting between the Dutch and the Indonesian army took place (mostly on Java and Sumatra), military officers had acted as de facto heads of local government because civilian officials had been captured or had fled. With the war over, the military no longer fulfilled these functions.
11. Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 65.
12. Most important, the regional rebellions between 1956 and 1958 as well as the ongoing Islamist insurgencies in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi catapulted the military back into the very position of emergency administrators that it had reluctantly vacated after 1945.
13. Herbert Feith, “Dynamics of Guided Democracy,” in Ruth McVey, ed., Indonesia, 2d rev. ed., 309–409 (New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press, 1967).
14. Jamie Mackie, “Inevitable or Avoidable? Interpretations of the Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy,” in David Bourchier and John Legge, eds., Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, 26–38 (Clayton, Australia: Monash University, 1994).
15. See Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), and Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
16. What exactly happened on September 30, 1965, remains unclear and will probably never be completely revealed. But it seems plausible that a small group of PKI officials and pro-Communist TNI elements did indeed try to decapitate the military leadership and take power temporarily, probably believing that the latter planned to move against Sukarno. Presented with this welcome chance of grabbing power and destroying the PKI, Suharto assumed control and did not relinquish it for almost thirty-three years. See John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’État in Indonesia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).
17. Not coincidentally, one of the most serious challenges from within the military against Suharto’s leadership was launched in 1978—at the time when the president was leaving active military service. The fact that he survived the crisis proved that he was willing (and able) to build a power base outside of his military circles.
18. Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).
19. David R. Mares, Civil–Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 7.
20. It was widely believed that Suharto had intended to appoint Habibie as vice president in 1993, but the military preempted this move by publicly nominating Try Sutrisno, its commander. Ignoring the military’s nomination would have exposed splits within the regime, so Suharto decided to accept Try as his deputy. However, he also retaliated by isolating Try from government business and reducing the military’s representation in Parliament.
21. Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization”: The Indonesian Pro-democracy Movement in a Changing World (Richmond, U.K.: Curzon, 1997), 58.
22. One week before his resignation, Suharto had announced his plan to reestablish a notoriously repressive security agency that had dealt effectively with regime opposition in the 1970s. But Wiranto, commander of the armed forces, objected to the initiative, and Suharto subsequently aborted it. See Takashi Shiraishi, “The Indonesian Military in Politics,” in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris, eds., The Politics of Post-Suharto Indonesia, 73–86 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), and Tatik Hafidz, Fading Away? The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia’s Transition to Democracy, 1998–2001 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2006).
23. Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia, 122–138.
24. David Bourchier, “Skeletons, Vigilantes, and the Armed Forces’ Fall from Grace,” in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury, eds., Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, 149–172 (Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999).
25. Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, 3rd printing (Singapore: Talisman, 2004).
26. The only group pushing for a more “revolutionary” solution to the crisis were the students, but even they began to disband after it became clear that most Indonesians were satisfied with Suharto’s removal and were prepared to give Habibie a chance. Most oppositional figures rejected the idea of a transitional government in which they all would be represented because the distrust among them was so deep that cooperation seemed impossible.
27. “Reformasi ABRI batasi masa jabatan presiden” (ABRI Reform Limits Presidential Term), Republika, May 26, 1998.
28. Marco Bünte, “Indonesia’s Protracted Decentralization: Contested Reforms and Their Unintended Consequences,” in Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen, eds., Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia, 102–123 (New York: Routledge, 2009).
29. The military reform agenda was formulated at an internal military seminar in September 1998; Habibie apparently did not provide policy directives for this event.
30. Jun Honna, “From Dwifungsi to NKRI: Regime Change and Political Activism of the Indonesian Miliarty,” in Bünte and Ufen, eds., Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia, 226–248.
31. Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State, 207.
32. One scenario developed within TNI was the division of East Timor into a western and eastern part, with the West remaining in the Indonesian Republic. See Douglas Kammen, “The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution to East Timor,” in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, ed., Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, 156–188 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2001).
33. Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), 115.
34. The number of TNI representatives was reduced from seventy-five in the 1997 Parliament to thirty-eight in the legislature elected in 1999. Representatives of political parties initially wanted to grant TNI only “two or three” unelected members, but Yudhoyono, who negotiated the electoral laws with Parliament, criticized this offer as “cruel.” Author’s interview with Zarkasih Nur, senior member of Parliament, Jakarta, February 10, 1999.
35. Harold Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia After Suharto (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).
36. The military had a very strained relationship with Wahid. That was not unusual, however—virtually every other political party or group was in permanent conflict with the president. Wahid was impeached almost unanimously.
37. Blair King, “Empowering the Presidency: Interests and Perceptions in Indonesia’s Constitutional Reforms, 1999–2002,” Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 2004.
38. Honna, “From Dwifungsi to NKRI.”
39. Author’s interview with Lieutenant-General (ret.) Agus Widjojo, Jakarta, August 15, 2007.
40. The People’s Consultative Assembly had in 1999 still elected the president, and TNI’s thirty-eight delegates were a small but significant voting block in the seven-hundred-member body. After 2004, however, the assembly lost its authority to elect the head of state and thus much of its relevance.
41. Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009).
42. Michael Morfit, The Road to Helsinki: The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia’s Democratic Development,” Internation Negotiation 12 (1): 111–143.
43. Author’s interview with General (ret.) Endriartono Sutarto, Jakarta, June 11, 2007.
44. Author’s interview with Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono, Jakarta, May 1, 2007.
45. Interview with General Sutarto, June 11, 2007.
46. Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State, 360–382.
47. According to a USAID-sponsored opinion survey, support for democracy stood at 48 percent in 2008, with only 7 percent of respondents endorsing nondemocratic forms of government. See Democracy International, Inc., Indonesia Annual Public Opinion Surveys—2008 Report (Bethesda, Md.: Democracy International, November 11, 2008).
48. Andreas Ufen, Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between Politik Aliran and “Philippinisation,” Paper no. 37 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2006).
49. Jaap Hoogenboexem, “Civil Society and Control of the Military,” paper presented at the ERGOMAS Ninth Biennal Conference, École Militaire, Paris, December 9–11, 2004.
50. Generals who were rivals for key military positions during their active service often become bitter political opponents after their retirement as well. Many national and local elections have been contested by a number of deeply antagonistic military candidates.
