1. Quoted in Christopher Clark, Iron kingdom. The rise and downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947 (London, 2006), p. 557.
2. Quoted in Michael Howard, ‘A thirty years’ war? The two world wars in historical perspective’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, Vol. III (1993), p. 171.
3. For the connection between the wars of American and German unification see C. A. Bayly, The birth of the modern world, 1780–1914 (Oxford, 2004), p. 163; Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, ‘Global violence and nationalizing wars in Eurasia and America: the geopolitics of war in the mid-nineteenth century’, Comparative Studies in History and Society, 38 (1996), pp. 619–57, especially p. 621; and Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (eds.), On the road to total war. The American Civil War and the German wars of unification, 1861–1871 (Cambridge, 1997).
4. Quoted in Robert Kagan, Dangerous nation (New York, 2006), p. 276.
5. See Bruce Cumings, Dominion from sea to sea. Pacific ascendancy and American power (New Haven and London, 2009), pp. 55–125.
6. Quoted in John Dunn, ‘Africa invades the new world. Egypt’s Mexican adventure, 1863–1867’, War in History, 4, 1 (1997), p. 32.
7. Quoted in Clark, Iron kingdom, p. 546.
8. Frank Becker shows that German nationalist acceptance of Prussian leadership was a product not a cause of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71: Frank Becker, Bilder von Krieg und Nation. Die Einigungskriege in der bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit Deutschlands, 1864–1913 (Munich, 2001), pp. 488–9 and passim.
9. Quoted in F. R. Bridge, The Habsburg monarchy among the great powers, 1815–1918 (New York, Oxford and Munich, 1990), p. 95.
10. Quoted in Florian Buch, Grosse Politik im neuen Reich. Gesellschaft und Aussenpolitik in Deutschland 1867–1882 (Kassel, 2004), p. 351.
11. Geoffrey Hicks, ‘ “Appeasement” or consistent conservatism? British foreign policy, party politics and the guarantees of 1867 and 1939’, Historical Research, 84 (2011), pp. 520–21 and 525–6 (Stanley quotation pp. 526–7). Augustus Loftus, The diplomatic reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus, 1862–1879, Vol. I (London, 1894), p. 99.
12. Quoted in Jonathan Parry, The politics of patriotism. English liberalism, national identity and Europe, 1830–1886 (Cambridge, 2006), p. 243.
13. J. M. Hobson, ‘The military extraction gap and the wary titan: the fiscal sociology of British defence policy, 1870–1913’, Journal of European Economic History, 222 (1993), pp. 461–506.
14. Quoted in Bridge, Habsburg monarchy, p. 84.
15. Quoted in Hans A. Schmitt, ‘Count Beust and Germany, 1866–1870: reconquest, realignment, or resignation?’, Central European History, 1, 1 (1968), pp. 20–34.
16. See Dietrich Beyrau, ‘Der deutsche Komplex: Russland zur Zeit der Reichsgründung’, in Eberhard Kolb (ed.), Europa und die Reichsgründung. Preussen-Deutschland in der Sicht der grossen europäischen Mächte, 1860–1880 (Munich, 1980), p. 87.
17. See M. Katz, Mikhail N. Katkov. A political biography, 1818–1887 (The Hague and Paris, 1966), pp. 112–17.
18. The quotation is in Dietrich Geyer, Russian imperialism. The interaction of domestic and foreign policy, 1860–1914 (Leamington Spa, 1987), p. 94.
19. Quoted in Elisabeth Fehrenbach, ‘Preussen-Deutschland als Faktor der französischen Aussenpolitik in der Reichsgründungszeit’, in Kolb (ed.), Europa und die Reichsgründung, p. 124.
20. Quoted in Tombs, France, p. 417.
21. Quoted in Clark, Iron kingdom, p. 548.
22. Quoted in Tombs, France, p. 423.
23. Alexander Seyferth, Die Heimatfront 1870/71. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im deutsch-französischen Krieg (Paderborn, 2007), pp. 76–8, stresses fear of French aggression over patriotic enthusiasm.
24. These figures are in A. J. P. Taylor, The struggle for mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1971 [1954]), p. xxv.
25. Quoted in Detlef Junker, ‘Die manichäische Falle: das deutsche Reich im Urteil der USA, 1871–1945’, in Klaus Hildebrand (ed.), Das deutsche Reich im Urteil der grossen Mächte und europäischen Nachbarn (1871–1945) (Munich, 1995), pp. 141–58 (quotation p. 142).
26. Peter Krüger, ‘Die Beurteilung der Reichsgründung und Reichsverfassung von 1871 in den USA’, in Norbert Finzsch et al., Liberalitas. Festschrift für Erich Angermann zum 65. Geburtstag (Stuttgart, 1992), pp. 263–83 (quotations pp. 271 and 273).
27. See Paul W. Schroeder, ‘The lost intermediaries: the impact of 1870 on the European system’, International History Review, 6, 1 (1984), pp. 1–27, especially pp. 2–3, 8 and 11–12.
28. See Sudhir Hazareesingh, ‘Republicanism, war and democracy: the Ligue du Midi in France’s war against Prussia, 1870–1871’, French History, 17, 1 (2003), pp. 48–78, especially pp. 50–51.
29. Bertrand Taithe, Defeated flesh. Welfare, warfare and the making of modern France (Manchester, 1999), pp. 71–98, and Citizenship and wars: France in turmoil, 1870–1871 (London and New York, 2001).
30. Quoted in Jacques Bariety, ‘Das deutsche Reich im französischen Urteil, 1871–1945’, in Hildebrand (ed.), Das deutsche Reich im Urteil der grossen Mächte, pp. 203–18 (quotation p. 208).
31. See Allan Mitchell, Victors and vanquished. The German influence on Army and Church in France after 1870 (Chapel Hill, 1984), especially pp. 41–8, and Rachel Chrastil, Organising for war. France, 1870–1914 (Baton Rouge, 2010), pp. 157–8 and passim.
32. Heinrich Lutz, ‘Zur Wende der österreichisch-ungarischen Aussenpolitik 1871. Die Denkschrift des Grafen Beust für Kaiser Franz Joseph vom 18. mai’, in Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs 25 (1972), pp. 169–84, especially pp. 177–8 (‘Mitteleuropa’, p. 180).
33. Quoted in Bridge, Habsburg monarchy, p. 94.
34. See W. E. Mosse, The European powers and the German Question, Appendix C: ‘The Russian national press and the “German Peril”, 1870–71’, pp. 391–2.
35. Deryck Schreuder, ‘Gladstone as “Troublemaker”: Liberal foreign policy and the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 1870–1871’, Journal of British Studies, 17 (1978), pp. 106–35 (quotation p. 119). I am grateful to Eddie Fishman for conversations on the subject.
36. Quoted in Karina Urbach, Bismarck’s favourite Englishman. Lord Odo Russell’s mission to Berlin (London, 1999), p. 208.
37. Thus Klaus Hildebrand, No intervention. Die Pax Britannica und Preussen 1865/66–1869/70. Eine Untersuchung zur englischen Weltpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1997), pp. 393–4 and passim.
38. See Scott W. Murray, Liberal diplomacy and German unification: the early career of Robert Morier (Westport and London 2000), pp. 91–138.
39. Thus William Mulligan, ‘Britain, the “German Revolution”, and the fall of France, 1870/1’, Historical Research, 84, 224 (2011), pp. 310–27.
40. Quoted in ibid., p. 324.
41. Quoted in Thomas Schaarschmidt, Aussenpolitik und öffentliche Meinung in Grossbritannien während des deutsch-französischen Krieges von 1870/71 (Franfurt am Main, Berne, etc., 1993), p. 132.
42. See Michael Pratt, ‘A fallen idol: the impact of the Franco-Prussian War on the perception of Germany by British intellectuals’, International History Review, 7, 4 (1985), pp. 543–75.
43. Quoted in Mulligan, ‘Britain, the “German Revolution”, and the fall of France’.
44. On the importance of the empire to Britain’s great power standing see Edward Ingram, The British Empire as a world power (London, 2001), especially pp. 25–45. See also James Belich, Replenishing the earth. The settler revolution and the rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939 (Oxford, 2009).
45. My view of Imperial Federation has been strongly influenced by conversations with Daniel Robinson, James Rogers and Duncan Bell. See Duncan Bell, The idea of greater Britain. Empire and the future of world order, 1860–1900 (Princeton, 2007).
46. Thus Max Beloff, Imperial sunset: Britain’s liberal empire, 1897–1921 (London, 1969), p. 37.
47. Quoted in Parry, Politics of patriotism, p. 293.
48. See William Mulligan, ‘British anti-slave trade and anti-slavery policy in East Africa, Arabia, and Turkey in the late nineteenth century’, in Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim (eds.), Humanitarian intervention. A history (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 257–82, especially p. 273.
49. See Jacques Freymond and Miklós Molnár, ‘The rise and fall of the First International’, in Milorad Drachkovitch (ed.), The revolutionary Internationals, 1864–1943 (Stanford, 1966), p. 33.
50. Articles 60 and 63 of the constitution are quoted in Christopher Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm II. A life in power (London, 2009), p. 94.
51. Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Practicing democracy. Elections and political culture in imperial Germany (Princeton, 2000). See also Gerhard A. Ritter, ‘Die Reichstagswahlen und die Wurzeln der deutschen Demokratie im Kaiserreich’, Historische Zeitschrift, 275 (2002), pp. 385–403.
52. Thus Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, as quoted in W. N. Medlicott and Dorothy K. Coveney (eds.), Bismarck and Europe (London, 1971), p. 138.
53. Quoted in Lothar Gall, Bismarck. Der weisse Revolutionär (Frankfurt, 1980), p. 623.
54. Quoted in Detlef Junker, The Manichean Trap: American perceptions of the German empire, 1871–1945 (Washington, DC), p. 14.
55. See the text of the agreement (6.6.1873) in Bridge, Habsburg monarchy, Appendix I, p. 381.
56. Quoted in Medlicott and Coveney (eds.), Bismarck and Europe, pp. 87–8.
57. Quoted in Klaus Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Aussenpolitik von Bismark bis Hitler (Stuttgart, 1995), p. 33. For perception and reality of the French threat see Johannes Janorschke, Bismarck, Europa und die ‘Krieg in Sicht’ Krise von 1875 (Paderborn, 2010), pp. 146–56, and 192–4.
58. The importance of the caesura is stressed by T. G. Otte, ‘From “War-insight” to nearly war: Anglo-French relations in the age of high imperialism, 1875–1898’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17, 4 (2006), pp. 693–714, especially pp. 695–7.
59. For the importance of the war for development of newspapers see Louise McReynolds, The news under Russia’s old regime. The development of a mass-circulation press (Princeton, 1991), pp. 73–92.
60. Quoted in Matthias Schulz, ‘The guarantees of humanity: the Concert of Europe and the origins of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877’, in Simms and Trim (eds.), Humanitarian intervention, pp. 184–204 (quotation p. 184).
61. Quoted in Medlicott and Coveney (eds.), Bismarck and Europe, pp. 96–7 and 102–3.
62. Carole Fink, Defending the rights of others. The great powers, the Jews and international minority protection, 1878–1938 (Cambridge, 2004). The British diplomat, speaking in the late 1860s, is quoted in Abigail Green, ‘Intervening in the Jewish Question, 1840–1878’, in Simms and Trim (eds.), Humanitarian intervention, pp. 139–58 (quotation p. 139).
63. Quoted in Medlicott and Coveney (eds.), Bismarck and Europe, p. 99.
64. Quoted in Geyer, Russian imperialism, p. 82. See also S. Lukashevich, Ivan Aksakov, 1823–1886. A study in Russian thought and politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 140–41.
65. Quoted in Geyer, Russian imperialism, p. 78.
66. Thus Barry Bascom Hayes, Bismarck and Mitteleuropa (London and Toronto, 1994), pp. 302–3, 353, 391 and passim (quotations pp. 303 and 357).
67. Quoted in Bridge, Habsburg monarchy, p. 135.
68. Quoted in Medlicott and Coveney (eds.), Bismarck and Europe, p. 126.
69. Quoted in Hugh Seton-Watson, The decline of Imperial Russia, 1855–1914 (New York, 1960), p. 494.
70. For the ‘defensiveness’ of early Zionism see Anita Shapira, Land and power. The Zionist resort to force, 1881–1948 (Oxford, 1992), pp. 3–52. See John Klier, Russians, Jews, and the pogroms of 1881–1882 (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 1 (Ignatiev quotation) and 234–54 (for the foreign policy implications).
71. David Foglesong, The American mission and the ‘Evil Empire’. The crusade for a ‘Free Russia’ since 1881 (New York, 2007), pp. 7–33.
72. See Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The culture of defeat. On national trauma, mourning, and recovery, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York, 2003), pp. 179–80 (Bert quotation), and Peter Grupp, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Kolonien. Der französische ‘parti colonial’ und Deutschland, 1890 bis 1914 (Tübingen, 1980), pp. 75–9.
73. Edward E. Morris, Imperial Federation. A lecture (Melbourne, 1885), quotations pp. 8–9.
74. See Georgios Varouxakis, ‘ “Great” versus “small” nations: scale and national greatness in Victorian political thought’, in Duncan Bell (ed.), Victorian visions of global order. Empire and international relations in nineteenth-century political thought (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 136–59.
75. Quoted in John Darwin, The Empire project. The rise and fall of the British world-system, 1830–1970 (Cambridge, 2009), p. 79.
76. See generally Humphrey J. Fisher, Slavery in the history of Muslim Black Africa (London, 2001), pp. 98–137.
77. See Mulligan, ‘British anti-slave trade and anti-slavery policy’, in Simms and Trim (eds.), Humanitarian intervention, pp. 257–82.
78. Thus W. J. Mommsen, ‘Bismarck, the Concert of Europe, and the future of West Africa, 1883–1885’, in Stig Förster, Wolfgang Mommsen and Ronald Robinson (eds.), Bismarck, Europe and Africa. The Berlin Africa conference 1884–1885 and the onset of partition (Oxford, 1988), pp. 151–70, especially pp. 165–6.
79. Sönke Neitzel, ‘ “Mittelafrika”. Zum Stellenwert eines Schlagwortes in der deutschen Weltpolitik des Hochimperialismus’, in Wolfgang Elz and Sönke Neitzel (eds.), Internationale Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Winfried Baumgart zum 65. Geburtstag (Paderborn, Munich, etc., 2003), pp. 83–103.
80. See Benedikt Stuchtey, Die europäische Expansion und ihre Feinde. Kolonialismuskritik vom 18. bis in das 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 2010).
81. Quoted in Gregory Claeys, Imperial sceptics. British critics of empire, 1850–1920 (Cambridge, 2010), p. 111.
82. Quoted in Schivelbusch, Culture of defeat, p. 181.
83. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 109.
84. But see Terence Zuber, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. German war planning, 1871–1914 (Oxford, 2002), pp. 135–219, who sees the plan as a bid for increased defence funding rather than a fully worked-out strategy.
85. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 156.
86. On the importance of the Mittellage for Caprivi’s thinking see Rainer Lahme, Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1890–1894. Von der Gleichgewichtspolitik Bismarcks zur Allianzstrategie Caprivis (Göttingen, 1990), pp. 34–5 and passim.
87. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 168.
88. Quoted in Clark, Kaiser Wilhelm II, p. 83.
89. See Francis W. Wcislo, Tales of Imperial Russia. The life and times of Sergei Witte, 1849–1915 (Oxford, 2011), pp. 138–88, especially pp. 140–42.
90. See Moshe Zimmermann, ‘Muscle Jews vs. nervous Jews’, in Michael Brenner and Gideon Reuveni (eds.), Emancipation through muscles. Jews and sports in Europe (Lincoln, Nebr., 2006), pp. 15–28.
