Applied Ethics
Its program consists, by and large, of evaluating, from the moral point of view, the arguments employed in public debates relating to certain specific domains of action (relations with nature and with animals, biomedicine, sexual relationships, global justice, and so on). It may proceed to this evaluation by adopting as criteria the principles of the existing moral theories (utilitarian, Kantian, or others). But this is not necessary. In applied ethics, a respect for general principles of coherence and a profound understanding of the specific domain (in issues of health or the environment, for example) are tools that certain philosophers prefer to the blind application of general principles. Research in applied ethics sometimes even leads to these principles being placed in question.
Compatibilism-Incompatibilism
Is it possible to reconcile what we know of the behavior of humans, subject, like everything belonging to the natural world, to forces that escape them, and our tendency to judge them as if they were free and responsible for their actions? How are we to render these two contradictory ideas “compatible”: we are free and at the same time subject to the determinism of nature?
One of the ways of demonstrating that liberty and determinism are not incompatible consists in pointing out that a free action is not an action that is mad, arbitrary, and without reasons, but an action caused or determined by our own reasons, that is to say, a voluntary reason. But the “incompatibilists” answer that to be free is not only to act according to one’s own reasons but also to have the power to choose one’s own reasons. According to them, we do not have that power.
Another way of attempting to resolve the conflict amounts to saying that our beliefs in determinism and liberty can perfectly well coexist without contradicting each other, for they relate to completely different aspects of our lives. Even if reason tells us that we are subject to forces that escape us, we cannot help having emotional reactions of joy, anger, and indignation toward what we are doing or what others are doing, as if we and they were free. It would be absurd to think that such reactions could be eliminated.
But an “incompatibilist” could always object that our emotional reactions of joy, anger, and indignation toward what we are doing or what others are doing are simply irrational and should not influence our judgments.
Consequentialism
For the consequentialist what counts morally is not blindly respecting certain absolute constraints upon action, such as those that would prohibit our treating someone simply as a means, but rather acting in such a way that there is, in total, the most good or the least evil possible in the universe. And if it is necessary, in order to get there, to free ourselves from such constraints, we must do so. Consequentialism does not however impose any definition of the good. We may in fact distinguish between several different consequentialist conceptions in terms of their definition of it. The most famous is utilitarianism. For it, the good is pleasure, or the satisfaction of the preferences of each. But a consequentialist may also recommend that friendship or fundamental rights be promoted. Can all these goods, however, be the object of this kind of calculation? What does it mean to act in such a way that there is “the most friendship possible in the universe”? Would it be morally recommended to sacrifice a few friends in order to have more in total? Furthermore, our fundamental rights have the property of being untouchable and inviolable. Can consequentialism really make a place for them in its system?
Deontologism
For the deontologist (from the Greek deon, “duty”), there exist absolute constraints upon our actions, things that one should never do: “do not lie” and “do not treat a person simply as a means” are examples of this kind of constraint.
Kantian morality is the model for strict deontological moralities. But there are less exacting deontological moralities, which concede some exemptions from the constraints upon action in order to avoid infringements upon the well-being of all that are too grave. Is this not proof that rigid respect of these constraints, without interrogating their contribution to the well-being of all, has something irrational about it?
Doctrine of Double Effect
This moral doctrine, whose original formulation is attributed to Thomas Aquinas, designates two effects, one good and the other bad, of an action that, considered in itself, is good, or neither good nor bad.
One might think of the bombardment of a bunker in which is hidden the high command of a cruel army waging an unjust war, and in which there are also civilians. One of these effects is good (eliminating unjust aggressors). This is the purpose of the action, what its authors intend. The other is bad (killing innocent civilians). It is anticipated by the authors of the action. It is an inevitable “collateral effect.” But it is not this effect that is intended by the action or desired by its authors. It is not even conceived to be a means of arriving at the result intended. According to the doctrine of double effect, this kind of action with two effects is morally permissible under these conditions (the bad effect is not intended, it is not a means), to which we must add that the harm caused (in terms of innocent victims, for example) is not disproportionate.
But the doctrine still remains just as controversial. For the consequentialists, it is false: there is no meaningful moral difference between massacring civilians as the anticipated collateral effect of an action whose intention is good, massacring civilians as a means to achieve a certain goal, and massacring civilians tout court. For the deontologists, this doctrine is muddled: it is simpler to say that we should never treat a person simply as a means. For the friends of the virtues, we are too wary of causing a harm for the motive of coming to the assistance of someone to accept the doctrine of double effect in its current form.