51. “Prajurit malu, prajurit tumbang di pilkada” (Officers Embarrassed About Failure in Local Elections), Jawa Pos, April 26, 2008.
52. “RUU peradilan militer belum tuntas” (Military Justice Bill Not Yet Completed), Kompas, July 29, 2008; author’s interviews with Andreas Pereira, chairman of the parliamentary committee in charge of deliberating the bill on the military justice system, Jakarta, May 7, 2007, and November 14, 2008.
53. Marcus Mietzner, “Soldiers, Parties, and Bureaucrats: Illicit Fund-Raising in Contemporary Indonesia,” South East Asian Research 16 (2) (2008): 225–254.
54. Human Rights Watch, Out of Sight: Endemic Abuse and Impunity in Papua’s Central Highlands (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 4, 2007).
55. Samuel Finer, The Man on Horesback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Transaction, 2002).
56. See, for instance, Mainwaring, Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation.
58. See Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview,” Journal of Democracy 15 (2) (2004): 20–31.
6. Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam Since 1998
1. Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2002), 186–88.
2. International Crisis Group (ICG), Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia Report no. 74 (Brussels: ICG, February 2004). Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Adung went back in October 1998 to test the waters. They had no problem coming into the country and so returned to Malaysia with the message that it was safe to go home. ICG recorded interview with Adung, April 24, 2006. KOMPAK stands for “Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis” (Crisis Management/Prevention Committee), but the group is known simply as Mujahidin KOMPAK.
3. Ali Imron, Ali Imron: Sang pengebom (Ali Imron: The Bomber) (Jakarta: Republika Jakarta, November 2007). The more radical members of JI saw the Ambon conflict as a local manifestation of the larger conflict involving an international “Crusader–Zionist alliance” led by the United States against Islam. Fighting local Christians was thus a way of taking on an international enemy. Whether Ambon was a legitimate jihad or not, however, was a matter of fierce debate within JI. See ICG, Indonesia Backgrounder.
4. Wakalah Jawa Wustho, “Laporan perkembangan Da’wah Wal Irsyad” (Report of Religious Outreach Developments), June 1999, unpublished, copy in author’s files.
5. Coming to Habibie’s support were many of the militant Muslim groups such as the Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with World Islam) that had been drawn into Jakarta power politics in the late 1990s by Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s son-in-law. Wiranto, who cast his lot with Habibie and whose power depended on staying with him, saw Prabowo as his major rival and succeeded in ousting him. One of his priorities, then, became to co-opt Prabowo supporters, especially those, like some of the Muslim organizations, that had a mass base. Personal communication from Jeremy Wagstaff, author and political analyst, March 26, 2009.
6. Institut Studi Arus Informasi, Premanisme politik (Political Thuggery) (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, March 2000), 90–102; O’Rourke, Reformasi, 180–181.
7. Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post–New Order Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2006), 100. It is doubtful whether anyone in the government had any consciousness of the Salafis’ strong ties to ulama in Saudi Arabia and Yemen or whether this knowledge would have made any difference if they had.
9. KOMPAK was created in 1998 under the auspices of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council. Its head in Solo was JI member Aris Munandar, who became the main conduit for funding the Ambon operation.
10. In the Ambon conflict, as in Poso, Muslims and Christians were equally perpetrators and victims. The Christian side, because of its international network, including through diaspora Christian Moluccan groups in the Netherlands, succeeded in convincing many in the international community that they were overwhelmingly the victims. Within Indonesia, Muslim networks portrayed Christians as the aggressors. The balance did shift in favor of the Muslims after a Muslim militia called Laskar Jihad (Jihad Militia), supported by the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian National Military), arrived in Ambon in April 2000.
11. Author’s interview with Indonesian investigator, Jakarta, June 2008.
12. The TNI at the time claimed and continues to claim that the major instigator of violence had been elements of the Republic of the South Moluccas, a movement that the army had defeated in the 1950s but that retained a small band of supporters in Maluku. “Christian separatists” and their foreign backers, in many conservative Muslims’ view, were also responsible for the independence movement in East Timor.
13. “Gus Dur sampaikan surat prihatin” (Gus Dur Conveys a Letter of Concern), Pontianak Post, August 2, 2000.
14. The officials blamed were Prabowo Subianto, the former army strategic reserve commander whom Wiranto had sacked, and Hartono, an official close to the Suharto family. See “Prabowo bantah tudingan Gus Dur” (Prabowo Denies Gus Dur’s Accusation), January 16, 2002. BIN may have exploited one of those bombings (Medan), but for purposes of blaming the Acehnese rebel movement, GAM, rather than to destabilize the government.
15. One of the eleven cities where bombs went off was Medan, North Sumatra; a member of GAM was arrested for involvement, as was a man with longstanding ties to the military. JI members were clearly involved as well, but the bombing was blamed on GAM.
16. ICG, Indonesia: The Implications of the Timor Trials, Asia Briefing no. 16 (Brussels: ICG, May 2002).
17. Interrogation of Imam Samudra, November 28, 2002, in Abu Bakar Ba’asyir case dossier, Central Jakarta District Court, 2003. At another point in his interrogation, Imam Samudra gave a longer list of reasons: “(a) to fight the brutality of the Crusader Army of the United States and its allies—Britain, Australia, Germany, France, Japan, Russian Orthodox, and so on; (b) as the duty of all Muslims to retaliate for the two hundred thousand innocent men, women, and infants who fell under thousands of tons of bombs in September 2001 in Afghanistan; (c) because Australia intervened to separate East Timor from Indonesia as part of the international Crusader conspiracy; (d) because of the intervention of Crusader forces who worked with infidel Hindus in India to annihilate Muslims in Kashmir; (e) as a response to the brutality and involvement of Crusader forces to the ethnic cleansing in Ambon, Poso, Halmahera, and elsewhere; (f) to defend Bosnian Muslims who were being exterminated by Crusader forces; (g) to undertake Muslims’ individual obligation to wage a global war on Jews and Christians in all Muslim countries; (h) as an expression of the Muslim community, unfettered by geographic boundaries; (i) to execute Allah’s order in Surat An-Nisa on everyone’s duty to defend innocent men, women, and children who become the targets of the inhumane American terrorists and their allies; (j) as a warning to Christians and Jews against the effort led by America and its allies to colonize the two most holy places of Islam; (k) so that American terrorists and their allies understand that the price of Muslims’ blood comes high and cannot be exploited; (l) so that American terrorists understand the pain and bitterness of losing mothers, husbands, children, and wives because they have caused the deaths of Muslims around the world; (m) to show to Allah that we will do our utmost to defend vulnerable Muslims and will fight to oppose imperialists and American terrorists and their allies (may Allah curse and destroy them).” Author’s translation of the original transcript.