91. On the German character of Zionists see David Aberbach, ‘Zionist patriotism in Europe, 1897–1942: ambiguities in Jewish nationalism’, International History Review, 31, 6 (2009), pp. 268–98, especially pp. 274–81 (quotation p. 278).
92. Moshe Zimmermann, ‘Jewish nationalism and Zionism in German-Jewish students’ organisations’, Publications of the Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXVII (1982), pp. 129–53 (quotations p. 153).
93. Quoted in Otte, ‘From “War in sight” ’, p. 703.
94. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 202.
95. See Sönke Neitzel, Weltmacht oder Untergang. Die Weltreichslehre im Zeit-alter des Imperialismus (Paderborn, 2000).
96. See Sönke Neitzel, ‘Das Revolutionsjahr 1905 in den internationalen Beziehungen der Grossmächte’, in Jan Kusber and Andreas Frings (eds.), Das Zarenreich, das Jahr 1905 und seine Wirkungen (Berlin, 2007), pp. 17–55 (quotation p. 21).
97. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 187.
98. See Harald Rosenbach, Das deutsche Reich, Grossbritannien und der Transvaal (1896–1902) (Göttingen, 1993), pp. 309–314.
99. Matthew S. Seligmann, Rivalry in Southern Africa, 1893–99. The transformation of German colonial policy (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 16–17, 58–61 and 128–31 (quotation p. 16).
100. Quoted in Darwin, Empire project, p. 110.
101. Quoted in Kagan, Dangerous nation, p. 357.
102. See Mike Sewell, ‘Humanitarian intervention, democracy, and imperialism: the American war with Spain, 1898 and after’, in Simms and Trim (eds.), Humanitarian intervention, pp. 303–22 (quotation p. 303), and Paul T. McCartney, Power and progress. American national identity, the war of 1898, and the rise of American imperialism (Baton Rouge, 2006), quotation p. 272.
103. Quoted in Tony Smith, America’s mission. The United States and the worldwide struggle for democracy in the twentieth century (Princeton, 1994), p. 41.
104. See Keith Wilson (ed.), The international impact of the Boer War (Chesham, 2001).
105. Quoted in Warren Zimmermann, First great triumph. How five Americans made their country a world power (New York, 2002), p. 446. I am grateful to Charles Laderman for this reference. See also T. G. Otte, The China Question. Great power rivalry and British isolation, 1894–1905 (Oxford, 2007).
106. Quoted in Gordon A. Craig, Germany, 1866–1945 (Oxford, 1978) p. 313.
107. See Phillips Payson O’Brien, British and American naval power. Politics and policy, 1900–1936 (London, 1998), pp. 26–7.
108. Quoted in William Mulligan, ‘From case to narrative: the Marquess of Landsdowne, Sir Edward Grey, and the threat from Germany, 1900–1906’, International History Review, 30, 2 (2008), p. 292.
109. Matthew Seligmann, ‘Switching horses: the Admiralty’s recognition of the threat from Germany, 1900–1905’, International History Review, 30, 2 (2008), pp. 239–58, and Matthew Seligmann, ‘Britain’s great security mirage: the Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian naval threat, 1898–1906’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 35 (2012), pp. 861–86.
110. Quoted in Christopher Ross, ‘Lord Curzon, the “Persian Question”, and geopolitics, 1888–1921’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2010).
111. Matthew Seligmann, ‘A prelude to the reforms of Admiral Sir John Fisher: the creation of the Home Fleet, 1902–3’, Historical Research, 83 (2010), pp. 506–19, especially pp. 517–18.
112. See G. R. Searle, The quest for national efficiency (Berkeley, 1971). For the role of foreign policy in British electoral politics see T. E. Otte, ‘ “Avenge England’s dishonour” By-elections, parliament and the politics of foreign policy in 1898’, The English Historical Review, CXXI, 491 (2006), pp. 385–428.
113. Quoted in Mathew Johnson, ‘The Liberal War Committee and the Liberal advocacy of conscription in Britain, 1914–1916’, Historical Journal, 51. (2008), who cites the National Service Journal of November 1903.
114. On the centrality of foreign policy to Chamberlain’s conception of tariff reform see Paul Readman, ‘Patriotism and the politics of foreign policy, c. 1870–c. 1914’, in William Mulligan and Brendan Simms (eds.), The primacy of foreign policy in British history, 1660–2000. How strategic concerns shaped modern Britain (Basingstoke, 2010), especially, pp. 264–5.
115. See Richard H. Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, culture, diplomacy and expansion. A new view of American imperialism (Baton Rouge and London, 1985), pp. 101–2. I thank Quinby Frey for this and many other references on US history.
116. See James Ford Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, 1897–1909 (New York, 1922), p. 249.
117. Thus Frederick Marks III, Velvet on iron. The diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt (Lincoln, Nebr., and London, 1979), pp. 6–10, 38–47 and 172–3. For a different view see Nancy Mitchell, The danger of dreams. German and American imperialism in Latin America (Chapel Hill and London, 1999), pp. 216–28 passim (quotations pp. 75–6).
118. James R. Holmes, Theodore Roosevelt and world order. Police power in international relations (Washington, DC, 2006), passim, especially pp. 70 and 110. For a case study see Stephen Wertheim, ‘Reluctant liberator: Theodore Roosevelt’s philosophy of self-government and preparation for Philippine independence’, in Presidential Studies Quarterly, 39, 3 (2009), pp. 494–518.
119. For US attacks on Prussianism and German ‘autocracy’ in the early 1900s see Marks, Velvet on iron, p. 8. For the emergence of an anti-German ‘generation’ in Britain and the United States around the turn of the century see Magnus Brechtken, Scharnierzeit, 1895–1907. Persönlichkeitsnetze und internationale Politik in den deutsch-britisch-amerkanischen Beziehungen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Mainz, 2006), pp. 374–6.
120. Stuart Anderson, Race and rapprochement. Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American relations, 1895–1904 (London and Toronto, 1981), pp. 66–9 (quotation p. 67).
121. On the Copenhagen Complex see Jonathan Steinberg, ‘The Copenhagen Complex’, Journal of Contemporary History, 1, 3 (1966), pp. 23–46, especially pp. 29–30.
122. Quoted in Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the rise of America to world power (Baltimore, 1956), p. 236 I thank Charles Laderman for this reference.
123. Quoted in Geyer, Russian imperialism, p. 221.
124. Josh Sanborn, Drafting the Russian nation. Military conscription, total war and mass politics, 1905–1925 (DeKalb, Ill., 2003), pp. 25–9.
125. Jan Rüger, The great naval game. Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 234–40.
126. On this strategy see William Philpott, ‘Managing the British way in warfare: France and Britain’s continental commitment, 1904–1918’, in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (eds.), The British way in warfare. Power and the international system, 1856–1956. Essays in honour of David French (Farnham, 2010), pp. 83–100.
127. Thus T. G. Otte, ‘ “Almost a law of nature”? Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905–12’, in Erik Goldstein and B. J. C. McKercher (eds.), Diplomacy and Statecraft. Special Issue on Power and Stability. British Foreign Policy, 1865–1965, 14, 2 (2003), pp. 77–118 (pp. 80–81).
128. See Neitzel, ‘Das Revolutionsjahr 1905’, in Kusber and Frings (eds.), Das Zarenreich, das Jahr 1905 und seine Wirkungen, pp. 43–4.
129. Quoted in Annika Mombauer, ‘German war plans’, in Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (eds.), War planning 1914 (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 48–79 (quotation p. 54).
130. Albrecht Moritz, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges in der deutschen Politik während der ersten Marokkokrise (Berne and Frankfurt am Main, 1974), pp. 144 and 280–84.
131. See Michael Epkenhans, Die wilhelminische Flottenrüstung, 1908–1914. Weltmachtstreben, industrieller Fortschritt, soziale Integration (Munich, 1991). On the capacity of the British state for massive military mobilization even in peacetime see G. C. Peden, Arms, economics and British strategy. From Dreadnoughts to hydrogen bombs (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 1–16.
132. Balfour was speaking in 1906, ‘Navy estimates, 1906–1907’, Hansard, vol. 162, col. 112. (1906)
133. Quoted in John Albert White, Transition to global rivalry. Alliance diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895–1907 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 288. Another work which, unlike this book, stresses the primacy of imperial over European considerations is Keith Wilson, The limits of eurocentricity. Imperial British foreign and defence policy in the early twentieth century (Istanbul, 2002).
134. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 245.
135. See Frank Boesch, ‘ “Are we a cruel nation?” Colonial practices, perceptions, and scandals’, in Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth (eds.), Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain. Essays in cultural affinity (Oxford, 2008), pp. 115–40, especially pp. 121–3.
136. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 249.
137. On the link between foreign policy and domestic reform see Uwe Liszkowski, Zwischen Liberalismus und Imperialismus. Die zaristische Aussenpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg im Urteil Miljukovs und der Kadettenpartei, 1905–1914 (Stuttgart, 1974), pp. 56–77.
138. Quotations in Geyer, Russian imperialism, pp. 295–6.
139. See Matthew Seligmann, ‘Intelligence information and the 1909 naval scare: the secret foundations of a public panic’, War in History, 17, 1 (2010), pp. 37–59, and Phillips Payson O’Brien, ‘The 1910 elections and the primacy of foreign policy’, in Mulligan and Simms (eds.), Primacy of foreign policy in British history, pp. 249–59.
140. Thus Christopher Andrew, The defence of the realm. The authorized history of MI5 (London, 2009), pp. 3–18.
141. David Lloyd George, Limehouse Speech, 30 July 1909.
142. See Jean H. Quataert, ‘Mobilising philantropy in the service of war: the female rituals of care in the new Germany, 1871–1914’, in Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), Anticipating total war. The German and American experiences, 1871–1914 (Cambridge, 1999); Roger Chickering, ‘ “Casting their gaze more broadly”: women’s patriotic activism in imperial Germany’, Past and Present, 118 (1988), pp. 156–85, especially pp. 172, 175 and 182–3.
143. Quoted in Sheila Rowbotham, A century of women. The history of women in Britain and the United States (London, 1997), p. 82.
144. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 240.
145. See Friedrich Katz, The secret war in Mexico. Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago and London, 1981), quotation p. 88, and Reiner Pommerin, Der Kaiser und Amerika. Die USA in der Politik der Reichsleitung, 1890–1917 (Cologne, 1986).
146. Quoted in John Lamberton Harper, American visions of Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge, 1994), p. 31. See Matthew S. Seligmann, ‘Germany and the origins of the First World War in the eyes of the American diplomatic establishment’, German History, 15, 3 (1997), pp. 307–32.
147. Quoted in Mark Hewitson, ‘Germany and France before the First World War: a reassessment of Wilhelmine foreign policy’, The English Historical Review, 115, 462 (2000), pp. 570–606 (quotation pp. 594–5).
148. Writing in 1913, quoted in Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Germany and the coming of war’, in R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (eds.), The coming of the First World War (Oxford and New York, 1988), p. 111.
149. Quoted in Fritz Fischer, War of illusions. German policies from 1911 to 1914 (London, 1975), p. 180.
150. See Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. A political soldier (Oxford, 2006), pp. 99–100 and passim.
151. See P. P. O’Brien, ‘The Titan refreshed: imperial overstretch and the British navy before the First World War’, Past and Present, 172 (2001), pp. 145–69, especially pp. 154–5.
152. Quoted in Darwin, Empire project, p. 306.
153. Thomas Meyer, ‘Endlich eine Tat, eine befreiende Tat.’ Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächters ‘Panthersprung nach Agadir’ unter dem Druck der öffentlichen Meinung (Husum, 1996), pp. 295–302.
154. Quoted in Groh, p. 432
155. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 266.
156. Thus Niall Ferguson, ‘Public finance and national security: the domestic origins of the First World War revisited’, Past and Present, 142 (1994).
157. Quoted in Geyer, Russian imperialism, p. 306.
158. Quoted in Seton-Watson, Decline of Imperial Russia, p. 676.
159. Quoted in Smith, America’s mission, p. 69.
160. Quoted in Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman road to war: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War (Cambridge, 2008), p. 21.
161. Quoted in Aksakal, Ottoman road to war, p. 76.
162. Quoted in Sean McMeekin, The Russian origins of the First World War (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), p. 6.
163. Quoted in Smith, America’s mission, p. 70.
164. See now Christopher Clark, The sleepwalkers. How Europe went to war in 1914 (London, 2012), pp. 367–403.
165. Bridge, Habsburg monarchy, p. 335.
166. According to the testimony of Count Forgach. See Annika Mombauer, ‘The First World War: inevitable, avoidable, improbable or desirable? Recent interpretations on war guilt and the war’s origins’, German History, 25, 1 (2007), pp. 78–95 (quotation p. 84).
167. See Samuel R. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the origins of the First World War (Basingstoke and London, 1991), pp. 191, 197 and passim.
168. Quoted in Fischer, War of illusions, p. 224.
169. Quoted in Geyer, Russian imperialism, p. 314.
170. See K. M. Wilson, ‘The British cabinet’s decision for war, 2 August 1914’, British Journal of International Studies, I (1975), pp. 148–59 (quotation p. 153).
171. Martin Ceadel, Living the great illusion. Sir Norman Angell, 1872–1967 (Oxford, 2009), especially pp. 104–14. On this failure of ‘liberal peace’ see also Ralph Rotte, ‘Global warfare, economic loss and the outbreak of the Great War’, War in History, 5 (1998), pp. 481–93, especially p. 483.
172. In November 1914, quoted in Bridge, Habsburg monarchy, p. 346.
173. See Fritz Fischer, Germany’s aims in the First World War (London, 1967), pp. 103–4.
174. Quoted in McMeekin, The Russian origins of the First World War, p. 92.
175. A. L. Macfie, ‘The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914–18’, Middle Eastern Studies, 19,1 (1983), pp. 43–74 (quotations pp. 50 and 58).
176. Figures are in William Mulligan, The origins of the First World War (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 181–4.
177. Taylor, Struggle for mastery in Europe, p. xxv.
178. Quoted in J. W. B. Merewether and Frederick Smith, The Indian Corps in France (London, 1917), pp. 1–20. I am very grateful to Tarak Barkawi for this reference.
179. See Hew Strachan, The First World War. Vol. I: To arms (Oxford, 2001).
180. Robert T. Foley, German strategy and the path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the development of attrition, 1870–1916 (Cambridge, 2005).
181. See Elizabeth Peden, Victory through coalition. Britain and France during the First World War (Cambridge, 2005).
182. Thus A. L. Macfie, ‘The Straits Question in the First World War, 1914–18’, Middle Eastern Studies, 19, 1 (1983), pp. 43–74, and Graham T. Clews, The real story behind the origins of the 1915 Dardanelles campaign (Santa Barbara, 2010), pp. 66–7 and 293–4.
183. See Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic victory. French strategy and operations in the Great War (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 2, 109, 169–71 and passim.
184. Thus the revisionist argument of William Philpott, Bloody victory. The sacrifice on the Somme (London, 2009), pp. 96–7, 624–9 and passim (Joffre is quoted on p. 96).
185. See Donald McKale, War by revolution. Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in World War I (Kent, Ohio, 1998), pp. 46–68 (quotation p. 48). See also Sean McMeekin, The Berlin–Baghdad Express. The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s bid for world power, 1898–1918 (London, 2010).
186. See Kris Manjapra, ‘The illusions of encounter: Muslim “minds” and Hindu revolutionaries in First World War Germany and after’, Journal of Global History, 1 (2006), pp. 363–82, especially pp. 372–7.
187. See Mark von Hagen, War in a European borderland. Occupations and occupation plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918 (Seattle and London, 2007).
188. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 359.
189. Thus Friedrich Katz, The life and times of Pancho Villa (Stanford, 1998), pp. 554–5 (quotation p. 555).
190. See Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson, The making of a new Europe. R. W. Seton-Watson and the last years of Austria-Hungary (London, 1981).
