The president spent most of the weekend tending to administrative duties. He authorized General Edward R. S. Canby to assist in raising funds for the Orphans’ Home of the State of Mississippi, discharged a Private Charles T. Dorsett from the army at the request of the soldier's father, and annulled the sentences of two contractors named Benjamin G. Smith and Franklin W. Smith, both of whom were convicted of committing fraud against the government. Lincoln did not believe that the two had willfully defrauded the government and declared that “the judgement and sentence are disapproved and declared null.”1

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, who was well acquainted with the details of this particular case, thought that Lincoln's famous charity was misplaced in this instance, and that he never should have overturned the conviction. “It is, I regret to say, a discreditable endorsement,” Welles reflected, “and would, if made public, be likely to injure the president.”² Secretary Welles did not think Lincoln was being charitable or compassionate, only unwise.

On Sunday, March 19, Lincoln approved General John Pope's “plan of action for Missouri,” which the general had sent earlier in the month.³ Missouri was a border state that supplied men to both sides, and also had had a history of vicious guerilla fighting since the beginning of the war. General Pope's proposal was to remove all “United States troops” from the state, unless they were needed “to defend it against an armed invasion.” As long as Federal troops remained, Pope explained, “they will be a constant source of embarrassment and a difficult obstacle to the renewal of the civil administration.” General Pope recommended that the troops be withdrawn, so that Missouri could form its own state government. The president agreed with Pope's recommendation and sent his approval.

This is another instance of President Lincoln looking beyond the war, and of taking the postwar development of the country into consideration. Most of his second term would be concerned with reconciling and reunifying the country. Approving General Pope's endorsement was another step toward reunification.

General Sherman was still doing his best to join with General Grant at Petersburg, but, as ever, was being slowed by bad roads, bad maps, and General Joseph E. Johnston. “The country was very obscure,” General Sherman complained, “and the maps extremely defective.”4 All the roads were basically rivers of mud, and Joe Johnston always seemed to be somewhere nearby, just waiting for the chance to strike.

On March 19, cannon fire came from the direction of Bentonville. “Johnston's army struck the head of Slocum's columns,” Sherman would write.⁵ The heaviest day of fighting was March 19, but the battle went on for several more days—Sherman considered the fighting of March 20 and 21 nothing more than “mere skirmishing.” By March 23, every one of Sherman's corps had reached Goldsboro, in spite of all opposition and inconveniences, “thus effecting a perfect junction of all the army at that point, as originally contemplated.”

Now that Sherman's army had arrived at its goal, the next step was to move north into Virginia—“to resume our march,” according to General Sherman, “and come within the theatre of General Grant's field of operations.”⁶ At this point in time, Sherman thought his army could do absolutely anything he asked it to do. It had just made “one of the longest and most important marches ever made by any organized army in a civilized country”—from Savannah to Goldsboro, 425 miles in fifty days, had destroyed Columbia and Fayetteville, forced the evacuation of Charleston, had “utterly broken up” all the railroads in South Carolina, and had accomplished all of this “with the army in superb order.”

Now that he had done all of these impressive things, what General Sherman wanted most of all was to finish up the war with his old friend Grant. He would rest his army at Goldsboro, refit, reequip, pick up some rations, and march to Petersburg. In Sherman's own words, his men were “ragged, dirty, and saucy, and we must rest and fix up a little.”7 Sherman had the idea that Grant should wait for him and his army to arrive, so that they could begin their spring offensive against General Lee together. The two armies, teamed up and fighting together, would make an unbeatable combination and would be able to achieve anything: capture Richmond, overwhelm General Lee, or whatever General Grant might have in mind—at least in General Sherman's considered opinion.

But General Grant did not share his friend's enthusiasm. “Sherman was anxious that I should stay where I was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it,” he later would write, “but I had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit my doing so.” He would have to wait until Philip Sheridan arrived with his cavalry, “as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind.”⁸

General Grant was not inclined to stay in Petersburg until General Sherman showed up. His main anxiety was still that General Lee and his army would get away from him and escape to North Carolina. He intended to begin operations against Lee around March 28, and did not have the time to wait for Sherman. “Every possible precaution was taken meanwhile to prevent Lee from withdrawing his army,” General Grant's aide, Colonel Horace Porter, recalled. “Scouts and spies were more active than ever before; about 30,000 men were kept virtually on the picket line, and all the troops were equipped and supplied, ready to make a forced march at a moment's notice in case Lee should be found moving.”9

Although Grant was nervous about General Lee and what he had planned for the immediate future, just about everyone in Washington seemed to be optimistic about the war and its impending outcome. “The news from the army continues favorable,” Gideon Welles wrote, “and it seems impossible for the Rebel leaders to continue much longer to hold out.”¹⁰ But President Lincoln did not agree with this point of view. If anything, he was even more anxious than Grant. Lincoln wanted to end the war as quickly as possible, and with as little additional loss of life as possible. He did not want Lee to escape from Petersburg, which would extend the fighting for another three to six months, and possibly longer.