18. Quoted in Aly Gufron bin Nurhasyim, Jihad bom Bali: Sebuah pembelaan (The Bali Bombings Jihad: A Defense), handwritten copy obtained by the author, no pagination, author’s translation.
19. Author’s interview with senior prosecutor, Jakarta, April 2008.
20. Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 198–199.
21. See, for example, “Noordin M Top penyusup Malaysia yang takut kemajuan Indonesia?” (Was Noordin Top Smuggled Here from Malaysia, Which Fears Indonesia’s Rise?), September 25, 2009, at http://www.infospesial.com, accessed September 30, 2009.
22. Quoted in “Fugitive Militant Slain in Indonesia,” Washington Post, September 18, 2009.
23. “Proyek Bali” (The Bali Project), document found on Dr. Azhari’s computer, November 2005, my translation.
24. One of the reasons the central government had largely ignored Poso may have been that it did not want to imply that the Malino Accords had failed. See ICG, Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report no. 127 (Brussels: ICG, January 24, 2007).
25. The new pesantren is a branch of Gontor, the school that produced some of Indonesia’s best-known moderate intellectuals but also produced Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.
27. Quoted in ICG, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree, Asia Briefing no. 78 (Brussels: ICG, July 7, 2008), 14.
28. Author’s interview with Brigadier General (Police) Dr. Badrodin Haiti, Central Sulawesi chief of police, Palu, Central Sualwesi Indonesia, November 30, 2006. A little more knowledge of the local rifts would have shown that there was no point in trying to use Rizieq as a counterweight to Arsal because the local FPI head was Arsal’s bitterest rival—there was no way that Arsal supporters were going to be attracted to FPI.
29. Laskar Jihad disbanded a day after the Bali attack, but the reasons were internal, and the process had begun long before Bali. See Hasan, Laskar Jihad, and ICG, Indonesia: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix, Asia Report no. 83 (Brussels: ICG, September 1, 2004).
32. ICG, Indonesia: Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons, Asia Report no. 142 (Brussels: ICG, November 19, 2007). What the government called a “deradicalization program” was a series of ad hoc efforts to provide prisoners detained or convicted on terrorism charges with additional food and sometimes financial assistance for their families in exchange for cooperation and providing information. There was no systematic effort at religious counseling to move them away from jihadi tenets. After some twenty former prisoners were found in 2010 to be involved directly or indirectly in setting up a military training camp in Aceh, officials realized a more systematic approach was needed.
33. ICG, Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh, Asia Report no. 189 (Brussels: ICG, April 20, 2010).
34. See Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, “Selamatkan Indonesia dengan syariah” (Saving Indonesia with Islamic Law), paper presented at the National Seminar on Implementation of Syariat Values in Society and State, November 25, 2007, location unknown.
35. The fatwa is reproduced in “Tanggapan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia terhadap fatwa MUI tentang golput” (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s View of the Indonesian Ulama Council’s Fatwa on Abstaining from Voting), January 28, 2009, Document no. 152/PU/E/01/09, Jakarta, at http://ppiuk.org/node/537, accessed February 2, 2010.
36. “Fatwa MUI: Golput wajib! Golput haram!” (The Indonesia Ulama Council Fatwa: Abstention Is Obligatory! Abstention Is Forbidden!), February 11, 2009, my translation, at http://fpionline.multiply.com/journal/item/70, accessed October 30, 2012.
37. “Tanggapan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia terhadap fatwa.”
38. “Pilih Islam atau Democrazy” (Choose Islam or “Democrazy”), flyer handed out February 15, 2009, as-Salaam Mosque, Citerueup, Bogor, author’s translation.
39. JAT remains committed to jihad (here its teachings are virtually identical to JI’s), and in 2010 police found it had a secret wing for military training. There was little evidence that it was interested in mounting operations in Indonesia, but after more than a dozen jihadis linked to the Aceh training camp were killed by police, one JAT cell carried out execution-style murders of three police officers. It was not clear as of late 2010 that these killings were sanctioned by the JAT leadership. But JAT was already showing signs of disarray when one of the most militant ulama on the executive council of the new body, Oman Rochman (a.k.a. Aman Abdurrahman), pulled out—or was pushed out—for taking too hard a line and effectively demanding that all Indonesian officials and politicians who do not fully support Islamic law be declared kafir (unbelievers). Oman was responsible for a bomb-making class that led to an explosion in Cimanggis in March 2004. He was imprisoned, released in July 2008, and rearrested in March 2010 for his role in recruiting participants for the Aceh camp. He is recognized as the most influential scholar within the radical community and is the main translator of al-Maqdisi’s work from Arabic into Indonesian.
40. For a good background paper on HTI, see Greg Fealy, “Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia: Seeking a ‘Total’ Islamic Identity,” in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri, eds., Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West, 151–164 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007). It is worth noting, however, that although Indonesia routinely imprisons Papuans and Moluccans for flying the flags of their respective independence movements, it has never questioned the use of HTI’s flag, which in its own way is calling for an alternative government.
7. How Indonesia Survived: Comparative Perspectives on State Disintegration and Democratic Integration
1. Most Indonesia specialists in fact argued that state breakup was unlikely. See, for example, Robert Cribb, “Not the Next Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Disintegration of Indonesia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 53 (2) (1999): 169–178; Donald Emmerson, “Will Indonesia Survive?” Foreign Affairs 79 (3) (May–June 2000): 95–106 ; Sylvia Tiwon, “From East Timor to Aceh: The Disintegration of Indonesia?” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32 (1–2) (2000): 97–104; Edward Aspinall and Mark T. Berger, “The Breakup of Indonesia? Nationalisms After Decolonisation and the Contradictions of Modernity in Post–Cold War Southeast Asia,” Third World Quarterly 22 (6) (2001): 1003–1024.
2. The figures are derived from Gerry van Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars (London: Routledge, 2007), 4. Van Klinken in turn draws on Ashutosh Varshney, Rizal Panggabean, and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990–2003) (Jakarta: United Nations Support, 2004) and my own estimate of deaths in Aceh. The figures are likely to be a serious underestimate: the United Nations report is based on a survey of newspaper reports, and my own estimate of 7,200 deaths in Aceh is based on official and newspaper tallies.
3. Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3.
4. See, for example, Ann Booth, “Can Indonesia Survive as a Unitary State?” Indonesia and the Malay World 20 (58) (1992): 32–47.
5. Ted Robert Gurr, “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2000): 52–64.
6. See, for example, Pranab Bardhan, “Decentralization of Governance and Development,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (4) (2002): 185–205.
8. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization, 448.
9. I analyze this mobilizational cycle in Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 202–238.
10. “Dua tokoh proklamasikan Riau merdeka” (Two Leaders Proclaim Free Riau), Jawa Pos, March 8, 1999.
11. “People’s Congress Votes for Riau Independence,” Jakarta Post, February 2, 2000; “Gerakan Riau Merdeka latih 20.000 tentara di Malaysia” (Free Riau Movement Trains 20,000 Fighters in Malaysia), Detik.com, July 2, 2000.
12. Adrian Vickers, “Bali Merdeka? Migration, Tourism, and Hindu Revivalism,” in Minako Sakai, ed., Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local Societies in Indonesia (Adelaide: Crawford House, 2002), 81.
13. “Mahasiswa Makassar tuntut Sulawesi merdeka” (Makassar Students Demand Free Sulawesi), Republika, October 23, 1999. Even more bizarrely, some supporters of Habibie’s successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, threatened they would establish a “State of East Java” if he were removed from office: “FKB sepakat penugasan Mega lewat tap MPR” (National Awakening Fraction Agrees to Appointment of Mega Via an MPR Decree), Bernas, May 8, 2001.
14. Examples include a law on the national education system, specifically its provisions regarding religious education, and an antipornography bill, which some Hindus, Christians, and other minorities viewed as an expression of Islamist aspirations: “Education Bill Continues to Divide Indonesians,” Jakarta Post, May 12, 2003; “Huge Turnout as Balinese Decry Porn Bill,” Jakarta Post, March 4, 2006.
15. See, for example, Freek Colombijn, “Where There Is Nothing to Imagine: Nationalism in Riau,” in Peter J. M. Nas, Gerard A. Persoon, and Rivke Jaffe, eds., Framing Indonesian Realities: Essays in Symbolic Anthropology in Honour of Reimar Schefold, 333–370 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003).
16. See, for example, van Klinken, Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia, and Jamie S. Davidson, From Rebellion to Riots: Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008).
17. Tim Johnston, “Indonesia Takes Final Steps Towards Devolved Democracy,” Financial Times (London), June 3, 2005.
18. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 101.
19. The regulation at the time of writing is that political parties must have branches in at least 60 percent of the provinces, in 50 percent of the districts in those provinces, and in 25 percent of the subdistricts in those districts (Art. 3.2.d. of Law No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties).
20. Dawn Brancati, “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?” International Organization 60 (2006), 656.
21. M. Ryaas Rasyid, “Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia,” in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds., Democratisation and Decentralisation in Indonesia: Local Power and Politics (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 63.
22. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 74.
23. Quoted in Richard Chauvel, Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation (Washington, D.C.: East West Center, 2005), 9.
24. Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 149.
25. Leon Aron, “The ‘Mystery’ of the Soviet ‘Collapse,’” Journal of Democracy 17 (2) (2006), 29.
26. The most widely cited exception is in Lithuania, where Soviet troops were mobilized in response to Lithuania’s March 1991 declaration of independence, leading to the deaths of fourteen civilians.
27. Beissinger cites official statistics that suggest that 1,314 persons died in interethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union between January 1988 and May 1991 (Nationalist Mobilization, 276) (this figure, of course, does not count the many persons who perished in the various conflicts that followed the dissolution of the Soviet state).
28. Address by H. E. Megawati Sukarnoputri, president of the Republic of Indonesia, at the United States–Indonesia Society Gala Dinner, Washington, D.C., September 19, 2001, copy sent to the author by email.
29. For one example, see Rizal Mallarangeng, “Aceh, ujian pertama dan terakhir” (Aceh, the First and Final Test), Kompas, November 20, 1999.
30. Human Rights Watch, Aceh Under Martial Law: Inside the Secret War (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), at http://hrw.org/reports/2003/indonesia1203/indonesia1203.pdf, accessed December 10, 2003; Amnesty International, New Military Operations, Old Patterns of Human Rights Abuses in Aceh (New York: Amnesty International, 2004), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA210332004ENGLISH/$File/ASA2103304.pdf, accessed June 1, 2004.
32. “Empat anggota Gerakan Negara Sunda jadi tersangka” (Four Members of the Sunda State Movement Named Suspects), Koran Tempo, May 24, 2006; “300 anggota FKM masih buron” (300 FKM Members Still Fugitives), Tempo Interaktif, July 4, 2004.
33. Edward Aspinall, The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh? (Washington, D.C.: East West Center, 2005), 7–14.
34. Anthony D. Smith, “State-Making and Nation-Building,” in John A. Hall, ed., States in History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 261–262. I am grateful to Mark T. Berger for drawing my attention to this quotation.
35. Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 136.
36. Peter Radan, The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International Law (London: Routledge, 2002).
37. Valerie Bunce, Minority Politics in Ethnofederal States: Cooperation, Autonomy, or Secession? Working Paper Series no. 8-07 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, Cornell University, 2007), 7.
38. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23.
39. Ronald Grigor Suny, “Learning from Empire: Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore, eds., Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power (New York: New Press, 2005), 88.
40. Bunce, Subversive Institutions, 137.
41. Robert Cribb, “The Historical Roots of Indonesia’s New Order: Beyond the Colonial Comparison,” in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds., Indonesia: Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy (Canberra: Australian National University E-Press, 2010), 70.
42. Michael S. Malley, “New Rules, Old Structures, and the Limits of Democratic Decentralization,” in Aspinall and Fealy, eds., Democratisation and Decentralisation in Indonesia, 107.
43. Cribb, “Not the Next Yugoslavia,” 175.
44. This argument is developed in Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 18–48.
45. Robert Cribb, “Independence for Java? New National Projects for an Old Empire,” in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon L. Smith, eds., Indonesia Today: Challenges of History, 298–307 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001).
46. Edward Aspinall, “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses,” Journal of East Asian Studies 11 (2) (2011): 289–319.
47. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 16, 29.
48. Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 5. These authors also insist that the maintenance of strong state functions at the center was imperative to the survival of these states, unlike Yugoslavia, and what emerges are not polarized nation-only identities as in Serbia and Croatia, but nonpolarized multiple and complementary identities equally proud of being Catalan and Spanish or equally proud of being Tamil and Indian.
8. Contours of Sharia in Indonesia
1. For estimates of the numbers of such regulations and more generally for an overall argument about incentives for such regulations that provides a macrolevel complement to this chapter, see Michael Buehler, “The Rise of Shari’a By-laws in Indonesian Districts: An Indication for Changing Patterns of Power Accumulation and Political Corruption,” South East Asia Research 16 (2): 255–285.
2. On the historical aspects of what follows in this chapter, see Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases of Legal Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Mark E. Cammack, “The Indonesian Islamic Judiciary,” in R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack, eds., Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions, 146–169 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
3. For Aceh and North Sumatra, see Anthony Reid, The Blood of the People: Revolution and the End of Traditional Rule in Northern Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979).
4. John R. Bowen, “Normative Pluralism in Indonesia: Regions, Religions, and Ethnicities,” in Will Kymlicka and Boagang He, eds., Multiculturalism in Asia: Theoretical Perspectives, 152–169 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
5. For the history of the Compilation, see Cammack, “The Indonesian Islamic Judiciary.”
6. Mark E. Cammack, Helen Donovan, and Tim B. Heaton, “Islamic Divorce Law and Practice in Indonesia,” in Feener and Cammack, eds., Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia, 99–127; John R. Bowen, Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia: An Anthropology of Public Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. 173–199.
7. “Pemerintah cabut 530 perda terkait pajak dan retribusi daerah” (The Government Overturns 530 Regional Regulations Concerning Taxes and Regional Revenues), Hukumonline, March 29, 2006.
8. Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Indramayu (Regional Regulation in Indramayu Region), July 1999); Peraturan Daerah Kota Palembang (Regional Regulation in Palembang City, February 2004); Peraturan Daerah Kota Tangerang (Regional Regulation in Tangerang City, August 2005); Peraturan Daerah Propinsi Sulawesi Utara (Regional Regulation in North Sulawesi Province, January 2004). The Tangerang regulation was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2007.
9. In a 2008 publication, Robin Bush counted seventy-eight regional regulations having to do with morality or religion, but she did not include circulars or directives. She considers about half to be of the morals sort and half to deal with Islam. See Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?” in Greg Fealy and Sally White, eds., Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, 174–191 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008).
10. Surat ederan bupati Cianjur No. 451/2717/ASSDA.1 (Circular No. 451/2717/ASSDA.1 from Cianjur Regional Head), author’s collection.
11. Rencana strategis kabupaten Tasikmalaya tahun 2001–2005 (Strategic Plan for Tasikmalaya Region 2001–2005) (Tasikmalaya: Regional Government, 2003), author’s collection. On the relationship between Islamic character building and productivity strategies in Indonesia, see Daromir Rudnyckyj, Spiritual Economies: Islam and the Afterlife of Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010).
13. Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia,” 14.
14. See chapter 9 in this volume by Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt for a comprehensive analysis of problems of judicial review in the context of decentralization.
15. Jakarta Post, September 19, 2008.
16. Quoted in “Anti-perda syariat: Ahistoris dan perpanjangan tangan colonial” (Opposition to Sharia Regional Regulations: Ahistorical and an Extension of Colonial Interference), Media Dakwah, no. 368 (July 2006), 49.
17. This account is drawn from Moh Yasir Alimi, “Inculcating Islam: The Public Sphere and the Islamic Traditions of South Sulawesi,” Ph.D. diss., Australian National University, Canberra, 2009.
18. M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Syariah: Defining a National School of Islamic Law (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 259–264.
19. Alimi, “Inculcating Islam,” 29.
22. On the complex motives and statements of GAM leaders on this question, see Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 193–219.
23. The WH must refer cases to local prosecutors for enforcement, who can carry out public canings but have no authority to jail offenders. The first officially sanctioned caning took place in North Aceh in mid-2005 and involved persons arrested for gambling during the previous months. Although enforcement rose thereafter, it has been sporadic in some places; indeed, in 2008 no cases were brought to trial in Banda Aceh because suspects were never put into jail by the police and simply walked away (Serambi Indonesia, January 17, 2009).
24. A much-needed media study would consider the considerably softer international reactions to the much more physically damaging canings carried out for many years in Singapore and the role that fears of sharia have played in directing and shaping international human rights complaints.
25. M. B. Hooker argues that through its fatwas the MPU has fashioned an Islamic rhetoric specific to Aceh, relying neither on the Compilation nor on Shafii fiqh, but on direct citations of Qur’an and hadith. The teungku dayah remain thoroughly Shafii in orientation, however. See Hooker, Indonesian Syariah, 246–249.
26. Author’s interview with Muslim Ibrahim, chair, MPU, Banda Aceh, January 14, 2008.
27. Arskal Salim, Politics and Islamisation in Aceh: An Update, Occasional Seminar paper (Melbourne: Asian Law Centre, 2009).
30. Another likely conflict will be between the Aceh draft law on rape, which explicitly excludes the possibility of a husband raping his wife, and the 2004 national law on domestic violence.
31. This section is based on my field notes at the conference, Banda Aceh, February 25, 2007.
32. Author’s interview with Hamid Sarong, Banda Aceh, January 15, 2008.
9. Unfinished Business: Law Reform, Governance, and the Courts in Post-Suharto Indonesia
1. Sri Muniggar Sarasati, “Now Indonesia’s Judicial Mafia Fight Gets Serious,” Jakarta Globe, January 6, 2009.
2. Daniel S. Lev, “Judicial Authority and the Struggle for an Indonesian Rechsstaat,” Law and Society Review 13 (1978), 37.
3. For these accounts, see Daniel S. Lev, “Between State and Society: Professional Lawyers and Law Reform in Indonesia,” in Timothy Lindsey, ed., Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd ed., 48–67 (Annandale, Australia: Federation Press, 2008); Sebastiaan Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2005); Timothy Lindsey and Dick Howard, Corruption in Asia: Rethinking the Governance Paradigm (Annandale, Australia: Federation Press, 2002); Timothy Lindsey, “The Criminal State: Premanisme and the New Indonesia,” in Shannon Smith and Grayson Lloyd, ed., Indonesia Today: Challenges of History, 283–294 (Singapore: Institution of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001); Timothy Lindsey, “Black Letter, Black Market, and Bad Faith: Corruption and the Failure of Law Reform,” in Chris Manning and Peter Van Diermen, eds., Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, 278–292 (London: Zed Books, 2000).