Ethics and Morality
This is a division that is judged to be fundamental in nonanalytic moral philosophy, but not in analytic moral philosophy, where one sets out rather from a distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics (see the entries in this glossary). It must be said that the opposition between ethics and morality lacks clarity. Sometimes ethics concerns the relation to self and morality the relation to the other. Sometimes ethics is on the side of the desirable, and morality on the side of the prohibited or the obligatory. Sometimes ethics is on the side of critique and invention, and morality on the side of conformity. But what sort of ethics would it be that was in no way concerned with the relation to others, or that dispensed entirely with the notions of prohibition and obligation? What sort of morality would it be that had no creative and critical dimension or that had nothing desirable about it?
Facts and Norms
The majority of philosophers reject the idea that it is intellectually legitimate to pass, without any additional argument, from a factual statement (which tells us what people think or do) to a normative statement (which tells us what we should think or do). Thus the statement “from the fact that slavery exists and has always existed, it follows that it ought to exist” is completely illogical and ill formed. But in many cases, we reckon that we can pass from factual statements to normative statements. The fact that slavery is incapable of satisfying the most basic human needs is a sufficient reason for thinking that we must abolish it absolutely and universally. Furthermore, the rule “no one is obliged to do what is impossible” (or, in technical terms, cannot implies ought not), which everyone seems to accept, posits that we can pass from a fact (we cannot) to a norm (we ought not to).
The word “internalism” refers to two different ideas in moral philosophy. The internalism of the judgment asserts that an authentic moral judgment is necessarily accompanied by a certain motivation to act in accordance with its requirements. If I sincerely assert that “it is wrong to let children from the poorest countries die of hunger,” it is obvious, for the internalist, that I am committing myself, in some way, to doing everything in my power to change this state of affairs.
The externalist rejects the idea that there exists a necessary link between our moral judgments and motivation. For him, the sentence “I know that it is good, but I have no wish to do it” is perfectly intelligible. It is, according to him, borne out daily by cases of depression (I have kept my moral beliefs but I have lost the motivation to act in accordance with them) and of amoralism (I know what is good, but I don’t give a damn). The whole question is that of knowing whether amoralism really exists. Does someone who does not do what he knows is good really know that it’s good? Is it authentic knowledge?
The internalism of existence tells us that there cannot be reasons for acting that are completely external to the whole formed by the most characteristic beliefs, desires, and emotions of people, that is to say, by their “motivational system.” But if this conception were true, the reason would have no reason to act in a tolerant fashion. Such reasons would be completely external to his “motivational system.”
Metaethics
Metaethics has the ambition to describe the moral judgments of each and every one of us and to identify their most meaningful properties from a philosophical point of view. It poses semantic, ontological, epistemological, and psychological questions. The most debated ones are the following.
What do the words “good” and “just” mean? Can we derive judgments of value from judgments of fact? How are we to justify our moral judgments? Can our moral statements be true or false? Do our moral judgments necessarily contain a motive for acting? Do there exist “moral facts” that are as objective as physical or mathematical facts? What is the value of the different “foundations” that have been given to morality: God, nature, reason, feelings, society? Does morality need “foundations”? To what extent can we reply to these questions without taking into account two other branches of moral philosophy, normative ethics and applied ethics? Is the distinction between the three so obvious?
Moral Intuitions
These are spontaneous moral judgments, which are not derived through an argument from general principles or from moral theories. According to another conception, they are basic moral judgments that are obvious to all and that have no need to be justified by principles or theories. Do we have the means, however, to distinguish clearly, on the inside of our moral judgments, between the spontaneous and the reasoned part?
Moral Modules
A module is a highly specialized psychological mechanism, organized in order to treat in the most effective manner certain wholly specific problems: recognizing forms, sounds, smells, colors, and the texture or the taste of things; cutting up a flow of sound into words and sentences; and so on. A module functions like a reflex: automatically, rapidly, independently of our conscience and of our will. The most important thing is the fact of its being impermeable to our beliefs and our knowledges. Thus, even if we know that two lines are the same length, we will see one as longer than the other if they end in angles going in opposite directions (the so-called Müller-Lyer illusion).
According to a less exacting conception of modules, it is not necessary for a psychological mechanism to present absolutely all of these characteristics to be a module. We can perfectly well conceive of mechanisms that would not be as impermeable to beliefs and knowledges as perceptual mechanisms, but that would be sufficiently specialized in their functioning to be considered modules. It seems that we can only speak of moral modules in the sense of the least exacting conception of modularity.
Saying that there exist “moral modules” amounts to supposing that we have certain “moral reflexes” that can, however, be modified by thought. Does so unexacting a conception of modules still allow us to distinguish in our moral reactions what relates to the “intuitive”?
