The first teams of the 1st SFGA arrived in Vietnam in late 1957. There had already been a US presence there since 1950 in the form of the US Military Assistance Advisory Group Indochina.
Vietnam was a country divided. With the defeat of the French Union forces by the Viet Minh (Communist Vietnam Independence League), the former French colony of Indochina (made up of the three semi-autonomous ‘countries’ of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) were given their independence by agreement to Geneva accords in 1954. Vietnam was divided into a Communist-controlled North Vietnam and a Western-oriented South Vietnam. A brief peace ensued, but it was not long before the Communist National Liberation Front and its military arm, the Viet Cong, made its presence known. They received support from North Vietnam in the form of limited amounts of supplies, weapons, and infiltrated cadre personnel.
Since 1957 SF had been training Vietnamese personnel at the Commando Training Center in Nha Trang. These men would eventually become the nucleus for the Vietnamese SF. Members of the 77th SFGA began training the first Vietnamese Ranger units shortly afterwards. The mission continued with the primary task of providing the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) with its own special operations and offensive UW units. Teams from both the 1st and 77th (later 7th) SFGAs were deployed to Vietnam for this purpose. Until 1961 the US advisory effort was oriented towards developing the ARVN into a conventional force capable of defending the new nation from a Korean-style invasion by North Vietnam: a rôle that was to change.
An A Team of the 7th SFGA providing a demonstration of parachute equipment in the Panama Canal Zone, 1962. The parachute is the T-10. The M1951 mountain rucksack is rigged under the reserve parachute. (US Army)
In the early 1960s the Vietnamese government had virtually no military or administrative control over the Central Highlands and large areas of the Mekong Delta. Control of these areas by the government were critical. Just as neglected were the various minority groups which populated them.
The development of indigenous minority groups into a military force has always been a recognised SF concept. Living in remote rural areas, often in poverty, they are used to physical hardship, and they know the area and how to survive in it. Due to their minority status, however, they tend to be somewhat neglected, ignored or even persecuted by the national government. Their situation varies from complacency with their lot to discontent verging on rebellion. Either way, they are generally ripe for exploitation by whichever side reaches them first. This may mean anything from forced service in an insurgent unit to total inclusion in the legal government’s national goals. One hazard for the legal government is that even though a minority group may side with it, their ultimate goals may not necessarily be the same. In Vietnam’s case the problems were further aggravated by the centuries-old racial and religious prejudices of the ethnic Vietnamese.
Vietnam has a number of ethnic and religious minorities, which were ignored or actually ill-treated by the government in Saigon. The VC were beginning to exploit these groups. In order to secure the critical areas, expand government presence, limit the exploitation of the minorities, and bring them into the national struggle, it was decided to employ SF elements to organise them into local self-defence forces.
The heart of most SF efforts in Vietnam was the Civilian Irregular Defense Group programme (CIDG—pronounced ‘cidge’); it was begun in 1961 as the Area Development Program, and was not officially designated CIDG until the following year. The CIDG were civilian employees of the US Army, and not part of the ARVN. They were recruited, trained, clothed, equipped, fed, housed, and paid by the USSF. The CIDG programme was initially composed exclusively of Montagnards (French for ‘highlanders’). The Montagnards, who were of a completely different racial stock than the Vietnamese, had long been despised by them; referred to as moi (savages), they were not recognised as citizens. They are simple people who do not have a common language, and in the more remote areas it is difficult for them to understand the dialect of the village on a neighbouring mountain. Only the Jarai and Rhade, the most advanced tribes, had a crude written language. The SF troops quickly developed a close relationship with these simple people, and in many cases were even made members of the tribe in elaborate ceremonies. A dangerous situation did develop in 1964 when some Rhade Montagnard strike forces revolted and killed some Vietnamese SF troops; the USSF managed to negotiate a peaceful settlement.