4. On impunity for human rights abuses, see Jeff Herbert, “The Legal Framework of Human Rights in Indonesia,” in Lindsey, ed., Indonesia, 2nd ed. 456–483.
5. Daniel S. Lev, “Comments on the Judicial Reform Program in Indonesia,” paper presented at the Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., June 3, 2004, n.p., copy on file with the authors.
6. On the meaning of these terms, see Todung Mulya Lubis, In Search of Human Rights: Legal Political Dilemmas of Indonesia’s New Order, 1966–1990 (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1993); Timothy Lindsey, Corruption in Asia: Rethinking the Governance Paradigm (Annandale, Australia: Federation Press, 2003); David Linnan, “Indonesian Law Reform, or Once More Unto the Breach,” in Lindsey, ed., Indonesia, 2nd ed., 68–93; and David Bourchier, “Positivism and Romanticism in Indonesian Legal Thought,” in Timothy Lindsey, ed., Indonesia: Law and Society, 1st ed., 186–196 (Annandale, Australia: Federation Press, 1999).
7. Article 1(3) provides that “[t]he Indonesian State is a law state.”
8. See, for example, the People’s Consultative Council’s Five-Year Development Plan of 1969–1970, cited in John Ball, Indonesian Law: Commentary and Teaching Materials, 2nd ed. (Sydney: University of Sydney, 1995), 365; Seno Adji, “An Indonesian Perspective on the American Constitutional Influence,” in Lawrence Beer, ed., Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 107; Sudargo Gautama and Robert N. Hornick, An Introduction to Indonesian Law: Unity in Diversity (Bandung, Indonesia: Penerbit Alumni, 1983), 191; Lubis, In Search of Human Rights, 88; Angin baru dari Simposium UI (A New Breeze from the University of Indonesia Symposium) (Bandung, Indonesia: Penerbit Angkasa, 1966); and Justice Siahaan (dissenting) in Constitutional Court Decision No. 006/2003, reviewing Law No. 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission, p. 111.
9. Simon Butt, “Judicial Review in Indonesia: Between Civil Law and Accountability? A Study of Constitutional Court Decisions 2003–2005,” Ph.D. diss., Law Faculty, Melbourne University, 2007.
10. See Articles 28A–28J (Chapter XA) of the amended Constitution of 1945. A raft of statutes and other regulations has now been passed to implement Chapter XA. They include Presidential Decree No. 181 of 1998, regulating the Komnas Perempuan (National Commission for the Rights of Women); Law 39/1999, Human Rights Law, regulating the Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, National Commission for Human Rights); Law 26/2000, establishing the Pengadilan HAM (Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia, Human Rights Courts); Law 23/2002 on Child Protection; Presidential Decree 77/2003, establishing the Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia (Commission for the Protection of Indonesian Children); Law 27/2004 on the Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi (Truth and Reconciliation Commission); and Law 23/2004 on the Elimination of Violence in Households. In addition, Indonesia has also signed a range of human rights conventions. These conventions include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, acceded to in 1984; the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified in 1990; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatments or Punishments, acceded to in 1998; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, acceded to in July 1999; the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights, acceded to in 2006; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, acceded to in 2006. See Timothy Lindsey, “Indonesian Constitutional Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy,” Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 6 (1) (2002): 244–301.
11. Simon Butt and Timothy Lindsey, “Economic Reform When the Constitution Matters: Indonesia’s Constitutional Court and Article 33,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 44 (2) (2008): 239–262.
12. As mentioned, these rights appear to include rights to legal aid, legal certainty, access to justice, a fair trial, and due process. Butt, “Judicial Review in Indonesia.”
13. See Law No. 14 of 1970.
14. To give just one example, although the Supreme Court, under the oversight of the Ministry of Justice, had responsibility for conducting “technical juridical oversight” of the Religious Courts, it was the Department of Religious Affairs that “handled organizational, administrative, and financial aspects” of the Religious Court. In practice, it was often impossible to disentangle these two overlapping areas of ministerial authority, with the result that the Religious Courts were victims of institutional and budgetary rivalry between their two masters, neither of whom felt fully responsible for them.
15. Lev, “Judicial Authority.”
16. Article 24(1) (pre-amendment): “The judicial power is exercised by a Supreme Court and other such courts of law as are provided for by law.” Article 24(2): “The composition and powers of these legal bodies shall be regulated by law.”
17. These regulations include Law No. 5 of 2004 on the Supreme Court, amending Law No. 14 of 1985; Presidential Decree 21 of 2004 on Transferring Responsibility to the Supreme Court; and Presidential Regulation 13 of 2005 on the Secretariat of the Supreme Court. These instruments implemented Law No. 35 of 1999 (the One-Roof Law), introduced before the amendments to Article 24 as part of a rolling series of judicial system reforms between 1999 and 2005, of which the amendments to Article 24 and the creation of the Constitutional Court were part.
18. Lev, “Judicial Authority.”
19. For more information on the Blueprint, see Rifqi Assegaf, “Judicial Reform in Indonesia, 1986–2006,” in Naoyuki Sakumoto and Hikmahanto Juwana, eds., Reforming Laws and Institutions in Indonesia: An Assessment, no. 74 (Ciba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation, and Joint Studies on Economic Development Policies in ASEAN and Neighbouring Countries, 2007), at http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Asedp/074.html, accessed March 9, 2009; and IMF/Netherlands Program, IMF/Netherlands Program: Legal and Judicial Reform in Indonesia 2000–2004, External Evaluation. Final Report (2005), at http://sitesources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/imfexternalnetherlandsind.pdf, accessed March 9, 2009.
20. Lubis, In Search of Human Rights; Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court.
21. Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court; Lev, “Between State and Society.”
22. William Neilson, “Reforming Commercial Laws in Asia: Strategies and Realities for Donor Agencies,” in Timothy Lindsey, ed., Indonesia: Bankruptcy & the Commercial Court, 15–27 (Armadale, Australia: Desert Pea Press, 2000).