Normative Ethics
The vocation of normative ethics is prescriptive. It asks itself what we must do, what is good or bad, just or unjust. It revolves today around a huge debate concerning the exact form and the value of three great theories: deontologism, consequentialism, and virtue ethics. It may be summarized through a handful of questions: What is a moral theory? Do we really need a moral theory in order to make a correct moral judgment and act in a way that is fitting? And if we do need one, which is best? What methods do we have available in order to know? What is a moral reflex and what is the product of organized moral thought?
Reflective Equilibrium
How are we to justify rationally a moral judgment such as “slavery is an evil”? The principal threat in such attempts at justification is infinite regress. We have to justify the justification and so on to infinity.
The foundationalist reckons that the threat can be contained, either by invoking great basic principles that are self-evident (“all men are born equal in right,” for example) or by appealing to elementary experiences of a perceptual or emotional kind (anger, indignation at slavery, and so on).
The coherentist disputes the validity of this method. According to him, the idea of an “ultimate” justification is illusory because the notion of intellectual evidence is vague, and because elementary experiences can never by themselves justify moral judgments. We must at least add some normative reasons for thinking that these experiences can fulfill this justificatory function.
For the coherentist, the only reasonable way of attempting to justify our moral judgments consists in showing that they can belong to a set of judgments that are sufficiently coherent among themselves. But the foundationalist may object that coherentism is threatened by circularity or systematic falsity. There is no shortage of perfectly coherent and systematically false narratives (reports of spies, fairy stories, and so on). The method known as “reflective equilibrium,” which we owe to John Rawls, proceeds through the reciprocal adjustment of the spontaneous judgments of rational and reasonable persons and reflections on the great political or moral principles. It is coherentist. It therefore inherits the advantages, as well as the shortcomings, of this conception of the justification of moral ideas.
Slippery Slope
Saying that there is a “slippery slope” amounts to asserting that, if we tolerate a certain action whose moral value is the object of a controversy (euthanasia, research into embryos, abortion, and the like), we will necessarily come to tolerate actions whose morally repugnant character is not the object of any controversy, such as the wholesale elimination of the poor, the weak, the ugly, and the handicapped and belated infanticide. If we do not wish to end up at these inadmissible conclusions, it is better not to place ourselves on the slippery slope that leads necessarily to it. The problem posed by this argument is that the reasons for which one should necessarily end up with these conclusions that no one should accept are either well hidden or else unfounded.
Utilitarianism
Consequentialism asks us to promote the good, but it does not pronounce upon the nature of the good to be promoted. Utilitarianism is a specification of consequentialism, in the sense that it proposes a certain definition of the good to be promoted. What we must do, so far as utilitarianism is concerned, is work for the greatest pleasure (or for the greatest well-being or for the satisfaction of preferences) of the greatest number. This objective may be pursued in two different ways:
1. By evaluating through a calculation the contribution of each act to the promotion of the greatest good for the greatest number (act utilitarianism).
2. By following, without calculation, certain general rules such as “do not torture” and “do not lie,” of which there is every reason to think that, if everyone followed them, one would help to promote the greatest good of the greatest number (rule utilitarianism).
It is supposed that the advantage of utilitarian thought over other moral conceptions is its giving us the means to approach moral questions in a rational fashion and without too many prejudices.
But is act utilitarianism so rational? It asks us to carry out a calculation of the positive and negative effects of each action that we get ready to perform. Is such a calculation not impossible or too costly? Rule utilitarianism, for its part, asks that we respect rules of common sense that have always worked. Is it really up to helping us to rid ourselves of our prejudices?
Victimless Crimes
These are actions that are regarded as crimes but that have caused no unconsenting harm to a concrete person. The category covers personal relationships between consenting adults (incest, homosexuality, prostitution), violations of abstract entities (blasphemy against gods or ancestors), actions directed against oneself (suicide, cleanliness, control of hair, sexual secretions).
Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics takes its inspiration to a greater or lesser degree from Aristotle. It is sometimes called “aretist” (from the Greek arête, “excellence”). It asserts that the only thing that matters morally is personal perfection: being someone good, a person of good character, generous, affectionate, brave, and so on. The rest—that is to say, respecting great principles or working for the greater good of the greater number—is secondary. The question is to know in what respect it is a moral doctrine, inasmuch as it does not tell us what we must do or what we must aim at. In order to withstand this objection, the modern versions of virtue ethics assert that what we must do is imitate “exemplary” moral personalities. But aside from the fact that this kind of conception no longer has anything to do with Aristotle, who never said that a good action consisted in imitating such-and-such a person, it poses an internal logical problem. According to which criteria will we choose these personalities and decide that they are “morally” exemplary? Must we choose Gandhi or Napoleon, like a character in Dostoyevsky? Do we not already have to know what is moral in order to make the right decision?