Radio operators of the 5th SFGA operate an AN/GRA-109 radio powered by a G-13 generator, Ft Bragg, 1962. They wear the M1953 field jacket. (US Army)
The first experimental SF camp was established at Buon Enao, near Ban Me Thuot, by half of 1st SFGA’s Detachment A-35 in late 1961. The purpose of the programme was to establish and train both village defence and local security forces for some 40 villages in the area. It was so successful that by the next year over 200 villages were involved in the programme with 12,000 armed Rhade Montagnards.
During 1962 a number of separate counterinsurgency and paramilitary programmes were instituted by the US Military Assistance Advisory Command Vietnam and the CIA’s US Operations Mission. These were all to be incorporated into the CIDG programme under the auspices of SF on 1 July 1963. Besides village security and defence, the CIDG were progressively tasked with more aggressive missions. A Mountain Commando (later Mountain Scouts) Training Center was established, and reconnaissance missions were conducted into remote areas. Another programme was the Trailwatchers (later Border Surveillance), which conducted surveillance missions on infiltration trails in the border areas. The village defence programme was expanded into other areas of Vietnam as well. By the end of 1963 there were 18,000 CIDG strike force and 43,000 hamlet militia (the redesignated village self-defence) troops advised by two B Teams and 22 A Teams.
US Army Special Forces Vietnam (Provisional) or USASFV—in effect, a small SF group—was formed in September 1962 for the control of all SF elements in the country. Teams from the 1st, 5th, and 7th SFGAs were rotated to Vietnam for six-month temporary duty hours. This system had the advantage of retaining team integrity, but it sacrificed continuity of the advisory effort, and forced the relieving team to learn the area, the troops, and the effective methods of operation anew with each rotation. The in-country team provided the relieving team with information on the area and their operations, and upon their arrival conducted briefings and orientation patrols before departing.
By 1964 the CIDG were actively conducting strike operations, and had expanded to include other minority groups. These included the Khmers (ethnic Cambodians born and raised in Vietnam), Nungs (ethnic Chinese mountain tribesmen), Chams and other ethnic Chinese from the coastal regions, and the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao militant religious sects (ethnic Vietnamese). These minority groups and their SF advisors rapidly developed a mutual respect and loyalty; many of the kind of men that SF attracts have a natural leaning towards the ‘underdog’ to begin with.
Members of the 5th SFGA, February 1962. The flashes were made by gluing a piece of black felt on to a larger white piece, explaining the variation in the width of the borders. At this time officers still wore the SF distinctive insignia, rather than their rank insignia, on the flash. (US Army)
Although highly conducive to the war effort and the accomplishment of assigned unit missions, this close relationship between the CIDG strikers and the SF troopers led to the almost total exclusion of the Vietnamese SF (Lac Luong Dac Biet—LLDB) from the chain of command in many strike forces. The predominantly Vietnamese (and usually prejudiced) LLDB were officially in command of the strike forces, while the USSF were supposedly to act only as advisors to them; this was often not the case in practice.
The Vietnamese SF were formed in 1957 from a group of 58 men trained by the 14th SFOD; these men became the cadre for the Vietnamese 77th Observation Group, an SF-type unit. After several reorganisations it evolved in 1963 into the LLDB Command, similar to a USSF group. An LLDB team (slightly smaller than its USSF counterpart) was assigned to each strike force camp.
Sad to say, the relationship between the USSF team and its LLDB counterpart was not always as it should have been. Attitudes ranged from totally ignoring each other to outright hostility in a few instances. In most cases, though, a workable relationship evolved, and things ran more or less smoothly. Quite often the LLDB handled the day-to-day administration and operation of the camp, while the USSF ran the combat operations of the strike force. There were a number of reasons for this conflict, and a simple clash of cultures was a primary one. The LLDB were not necessarily as well trained as their US counterparts; but they had been at it for a long time, and would remain at it long after the ‘hard charging’ Americans had completed their six-month tour and had been replaced by more Americans, with more new ideas on how to change things. There were cases of corruption, laziness, and reluctance to fight on the part of some members of the LLDB, but there were also many good ones. It was not unusual for an LLDB team and its USSF counterpart to develop a good working relationship.