191. Quoted in Branka Magaš, Croatia through history (London, 2008), p. 462.
192. See Matthew S. Seligmann, ‘Germany and the origins of the First World War in the eyes of the American diplomatic establishment’, German History, 15, 3 (1997), pp. 307–32, especially pp. 312, 315 and 323.
193. See Martin Horn, Britain, France and the financing of the First World War (Montreal and Kingston, 2002), pp. 142–65.
194. Quoted in Nancy Mitchell, The danger of dreams. German and American imperialism in Latin America (Chapel Hill and London, 1999), p. 1.
195. Quoted in Katz, Secret war in Mexico, p. 302.
196. Frank McDonough, The Conservative Party and Anglo-German relations, 1905–1914 (Basingstoke, 2007), p. 143.
197. Thus Paul Bridgen, The Labour Party and the politics of war and peace, 1900–1924 (Woodbridge, 2009), p. 51.
198. See John Turner, British politics and the Great War. Coalition and conflict, 1915–1918 (New Haven and London, 1992).
199. Quoted in Alistair Horne, The French army in politics (London, 1984), p. 39.
200. Thus Keith Robbins, ‘The Welsh Wizard who won the war: David Lloyd George as war leader’, in Brendan Simms and Karina Urbach (eds.), Die Rückkehr der ‘Grossen Männer’. Staatsmänner im Krieg – ein deutsch-britischer Vergleich 1740–1945 (Berlin and New York, 2010), pp. 96–107, especially p. 105.
201. See Axel Jansen, ‘Heroes or citizens? The 1916 debate on Harvard volunteers in the “European War” ’, in Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen (eds.), War volunteering in modern times. From the French Revolution to the Second World War (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 150–62.
202. For Russia see Peter Holquist, Making war, forging revolution: Russia’s continuum of crisis, 1914–1921 (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), pp. 18–19 and 38–9 (on the need to imitate the Germans).
203. On the balance between conscription and volunteering see Alexander Watson, ‘Voluntary enlistment in the Great War: a European phenomenon?’, in Krüger and Levsen (eds.), War volunteering in modern times, pp. 163–88.
204. Quoted in Matthew Johnson, ‘The Liberal War Committee and the Liberal advocacy of conscription in Britain, 1914–1916’, Historical Journal, 51, 2 (2008), pp. 402 and 414–15.
205. See Laurence V. Moyer, Victory must be ours: Germany in the Great War, 1914–1918 (Barnsley, 1995), pp. 102–33.
206. Marc Michel, L’appel à l’Afrique. Contributions et réactions à l’effort de guerre en A.O.F (1914–1919) (Paris, 1982). I am grateful to Christopher Andrew for this reference.
207. Quoted in Darwin, Empire project, p. 333.
208. I base this paragraph on Darwin, Empire project, pp. 324–5.
209. See Bridge, Habsburg monarchy, pp. 353–4.
210. Quoted in ibid., p. 358.
211. Thus Jo Vellacott, Pacifists, patriots and the vote. The erosion of democratic suffragism in Britain during the First World War (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 21 and 45.
212. See William C. Fuller, The foe within. Fantasies of treason and the end of Imperial Russia (Ithaca, 2006), pp. 172–83.
213. See Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 187–8.
214. Quoted in Rowbotham, Century of women, p. 67.
215. See Frances M. B. Lynch, ‘Finance and welfare: the impact of two world wars on domestic policy in France’, Historical Journal, 49 (2006), pp. 625–33, especially pp. 628–29; and Paul V. Dutton, Origins of the French welfare state. The struggle for social reform in France, 1914–1947 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 14–19.
216. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 336.
217. Thus Jürgen Kocka, Facing total war. German society, 1914–1918 (Leamington Spa, 1984).
218. See Ernst-Albert Seils, Weltmachtstreben und Kampf für den Frieden. Der deutsche Reichstag im Ersten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt, 2011), pp. 194–7.
219. Quoted in Seton-Watson, Decline of Imperial Russia, p. 712.
220. Quoted in ibid., p. 723. For the parliamentary critique of ‘German dominance’ within Russia in the early war years see M. M. Wolters, Aussenpolitische Fragen vor der vierten Duma (Hamburg, 1969), pp. 122–34.
1. Quoted in Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, revolutionary Germany and peacemaking, 1918–1919. Missionary diplomacy and the realities of power (Chapel Hill and London, 1985), p. 256.
2. Quoted in Klaus Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler (Stuttgart, 1995), p. 781.
3. Halford Mackinder, Democratic ideals and reality (London, 2009 [1919]), p. 70.
4. Quotations in John Darwin, The Empire project. The rise and fall of the British world system, 1830–1970 (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 335 and 348.
5. See Charles Seymour (ed.), The intimate papers of Edward House arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour (Boston and New York, 1926–8), p. 323. President Wilson Flag Day address, 14 June 1917. I thank Charles Laderman for these references.
6. Quotations in Tony Smith, America’s mission. The United States and the worldwide struggle for democracy in the twentieth century (Princeton, 1994), pp. 92 and 84.
7. Indeed, German critics of Wilson argued that Allied policy was ‘not the democratization or subjection of Germany but rather the subjection of Germany through its democratization’: Peter Stirk, ‘Hugo Preuss, German political thought and the Weimar Constitution’, History of Political Thought, 23, 3 (2002), pp. 497–516 (quotation p. 515).
8. The State Secretary (Kühlmann) to the foreign ministry liaison officer at general headquarters, 3 December 1917, Berlin, in Z. A. B. Zeman (ed.), Germany and the revolution in Russia, 1915–1918. Documents from the archives of the German foreign ministry (London, 1958), p. 94.
9. ‘Decree on peace’, 8.11.1917, in Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet documents on foreign policy (London, 1951), pp. 1–2.
10. See Michael A. Reynolds, ‘Buffers not brethren: Young Turk military policy in the First World War and the myth of Panturanism’, Past and Present, 203 (2009), pp. 137–79.
11. Cited in John Thompson, Woodrow Wilson (Harlow, 2002), p. 170.
12. Quoted in Darwin, Empire project, pp. 313–14.
13. Jonathan Schneer, The Balfour Declaration. The origins of the Arab–Israeli conflict (London, 2010), pp. 343–5 (quotation p. 343).
14. See David Aberbach, ‘Zionist patriotism in Europe, 1897–1942. Ambiguities in Jewish nationalism’, International History Review, 31, 2 (2009), pp. 268–98, especially pp. 277–9 (quotations pp. 281 and 287). On British fears of Jewish sympathies for Germany see John Ferris, ‘The British Empire vs. The Hidden Hand: British intelligence and strategy and “The CUP– Jew–German–Bolshevik combination”, 1918–1924’, in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (eds.), The British way in warfare: power and the international system, 1856–1956. Essays in honour of David French (Farnham, 2010), p. 337. For French belief in the international power and German sympathies of Jews see David Pryce-Jones, Betrayal. France, the Arabs, and the Jews (New York, 2006), pp. 28–32.
15. Balfour note, 25.4.1918, in James Bunyan (ed.), Intervention, civil war, and communism in Russia, April–December 1918. Documents and materials (Baltimore, 1936), p. 73. For fears that Germany would take over Russia and its resources see Benjamin Schwartz, ‘Divided attention. Britain’s perceptions of a German threat to her eastern position in 1918’, Journal of Contemporary History, 28, 1 (1993), pp. 103–22 (quotation pp. 118–19).
16. For the general background see Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the world, 1917–1991 (London and New York, 1998), pp. 18–23.
17. See John Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian communism (London, 1954).
18. Quoted in R. Craig Nation, Black earth, red star. A history of Soviet security policy, 1917–1991 (Ithaca, 1992), pp. 2, 120 and 15.
19. See for example Timothy Snyder, The red prince. The fall of a dynasty and the rise of modern empire (London, 2008).
20. Here the Bolsheviks were able to capitalize on the preceding mobilization against the central powers: Peter Holquist, Making war, forging revolution. Russia’s continuum of crisis, 1914–1921 (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2002), pp. 285–6 and passim.
21. Ibid., p. 121.
22. Quoted in J. F. McMillan, Twentieth-century France. Politics and society 1898–1991 (London, 1992), p. 73.
23. For American domestic propaganda against Germany see Alan Axelrod, Selling the Great War. The making of American propaganda (Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 63–5, 143–4 and passim.
24. See C. Cappozzola, Uncle Sam wants you. World War I and the making of the modern American citizen (Oxford, 2008), especially pp. 207–14; Adriane Lentz-Smith, Freedom struggles. African Americans and World War I (Cambridge, Mass., 2009), pp. 3–5.
25. See Wilhelm Deist, ‘The military collapse of the German Empire: the reality behind the stab-in-the-back myth’, War in History, 3 (1996), 186–207.
26. See Gary Sheffield’s rehabilitation of Lord Haig, Forgotten victory. The First World War: myths and realities (London, 2001). For the American contribution to the defeat of Germany see John Mosier, The myth of the Great War. A new military history of World War I (London, 2002), pp. 327–36 and passim.
27. On the greater resilience of the ‘liberal-democratic states’ see John Horne (ed.), State, society and mobilisation in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge, 1997), p. 16 and passim.
28. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 390.
29. Clemens King, Foch versus Clemenceau. France and German dismemberment, 1918–1919 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).
30. Quoted in Patrick O. Cohrs, The unfinished peace after World War I. America, Britain and the stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932 (Cambridge, 2008), p. 213.
31. Quoted in Stefan Berger, ‘William Harbutt Dawson: the career and politics of an historian of Germany’, The English Historical Review, 116, 465 (2001), pp. 76–113 (quotation p. 91).
32. Lenin is quoted in John Riddell (ed.), The German Revolution and the debate on Soviet power. Documents: 1918–1919. Preparing the Founding Congress (New York, 1986), pp. 27–8 and 3.
33. Quoted in Klaus Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, revolutionary Germany and peacemaking, 1918–19. Missionary diplomacy and the realities of power (Chapel Hill and London, 1985), pp. 395–9 (quotation p. 46).
34. John Ramsden, ‘Churchill and the Germans’, Contemporary British History, 25, 1 (2011), pp. 125–39 (quotations pp. 129–30n).
35. Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elisabeth Glaser (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles. A reassessment after 75 years (Cambridge, 1998).
36. Margaret Pawley, The watch on the Rhine. The military occupation of the Rhineland, 1918–1930 (London and New York, 2007), pp. 16–18. Over the next two decades Germany continued to be the British army’s main potential enemy: David French, Raising Churchill’s army. The British army and the war against Germany, 1919–1945 (Oxford, 2000).
37. On the centrality of the League to the containment of Germany and locking the Reich into collaboration against Bolshevism see Peter J. Yearwood, Guarantee of Peace. The League of Nations in British policy, 1914–1925 (Oxford, 2009), pp. 149–50.
38. The phrase is quoted in Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, p. 199.
39. Quoted in Maurice Vaïsse, ‘Security and disarmament: problems in the development of the disarmament debates, 1919–1934’, in R. Ahmann, A. M. Birke, and M. Howard (eds.), The quest for stability. Problems of West European security, 1918–1957 (Oxford, 1993), p. 175.
40. See Mark Levene, War, Jews and the new Europe. The diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–1919 (Oxford, 1992).
41. See for example Antoine Prost, ‘The impact of war on French and German political cultures’, Historical Journal, 37 (1994), 209–17.
42. Thus William Lee Blackwood, ‘German hegemony and the Socialist International’s place in inter-war European diplomacy’, European History Quarterly, 31 (2001), pp. 101–40 (quotation pp. 108–9).
43. Quoted in William Mulligan, ‘The Reichswehr, the Republic and the primacy of foreign policy, 1918–1923’, German History, 21, 3 (2003), p. 356.
44. See William Mulligan, ‘Civil–military relations in the early Weimar Republic’, Historical Journal, 45, 4 (2002), pp. 819–41.
45. On the centrality of demographic-military concerns see Paul V. Dutton, Origins of the French welfare state. The struggle for social reform in France, 1914–1947 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 22–3.
46. John Maynard Keynes, The economic consequences of the peace, in Collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 2 (London, 1920), p. 226.
47. Thus John Milton Cooper Jr, Breaking the heart of the world. Woodrow Wilson and the fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge, 2001), p. 119.
48. Quoted in Thompson, Woodrow Wilson, pp. 224 and 229.
49. Lloyd Ambrosius, ‘Wilson, the Republicans, and French security after World War I’, Journal of American History, 59 (September 1972), pp. 341–52.
50. See Stephen Wertheim, ‘The league that wasn’t. American designs for a legalist-sanctionalist League of Nations and the intellectual origins of international organisation, 1914–1920’, Diplomatic History, 35, 5 (2011), pp. 797–836. The Wilson quotation is in Stephen Wertheim, ‘The Wilsonian chimera: why debating Wilson’s vision hasn’t saved American foreign relations’, White House Studies, 10 (2011), p. 354.
51. See Gerhard Weinberg, ‘The defeat of Germany in 1918 and the European balance of power’, Central European History, 2, 3 (1969), pp. 248–60.
52. See Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Realism and the spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder and the reality of the League of Nations’, European Journal of International Relations (online, 2010), pp. 1–23, especially pp. 9–10.
53. See Norman Davies, White eagle, red star: the Polish–Soviet war, 1919–1920 (New York, 1972).
54. Robert Himmer, ‘Soviet policy toward Germany during the Russo-Polish War, 1920’, Slavic Review, 35, 4 (Dec. 1976), pp. 665–82, especially pp. 666–7.
55. For the centrality of Germany in French thinking on Poland in 1920 see Michael Jabara Carley, ‘Anti-Bolshevism in French foreign policy: the crisis in Poland in 1920’, International History Review, 2, 2 (1980), pp. 410–31, especially pp. 411–12 and 428.
56. See Shelley Baranowski, Nazi Empire. German colonialism and imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 116–71.
57. See Werner T. Angress, Stillborn revolution. The communist bid for power in Germany, 1921–1923 (Princeton, 1963).
58. Stephanie C. Salzmann, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union: Rapallo and after, 1922–1934 (Rochester, 2003), emphasizes that while the treaty caused a sensation, it did not lead to panic in the Foreign Office.
59. Mussolini is quoted in MacGregor Knox, ‘Conquest, foreign and domestic, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany’, Journal of Modern History, 56, 1 (1984), pp. 1–57 (quotation p. 19), and in ‘The Fascist regime, its foreign policy and its wars: an “anti-anti-Fascist” orthodoxy? ’, in Patrick Finney (ed.), The origins of the Second World War (London, New York, etc. 1997), p. 159
60. See Charlotte Alston, ‘ “The suggested basis for a Russian Federal Republic”. Britain, anti-Bolshevik Russia and the border states at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919’, History, 91 (2006), pp. 24–44, especially pp. 33–4.
61. Thus Andrew Orr, ‘ “We call you to holy war”. Mustafa Kemal, communism, and Germany in French intelligence nightmares, 1919–1923’, Journal of Military History, 75 (2011), pp. 1095–1123.
62. Margaret Pawley, The watch on the Rhine. The military occupation of the Rhineland, 1918–1930 (London and New York, 2007), pp. 77–88.
63. Quoted in Degras (ed.), Soviet documents on foreign policy, p. 287.
64. See M. D. Lewis, ‘One hundred million Frenchmen. The “assimilation” theory in French colonial policy’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 4 (1962), pp. 129–53.
65. Quoted in Robert C. Reinders, ‘Racialism on the left. E. D. Morel and the “Black Horror on the Rhine” ’, International Review of Social History, XIII (1968), pp. 1–28 (quotation p. 8).
66. Keith L. Nelson, ‘The “Black Horror on the Rhine”. Race as a factor in post-World War I diplomacy’, Journal of Modern History, 42, 4 (1970), pp. 606–27 (quotations pp. 613 (Mangin) and 616 (Müller)).
67. Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann. Weimar’s greatest statesman (Oxford, 2002).
68. Carole Fink, ‘German Revisionspolitik, 1919–1933’, in Historical papers/Communications historiques. A selection from the papers presented at the annual meeting [of the Canadian Historical Association] held at Winnipeg, 1986 (Ottawa, 1986), pp. 134–45 (quotation p. 143). On Stresemann’s use of economic power for strategic purposes see Gottfried Niedhart, Die Aussenpolitik der Weimarer Republik (Munich, 1999), pp. 63–99.
69. On all this see Peter Jackson, ‘France and the problems of security and disarmament after the First World War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29, 2 (2006), pp. 247–80.
70. See Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa (Vienna, 1923).
71. Ina Ulrike Paul, ‘In Kontinenten denken, paneuropäisch handeln. Die Zeitschrift Paneuropa 1924–1938’, Jahrbuch für europäische Geschichte, 5 (2004), pp. 161–92, especially pp. 182–3.
72. Quoted in Cohrs, Unfinished peace after World War I, pp. 105 and 135.
73. Quoted in Darwin, Empire project, p. 365.
74. See Melvin P. Leffler, The elusive quest. America’s pursuit of European stability and French security, 1919–1933 (Chapel Hill, 1979), pp. 41–3 (quotation p. 41).
75. See Gaynor Johnson (ed.), Locarno revisited: European diplomacy 1920–1929 (London and New York, 2004), quotation p. 103.
76. Quoted in Cohrs, Unfinished peace after World War I, pp. 215 and 225.
77. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston, 1971), pp. 645, 642–3, 646, 649 and 651.
78. Quoted in Teddy J. Uldricks, ‘Russia and Europe: diplomacy, revolution, and economic development in the 1920s’, International History Review, 1, 1 (1979), p. 74.
79. Quoted in Cohrs, Unfinished peace after World War I, p. 372.
80. Andrew Webster, ‘An argument without end: Britain, France and the disarmament process, 1925–34’, in Martin S. Alexander and William J. Philpott (eds.), Anglo-French defence relations between the wars (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 49–71.
81. See John Keiger, ‘Wielding finance as a weapon of diplomacy: France and Britain in the 1920s’, Contemporary British History, 25, 1 (2011), pp. 29–47, especially pp. 40–43.
82. Quoted in Nation, Black earth, red star, pp. 61 and 63.
83. This point is made very effectively in Richard Hellie, ‘The structure of Russian imperial history’, History and Theory, 44, 4 (2005), pp. 88–112 (pp. 102–3); despite its title, much of the article deals with the Soviet period.
84. For Hitler’s knowledge of and keen interest in the United States see Klaus P. Fischer, Hitler and America (Philadelphia, 2011), pp. 9–46.
85. Quotations in Adolf Hitler, Second book [Aussenpolitische Standortbestimmung nach der Reichtagswahl Juni–Juli 1928], ed. Gerhard L. Weinberg, in Institut für Zeitgeschichte (ed.), Hitler. Reden, Schriften, Anordnungen, Februar 1925 bis Januar 1933 (Munich, New Providence, London and Paris, 1995), pp. 15, 88–90.
86. For Germany and the Young Plan see Michael Wala, Weimar und Amerika. Botschafter Friedrich von Prittwitz und Gaffron und die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen von 1927 bis 1933 (Stuttgart, 2001), pp. 12–151.
87. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, pp. 524–5.
88. Quoted in ibid., p. 525.
89. Jürgen Elvert, Mitteleuropa! Deutsche Pläne zur europäischen Neuordnung (1918–1945) (Stuttgart, 1999).
90. See Andreas Rödder, Stresemann’s Erbe. Julius Curtius und die deutsche Aussenpolitik, 1929–1931 (Paderborn, 1996), quotations pp. 199 and 202.
91. See William L. Patch Jr, Heinrich Brüning and the dissolution of the Weimar Republic (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 213–19. (quotation p. 255)
92. See Irene Strenge, Kurt von Schleicher. Politik im Reichswehrministerium am Ende der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, 2006).
93. See Enrico Syring, Hitler. Seine politische Utopie (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), pp. 234–7.
94. See Kiran Klaus Patel, Soldiers of labor. Labor service in Nazi Germany and New Deal America, 1933–1945 (Cambridge and New York, 2005), pp. 4, 72 and 228–9.
95. See Wolfram Wette, ‘Ideology, propaganda and internal politics as preconditions of the war policy of the Third Reich’, in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Germany and the Second World War. Vol. I. The build-up of German aggression (Oxford, 1990).
96. Thus Patrizia Albanese, Mothers of the nation. Women, families and nationalism in twentieth century Europe (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2006), pp. 32–44 (quotation p. 36).
97. Quoted in Zach Shore, ‘Hitler’s opening gambit. Intelligence, encirclement, and the decision to ally with Poland’, Intelligence and National Security, 14, 3 (1999), quotation p. 112.
98. For British misconceptions see R. J. Overy, ‘German air strength 1933 to 1939: a note’, Historical Journal, 27, 2 (1984), pp. 465–71.
99. Thus Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the struggle for collective security in Europe, 1933–39 (London, 1984), pp. 1–226, especially p. 2.
100. Thus Wesley K. Wark, The ultimate enemy. British intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 (Ithaca, 1985).
101. Quoted in Ramsden, ‘Churchill and the Germans’, p. 131. For the mainstream view see Philip Towle, ‘Taming or demonising an aggressor: the British debate on the end of the Locarno system’, in Gaynor Johnson (ed.), Locarno revisited: European diplomacy, 1920–1929 (London and New York), pp. 178–98 (pp. 190–91).
102. See Bret Holman, ‘The air panic of 1935: British press opinion between disarmament and rearmament’, Journal of Contemporary History, 46, 2 (2011), pp. 288–307 (quotation p. 295).
103. See Arnold A. Offner, American appeasement. United States policy and Germany, 1933–1938 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 12, 59 and passim, and Alonzo L. Hamby, For the survival of democracy. Franklin Roosevelt and the world crisis of the 1930s (New York, 2009).
104. Thus Mary E. Glantz, FDR and the Soviet Union. The president’s battles over foreign policy (Lawrence, Kan., 2005), pp. 17–35.
105. Quoted in Nation, Black earth, red star, p. 117.
106. For the link between the (exaggerated) fear of encirclement, Polish subversion and repressive policies in the Ukraine and Belarus see Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York, 2010), pp. 30–31, 37, 42, 71 and 89.
107. R. Heller, ‘East Fulham revisited’, Journal of Contemporary History, 6, 3 (1971), pp. 172–96; C. Stannage, ‘The East Fulham by-election, 25 October 1933’, Historical Journal, 14, 1 (1971), pp. 165–200. See also Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin (Cambridge, 1999).
108. See Mona Siegel, ‘ “To the Unknown Mother of the Unknown Soldier”. Pacifism, feminism, and the politics of sexual difference among French institutrices between the wars’, French Historical Studies, 22, 3 (1999), pp. 421–51, especially pp. 428–9.
109. See Benedikt Stuchtey, ‘ “Not by law but by sentiment”. Great Britain and imperial defense, 1918–1939’, in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (eds.), The shadows of total war. Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939 (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 255–70 (quotation p. 263).
110. Quoted in Darwin, Empire project, p. 457.
111. Thus Michaela Hoenicke Moore, Know your enemy. The American debate on Nazism, 1933–1945 (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 78–93 and 341–2.
112. Quoted in Alan Bullock, Hitler. A study in tyranny (London, 1952), p. 315.
113. Both Göring and Hitler are quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 623.
114. Quoted in Pierre-Henri Laurent, ‘The reversal of Belgian foreign policy, 1936–1937’, The Review of Politics, 31, 3 (July 1969), p. 370.
115. See Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front and central Europe. The dilemmas of French impotence, 1919–1940 (Cambridge, 1992).
116. See Antony Beevor, The battle for Spain. The Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (London, 2006).
117. See David Patterson, A genealogy of evil. Anti-semitism from Nazism to Islamic Jihad (Cambridge, 2011).
118. On the link between encirclement and Stalin’s ‘total security state’ see Silvio Pons, Stalin and the inevitable war, 1936–1941 (London and Portland, 2002).
119. Quoted in John Lamberton Harper, American visions of Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan and Dean G. Acheson (Cambridge, 1994), p. 67.
120. See J. Noakes and G. Pridham (eds.), Nazism. A history in documents and eyewitness accounts, 1919–1945. Vol. II: Foreign policy, war and racial extermination (New York, 1988), quotation p. 685.
121. Quoted in David Dilks, ‘ “We must hope for the best and prepare for the worst”. The prime minister, the Cabinet and Hitler’s Germany, 1937–1939’, Proceedings of the British Academy, LXXIII (1987), p. 325.
122. Quoted in B. J. C. Roi and M. L. McKercher, ‘ “Ideal” and “punchbag”: conflicting views of the balance of power and their influence on interwar British foreign policy, diplomacy and statecraft’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12, 2 (2001), pp. 47–78 (quotation, p. 53).
123. Daniel Hucker, ‘French public attitudes towards the prospect of war in 1938–1939’, French History, 21, 4 (2007), pp. 431–4; Jerry H. Brookshire, ‘Speak for England, act for England: Labour’s leadership and British national security under the threat of war in the late 1930s’, European History Quarterly, 29, 2 (1999), pp. 251–87.
124. Thus Maurice Cowling, The impact of Hitler. British politics and British policy, 1933–1940 (Chicago and London, 1975).
125. Quoted in Tobias Jersak, ‘A matter of foreign policy: “Final Solution” and “Final Victory” in Nazi Germany’, German History 21, 3 (2003), pp. 369–91 (quotation p. 378).
126. Quoted in John Thompson, ‘Conceptions of national security and American entry into World War II’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16, 4 (2005), pp. 671–97 (quotations pp. 673–4).
127. Quoted in Thompson, ‘Conceptions of national security’, p. 674.
128. See Barbara Rearden Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis. A study of decision-making (Princeton, 1997), p. 159.
129. Quoted in Nation, Black earth, red star, p. 98.
130. On the rhetorical duel between the two see David Reynolds, From world war to Cold War. Churchill, Roosevelt and the international history of the 1940s (Oxford, 2006), pp. 18–19.
131. See Jochen Thies, Archtekt der Weltherrschaft. Die ‘Endziele’ Hitlers (Dusseldorf, 1976).
132. Thus Rolf-Dieter Müller, Der Feind steht im Osten. Hitlers geheime Pläne für einen Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion im Jahr 1939 (Berlin, 2001), pp. 251–61.
133. Quoted in Albert L. Weeks, Stalin’s other war. Soviet grand strategy, 1939–1941 (Lanham, Boulder, etc., 2002), pp. 172–3.
134. For the prehistory of these Anglo-French tergiversations see A. J. Prazmovska, ‘War over Danzig? The dilemma of Anglo-Polish relations in the months preceding the outbreak of the Second World War’, Historical Journal, 26 (1983), pp. 177–83.
135. Thus Jonathan Haslam, ‘Soviet war aims’, in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley (eds.), The rise and fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941–45 (Basingstoke and New York, 1995), pp. 24–5.
136. For the contrast between the British and French war economies in this respect see Talbot C. Imlay, Facing the Second World War. Strategy, politics and economics in Britain and France, 1938–1940 (Oxford, 2003).
137. Jan T. Gross, Revolution from abroad. The Soviet conquest of Poland’s western Ukraine and western Belorussia (Princeton, 1988).
138. See David Reynolds, ‘1940: fulcrum of the twentieth century?’, International Affairs, 66 (1990), pp. 325–50.
139. See Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France. Old guard and new order, 1940–1944 (London, 1970), pp. 51–62.
140. See Davide Rodogno, Fascism’s European empire. Italian occupation during the Second World War (Cambridge, 2006).
141. See Richard Bosworth, ‘War, totalitarianism and “deep belief” in Fascist Italy, 1935–43’, European History Quarterly, 34, 4 (2004), pp. 475–505, especially pp. 492–93.
142. Thus Stanley G. Payne, Spain, Germany and World War II (New Haven and London, 2008), pp. 87–113.
143. Avi Shlaim, ‘Prelude to downfall: the British offer of union to France, June 1940’, Journal of Contemporary History, 9, 3 (1974), pp. 27–63.
144. See Anthony J. Cumming, ‘Did the Navy win the Battle of Britain? The warship as the ultimate guarantor of Britain’s freedom in 1940’, Historical Research, 83 (2010), pp. 165–88.
145. See now David Edgerton, Britain’s war machine. Weapons, resources and experts in the Second World War (London, 2011), especially pp. 47–8 and 124–5.
146. J. Lee Ready, Forgotten allies. The military contribution of the colonies, exiled governments and lesser powers to the Allied victory in World War II. Vol. I: The European theatre (Jefferson and London, 1985).
147. On this see Andrew Stewart, Empire lost. Britain, the dominions and the Second World War (London, 2008), p. 106.
148. See Norman J. W. Goda, Hitler, northwest Africa, and the path toward America (College Station, Texas, 1998).
149. Roosevelt’s reported remarks of late September 1939 are quoted in Harper, American visions of Europe, p. 59.
150. Quoted in Reynolds, From world war to Cold War, p. 19.
151. Quoted in Nation, Black earth, red star, pp. 122–4.
152. See Steven Merritt Miner, Stalin’s holy war. Religion, nationalism, and alliance politics, 1941–1945 (Chapel Hill and London, 2003).
153. See Dan Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN. How the Allies won World War II and forged a peace (London, 2011), especially pp. 31–57 (quotation p. 34).
154. Mark Harrison, ‘Resource mobilisation for World War II: the USA, UK, USSR and Germany, 1938–1945’, Economic History Review, 41, 2 (1988), pp. 171–92.
155. Quoted in Snyder, Bloodlands, p. 161.
156. See Nicole Kramer, Volksgenossinnen an der Heimatfront. Mobilisierung. Verhalten. Erinnerung (Göttingen, 2011), pp. 164–5.
157. Quoted in Sheila Rowbotham, A century of women. The history of women in Britain and the United States (London, 1997), p. 247.
158. See James T. Sparrow, Warfare state. World War II Americans and the age of big government (Oxford and New York, 2011).
159. See Thomas Bruscino, A nation forged in war. How World War II taught Americans how to get along (Knoxville, 2010).
160. Quoted in Ian Kershaw, Fateful decisions. Ten decisions that changed the world, 1940–1941 (London, 2007).
161. Christopher Browning, The origins of the Final Solution. The evolution of Nazi Jewish policy, 1939–1942 (London, 2005). My interpretation here follows closely that of Jersak, ‘A matter of foreign policy’, pp. 369–89.
162. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 752.
163. Speaking at the Moscow Conference in October 1943, quoted in Michael R. Beschloss, The conquerors. Roosevelt, Truman and the destruction of Hitler’s Germany (New York, 2002), p. 21.
164. Quoted in Ilse Dorothee Pautsch, Die territoriale Deutschlandplanung des amerikanischen Aussenministeriums, 1941–1943 (Frankfurt am Main, 1990), p. 122. For US fears of German post-war power even while the conflict raged see James McAllister, No exit. America and the German problem, 1943–1954 (Ithaca and London, 2002), pp. 1–42.
165. Quoted in Klaus Larres, ‘Churchill: flawed war leader or charismatic visionary?’, in Brendan Simms and Karina Urbach (eds.), Die Rückkehr der ‘Grossen Männer’. Staatsmänner im Krieg – ein deutsch-britischer Vergleich 1740–1945 (Berlin and New York, 2010), p. 154.
166. Quoted in Lothar Kettenacker, Krieg zur Friedenssicherung. Die Deutsch-landplanung der britischen Regierung während des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Göttingen and Zurich, 1989), pp. 534 and 537–42.