23. The exceptions are the Constitutional Court (Butt, “Judicial Review in Indonesia”), the Anti-corruption Court (Stewart Fenwick, “Measuring Up? Indonesia’s Anti-corruption Commission and the New Corruption Agenda,” in Lindsey, ed., Indonesia, 2nd ed., 406–429), and (albeit to a lesser extent) the Religious Court (Cate Sumner, Justice for the Justice Seeker: Access to Justice Survey Report: 2007–2009 [Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung/AusAID, 2010]).
24. Vito Tanzi, Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995).
26. Douglas Ramage, “Indonesia: Democracy First, Good Governance Later,” in Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar, eds., Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 136.
27. Nicholas Parsons and Marcus Mietzner, “Sharia By-laws in Indonesia: A Legal and Political Analysis,” Australian Journal of Asian Laws 11, no. 2 (2010): 190–217.
28. See, for example, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (at http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/overview, accessed October 21, 2012), which ranks Indonesia as the seventh most corrupt country; identifies the judiciary as the second most corrupt branch of government after the legislature in Indonesia; and in which 48 percent of surveyed households in Indonesia classified the judiciary as “extremely corrupt.” See also the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, at http://www.heritage.org/Index/Country/Indonesia, accessed October 21, 2012; World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013, at http://www.weforum.org/reports, accessed October 21, 2012. All these sources are cited in http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/indonesia/corruption-levels/judicial-system, accessed October 21, 2012.
29. See Wasingatu Zakiyah, Danang W, Iva Kasuma, and Ragil YE, Menyingkap tabir mafia peradilan (Opening the Curtain on the Judicial Mafia) (Jakarta: Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2002).
30. World Bank, Combating Corruption in Indonesia: Enhancing Accountability for Development (Jakarta: World Bank Office Jakarta, 2004), 83–85; Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional (KHRN) and Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan (LeIP) Indonesia, Menuju independensi kekuasaan kehakiman (Toward Judicial Independence), position paper (Jakarta: Indonesian Center for Environmental Law, 1999), 62; Maria Dakolias and Kimberly L. Thachuk, “Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial Reform,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 18 (2000), 398; “ICW: Makin besar gaji hakim, makin ‘gila-gilaan’ korupsinya” (ICW: The Higher the Judicial Salary, the More Out of Control the Corruption), Hukumonline, July 23, 2002.
31. For a serious attempt to provide such data, see ICW, Menyingkap tabir mafia peradilan.
32. In our experience, judicial corruption or impropriety in particular cases is often presumed by the media and public based solely on the outcome of the case—the acquittal of a defendant, for instance. Yet this approach ignores other significant factors that might explain the outcome. For example, prosecutors may have put forward a weak case; evidence might not withstand in-court examination; or the presiding judges might have lacked sufficient competence to adjudicate the case effectively. See Simon Butt and Timothy Lindsey, “Judicial Mafia: The Courts and State Illegality in Indonesia,” in Edward Aspinall and Gerry van Klinken, eds., The State and Illegality in Indonesia, 189–216 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011).
33. Appeal to the Supreme Court takes the form of cassation, or kasasi, with the option in most cases of a final rung of appeal, the Peninjauan Kembali (PK, Reconsideration), by means of an internal review of the kasasi decision by a different panel of judges within the Supreme Court. Decisions of the Human Rights Court, the Tipikor Court, the Fisheries Court, and the various military courts can be appealed to their respective high courts before being heard on cassation by the Supreme Court. There are, however, no appeals from the Commercial Court (established under Law No. 4 of 1998) and the Labor Court (established under Law No. 2 of 2004) to a high court; they are heard directly by the Supreme Court. Although the decisions of the new Tax Court cannot be heard on cassation, they can be heard by the Supreme Court as a PK. The Constitutional Court has first and final authority in the matters it decides (Art. 24C of the Constitution and Law No. 24 of 2003).
34. Both Sebastiaan Pompe and Daniel Lev have described the historical development of this institutional culture. See Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court; Lev, “Between State and Society.”
35. The Supreme Court has, for example, entered into an agreement with AsianLII (www.asianlii.org/asianlii/) to publish selected judgments on a free public-access Internet database.
36. Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, “Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence,” American Journal of Comparative Law 57 (2009): 103–134.
37. Decision No. 005/PUU-IV/2006. For a detailed analysis of this controversy and the Constitutional Court’s decision, see Simon Butt, “Between Judicial Independence and Accountability,” in Andrew MacIntyre and Ross H. McLeod, eds., Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance, 178–199 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007).
38. We consider the topic of judicial corruption in detail in Butt and Lindsey, “Judicial Mafia.”
39. The majority of complaints lodged with Indonesia’s Ombudsman Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Ombudsman) relate solely to the judiciary. The commission has, however, had very little success in resolving such complaints to the public’s satisfaction. See Melissa Crouch, “Indonesia’s National and Local Ombudsman Reforms: Salvaging a Failed Experiment?” in Lindsey, ed., Indonesia, 2nd ed., 382–405, esp. 386.
40. Case No. 560.K/Pdt/1997, copy on file with the authors.
41. See Butt and Lindsey, “Judicial Mafia,” where we discuss the Endin case in detail. See also the Endin defamation case, Central Jakarta District Court Decision No. 427/PID.B/2001/PN.JKT.PST, copy on file with the authors.
42. Dakolias and Thachuk, “Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary,” 365, 398; World Bank, Combatting Corruption in Indonesia, vii.
43. This section draws on Simon Butt, “Regional Autonomy and the Proliferation of Perda in Indonesia: An Assessment of Bureaucratic and Judicial Review Mechanisms,” Sydney Law Review 32 (2) (2010): 177–191.
44. Hans Thoolen, Indonesia and the Rule of Law: Twenty Years of “New Order” Government: A Study (London: F. Pinter, 1987).
45. Articles 18(1), 18(5), and 18(6) of the Constitution. Under Article 10(3) of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Government, the central government retains exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defense, security, judicial affairs, national monetary and fiscal matters, and religion. The central government can, however, delegate its jurisdiction to regulate these matters to local governments (Article 10[4], Law No. 32).
47. Articles 18(3) and 18(4) of the Constitution.
48. “Hingga September 2006, ada 66 ranperda ditolak” (Up to September 2006, 66 Draft Perda Rejected), Hukumonline, October 13, 2006.