A lesser problem also developed in that conventional US units and higher commanders often looked upon the CIDG as SF’s ‘private army’. The problem was compounded by the fact that strike companies and combat reconnaissance platoons were in practice commanded by SF NCOs, often junior ones, in positions held by captains and lieutenants in conventional units. More than one battalion commander was surprised to find that the company commander with whom he had been conducting a joint operation was only a buck sergeant.
In September 1964 USASFV was disbanded, and the 5th SFGA was relocated to Vietnam by phasing in its teams. There were now some 40 camps. The six-month tour became a thing of the past, and one-year tours were required, as by other US personnel. This meant that a team was assigned to a specific camp where it remained. The personnel rotated in and out of the teams on their one-year tours, thus ensuring a continuity of the advisory effort, as there were always ‘old hands’ in the teams who were familiar with the strike force and the area. The arrival of the 5th SFGA also signalled another expansion of the CIDG programme.
The war was escalating at a rapid pace. North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units, and massive amounts of supplies and equipment, were flowing into the south by way of the Ho Chi Minh Trail network through Laos and Cambodia. By 1967 it could no longer be termed a guerrilla war: massive, prolonged multi-division battles were being fought by both sides.
The primary missions of the strike force camps were border security, infiltration trail network interdiction, local village security, civic action and medical coverage for the local populace, and general intelligence collection. In addition SF also had an advisory rôle for the Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF or ‘Ruff-Puffs’—territorial and local militia) in some areas. By 1969 the CIDG had grown into a well-armed and trained professional force, with its own traditions and lineages, of almost 40,000 strikers in the Camp Strike Forces alone. Several thousands more were employed by the Mobile Strike Forces and reconnaissance projects. All were trained, advised, and supported by a mere 2,300 USSF.
The Mobile Strike Force (‘Mike Force’) concept grew out of a need for SF to have a reaction force under its own control to reinforce camps that were under attack or siege. US and ARVN units could not always be relied upon to provide this support when, where, and in the manner needed. The concept was derived from a II Corps reaction force known as ‘Eagle Flight’, formed in late 1964. Since the early 1960s the term ‘mobile strike force’ had been used to designate locally raised reaction forces as well. In July 1965 a battalion-size Mobile Strike Force was authorised for each C Team for employment in their corps area. A fifth force was formed for employment by the 5th SFGA on a country-wide basis to provide an additional backup element. Each had an A Team in command of it, and did not receive an LLDB team until late 1966. That same year their strength was increased to between two and five battalions each, plus a reconnaissance company. In late 1967 a B Team was assigned to each Mike Force, providing a Mobile Strike Force Command for each corps area (1st to 4th) and the 5th directly under group control. The 1st, 2nd, and 5th were predominantly Montagnards, while the 3rd and 4th were mostly Nungs and Cambodians. They were airborne-qualified at the SF-run jump school at the LLDB Training Center, trained in more offensive-type operations, and more heavily armed than their Camp Strike Force comrades. The Mike Forces took part in a large number of operations which saved or took the pressure off hard-pressed camps. Additionally they conducted their own offensive operations, along with three successful battalion-size airborne assaults in 1967 and one in 1968.
The Commander of the 7th SFGA observes his men’s training at the Northern Warfare Center, Ft Greely, Alaska, October 1963. This is a rare instance of the beret flash being worn on a field cap. (US Army)
An off-shoot of the Mike Force concept was the Mobile Guerrilla Force created in mid-1966. These consisted of a specially trained CIDG Strike Force Company and a Reconnaissance Platoon under the command of a USSF A Team with no LLDB. One was assigned to each corps area, with the mission to infiltrate remote enemy-controlled areas and conduct ambushes and raids; these ‘Blackjack’ operations were very effective. At the end of 1967 the MGFs were absorbed into the expanding Mike Forces, which continued similar missions.
The height of SF deployment in Vietnam was 1969. The 5th SFGA was organised and deployed as follows:
The Special Forces Operations Base (SFOB) was at Nha Trang. It contained the Group Headquarters, Signal Company, Logistical Support Center, 5th Mobile Strike Force Command (SFOB B-55), and numerous special detachments (military intelligence, signal, engineer, etc.). The Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Recondo School (operated by 5th SFGA since 1966) was also here.
