{76} {77} CHAPTER EIGHT

Webbed Toes

A web of flesh joining the toes together, an extra finger branching off from the hand—yes, they do indeed emerge from one’s own inborn nature,¹ but they are still extraneous to the intrinsic powers² of the hand and of the foot. A “dangling wart or swollen tumor”³—yes, they do indeed emerge from one’s own body, but they are still extraneous to the body’s inborn nature. And those who have excessive sidegrowths⁴ in their humankindness and sense of responsibility⁵ and then put these into action, yes, they can even be correlated to the five internal organs!⁶ But this is not the true and unskewed condition⁷ of the Course and its intrinsic powers.

For to web the toes together is to add useless flesh. To branch something off from the hand is to plant a useless finger. And when excessive sidegrowths are made to web together and branch from the uncontrived realities of the five organs, it leads to perverse and distorted applications of humankindness and responsibility, and even to excesses and sidegrowths of the powers of seeing and hearing. Such webbing of something extraneous to the power of seeing disrupts the five colors, and corrupts patterns and forms—is not the flashiness of the blue and yellow {78} embroideries on the ceremonial garments an example? But that is what people like Li Zhu⁸ really accomplish. Excessively sharp hearing disrupts the five notes and corrupts the six tones—are not the soundings of the Yellow Bell mode and Great Tube mode on the bells, chimes, strings, and woodwinds an example? But that is what people like Master Kuang⁹ really accomplish. Branching extensions of humankindness and responsible conduct uproot the intrinsic virtuosities and obstruct the inborn nature in exchange for a good name. Are not the trumpeted fanfares that drum everyone forward in pursuit of some unreachable standard an example? But that is what people like Zeng Shen and Shi Yu¹⁰ really accomplish. The excess webbings of disputational acumen lead to the manipulation of verbal phrases as if piling bricks or twining cords, sending the mind wandering around amid “hard” and “white,” “same,” and “different.” Are not all the useless discussions with their wearying stagger toward honor an example? But that is exactly what people like Yang Zhu and Mo Di¹¹ really accomplish.

All of these describe a course of excess webbings and side-branchings, not the true and unskewed condition of the world. To be truly unskewed¹² just means not to lose the uncontrived condition of the inborn nature and its allotment of life. In this, what is joined is not so because of extra webbing and what is branched is not so because of additions. The long is not excessive and the short is not deficient. The duck’s neck may be short, but lengthening it would surely pain him; the swan’s neck may be long, but cutting it short would surely grieve him.

When we see that what is long by inborn nature is not to be cut short and what is short by inborn nature is not to be lengthened, all the worries that go with trying to remove them disappear. So I have to surmise that humankindness and responsible conduct are not the uncontrived {79} condition of man! Otherwise, why do those “humane men” always look so wracked with worry? Put it this way: if the toes are webbed together, cutting them loose will draw tears, and if the extra finger branches off from the hand, uprooting it will cause weeping. Whether something is added or something is taken away, the sorrow is the same. These days the “humane men” gaze wide-eyed into the distance worrying about all the world’s troubles, while the inhumane men mutilate the uncontrived condition of their inborn nature and allotment of life by gorging themselves on wealth and rank. Thus do I surmise that humankindness and responsible conduct are not the uncontrived condition of man! For from the Three Dynasties on down, what a racket and rumpus the world has become!

Any rectification that requires hooks, ropes, compass, or T-square is really a hacking up of the inborn nature. Any consolidation that requires ropes, cords, or glues is really an invasive attack on the intrinsic powers. And bending and scraping before ritual and music, warmly eulogizing humankindness and responsible conduct “to comfort the hearts of everyone in this world”—all that is really just a way of destroying the normal and sustainable state of things.¹³ The normal and sustainable state of things is to curve without needing a hook, to be straight without needing a carpenter’s line, to be round without needing a compass, to be angled without needing a T-square, to be attached without needing glue, and bound together without needing cords.

All living beings in the world spring to life as if lured forth, not knowing how they are born. Obliviously they all come to have what they have somehow, without knowing how they do so. In this, past and present are alike, for this is something that can never be lacking. So what are humankindness and responsible conduct doing wandering around in the midst of the Course and its intrinsic powers, trying to fasten everything together as if with glue and knotted cords? All they do is cast the world into confusion. Now a small confusion is easily remedied, but a great confusion can alter the inborn nature. How do we know this? Ever since that Mr. Yu¹⁴ starting waving his humankindness and responsible conduct around to stir up the world, everyone has spurred his allotment of life to a gallop after these ideals—is this not altering the inborn nature by means of humankindness and responsible conduct?

Let me try explaining it. From the time of the Three Dynasties on down, everyone in the world has altered his inborn nature for the sake of some external thing. The petty man sacrifices himself for profit, the distinguished man sacrifices himself for fame, the noble man sacrifices himself for his clan, the sage sacrifices himself for the world. Though the goal to which each devotes himself may differ, along with the reputations thereby gained, all of them are the same in harming their inborn natures by sacrificing themselves to some external thing.