167. Quoted in Larres, ‘Churchill’, p. 141.
168. See Patrick J. Hearden, ‘Early American views regarding European unification’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19 (2006), pp. 67–78, especially pp. 74–5.
169. See Brian P. Farrell, ‘Symbol of paradox: the Casablanca Conference, 1943’, Canadian Journal of History, 28, 1 (1993), pp. 21–40, which puts the debate about the best strategy against Germany at the forefront.
170. See Steven T. Ross, American war plans, 1941–1945 (London and Portland, 1997), pp. 9, 17, 21 and 47, and Mark Stoler, Allies and adversaries. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill and London, 2000), p. 71.
171. Quoted in Reynolds, ‘1940: fulcrum of the twentieth century?’, p. 344.
172. See now Reynolds, ‘Churchill and allied grand strategy in Europe, 1944–1945: the erosion of British influence’, in From world war to Cold War, pp. 121–36.
173. Thus Roger Beaumont, ‘The bomber offensive as a second front’, Journal of Contemporary History, 22, 1 (1987), pp. 3–19, especially pp. 13–15, and Stephan Glienke, ‘The Allied air war and German society’, in Claudia Baldoli, Andrew Knapp and Richard Overy (eds.), Bombing, states and peoples in western Europe, 1940–1945 (London, 2011), pp. 184–205.
174. See Mark Harrison (ed.), The economics of World War II: six powers in international comparison (Cambridge, 1998).
175. Quoted in Hildebrand, Das vergangene Reich, p. 781.
176. See Sönke Neitzel, ‘Hitlers Europaarmee und der “Kreuzzug” gegen die Sowjetunion’, in Michael Salewski and Heiner Timmermann (eds.), Armeen in Europa – europäische Armeen (Münster, 2004), pp. 137–50.
1. Quoted in Mary N. Hampton, The Wilsonian impulse. U.S. foreign policy, the alliance, and German unification (Westport, 1996), p. 18.
2. Anatoly Dobrynin, In confidence: Moscow’s ambassador to America’s six Cold War presidents (1962–1986) (New York, 1995), p. 63.
3. ‘The Yalta Protocol of Proceedings’, in T. G. Paterson, Major problems in American foreign policy since 1914, Vol. II, 3rd edn (Lexington, Mass., 1989), pp. 243–4.
4. Thus Melvyn Leffler, The struggle for Germany and the origins of the Cold War (Washington, DC, 1996).
5. Quoted in Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the line. The American decision to divide Germany, 1944–49 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 38.
6. See John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Repression versus rehabilitation: the problem of Germany’, in Gaddis, The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York, 1972), pp. 94–132 (quotations pp. 98–9).
7. Mark Kramer, ‘The Soviet Union and the founding of the German Democratic Republic: 50 years later. A review article’, Europe–Asia Studies, 51 (1999), pp. 1093–1106 (quotation pp. 1097–8).
8. See R. C. Raack, Stalin’s drive to the west, 1938–1945. The origins of the Cold War (Stanford, 1995), pp. 133–4 and passim.
9. See Fraser J. Harbutt, Yalta 1945. Europe and America at the crossroads (Cambridge, 2010).
10. ‘Yalta Protocol’, p. 242.
11. Ibid., pp. 239–40.
12. Ibid., p. 241.
13. For an epic account see Antony Beevor, Berlin. The downfall (London, 2002).
14. Quoted in Leffler, Struggle for Germany, p. 13.
15. Quoted in Charles Mee, Meeting at Potsdam (New York, 1975), p. 320.
16. Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, ‘Soviet war aims’, in Ann Lane and Howard Temperley (eds.), The rise and fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941–45 (Basingstoke and New York, 1995), p. 27.
17. See now Jessica Reinisch and Elizabeth White (eds.), The disentanglement of populations. Migration, expulsion and displacement in post-war Europe, 1944–9 (Basingstoke, 2011), especially pp. 3–50.
18. Quoted in Zbyněk Zeman and Antonín Klimek, The life of Edvard Beneš, 1884–1948. Czechoslovakia in peace and war (Oxford, 1997), p. 247. See also Eagle Glassheim, ‘The mechanics of ethnic cleansing: the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, 1945–1947’, in Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (eds.), Redrawing nations. Ethnic cleansing in east-central Europe, 1944–1948 (Lanham, 2001), pp. 197–200.
19. Quoted in Mark Mazower, No enchanted palace. The end of empire and the ideological origins of the United Nations (Princeton and Oxford, 2009), p. 7.
20. See David J. Dunthorn, ‘The Paris Conference on Tangier, August 1945. The British response to Soviet interest in the “Tangier Question” ’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16, 1 (2005), pp. 117–37 (quotation p. 123).
21. Quoted in Andreas Hillgruber, Die Zerstörung Europas. Beiträge zur Weltkriegsepoche, 1914 bis 1945 (Frankfurt am Main and Berlin, 1988), p. 363.
22. Andrew J. Rotter, Hiroshima. The world’s bomb (New York, 2008), pp. 177–228.
23. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the world, 1917–1991 (London and New York, 1998), p. 84. Hiroshima had ‘destroyed the equilibrium of the world’.
24. Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi, ‘For a free and united Europe. A draft manifesto’, in Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (ed.), Debates on European integration. A reader (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 37–42.
25. See Scott Kelly, ‘“The ghost of Neville Chamberlain”. Guilty Men and the 1945 election’, Conservative History Journal, 5 (Autumn 2005), 18–24, especially, 21–2 (quotation p. 18).
26. See Correlli Barnett, The audit of war. The illusion and reality of Britain as a great nation (London, 1986).
27. See Jim Tomlinson, ‘Balanced accounts? Constructing the balance of payments problem in post-war Britain’, The English Historical Review, CXXIV, 509 (2009), pp. 863–84.
28. See generally, Martin Thomas, Bob Moore and L. J. Butler, Crises of empire. Decolonisation and Europe’s imperial states, 1918–1975 (London, 2008), especially pp. 47–72.
29. Quoted in Pablo de Orellana, Implications of the Cold War for the maintenance of colonialism in Indochina, 1945–1954 (M.Phil. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2009), p. 23. I am most grateful to Mr de Orellana for extremely interesting conversations on this subject.
30. Anne Deighton, ‘Entente neo-coloniale? Ernest Bevin and the proposals for Anglo-French Third World power, 1945–1949’, in Glyn Stone and T. G. Otte (eds.), Anglo-French relations since the late eighteenth century (London and New York, 2008), pp. 200–218 (Bevin quotation p. 208).
31. See Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe (eds.), Stalinist terror in eastern Europe. Elite purges and mass repression (Manchester and New York, 2010), p. 5 and passim for the crucial international context.
32. Thus Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds.), The establishment of communist regimes in eastern Europe, 1944–1949 (Boulder and Oxford, 1998).
33. Quoted in Fernande Scheid Raine, ‘Stalin and the creation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in Iran, 1945’, Cold War History, 2, 1 (2001), pp. 1–38 (quotation p. 1).
34. Compare George F. Kennan, ‘Containment: 40 years later. Containment then and now’, Foreign Affairs, 65, 4 (Spring 1987).
35. See Dirk Spilker, ‘The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and the German Question, 1944–1953’, dissertation abstract, compiled by Cornelie Usborne, German History, 17, 1 (1999), pp. 102–3.
36. Thus Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany. A history of the Soviet zone of occupation, 1945–49 (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).
37. Hannes Adomeit, Imperial overstretch. Germany in Soviet policy from Stalin to Gorbachev (Baden-Baden, 1998).
38. Richard L. Merritt, Democracy imposed: US occupation policy and the German public, 1945–1949 (New Haven, 1995). I am grateful to my student Ross J. Tokola for this and many other references.
39. Wolfgang Krieger, ‘Was General Clay a revisionist? Strategic aspects of the United States occupation of Germany’, Journal of Contemporary History, 18, 2 (1983), pp. 165–84 (quotation p. 180).
40. See Josef Foschepoth, ‘British interest in the division of Germany after the Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 23, 3 (1986), pp. 391–411. For a broader overview of the post-war British preoccupation with Germany see Daniel Gossel, Briten, Deutsche und Europa. Die deutsche Frage in der britischen Aussenpolitik, 1945–1962 (Stuttgart, 1999).
41. William I. Hitchcock, France restored: Cold War diplomacy and the quest for leadership in Europe, 1944–1954 (Chapel Hill, 1998), pp. 74–7 and passim.
42. ‘X’ [George Kennan], ‘The sources of Soviet conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 25, 4 (July 1947), pp. 566–82.
43. See John Lewis Gaddis, The long peace. Inquiries into the history of the Cold War (New York and Oxford, 1987), pp. 41–2.
44. See Tony Judt, Postwar. A history of Europe since 1945 (London, 2005).
45. For the centrality of Germany to Truman’s thinking see Arnold A. Offner, Another such victory. President Truman and the Cold War, 1945–1953 (Stanford, 2002), pp. 157–67.
46. See Klaus Schwabe, ‘The Cold War and European integration, 1947–63’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12, 4 (2001), pp. 18–34.
47. Quoted in Robert E. Ferrell, ‘The Truman era and European integration’, in Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (eds.), The United States and the integration of Europe. Legacies of the postwar era (New York, 1996), p. 28.
48. See Avi Shlaim, Britain and the origins of European unity (Reading, 1978), pp. 114–42.
49. See John W. Young, Britain, France and the unity of Europe, 1945–1951 (Leicester, 1984), pp. 77–9 and passim.
50. See Mark Byrnes, ‘Unfinished business: the United States and Franco’s Spain, 1944–47’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11, 1 (2000), pp. 153–6.
51. Cited in Anne Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (Basingstoke, 1990), p. 58.
52. See Moshe Zimmermann, ‘Militär, Militarismus und Zivilgesellschaft in Israel – eine europäische Erbschaft?’, in Ute Frevert (ed.), Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1997), pp. 342–58.
53. Quoted in Moshe Naor, ‘Israel’s 1948 war of independence as a total war’, Journal of Contemporary History, 43, 2 (2008), pp. 241–57 (quotation p. 246).
54. See Scott Parrish, ‘The Marshall Plan and the division of Europe’, in Naimark and Gibianskii (eds.), Establishment of communist regimes in eastern Europe, pp. 267–90, especially pp. 286–7.
55. Silvio Pons, ‘Stalin, Togliatti, and the origins of the Cold War in Europe’, Journal of Cold War Studies 3, 2 (2001), pp. 3–27, especially pp. 5 and 12.
56. For the centrality of Germany at the Moscow conference see Robert H. Van Meter, ‘Secretary of State Marshall, General Clay, and the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of 1947: a response to Philip Zelikow’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16, 1 (2005), pp. 139–67, especially pp. 142–3, 145 and 152 (Dulles quotation p. 151).
57. Roger G. Miller, To save a city. The Berlin airlift, 1948–49 (College Station, Texas, 2000), pp. 36–86.
58. See Edmund Spevack, ‘American pressures on the German constitutional tradition: basic rights in the West German constitution of 1949’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 10, 3 (1997), pp. 411–36 (quotation p. 424). For the US role in the party-political democratization of Germany see Daniel E. Rogers, ‘Transforming the German party system. The United States and the origins of political moderation, 1945–1949’, Journal of Modern History, 65, 3 (1993), pp. 512–41.
59. Paul Fritz, ‘From defeat and division to democracy in Germany’, in Mary Fran T. Malone (ed.), Achieving democracy. Democratization in theory and practice (New York and London, 2011), pp. 169–94.
60. See Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism. The inner history of the Cold War (Oxford, 1995), pp. 157–66, for anti-totalitarianism as the ‘quasi-official ideology of the West German state’ (p. 157).
61. Thus Ulrich Lappenküper, ‘Primat der Aussenpolitik! Die Verständigung zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich, 1949–1963’, in Eckart Conze, Ulrich Lappenküper and Guido Müller (eds.), Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen. Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna, 2004), pp. 45–63.
62. See Robert A. Divine, ‘The Cold War and the election of 1948’, Journal of American History, 59 (1972), pp. 90–110, especially pp. 91, 95 and 98–9 (Dewey quotation p. 100).
63. Quoted in John Callaghan, ‘The Cold War and the march of capitalism, socialism and democracy’, Contemporary British History, 15, 3 (2001), pp. 1–25 (quotation p. 4).
64. Quoted in Dianne Kirby, ‘Divinely sanctioned. The Anglo-American Cold War alliance and the defence of western civilisation and Christianity, 1945–48’, Journal of Contemporary History, 35, 3 (2000), pp. 385–412 (quotation p. 405).
65. See Peter Hennessy, The secret state. Whitehall and the Cold War (London, 2002), and now Christopher Andrew, The defence of the realm. The authorized history of MI5 (London, 2010).
66. Quoted in Peter Clarke, ‘Labour’s beachmaster’, London Review of Books, 23.1.2003, p. 25.
67. Thus Aaron L. Friedberg, In the shadow of the garrison state. America’s anti-statism and its Cold War grand strategy (Princeton, 2000), especially pp. 340–45.
68. Quoted in Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War civil rights. Race and the image of American democracy (Princeton and Oxford, 2000), p. 29.
69. Thus ibid., pp. 2–3 and passim.
70. Quoted in Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke, A breath of freedom. The civil rights struggle, African American GIs and Germany (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 56 and 76.
71. Geoffrey Marston, ‘The United Kingdom’s part in the preparation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1950’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 42 (1993), pp. 796–826.
72. I thank Thomas Probert for drawing this fact to my attention.
73. Speaking in December 1952 as quoted in Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York, 2010), p. 366.
74. Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, Stalin’s last crime. The plot against the Jewish doctors, 1948–1953 (London, 2003), especially pp. 183–4.
75. See Kevin McDermott, ‘Stalinist terror in Czechoslovakia: origins, processes, responses’, in McDermott and Stibbe (eds.), Stalinist terror in eastern Europe, pp. 98–118, especially pp. 101–11.
76. See Kathryn Weathersby, The Soviet aims in Korea and the origins of the Korean War, 1945–1950. New evidence from Russian archives, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 8 (Washington, DC, 1993).
77. See Michael M. Sheng, Battling western imperialism. Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton, 1997), pp. 187–96, which is based on Red Chinese archives, and Lorenz M. Luethi, The Sino-Soviet split. Cold War in the communist world (Princeton, 2008), pp. 345–52.
78. On this general complex see Tony Smith, Thinking like a communist. State and legitimacy in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba (New York, 1987), pp. 191–2.
79. Quoted in Walter Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945–1996, 8th edn (New York, 1997), p. 96.
80. See Robert J. McMahon, ‘The Cold War comes to south-east Asia’, in McMahon and Thomas G. Paterson (eds.), The origins of the Cold War (Boston, 1999), pp. 227–43.
81. Quoted in William Stueck, The Korean War. An international history (Princeton, 1995), p. 373.
82. See John Gillingham, European integration, 1950–2003. Superstate or new market economy? (Cambridge, 2003) p. 27.
83. Christopher Gehrz, ‘Dean Acheson, the JCS and the “single package”: American policy on German rearmament, 1950’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12, 1 (2001), pp. 135–60, especially pp. 137 and 141–3 (Acheson quotation p. 141).
84. Quoted in Kai Bird, The chairman. John J. McCloy and the making of the American establishment (New York, 1992), p. 337.
85. Thus Richard J. Aldrich, ‘OSS, CIA and European unity: the American Committee on United Europe, 1948–60’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 8, 1 (1997), pp. 184–227. I thank David Gioe for this reference.
86. See Arch Puddington, Broadcasting freedom. The Cold War triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington, 2001), pp. 73–4, on the importance on the Munich location, and Scott Lucas, Freedom’s war. The American crusade against the Soviet Union (Manchester, 1999), especially p. 81 on Germany as the hub of psychological warfare.