49. World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Decentralization in Client Countries: An Evaluation of the World Bank Support, 1990–2007 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2008); International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Local Government Discretion and Accountability: A Local Governance Framework (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2007); Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee, “Decentralization, Corruption, and Government Accountability: An Overview,” in Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed., International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, 161–188 (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2005); James Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999), 88–89; Paul Smoke and Rolland White, “East Asia Decentralizes,” in East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005), 3; Jose Edgardo Campos and Joel Hellman, “Governance Gone Local: Does Decentralization Improve Accountability?” in East Asia Decentralizes, 237.
50. World Bank, Factsheet: Perda Program, Justice for the Poor—Decentralization Support Facility (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007).
51. David Ray, “Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate,” in Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate, 1–27 (Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth, 2003).
52. For a detailed discussion, see Parsons and Mietzner, “Sharia By-laws in Indonesia.”
53. Ray, “Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate.”
54. Tjip Ismail, “Kebijakan pengawasan atas perda pajak daerah dan retribusi daerah” (Policy of Supervising Regional Tax and User-Charge Perda), in Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate, 87–88.
55. Article 145(2) of the 2004 Autonomy Law.
56. See Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No. 53 of 2007. Different procedures apply for the review of perda that set local government budgets, impose regional taxes or user charges, or relate to spatial planning (2004 Autonomy Law, Art. 185–189). These types of perda need prior central government approval.
57. Eko Susi Rosdianasari, Novi Anggriani, and Basri Mulyani, Dinamika penyusunan, substansi dan implementasi perda pelayanan publik (Dynamics of the Drafting, Substance, and Implementation of Public-Service Perda) (Jakarta: World Bank Justice for the Poor Project, 2009), ix; United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Enhancing Communications, Advocacy, and Public Participation Capacity for Legal Reforms (CAPPLER) PHASE II (Paris: UNDP, 2008), 7.
58. Ray, “Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate,” 18; Ismail, “Kebijakan pengawaan,” 89.
59. Article 145(3) and (7) of the 2004 Autonomy Law.
60. Blane D. Lewis, “Tax and Charge Creation by Regional Governments Under Fiscal Decentralization: Estimates and Explanations,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 39 (2) (2003), 178; Ray “Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate,” 18.
61. Ray, “Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate,” 19.
62. Article 145(5) of the 2004 Autonomy Law.
63. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider review petitions lodged by citizens using its general powers of judicial review. Under national judiciary laws, the Court can ensure that executive legal instruments—including local government laws—do not contradict the higher-order laws, including government regulations, presidential regulations, or statutes enacted by Indonesia’s national Parliament (Art. 24A[1] of the Constitution; Art. 11[2][b] of the Judicial Power Law [Law No. 4 of 2004]; Art. 31[2] of the Supreme Court Law [Law No. 5 of 2004]). “Berangkat dari pembatalan perda privatisasi rumah sakit: Problem hukum pengujian perda (1)” (From the Invalidation of the Perda on Hospital Privatization: Legal Problems with Perda Review [1]), Hukumonline, June 22, 2006.
65. See, for example, MA Decision Nos. 14 P/HUM/2004, 20 P/HUM/2007, and 03 P/HUM/2009.
66. Article 2(4) of MA Regulation No. 1 of 2004; Article 5(4) of MA Regulation No. 1 of 1999. In 2011, after this chapter was written, the Supreme Court abolished the 180-day restriction, although it remains to be seen if this decision will result in any increase in the number of perda it invalidates.
67. Gregory Churchill, “Access to Legal Information in Indonesia: Recent Progress, Current Problems, and Future Prospects,” paper presented at the Seminar on Access to Legal Information: Language, Dictionaries, Databases, “State of the Art” session, Jakarta, August 20–22, 2000.
68. See, for example, MA Decision Nos. 03 G/HUM/2002, P/HUM/2002, 06 P/HUM/2003, and 06 P/HUM/2006.
69. Tangerang City Perda No. 8 of 2005 on Prostitution.
70. “Makeup Led to Woman’s Branding as Prostitute,” Jakarta Post, May 4, 2007; Karuni Rompies, “Moral Crusaders Focus on Females,” The Age, March 11, 2006; “Islamic Hard-liners Chip Away at Indonesia’s Secular Traditions,” International Herald Tribune, March 2, 2007; Jane Perlez, “Spread of Islamic Law in Indonesia Takes Toll on Women,” New York Times, June 27, 2006; “MA tolak uji materiil perda anti pelacuran” (MA Refuses to Review the Anti-prostitution Perda), Jawa Pos, April 14, 2007; Mark Forbes and Karuni Rompies, “Islamic Moral Drive Spreads Fear in Indonesia,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 11, 2006.
71. “MA tolak permohonan uji materiil perda pelacuran Tangerang” (MA Refuses to Review the Tangerang Anti-prostitution Perda), Hukumonline, April 16, 2007; “Perda pelacuran Tangerang tak bertentangan dengan UU” (Tangerang Prostitution Perda Does Not Breach Statute), Gatra, April 13, 2007; “MA: Perda pelarangan pelacuran tak bertentangan dengan undangundang” (MA: Perda Prohibiting Prostitution Does Not Breach Statute), Republika, April 13, 2007.
72. Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Government.
73. See, for example, Pratikno, “Exercising Freedom: Local Autonomy and Democracy in Indonesia, 1999–2001,” in Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, Maribeth Erb, and Caroline Faucher, eds., Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 25; Ismet Fanany, “The First Year of Local Autonomy: The Case of West Sumatra,” in Damien Kinsbury and Harry Aveling, eds., Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 177.
74. Gary F. Bell, “The New Indonesian Laws Relating to Regional Autonomy: Good Intentions, Confusing Laws,” Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal 2 (1) (2001), 29.
75. Article 7(1) of Law No. 10 of 2004 on Lawmaking.
76. See Parsons and Mietzner, “Sharia By-laws.”
77. Lindsey, “Indonesian Constitutional Reform”; Tim Lindsey, “Indonesia: Devaluing Asian Values, Rewriting Rule of Law,” in R. P. Peerenboom, ed., Asian Discourses of Rule of Law, 286–323 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
78. Herbert, “The Legal Framework of Human Rights in Indonesia.”
79. For example, a judicial watchdog or anticorruption court to handle corruption cases more effectively might be established. See Fenwick, “Measuring Up?”; or with regard to upholding important socioeconomic human rights of the majority of the population in the face of the competing human rights of a minority of citizens, see Butt, “Between Judicial Independence and Accountability.”