Goodie and Mealticket were herding sheep, and both of them lost their herds. Asked for the reason, Goodie said he was busy studying, while Mealticket said he was busy gambling. Though they devoted themselves to different goals, they were alike in losing their sheep. Now Bo Yi¹⁵ died in pursuit of fame at the foot of Mt. Shouyang, while Robber Zhi¹⁶ died in pursuit of profit at the top of {80} Mt. Dongling. They died for different things, but they were alike in damaging their lives and harming their inborn natures. So why must we say that Bo Yi was right and Robber Zhi was wrong? Everyone in the world is sacrificing himself for the sake of something or other. Those who do so for the sake of humankindness and responsible conduct are praised by the vulgar as noble men, while those who do so for the sake of wealth are condemned as petty men. But they are all alike in sacrificing themselves. So are there really any such things as “noble men” and “petty men”? In that they damage their lives and harm their inborn natures, Robber Zhi is no different from Bo Yi. Why should one be praised as a noble man and the other condemned as a petty man?

So to subordinate your inborn nature to humankindness and responsible conduct, even if you succeed like Zeng Shen and Shi Yu, is not what I call good.¹⁷ To subordinate your inborn nature to the five flavors, even if you succeed like Yu Er,¹⁸ is not what I call good. To subordinate your inborn nature to the five tones, even if you succeed like Master Kuang, is not what I call acute hearing. To subordinate your inborn nature to the five colors, even if you succeed like Li Zhu, is not what I call acute vision. What I call good is not humankindness and responsible conduct, but just being good at what is done by your own intrinsic virtuosities. Goodness, as I understand it, certainly does not mean humankindness and responsible conduct! It is just fully allowing the uncontrived condition of the inborn nature and allotment of life to play itself out. What I call sharp hearing is not hearkening to others, but rather hearkening to oneself, nothing more. What I call sharp vision is not looking to others, but rather looking to oneself, nothing more. For to see others without seeing oneself, to gain some external thing without finding oneself, is to find the success of others without finding one’s own success, “to take comfort in the comfort of others but not in your own comfort.”¹⁹ In taking their comfort in something other than their own comfort, Robber Zhi and Bo Yi are alike. Both perverted and distorted themselves. As for me, since I am not entirely shameless in the face of the Course and its intrinsic powers, I venture to engage in neither the lofty deeds of humankindness and responsible conduct nor in the debased practices of perversity and self-distortion.²⁰

¹. “Inborn nature” translates xing 性. This is the first appearance in our text of this term, so important in subsequent Chinese thought, notably absent from both the Inner Chapters and the Daodejing.

². “Intrinsic powers” translates De (“virtue”) when applied to something other than a human being. When applied to a human being, the same word is usually translated as “virtuosity” in the Inner Chapters, and “intrinsic virtuosity” in the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters. see Glossary.

³. The expression appears in Chapter 6, to which this is perhaps an allusion.

⁴. Reading pang 旁 for fang 方, following Ma Qichang.

⁵. Renyi. Elsewhere translated as “humankindness” and “responsible conduct,” among other things. see Glossary.

⁶. Liver, heart, spleen, lungs, and kidneys, which some thinkers were coming to correlate with the five cardinal Confucian virtues of humankindness, ritual, good faith, responsible conduct, and wisdom, respectively, thereby moralizing the natural world and naturalizing Confucian morality by rooting it in the nature of the body itself.

⁷. 正 zheng. see Glossary.

⁸. A paragon of sharp eyesight.

⁹. A paragon of musical skill.

¹⁰. A disciple of Confucius (teacher of Confucius’s grandson Zisi, who was the teacher of Mencius) and a historiographer of the state of Wei (mentioned approvingly, though perhaps with some reservations, in Analects 15:7), respectively, treated here as paragons of moral virtue.

¹¹. Yang Zhu is traditionally considered an advocate of extreme egoism, and Mo Di (i.e., Mozi, founder of the Mohists) an advocate of extreme altruism. Here both are taken as paragons of philosophical disputation. Compare Mencius 7A26.

¹². 正正者 zhengzhengzhe. For zheng, see Glossary.

¹³. 常然 Chang ran. For chang, see Glossary.

¹⁴. An irreverent way of referring to the ancient sage-emperor Shun, a Confucian paragon of perfect governance.

¹⁵. Another Confucian paragon of virtue, who, along with his brother Shu Qi, starved himself to death rather than eat the rice of the Zhou dynasty, which he disapproved of because to establish it the Zhou family had usurped its own ruler’s authority, by military force.

¹⁶. Stock example of extreme evil and lawlessness; see also Chapter 10. He stars in the eponymous Chapter 29 of this book.

¹⁷. 臧 zang, rather than the usual word used by Confucians such as Mencius to mean moral good, 善 shan.

¹⁸. Paragon of culinary discernment, apparently.

¹⁹. Cf. Chapter 6, p. 54, to which this is perhaps an allusion.

²⁰. The author rejects both so-called “good” and “evil” in favor of a position between them. This is typical of Chapters 8—11 and the first part of Chapter 12, and builds on a reading of the Daodejing, which this author often quotes. The original human nature is seen here as prior to the distinction between good and evil, but which, if undisturbed by “ideals” of goodness, functions naturally, lacking both moral turpitude and moral virtue. It can then be redefined as another kind of “good,” as here. See Chapter 9 for a fuller description of this author’s conception of “the inborn nature and its uncontrived condition.” The definitiveness of this specific nature is to be contrasted to the “lack of fixed identity” evoked by the Inner Chapters, and the idea of “neither good nor evil” is to be contrasted to the “both ‘good’ and ‘evil’” view set forth there, for example at the start of Chapter 3 (p. 29).