87. Volker R. Berghahn, America and the intellectual cold wars in Europe. Shepard Stone between philanthropy, academy, and diplomacy (Princeton and Oxford, 2001), pp. 108–51.
88. See Samuel Moyn, The last Utopia. Human rights in history (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 2010), pp. 78–9 on this.
89. Alan S. Milward, The United Kingdom and the European Community. Vol. I: The rise and fall of a national strategy (London, 2002).
90. See A. W. Lovett, ‘The United States and the Schuman Plan. A study in French diplomacy, 1950–1952’, Historical Journal, 39, 2 (1996), pp. 425–55.
91. See Kevin Ruane, The rise and fall of the European Defence Community. Anglo-American relations and the crisis of European defence, 1950–55 (Basingstoke, 2000).
92. Thus Gillingham, European integration, pp. 29–30.
93. See Vladislav Zubok, ‘The Soviet Union and European integration from Stalin to Gorbachev’, Journal of European Integration History, 2, 1 (1996), pp. 85–98, especially pp. 85–8.
94. Quoted in Christoph Bluth, The two Germanies and military security in Europe (Basingstoke, 2002), p. 13.
95. Thus Dirk Spilker, The East German leadership and the division of Germany: patriotism and propaganda, 1945–53 (Oxford, 2006).
96. See Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German politician and statesman in a period of war, revolution and reconstruction. Vol. I: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876–1952 (Providence and Oxford, 1995), pp. 649–63.
97. For these Cold War imperatives see Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies, The myth of the eastern front. The Nazi–Soviet war in American popular culture (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 46–89.
98. Jeffrey Herf, Divided memory. The Nazi past in the two Germanys (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).
99. Quoted in Mark Kramer, ‘The early post-Stalin succession struggle and upheavals in east central Europe: internal–external linkages in Soviet policy making’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 1, 1 (1999), p. 12.
100. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful adversaries. Grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, 1996).
101. See William B. Pickett, Eisenhower decides to run. Presidential politics and Cold War strategy (Chicago, 2000), pp. 213–15 (quotation p. 182).
102. Quoted in Steven Casey, Selling the Korean War. Propaganda, politics and public opinion in the United States, 1950–1953 (New York, 2008), p. 251.
103. For the role of foreign policy in Soviet high politics see Kramer, ‘Early post-Stalin succession struggle’, pp. 3–55. (Kramer seems to me too modest on the importance of foreign policy, p. 9, when his own evidence seems to suggest the opposite.) Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic (eds.), Khrushchev in the Kremlin. Policy and government in the Soviet Union, 1953–1964 (London and New York, 2011).
104. See Hubert Zimmermann, ‘The sour fruits of victory: sterling and security in Anglo-German relations during the 1950s and 1960s’, Contemporary European History, 9, 2 (2000), pp. 225–43.
105. On the centrality of Germany to British economic strategy see Geoffrey Owen, From Empire to Europe. The decline and revival of British industry since the Second World War (London, 1999), pp. 30–56 and passim.
106. On this see Lawrence Black, ‘“The bitterest enemies of communism”: Labour revisionists, Atlanticism and the Cold War’, Contemporary British History, 15, 3 (2001), pp. 26–62, especially pp. 27–8.
107. Quoted in ibid., p. 34.
108. Martin Ceadel, ‘British parties and the European situation, 1952–1957’, in Ennio di Nolfo (ed.), Power in Europe? II. Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the origins of the EEC, 1952–1957 (Berlin and New York, 1992), pp. 309–32.
109. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the end of the Cold War. Implications, reconsiderations, provocations (Oxford, 1992), p. 73.
110. Quoted in László Borhi, ‘Rollback, liberation, containment or inaction? U.S. policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 1, 3 (1999), pp. 67–110 (quotations p. 68).
111. See Ian Johnson, A mosque in Munich. Nazis, the CIA, and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the west (New York, 2010).
112. See Kevin Ruane, ‘Agonizing reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the crisis of European defence, 1953–54’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 13, 4 (2002), pp. 151–85 (quotations pp. 151, 153, 156–7 and 172).
113. The importance of anti-German sentiment is emphasized by Arnold Kanter, ‘The European Defense Community in the French National Assembly: a roll call analysis’, Comparative Politics, 2, 2 (1970), pp. 206, 212 and passim.
114. See Anne Deighton, ‘The last piece of the jigsaw: Britain and the creation of the western European Union, 1954’, Contemporary European History, 7, 2 (1998), pp. 181–96.
115. See Martin Schaad, ‘Plan G – a “counterblast”? British policy towards the Messina countries, 1956’, Contemporary European History 7, 1 (1998), pp. 39–60, passim (quotation p. 46).
116. Quoted in Lafeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, p. 178.
117. Thus Dieter Krüger, Sicherheit durch Integration? Die wirtschaftliche und politische Integration Westeuropas 1947 bis 1957/58 (Oldenbourg, 2003), p. 514 and passim.
118. See William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War. The global campaign to isolate East Germany, 1949–1969 (Chapel Hill and London, 2003).
119. Quoted in Sergei N. Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the creation of a superpower (University Park, Pa, 2000), p. 63.
120. Quoted in Ira Chernus, Apocalypse management. Eisenhower and the discourse of national insecurity (Stanford, 2008), p. 141.
121. Quoted in Mohamed Heikal, Sphinx and commissar. The rise and fall of Soviet influence in the Arab world (London, 1978), p. 65.
122. See Robert W. Heywood, ‘West European Community and the Eurafrica concept in the 1950s’, Journal of European Integration, 4, 2 (1981), pp. 199–210.
123. Quoted in Ralph Dietl, ‘Suez 1956: a European intervention?’, Journal of Contemporary History, 43, 2 (2008), pp. 259–78 (quotation p. 261).
124. See John C. Campbell, ‘The Soviet Union, the United States, and the twin crises of Hungary and Suez’, in William Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), Suez 1956. The crisis and its consequences (Oxford, 1989), pp. 233–53.
125. See Simon C. Smith (ed.), Reassessing Suez 1956. New perspectives on the crisis and its aftermath (London, 2008).
126. See Diane B. Kunz, The economic diplomacy of the Suez crisis (Chapel Hill and London, 1991), especially pp. 113–14 and 192–3.
127. See W. R. Louis, ‘Public enemy number one: the British Empire in the dock at the United Nations, 1957–1971’, in Martin Lynn (ed.), The British Empire in the 1950s. Retreat or revival? (Basingstoke, 2006).
128. Quoted in Kenneth O. Morgan, Britain since 1945. The people’s peace (Oxford, 1990), p. 158.
129. Quoted in Schaad, ‘Plan G – a “counterblast”?’, p. 50.
130. See Yinghong Cheng, ‘Beyond Moscow-centric interpretation: an examination of the China connection in eastern Europe and North Vietnam during the era of de-Stalinisation’, Journal of World History, 15, 4 (2004), pp. 487–518, especially pp. 489, 492–3 and 496 (quotation p. 489).
131. Thus Martin Thomas, The French North African crisis. Colonial breakdown and Anglo-French relations, 1945–1962 (Basingstoke, 2000).
132. See Vladislav Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin crisis (1958–1962), Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 6 (Washington, DC, 1993), p. 8. For the centrality of Germany to Khrushchev see p. 3.
133. Quoted in Nicholas Thompson, The hawk and the dove. Paul Nitze, George Kennan and the history of the Cold War (New York, 2009), p. 175.
134. Quoted in Richard Immerman, John Foster Dulles. Piety, pragmatism, and power in U.S. foreign policy (Wilmington, 1999), p. 188.
135. See Andrea Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian relations and the turn to Europe, 1961–1972 (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 26–41.
136. Quoted in Frank A. Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy. A study in German– American relations, 1961–1963 (Basingstoke, 1996), p. 96.
137. For an upbeat revisionist view of the military situation in the early 1960s see Mark Moyar, Triumph forsaken. The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge, 2006).
138. Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s wars. Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (Oxford, 2000).
139. Thus David Kaiser, ‘Men and policies’, in Diane B. Kunz (ed.), The diplomacy of the crucial decade (New York, 1994), pp. 11–41, especially pp. 23–9.
140. Höhn and Klimke, A breath of freedom, p. 95.
141. Quoted in Zubok, Khrushchev and the Berlin crisis, p. 25.
142. Quoted in Gordon S. Barrass, The Great Cold War. A journey through the hall of mirrors (Stanford, 2009), p. 131.
143. See Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the wall. Soviet–East German relations, 1953–1961 (Princeton, 2005).
144. Quoted in Robert Cottrell, ‘L’homme Nikita’, New York Review of Books, 1.5.2003, pp. 32–5 (quotation p. 33).
145. Quoted in Tony Judt, ‘On the brink’, New York Review of Books, 15.1.1998, quotation p. 55.
146. Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, We now know. Rethinking Cold War history (Oxford, 1997), p. 277. On the crisis more generally see Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, ‘One hell of a gamble’. Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy, and the Cuban missile crisis, 1958–1964 (London and New York, 1997).
147. See Hope M. Harrison, Ulbricht and the concrete ‘Rose’. New archival evidence on the dynamics of Soviet–East German relations and the Berlin crisis, 1958–61, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 5 (Washington, DC, 1993), p. 59.
148. According to the former US diplomat W. R. Smyser quoted in Gregor Peter Schmitz, ‘The day Berlin was divided’, Spiegel International, 30.10.2009: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-day-berlin-was-divided-kennedy-surprised-by-such-strong-american-outrage-to-the-wall-a-658349.html.
149. See Frédéric Bozo, Two strategies for Europe. De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic alliance (Lanham and Boulder, 2001), and Jeffrey Glen Giauque, Grand designs and visions of unity. The Atlantic powers and the reorganization of western Europe, 1955–1963 (Chapel Hill and London, 2002).
150. See Frank Costigliola, ‘The failed design: Kennedy, de Gaulle, and the struggle for Europe’, Diplomatic History, 8, 3 (1984), pp. 227–52.
151. See Matthias Schulz, ‘Integration durch eine europäische Atomstreitmacht? Nuklearambitionen und die deutsche Europa-Initiative vom Herbst 1964’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 53, 2 (2005), p. 286.
152. See Eckart Conze, ‘Hegemonie durch Integration? Die amerikanische Europapolitik und ihre Herausforderung durch de Gaulle’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 43 (1995), pp. 297–340.
153. Thus Francis J. Gavin, ‘The myth of flexible response: United States strategy in Europe during the 1960s’, International History Review, 23, 4 (2001), 847–75, especially pp. 848, 862–5.
154. Ibid., p. 869. See also Marc Trachtenberg, A constructed peace. The making of the European settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, 1999) pp. 382–98, which sees the atomic inferiority of West Germany through the NPT as the completion of the post-war settlement.
155. Quotations in Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe. In the shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), p. 44.
156. Quotations in Frank Costigiola, ‘The Vietnam War and the challenges to American power in Europe’, in Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger (eds.), International perspectives on Vietnam (College Station, Texas, 2000), pp. 146–7 and 151.
157. Daniel Kosthorst, ‘Sowjetische Geheimpolitik in Deutschland? Chruschtschow und die Adschubej-Mission 1964’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 44 (1996), pp. 257–94.
158. See Susanna Schrafstetter, Die dritte Atommacht. Britische Nichtverbreitungspolitik im Dienst von Statussicherung und Deutschlandpolitik, 1952–1968 (Munich, 1999), pp. 224, 234–6.
159. See Paul du Quenoy, ‘The role of foreign affairs in the fall of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964’, International History Review, 25, 2 (2003), pp. 334–56 (quotations pp. 339 and 351), and James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s double bind. International pressures and domestic coalition politics (Baltimore and London, 1994).
160. See R. D. Johnson, All the way with LBJ. The 1964 presidential election (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 77–90 and 124–5. I am very grateful to Andrew Preston for this reference.
161. Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the color line. American race relations in the global arena (Cambridge, Mass., 2001).
162. See Clifford G. Gaddy, The price of the past. Russia’s struggle with the legacy of a militarized economy (Washington, DC, 1997).
163. Thus Martin Malia, The Soviet tragedy. A history of socialism in Russia, 1917–1991 (New York, 1994).
164. See James Sheehan, The monopoly of violence. Why Europeans hate going to war (London, 2008).
165. See Thomas A. Schwartz, ‘The de Gaulle challenge: the Johnson administration and the NATO crisis of 1966–1967’, in Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stephen F. Szabo and Samuel F. Wells Jnr (eds.), The strategic triangle. France, Germany, and the United States in the shaping of the new Europe (Baltimore, 2006), p. 133.
166. See Fredrik Logevall, Choosing war. The lost chance for peace and the escalation of war in Vietnam (Berkeley, 1999), especially pp. 375–498.
167. See Mark Atwood Lawrence, Assuming the burden. Europe and the American commitment to war in Vietnam (Berkeley, 2007). Quotation in Costigiola, ‘Vietnam War and the challenges to American power in Europe’, p. 148.
168. See Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe. In the shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass., 2003).
169. See Saki Dockrill, Britain’s retreat from east of Suez. The choice between Europe and the world? (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 196–7 and 218–19.
170. Helen Parr, ‘Saving the community: the French response to Britain’s second EEC application in 1967’, Cold War History, 6, 4 (2006), pp. 425–54.
171. Quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s name. Germany and the divided continent (London, 1993), p. 54.
172. See Frédéric Bozo, ‘Détente versus alliance: France, the United States and the politics of the Harmel Report (1964–1968)’, Contemporary European History, 7, 3 (1998), pp. 343–60.
173. On the international nature of 1968, and the centrality of the Vietnam War, see Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker (eds.), 1968. The world transformed (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 8–18 and passim, and R. Gildea, James Mark and Niek Pas, ‘European radicals and the “Third World”: imagined solidarities and radical networks, 1958–73’, Cultural and Social History, 8 (2011), pp. 449–72.
174. Quoted in Hans Kundnani, Utopia or Auschwitz. Germany’s 1968 generation and the Holocaust (London, 2009), p. 64.
175. On the link between the German and American movements see Martin Klimke, The other alliance. Student protest in West Germany and the United States in the global sixties (Princeton, 2010).
176. Quoted in Kundnani, Utopia or Auschwitz, pp. 42 and 45.
177. Thus Dan Diner, America in the eyes of the Germans. An essay on anti-Americanism (Princeton, 1996), pp. 105–50.
178. See William Burr, ‘Sino-American relations, 1969: the Sino-Soviet border war and steps towards rapprochement’, Cold War History, 1, 3 (2001), pp. 73–112, especially pp. 87 and 104.
179. I follow here the analysis of John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Rescuing choice from circumstance. The statecraft of Henry Kissinger’, in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), The diplomats, 1939–1979 (Princeton, 1994), pp. 564–92 (the phrase ‘authoritarian purposefulness’ is on p. 571).
180. Quoted in G. R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States strategic policy, 1890–1987 (Brighton, 1988), p. 173.
181. See Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer (eds.), Ostpolitik, 1969–1974. European and global responses (Cambridge, 2009).
182. Quoted in Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), p. 735.
183. See Jussi Hanhimäki, The flawed architect. Henry Kissinger and American foreign policy (Oxford, 2004), pp. 85–90.
184. Quoted in Gordon S. Barrass, The Great Cold War. A journey through the hall of mirrors (Stanford, 2009), p. 169.
185. Quoted in H. G. Linke (ed.), Quellen zu den deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen. Vol. II: 1945–1991 (Darmstadt, 1999), p. 146.
186. Quoted in William Bundy, A tangled web. The making of foreign policy in the Nixon presidency (New York, 1998), p. 321.
187. Thus Mary E. Sarotte, Dealing with the devil. East Germany, détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973 (Chapel Hill, 2001), pp. 109–11.