Companies C, B, A, and D were responsible for the I, II, III, and IV CTZs respectively.1 Each had one C Team, two to four B Teams, and from eight to14 A Teams. Company E was responsible for special missions, and had eight B Teams.
Two members of the 5th SFGA planning a patrol during Exercise ‘Polar Siege’, Ft Richerson, Alaska, February 1964. They wear the OG 107 parka with fur-ruffed hood and three-finger arctic mittens. Pinned to their shoulder is the old ‘aggressor’ insignia, a green triangle. By this time the 5th SFGA had adopted an embroidered flash. (US Army)
The C Teams were co-located (except for that of Company E) with an LLDB C Team, and provided command and control and logistical support for its A and B Teams. One B Team in each company was the Mobile Strike Force Command while the others, usually located in province capitals, controlled a varied number of A Teams. There was a counterpart LLDB A and B Team co-located with each USSF one.
A Camp Strike Force consisted of three or four 130-man companies, a Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, and a Political Warfare (civic action) Team. Many camps had an ARVN artillery platoon (two 105 mm howitzers) attached.
The camps were usually established in remote areas where they could conduct border surveillance and interdiction missions, or further back from the border where they were situated to interdict infiltration trail networks. Usually the companies were rotated between week-long combat patrols, camp security, and training. Two USSF and one LLDB normally accompanied each combat operation. They operated in their assigned tactical area of responsibility of perhaps 100 to 200 square kilometres, but this varied greatly depending on the area. Occasionally joint operations were conducted with US or ARVN units.
The camp units were generally very good, but they did have their limitations. Being local paramilitary troops, they would often lose their motivation if deployed away from their home area. Their level of training and loose discipline limited their ability to execute complex, long-range, or long-term operations. They were lightly armed, and fire discipline was sometimes lax and erratic. So long as these limitations were allowed for, the CIDG were well suited for reconnaissance, interdiction, and harassing missions usually conducted in much the same manner as VC operations.
In the early days the camps were constructed of locally available materials and were often weakly defended. Quarters and support buildings were built of scrap lumber, corrugated metal, logs, and thatching. Defences usually included some machine gun bunkers, a few mortar pits, a surrounding trench or berm, punji stakes, a little barbed wire, and sometimes a shallow moat. In the mid-1960s the camps began to be ‘hardened’ and to be termed ‘fighting’ camps. More machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifles were added, perimeter fighting positions were improved, more barbed and concertina wire and claymore mines were emplaced, and an inner perimeter was constructed. The inner perimeter was capable of holding out even if the remainder of the camp was overrun. It contained the USSF and LLDB team houses, communications bunker, supply room, and ammunition bunkers. The outer perimeter area contained CIDG quarters and sometimes quarters for families, if they did not live in a nearby village. Many camps were a self-contained community with tailor and barber shops, medical dispensary, school, and recreational facilities. Most had an airstrip, and all had a helipad. In many rugged mountainous areas, and often in the Mekong Delta, there was no space for an airstrip: many of these camps could only be reached by helicopter or, in the latter case, by boat. The delta region even required floating camps due to almost year-round flooding.
A captain of the 6th SFGA presents a pre-jump briefing to Reservists of 17th SFGA during Exercise ‘Tanana Flats II’, Ft Wainwright, Alaska, July 1965. The three Regular Army captains wear the early version tropical fatigues. The captain with the beret wears Vietnamese SF jumpwings below his name tape and the Vietnamese ranger badge above it. The Reservists wear the OG 107 fatigues. The young sergeant has illegally cut down his fatigues to make a short-sleeve shirt. (US Army)
The VC and NVA could and did overrun some camps, so long as they were willing to pay the price. It was more of a propaganda/political victory than a military one. Other camps came close to being overrun, and still others suffered lengthy sieges. VC infiltrated into the strike force were responsible for the fall of some camps.