188. Thus Garton Ash, In Europe’s name.
189. Quoted in Kundnani, Utopia or Auschwitz, p. 90.
190. See Jeremy Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American century (Cambridge, Mass., 2007), pp. 171–2.
191. Niklas H. Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the rebirth of the special relationship. Britain, the US and the EC, 1969–74 (Basingstoke, 2009).
192. See Jenna Phillips, ‘Don’t mention the war? History suggests foreign policy can swing voters’, History and Policy, 22.4.2010, pp. 2–3.
193. Brian Harrison, Finding a role? The United Kingdom, 1970–1990 (Oxford, 2010), pp. 20–38.
194. See Keith Hamilton, ‘Britain, France, and America’s year of Europe, 1973’, in Stone and Otte (eds.), Anglo-French relations, pp. 237–62.
195. For an inside view from the Kremlin see Victor Israelyan, ‘The October 1973 war: Kissinger in Moscow’, Middle East Journal, 49 (1995), pp. 248–68.
196. Quoted in ‘Z’, ‘The year of Europe? ’, Foreign Affairs, 52, 2 (January 1974).
1. Quoted in A. James McAdams, ‘The new diplomacy of the West German Ostpolitik’, in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), The diplomats, 1939–1979 (Princeton, 1994), p. 559.
2. Quoted in Tony Smith, America’s mission. The United States and the worldwide struggle for democracy in the twentieth century (Princeton, 1994), p. 266.
3. Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Le Nouvel Observateur, 15–21.1.1998.
4. See Norman Stone, The Atlantic and its enemies. A personal history of the Cold War (London, 2010), chapter 19, ‘The Kremlin consolations’, pp. 353–81.
5. Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War. From the October Revolution to the fall of the Wall (New Haven and London, 2011), p. 304.
6. Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the politics of nuclear weapons in Europe, 1969–87. The problem of the SS-20 (Basingstoke, 1989), p. 76.
7. See Michael Ploetz, ‘Mit RAF, Roten Brigaden und Action Directe – Terrorismus und Rechtsextremismus in der Strategie von SED und KPdSU’, Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat, 22 (2007), pp. 117–44.
8. See Christopher Andrew, The world was going our way. The KGB and the battle for the Third World (New York, 2005).
9. See Paolo Filo della Torre, Edward Mortimer and Jonathan Story (eds.), Eurocommunism. Myth or reality? (Harmondsworth, 1979).
10. Quoted in Odd Arne Westad, The global Cold War. Third World interventions and the making of our times (Cambridge, 2005), p. 245.
11. The centrality of the Soviet conventional threat is stressed in Christoph Bluth, The two Germanies and military security in Europe (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 99–106, 227 and passim. For contemporary perceptions of the crushing Soviet conventional superiority see Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet strategic culture. Implications for limited nuclear options (Santa Monica, 1977), pp. 23–4.
12. See Aryeh Neier, Taking liberties. Four decades in the struggle for rights (New York, 2003), and Samuel Moyn, The last Utopia. Human rights in history (Cambridge, Mass., and London 2010).
13. See Thomas J. W. Probert, ‘The innovation of the Jackson–Vanik amendment’, in Brendan Simms and D. J. B. Trim (eds.), Humanitarian intervention. A history (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 323–42 (quotation p. 323). I have also benefited immensely from discussions with my doctoral student Jonathan Cook, who is writing a dissertation on Jackson.
14. Quoted in Clyde Haberman, ‘Decades later, Kissinger’s words stir fresh outrage among Jews’, The New York Times, 16.12.2010, which reviews the latest release of tapes from the Oval Office.
15. See Noam Kochavi, ‘Insights abandoned, flexibility lost: Kissinger, Soviet Jewish emigration, and the demise of détente’, Diplomatic History, 29, 3 (2005), pp. 503–29, especially pp. 521–2.
16. Thus Robert G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson. A life in politics (Seattle and London, 2000), pp. 251–3.
17. ‘Report by Mr Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council’, Bulletin of the European Communities, supplement 1/76 (1975), pp. 3, 5 and 11.
18. Quotations in Keith Hamilton, ‘Cold War by other means: British diplomacy and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975’, in Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (eds.), The making of détente. Eastern and western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75 (New York and London, 2008), pp. 169 and 172. See also Roger Beetham, ‘Observations on British diplomacy and the CSCE process’, British Scholar, III, 1 (2010), pp. 127–32. I thank Thomas Probert for this reference.
19. See William Korey, The promises we keep. Human rights, the Helsinki process, and American foreign policy (New York, 1993), p. xvii.
20. Quoted in Olav Njølstad, ‘The Carter administration and Italy: keeping the communists out of power without interfering’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 4, 3 (2002), pp. 56–94 (quotation p. 64).
21. Kenneth Maxwell, The making of Portuguese democracy (Cambridge, 1997).
22. See Donald Sassoon, One hundred years of socialism. The west European left in the twentieth century (London, 1996), especially chapter 21.
23. See Douglas Wass, Decline to fall. The making of British macro-economic policy and the 1976 IMF crisis (Oxford and New York, 2008).
24. Robin Harris (ed.), The collected speeches of Margaret Thatcher (London, 1997), p. 39. I am grateful to Matthew Jamison for this reference.
25. Quoted in Svetlana Savranskaya, ‘Human rights movement in the USSR after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and the reaction of Soviet authorities’, in Leopoldo Nuti (ed.), The crisis of détente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985 (London and New York, 2009), p. 29.
26. On Jackson’s role in influencing a later generation of ‘neo-conservatives’ see Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism. The biography of a movement (Cambridge, Mass., 2010).
27. See Klaus Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis. Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen (Berlin, 2005).
28. For the Cold War context see Maria Eleonora Guasconi, ‘Europe and the EMS challenge: old and new forms of European integration in the 1970s’, in Nuti (ed.), Crisis of détente in Europe, pp. 177–89, especially pp. 177–8 and 181.
29. Quoted in Oliver Bange, ‘ “Keeping détente alive”: inner-German relations under Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker, 1974–1982’, in Nuti (ed.), Crisis of détente in Europe, pp. 233–4.
30. See interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Le Nouvel Observateur, 15–21. 1.1998.
31. See Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the revolution. Iran and the world in the age of the ayatollahs (Oxford and New York, 2009), especially pp. 11–33 (quotations pp. 28, 18, 20 and 21). I thank my student Roseanna Ivory for many interesting discussions on the Iranian Revolution and its international ramifications.
32. See Enrico Fardella, ‘The Sino-American entente of 1978–1979 and its “baptism of fire” in Indochina’, in Max Guderzo and Bruna Bagnato (eds.), The globalization of the Cold War. Diplomacy and local confrontation. 1975–85 (London and New York, 2010), pp. 154–65, especially pp. 158–9.
33. Yaroslav Trofimov, The siege of Mecca. The forgotten uprising (London, 2007).
34. Quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, The long road to Baghdad. A history of U.S. foreign policy from the 1970s to the present (New York and London, 2008), p. 56.
35. See Odd Arne Westad, ‘The road to Kabul: Soviet policy on Afghanistan, 1978–1979’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), The fall of détente. Soviet–American relations during the Carter years (Oslo, 1997), especially pp. 134–5 on concerns that Amin might ‘turn to the west’.
36. Quoted in G. R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States strategic policy, 1890–1987 (Brighton, 1988), p. 191.
37. See Jeffrey Herf, War by other means. Soviet power, West German resistance, and the battle of the Euromissiles (New York, 1991), and Thomas Risse-Kappen, Zero option. INF, West Germany, and arms control (Boulder and London, 1988).
38. See David Skidmore, Reversing course. Carter’s foreign policy, domestic politics and the failure of reform (Nashville and London, 1996), pp. 52–83.
39. For a sceptical view on the domestic importance of foreign policy see Richard Melanson, American foreign policy since the Vietnam War. The search for consensus from Nixon to Clinton (Armonk and London, 1996), p. 134.
40. See Mark A. Kramer, ‘Poland, 1980–81. Soviet policy during the Polish crisis’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, issue 5 (Spring, 1995), pp. 118–23.
41. Quoted in Raymond L. Garthoff, The great transition. American–Soviet relations and the end of the Cold War (Washington, DC, 1994), p. 8.
42. Quoted in Smith, America’s mission, p. 303.
43. Quoted in ‘Obituary: Lord Blaker’, The Times, 9.7.2009, p. 57.
44. See Lawrence Freedman, The official history of the Falklands campaign, 2 vols. (London, 2005).
45. Thus A. F. K. Organski, The $36 billion bargain. Strategy and politics in US assistance to Israel (New York, 1990), p. 204.
46. Quoted in Beatrice Heuser, ‘The Soviet response to the Euromissiles crisis’, in Nuti (ed.), Crisis of détente in Europe, p. 144. For Soviet concerns about the Bundeswehr see p. 143.
47. On Soviet penetration of the British Labour Party and trade union movement see the articles by Pavel Stroilov, ‘Reaching through the Iron Curtain’ (based on the diaries of the Soviet International Department official Antoly Chernyaev), and Gerald Kaufman, ‘How my party was betrayed by KGB boot-lickers’, in the section ‘Labour and the Soviets’, Spectator, 7.11.2009, pp. 14–17.
48. See Peter J. Westwick, ‘The Strategic Offense Initiative? The Soviets and Star Wars’, Physics Today, 61, 6 (June 2008), p. 45.
49. On the European response to SDI see Sean N. Kalic, ‘Reagan’s SDI announcement and the European reaction: diplomacy in the last decade of the Cold War’, in Nuti (ed.), Crisis of détente in Europe, pp. 99–110.
50. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, 1993), p. 548. For the centrality of security to Thatcher’s view of Europe see Hugo Young, The blessed plot. Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 306–74, especially pp. 310 and 358.
51. Thus the brutal summary of Richard Hellie, ‘The structure of Russian imperial history’, History and Theory, 44, 4 (2005), p. 107.
52. Quoted in Amin Saikal and William Maley (eds.), The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge, 1989), p. 13.
53. See now Rodric Braithwaite, Afgantsy. The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89 (London, 2011), especially pp. 121–24.
54. On this see Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon averted. The Soviet collapse, 1970–2000 (Oxford, 2001), and Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika. New thinking for our country and the world (London, 1987), p. 19 and passim.
55. Quoted in Vladislav M. Zubok, ‘Why did the Cold War end in 1989? Explanations of “the turn” ’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, interpretations, theory (London, 2000), p. 347.
56. See Boris Meissner, Vom Sowjetimperium zum eurasischen Staatensystem. Die russische Aussenpolitik im Wandel und in der Wechselbeziehung zur Innenpolitik (Berlin, 1995), pp. 37–66.
57. Quoted in Vladimir Shlapentokh, ‘A normal system? False and true explanations for the collapse of the USSR’, The Times Literary Supplement, 15.12.2000, p. 12.
58. On this see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The international sources of Soviet change’, International Security, 16, 3 (1991–2), pp. 105–6.
59. Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, ‘1989: History is rewritten’, in S. Pons and F. Romero (eds.), Reinterpreting the end of the Cold War. Issues, interpretations, periodizations (London and New York, 2005), pp. 165–78 (quotations p. 167).
60. ‘Memorandum from Anatoly Chernyaev to Aleksandr Yakovlev on Germany and eastern Europe’, 10.3.1986, in Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton and Vladislav Zubok (eds.), Masterpieces of history. The peaceful end of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest and New York, 2010), pp. 222–3.
61. See ‘Record of conversation between Aleksandr Yakovlev and Zbigniew Brzezinski’, 31.10.1989, in Savranskaya, Blanton and Zubok (eds.), Masterpieces of history, pp. 566–7.
62. On ‘Gorbymania’ see Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the Cold War’, International Organization, 48, 2 (1994), pp. 185–214 (pp. 206–7).
63. This formed an important sub-plot in the Historikerstreit of the mid-1980s. See Mark Bassin, ‘Geopolitics of the Historikerstreit: the strange return of the Mittellage’, in Jost Hermand and James Steakley (eds.), Heimat, nation, fatherland. The German sense of belonging (New York etc., 1996), pp. 187–228, especially pp. 191–4.
64. Erhard Busek and Emil Brix, Projekt Mitteleuropa (Vienna, 1986). For a discussion of the political significance see Robin Okey, ‘Central Europe/eastern Europe: behind the definitions’, Past and Present, 137 (1992), pp. 127–9.
65. Yitzhak M. Brudny, Reinventing Russia. Russian nationalism and the Soviet state, 1953–1991 (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).
66. Quoted in Zubok, ‘Why did the Cold War end in 1989?’, p. 349.
67. See Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and his reforms, 1985–90 (New York and London, 1990), p. 9.
68. See here ‘The new democratic revolution’, in ibid., pp. 192–3.
69. Thus Eduard Schewardnadse, Als der eiserne Vorhang zerriss. Begegnungen und Erinnerungen (Duisburg, 2007), pp. 76–8.
70. See Stephen Wall, A stranger in Europe. Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair (Oxford, 2008).
71. See, for example, Baroness Young (Minister of State) at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Third Mackinder Lecture, printed in Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 12, 4 (1987), pp. 391–7, especially p. 393.
72. As quoted in the released Soviet record of a meeting in September 1989, before the fall of the Berlin Wall: Andrew Roberts, ‘Why Thatcher feared Germany’, Sunday Telegraph, 13.9.2009, p. 22.
73. Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko (eds.), The end of the Cold War and the Third World. New perspectives on regional conflict (London and New York, 2011).
74. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda. Casting a shadow of terror (London, 2004).
75. Abdullah Azzam, ‘The solid base’, April 1988, extracts in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds.), Al Qaeda in its own words (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), pp. 140–43 (quotation p. 143).
76. Thus Fawaz A. Gerges, The far enemy. Why jihad went global (Cambridge, 2005).
77. Quoted in Sakwa, Gorbachev and his reforms, pp. 134–5.
78. See Charles S. Maier, Dissolution. The crisis of communism and the end of East Germany (Princeton, 1997).
79. Quoted in Douglas A. Borer, Superpowers defeated. Vietnam and Afghanistan compared (London and Portland, 1999), p. 220.
80. Thus William E. Odom, The collapse of the Soviet military (New Haven, 1998).
81. For the centrality of Germany see Jeffrey A. Engel (ed.), The fall of the Berlin Wall. The revolutionary legacy of 1989 (Oxford, 2009), pp. 52–64, 69, 83–6, 140–41 and passim; and Harold James and Marla Stone (eds.), When the Wall came down. Reactions to German unification (London, 1993).
82. Quoted in Daniel Johnson, ‘Seven minutes that shook the world’, Standpoint, November 2009, p. 41.
83. Quoted in George R. Urban, Diplomacy and disillusion at the court of Margaret Thatcher. An insider’s view (London and New York, 1996), pp. 118–50 (especially p. 136).
84. See Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany unified and Europe transformed: a study in statecraft (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), and Robert L. Hutchings, American diplomacy and the end of the Cold War: an insider’s account of US policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC, Baltimore and London).
85. Quoted in Michael Cox and Steven Hurst, ‘ “His finest hour?” George Bush and the diplomacy of German unification’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 13, 4 (2002), p. 135.
86. The centrality of Germany, and the Soviet desperation, is emphasized in George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A world transformed (New York, 1998), pp. 182–203, 253, 280–81 (quotation) and passim.
87. See Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the highest levels. The inside story of the end of the Cold War (Boston, 1993), pp. 185–6.
88. David Cox, Retreating from the Cold War. Germany, Russia and the withdrawal of the Western Group of forces (London, 1996).
89. Angela Stent, ‘From Rapallo to reunification: Russia and Germany in the twentieth century’, in Sanford R. Lieberman, David E. Powell, Carol R. Saivetz and Sarah M. Terry (eds.), The Soviet Empire reconsidered. Essays in honour of Adam B. Ulam (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford, 1994).