The 5th SFGA also conducted a large number of special operations in Vietnam, under the control of Company E; long-range reconnaissance and intelligence collection were normally the goal. The ‘Greek-letter’ projects conducted most of these operations. The first, Project Delta (SFOD B-52), was formed in 1964. Projects Omega (SFOD B-50) and Sigma (SFOD B-56) were formed in 1966. They consisted of reconnaissance teams, ‘roadrunner’ teams (CIDG disguised as VC/NVA), and a reaction force unit. Other intelligence collection activities were conducted by SFODs B-53 and B-57 (Project Gamma). Besides operating in Vietnam, some missions were infiltrated into neighbouring countries. SFOD B-51 operated the LLDB Training Center, which also provided courses for the CIDG.
Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG)—often referred to as the Special Operations Group—was formed in January 1964 as a joint service unconventional warfare task force. It was initially headquartered in Cholon and moved to Saigon in 1966. Most of the Army personnel were SF and assigned on paper to Special Operations Augmentation (SOA), 5th SFGA as a cover. It was not part of the 5th SFGA and was not actually an SF unit. Its mission was to advise and support the Vietnamese Special Exploitation Service (later the Strategic Technical Directorate). Its ground reconnaissance elements were organised into Command and Control North, Central, and South (CCN, CCC, CCS). They conducted reconnaissance and direct action missions into North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Each ‘CC’ was made up of Spike reconnaissance teams, Hatchet strike platoons, and SLAM exploitation companies.
The withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam began in 1970. SF began to phase out its programme by transferring most to the ARVN. The camps were either converted to RF/PF units or into a new organisation under the ARVN Ranger Command, the Border Rangers. The Mike Forces were also converted to Border Rangers. The CIDG programme was officially terminated on 31 December 1970. The reconnaissance projects were closed down between 1970 and 1972. The 5th SFGA itself was folded down as troops were rotated home. The colours of the 5th SFGA were returned to Ft Bragg on 3 March 1971, and the group was reformed using the assets of the 6th SFGA.
An A Team of 3rd SFGA on a 1966 exercise in Colorado. They are wearing a mix of uniforms including old type tropical fatigues, one-piece coveralls, and OG 107 fatigues. (US Army)
Other SF personnel were to remain in Vietnam a little longer, however. MACV-SOG was inactivated in April 1972. The Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team 158 was formed to take its place; though much smaller, it continued SOG’s mission until disbanded in March 1973. The US Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (UITG) was formed in February 1971 from SFOD B-36 (the former 3rd Mike Force). Its mission was to train Cambodian infantry battalions and return them to Cambodia to combat the Khmer Rouge. In May 1972 UITG was redesignated Forces Armées Nationales Khmer Training Command (FANK) and continued the same mission until disbanded in November 1972. SF personnel were to return to Vietnam in 1973–75 as members of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center.
In addition to Vietnam, SF conducted other operations in South-East Asia. The White Star Mobile Training Teams in Laos were just one: a major operation was also conducted in Thailand. Company D (Augmented), 1st SFGA was activated on 15 April 1966 at Ft Bragg and was relocated to Thailand in October. The 46th SF Company was activated on 15 April 1967 in Lopburi, Thailand using the assets of Company D, 1st SFGA. It was responsible for training and advising the Royal Thai Army SF, Rangers, and Border Police. It also conducted various special operations into Laos and Cambodia; and acted as advisers to the Thai ‘Queen’s Cobras’ Regiment and ‘Black Panther’ Division, which were sent to Vietnam. On 3 March 1972 the assets of the 46th Company were used to form 3rd Battalion, 1st SFGA, at the time a classified designation; it actually had the cover designation of US Army SF, Thailand. After leaving Thailand the unit was inactivated at Ft Bragg on 27 March 1974. It was never physically part of the 1st SFGA.
A member of the 7th SFGA checks out a diver wearing the old type wet suit and a two-tank SCUBA system at Ft Bragg, 1968. (US Army)
1South Vietnam was divided into four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) for regional command and control. These were ARVN commands, but they were used by US forces because of their convenience of designating areas within the country. US forces had their own command structure overlaid on the ARVN CTZs. In 1972 these were redesignated Military Regions.