90. Quoted in Cox and Hurst, ‘ “His finest hour?” ’, p. 140.
91. Stephen F. Frowen and Jens Hölscher (eds.), The German currency union of 1990. A critical assessment (Basingstoke, 1997).
92. Anthony Glees, ‘The diplomacy of Anglo-German relations: a study of the ERM crisis of September 1992’, German Politics, 3 (1994), pp. 75–90.
93. See Ulrich Schlie, ‘Die ersten fünf Jahre der Wiedervereinigung: von außen betrachtet – eine Bücherauslese’, Die neue Ordnung, 49, 6 (1995), pp. 474–80; Manfred Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart (Frankfurt am Main, 2004); Christian Hacke, Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schröder, 2nd edn (Berlin, 2004); and Eckart Conze, Die Suche nach Sicherheit. Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1949 bis in die Gegenwart (Munich, 2009).
94. See Arthur Hertzberg, ‘Is anti-semitism dying out?’, New York Review of Books, 24.6.1993, pp. 51–7, especially p. 56.
95. For the refusal of Germany to conform to the ‘academic scare stories’ see Jan Müller, ‘The old questions and the German Revolution’, Contemporary European History, 7, 2 (1998), pp. 271–84.
96. On the structural weakness of German federalism and the economy after 1990 see Helmut Wiesenthal, ‘German unification and “Model Germany”: an adventure in institutional conservatism’, West European Politics, 26, 4 (2003), pp. 37–58.
97. See Christopher Hill, ‘The European dimension of the debate on UN Security Council membership’, The International Spectator, XL, 4 (2005), pp. 31–2. For the new Germany’s ‘internal culture of restraint and reticence’ despite its ‘enormous and increasing structural power’ see Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, The German predicament. Memory and power in the new Europe (Ithaca, 1997), pp. xiii and 3.
98. Gregor Schöllgen, Angst vor der Macht. Die Deutschen und ihre Aussenpolitik (Berlin, 1993).
99. The phrase is in a RAND study in the summer of 1990: Ronald D. Asmus, German strategy and opinion after the Wall, 1990–1993 (Santa Monica, 1994), p. 61.
100. James Gow, The Serbian project and its adversaries. A strategy of war crimes (Montreal, 2003), and Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, Bosnia remade. Ethnic cleansing and its reversal (Oxford, 2011).
101. See Leon Aron, Boris Yeltsin. A revolutionary life (London, 2000), pp. 440–93.
102. See Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, ‘Germany and the Iraq conflict’, in Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper (eds.), Western Europe and the Gulf. A study of West European reactions to the Gulf War (Paris, 1992), pp. 39–69, especially pp. 39–43.
103. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh (eds.), The Gulf conflict 1990–1991. Diplomacy and war in the New World Order (London, 1993); Alex Danchev and Dan Keohane (eds.), International perspectives on the Gulf conflict, 1990–1991 (London, 1994).
104. For a contemporary survey of this debate, with particular emphasis on the centrality of Germany, see Josef Joffe, ‘Collective security and the future of Europe: failed dreams and dead ends’, Survival, 34, 1 (1992), pp. 36–50.
105. On the ‘French alternative’ see Kori Schake, ‘NATO after the Cold War, 1991–1995: institutional competition and the collapse of the French alternative’, Contemporary European History, 7, 3 (1998), pp. 379–407 (p. 380).
106. D. Allen, ‘Wider but weaker or the more the merrier? Enlargement and foreign policy cooperation in the EC/EU’, in J. Redmond and G. G. Rosenthal (eds.), The expanding European Union. Past, present, future (Boulder, 1998).
107. See Ludger Kühnhardt, ‘The fall of the Berlin Wall and European integration’, pp. 47–60; http://www.kas.de/upload/Publikationen/Panorama/2009/1/kuehnhardt.pdf.
108. As recollected by Helmut Kohl, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin, 1996), pp. 194–201.
109. Quoted in Schake, ‘NATO after the Cold War’, p. 387.
110. Quoted in Jacques E. C. Hymans, ‘Judgment at Maastricht’, The Harvard Crimson, 4.12.1991.
111. See James Gow, Triumph of the lack of will. International diplomacy and the Yugoslav war (London, 1997), and Josip Glaurdić, The hour of Europe. Western powers and the breakup of Yugoslavia (New Haven and London, 2011).
112. See Brendan Simms, Unfinest hour. Britain and the destruction of Bosnia (London, 2001).
113. I base myself here on the unpublished thesis of Caoimhe ni Chonchuir, ‘French policy towards Bosnia, 1992–1995’ (Cambridge University M. Phil. dissertation, 2008).
114. See Richard Caplan, ‘The European Community’s recognition of new states in Yugoslavia: the strategic implications’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 21, 3 (1998), pp. 24–45.
115. See Takis Michas, Unholy alliance. Greece and Milošević’s Serbia (College Station, Texas, 2002).
116. For the ‘China debate’ of the mid-1990s see Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The coming conflict with China (New York, 1997). For the eastward turn in Washington and NATO see Philip H. Gordon, ‘Recasting the Atlantic alliance’, Survival, 38, 1 (1996), pp. 32–57.
117. Quoted in Smith, America’s mission, p. 325. Clinton was speaking in January 1994.
118. See Niall Ferguson and Brigitte Granville, ‘ “Weimar on the Volga”. Causes and consequences of inflation in 1990s Russia compared with 1920s Germany’, Journal of Economic History, 60, 4 (2000), pp. 1061–87.
119. Quoted in David Kerr, ‘The new Eurasianism: the rise of geopolitics in Russia’s foreign policy’, Europe–Asia Studies, 47, 6 (1995), p. 986.
120. For fears about NATO enlargement in the Bosnian context see Hans-Joachim Hoppe, ‘Moscow and the conflicts in former Yugoslavia’, Aussenpolitik, 43, 3 (1997), pp. 267–77, especially p. 277.
121. Yevgeny Primakov, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, and Yeltsin (speaking in September 1995) are quoted in Peter Truscott, Russia First. Breaking with the west (London and New York, 1997), pp. 48–9.
122. See John Dunlop and Anatol Lieven, Chechnya. Tombstone of Russian power (New Haven, 1998).
123. Quoted in Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton. The making of America’s Bosnia policy (Washington, DC, 2000), p. 10.
124. Václav Havel, ‘A new European order?’ New York Review of Books, 2.3.1995, p. 43.
125. See James Goldgeier, Not whether but when. The U.S. decision to enlarge NATO (Washington, DC, 1999), and Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s door. How the alliance remade itself for a new era (New York, 2002).
126. See John W. Young, Britain and European unity, 1945–1999, 2nd edn (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 150–74.
127. Though the Conservative divisions over Europe played a role: see Christopher Stevens, ‘Thatcherism, Majorism and the collapse of Tory statecraft’, Contemporary British History, 16, 1 (2002), pp. 119–50, especially p. 139.
128. Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the breakup of Yugoslavia. A political failure in search of a scholarly explanation (The Hague and London, 2000).
129. A National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement, The White House, February 1995, pp. 1, 2, 22, 25, 27, 30 and passim.
130. See also Oliver Daddow, New Labour and the European Union. Blair and Brown’s logic of history (Manchester and New York, 2011), especially pp. 1 and 12.
131. Quoted in Paul Gillespie, ‘History and geography rhyme for new Germany’, Irish Times, 8.11.1997.
132. Quoted in Brendan Simms, ‘From the Kohl to the Fischer Doctrine: Germany and the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession, 1991–1999’, German History, 21, 3 (2003), pp. 393–414 (quotation p. 414).
133. Thomas Diez, ‘Europe’s others and the return of geopolitics’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 2 (2004), pp. 319–35 (quotation p. 327).
134. See Christopher Hill, ‘The capability–expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe’s international role’, in Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott (eds.), Economic and political integration in Europe. Internal dynamics and global context (Oxford, 1994), especially pp. 104 (on Bosnia) and 116–17 (on ‘defence [as] the key to the development of the community’s place in the world’).
135. Quoted in Henrik Larsen, ‘The EU: a global military actor?’, Cooperation and Conflict. Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, 37, 3 (2002), pp. 283–302 (quotation p. 293).
136. See Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the west and the challenges of modernity (Leicester, 2001), p. 277.
137. Gilles Kepel, Allah in the west. Islamic movements in America and Europe (Oxford, 1997).
138. Quoted in Jonathan Bronitsky, British foreign policy and Bosnia. The rise of Islamism in Britain, 1992–1995, published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (London, 2010), p. 9.
139. Thus Ed Husain, The Islamist. Why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left (London, 2007), pp. 74–81 and passim.
140. Osama bin Laden, ‘Declaration of Jihad against the Americans occupying the land of the two Holy Sanctuaries’, in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (eds.), Al Qaeda in its own words (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), pp. 47–50.
141. There was, however, considerable doubt about this in the vast academic literature: Daniele Conversi, ‘Demo-skepticism and genocide’, Political Studies Review, 4 (2006), pp. 247–62, especially pp. 247 and 257.
142. Thus Gregor Schöllgen in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (eds.), Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik. Vol. IV: Institutionen und Ressourcen (Munich, 1998), p. 217.
143. See Rudolf Scharping, Wir dürfen nicht wegsehen. Der Kosovo-Krieg und Europa (Munich, 2001), p. 114.
144. Simms, ‘From the Kohl to the Fischer Doctrine’.
145. Chris Patten, ‘No more roses’, The Times Literary Supplement, 1.6.2007, p. 13.
146. Catherine Ashton, speech to European parliament, 3.3.2010.
147. For a contemporary analysis of this see Peter Riddell, ‘Europe must learn to defend itself. Military muscle would give the EU more diplomatic clout’, The Times, 28.6.1999, p. 20.
148. The centrality of Germany is stressed by Jolyon Howorth, ‘Discourse, ideas and epistemic communities in European security and defence policy’, West European Politics, 27 (2004), pp. 211–34 (p. 224).
149. Quoted in Hans Kundnani, Utopia or Auschwitz. Germany’s 1968 generation and the Holocaust (London, 2009), pp. 254–5. Joschka Fischer, ‘Vom Staatenbund zur Föderation: Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration’. Rede am 12. Mai 2000 in der Berliner Humboldt-Universität.
150. See James Rogers, ‘From “civilian power” to “global power”. Explicating the European Union’s “Grand Strategy” through the articulation of discourse theory’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 47, 4 (2009), pp. 831–62, and Jan Zielonka, Explaining Euro-paralysis. Why Europe is unable to act in international politics (Basingstoke and New York, 1998).
151. See Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ‘Why a Common Security and Defence Policy is bad for Europe’, Survival, 45, 4 (2003), pp. 193–206.
152. See Heinz Brill, ‘Geopolitische Motive und Probleme des europäischen Einigungsprozesses’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 32 (2008), pp. 41–6.
153. For example, Svitlana Kobzar, ‘The European Union’s impact on democratisation of Ukraine’, in David. Bosold, Petr Drulák and Nik Hynek (eds.), Democratization and security in central and eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states (Baden-Baden, 2012).
154. See Paul Lendvai, Inside Austria. New challenges, old demons (London, 2010), pp. 149–56.
155. See Giandomenico Majone, ‘Europe’s “democratic deficit”: the question of standards’, European Law Journal, 4, 1 (1998), pp. 5–28.
156. Deirdre Kevin, ‘Coverage of the European parliament elections of 1999: national public spheres and European debates’, Javnost – The Public, 8, 1 (2001), pp. 21–38.
157. See Philipp Borinski, ‘NATO towards double enlargement: the case of the Balkans’, Journal of European Integration, 24, 2 (2002), pp. 130–31.
158. See Alexander Rahr, Wladimir Putin. Der ‘Deutsche’ im Kreml (Munich, 2000).
159. See Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy (London, 2003), pp. 72–3 and 83–6, and Stephen Blank, ‘Russia’s unending quest for security’, in Mark Galeotti (ed.), The politics of security in modern Russia (Farnham, 2010), pp. 177–9.
160. Quoted in Kundnani, Utopia or Auschwitz, p. 268.
161. See from the perspective of ‘critical security studies’ J. Peter Burgess, The ethical subject of security. Geopolitical reason and the threat against Europe (London and New York, 2011), especially pp. 183 and 206–7.
162. ‘Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer during the European policy debate in the German Bundestag on 12 December 2001’.
163. For a critique see Tony Smith, A pact with the devil. Washington’s bid for world supremacy and the betrayal of the American promise (New York, 2007), a pentito among the new Wilsonians.
164. European Security Strategy, pp. 7–8: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime/r00004_en.htm.
165. See Romano Prodi, A wider Europe. Proximity as the key to stability, 6.12.02. For this new EU ‘security perimeter’ see Michael Smith, ‘The European Union and international order: European and global dimensions’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 12, 4 (2007), pp. 437–56 (especially p. 449).
166. Blair speech 2.10.2001.
167. Quoted in Kundnani, Utopia or Auschwitz, p. 284.
168. See Gregor Schöllgen, Der Auftritt. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne (Munich, 2003), and Joschka Fischer, ‘I am not convinced.’ Der Irak-Krieg und die rot-grünen Jahre (Cologne, 2011), especially pp. 169–225.
169. Derek Averre, ‘ “Sovereign democracy” and Russia’s relations with the European Union’, Demokratizatsiya, 15, 2 (2007), pp. 173–90, and Andrew Hurrell, ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?’, International Affairs, 82 (2006), pp. 1–19.
170. For example, Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st century (London and New York, 2005).
171. On this general issue see Andreas von Gehlen, ‘Two steps to European party democracy’, European View, 3 (2006), pp. 161–70.
172. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime/r00004_en.htm.
173. Thus Thomas C. Fischer, ‘An American looks at the European Union’, European Law Journal, 12, 2 (2006), pp. 226–78, especially p. 227.
174. See Glyn Morgan, The idea of a European superstate. Public justification and European integration (Princeton, 2005).
175. Quoted in International Herald Tribune, 4.3.2004.
176. See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, ‘Political Islam and foreign policy in Europe and the United States’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 3 (2007), pp. 345–67.
177. Christopher Hill, ‘Bringing war home: making foreign policy in multicultural societies’, International Relations, 21 (2007), pp. 259–83. For national cases see Sam Cherribi, In the house of war. Dutch Islam observed (Oxford, 2010), and Anthony McRoy, From Rushdie to 7/7. The radicalisation of Islam in Britain (London, 2006), pp. 50–67.
178. Barry Wain, Malaysian maverick. Mahathir Mohamad in turbulent times (Basingstoke, 2010).
179. See Menahem Milson, ‘A European plot on the Arab stage: the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in the Arab media’, Middle East Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis, 20.5.2011.
180. Thus the diagnosis of Hanns W. Maull, the foremost theoretician of ‘civilian power’, that ‘the new world situation requires a mobilization of society around a new primacy of foreign policy’: ‘Internationaler Terrorismus: die deutsche Aussenpolitik auf dem Prüfstand’, Internationale Politik, 56, 12 (2001), pp. 1–10.
181. See Samy Cohen (ed.), Democracies at war against terrorism. A comparative perspective (Basingstoke, 2008).
182. John McCain, speech in Stanford, California, 2.5.2007.
183. James Rubin, ‘Building a new Atlantic alliance: restoring America’s partnership with Europe’, Foreign Affairs, 87, 4 (2008), pp. 99–110 (quotations pp. 99 and 107). See also Andrew B. Denison, ‘Amerika kommt auf Deutschland zu’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 37–8 (2008), pp. 3–5.
184. Thus George Friedman, ‘The United States, Germany and beyond’, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 30.3.2009.
185. See Sergio Fabbrini, Compound democracies. Why the United States and Europe are becoming similiar (Oxford, 2010).
186. See Richard Youngs, Europe’s decline and fall. The struggle against global irrelevance (London, 2010).
1. Henry Kissinger, White House years (London, 1979), p. 54.