CHAPTER 6

The Warlike Nation of the Cherokee

One Conflict Avoided

June–July 1774

A SCALP HALLOO, the sound of which Reverend John Heckewelder described as a “mixture of triumph and terror, or glory and fear,” was heard from the woods beyond the cornfields.1 Messengers ran ahead to the cluster of villages that made up the town of Wakatomika to announce the approach of a war party returning from the south bank of the Ohio. Men and women, elders and children, all put aside daily chores, ceased play, interrupted routines, and gathered to welcome them home. The returning braves had drawn the first blood on behalf of their people against the enemy Shemanthe or Assaragoa, meaning Big Knife, as the Shawnees and Iroquois, respectively, called the Virginians.

Although not entirely unlike that of a victorious army returning from campaign with captured battle flags and prisoners of war, the Indian celebration was “far more frightful and terrific,” Heckewelder wrote. “It is an awful spectacle to see the Indians return home in triumph from a successful expedition with their prisoners and scalps taken in battle.” The different perspective reflected the wide cultural divide between European and native peoples. The weary but excited warriors quickened the pace to cover the last few hundred yards as they shouted the “dreadful scalp-yell.” The people of the town gathered around them as the braves proudly displayed their trophies, dressed scalps hung from long poles, and recounted the exploits of their victory.² Meanwhile, the captives contemplated the fate that awaited them. They had already endured much hardship since their capture and were grief stricken. They reflected on the scalps their captors displayed nearby. Some of them had belonged to family members, friends, and fellow prisoners just a few days before.3

Like their counterparts in many Indian societies, Shawnee and Mingo warriors measured victory by the number of “heads” taken in individual combat. Each head represented an enemy conquered, whether killed, wounded, or captured. It mattered little if he had lifted the scalp from the corpse of a slain enemy or a maimed one who still lived. A prisoner, whether eventually executed, sold, or adopted, counted toward a warrior’s tally as much as a scalp. According to Heckewelder, both scalps and prisoners provided “visible proofs” of their valor and prowess, and each warrior heralded his arrival in triumph with a separate scalp yell for each head taken.⁴

Embattled Indian nations found the practices particularly effective for terrorizing the inhabitants who settled in the frontier districts of British America, or those individuals who encroached on tribal homelands or exclusive hunting grounds. The taking of scalps and prisoners constituted an important component of national policy and the supporting military strategy when at war against any enemies, regardless of race or culture. Since an Indian nation often went to war to avenge insult of injury committed against it, the taking of heads was also an integral part of the condolence process for families who lost a young warrior in battle, as well as for those who lost any young people to disease or other nonwar-related cause. Grieving families satisfied their need for revenge by accepting an enemy scalp taken on their behalf or by torturing and executing a prisoner. The family could also adopt a captive to take the place of the deceased loved one or redeem the prisoner in exchange for weapons, ammunition, or goods.⁵

Prisoners usually endured tremendous cruelty on the march. Mary Jemison vividly recalled the horrific treatment she received as a prisoner of the Shawnees during the French and Indian War. One of ten captured in the attack on her family’s farm, only fifteen-year-old Mary and a neighbor’s young son arrived in Indian country alive.⁶ Mary’s captors deprived their “Extremely fatigued” prisoners of food and water the first day and night, and when the little ones cried for water, the braves made them “drink urine or go thirsty.” One Indian followed the party to lash the slower children with a whip in order to maintain the pace needed to evade the militia attempting to rescue the captives. During the first night’s rest halt, the warriors “watched [the prisoners] with the greatest vigilance” and permitted them neither shelters nor warming and cooking fires.⁷ In contrast, Betsy Spicer and her brother experienced less severe treatment. While Logan threatened to kill them if they attempted to escape or alert rescuers, he also had his men carry the children on their backs when they became too tired to maintain the pace.8

After they had traveled a sufficient distance, and any likelihood of an attempted rescue sufficiently diminished, the captors finally permitted hungry prisoners to build fires and offered them food, often plundered from their own pantries. Whereas Logan’s Mingoes had already slain all of Betsy and William’s relatives in their presence, the Shawnees separated Mary and one other child from the rest, never to see their families and friends again alive. In both cases, the captors separated the surviving children from each other and their previous lives. Mary and Betsy also experienced similar acts of mental cruelty by those who took them prisoner. Both girls recalled that they had to watch as their captors scraped their parents’ and siblings’ blood, brain matter, and other tissue from their “yet wet and bloody” scalps. The skins were then stretched over hoops fashioned from green wood, then dried and tanned like parchment. After the Indians painted the tanned skin and combed the hair, they hung the dressed scalps on the ends of long poles.⁹

On their arrival, amid the “peculiar shoutings, demonstrations of joy, and the exhibition of some trophies of victory, the mourners come forward to make their claims.”¹⁰ The distribution of plundered property satisfied some, while revenge and condolence provided the two major factors in determining the fate of captives. In the absence of a prisoner, returning braves might present the mourning family an enemy scalp to satisfy their vengeance.¹¹ Some captives, primarily women and children—as well as some men—who survived the journey to Indian country, like the Spicer orphans, found themselves “adopted by the families of their conquerors in the place of lost or deceased relations or friends.” The Indians separated Betsy and William and offered them to families from different tribal bands that lived a great distance apart. The two siblings did not see each other again for many years. Repatriated under the terms of the war-ending treaty, Betsy eagerly returned to her Dunkard Creek community. Like more than a few prisoners captured and adopted at a young age, William became domesticated and eventually identified more with his new family. When presented an opportunity to return home, adopted captives like William “never wish themselves away again.”¹² Captivity narratives attest to the relative good fortune and happiness of some as well as the cruel suffering and death of many who fell into Indian hands.

An adult male captive’s ordeal usually began when his conquerors ordered him to run the gantlet to a painted post from twenty to forty yards away. Reaching the goal required him to pass between two lines of men, women, and children who stood “ready to strike him” with axes, sticks, and other offensive weapons. Warriors stood on the sides to throw sand in his eyes to temporarily blind him as those on the gantlet continued to beat the victim “most intolerably.” Beatings became so severe that one survivor, James Smith, when captured by Ohio Indians during the French and Indian War, recalled having wished for his tormentors “to strike the fatal blow” and end his misery, and “apprehended they were too long about it.” Willing to accommodate such desires, “some person, longing to avenge the death of some relation or friend slain in battle,” always stood ready for the captive to fall and “immediately dispatched” him.13

Surviving the gantlet only guaranteed a captive that he would live until female elders or a grieving family determined his fate. If given as a condolence, mourners could elect to receive and adopt him into the family or exact their revenge with merciless treatment in long, protracted tortures, which included burning and other “dreadful executions.”¹⁴ The same applied to the community at large. A display of courage while running the gantlet significantly increased, but did not ensure, one’s chances of survival. According to the traveling Baptist preacher David Jones, “if any in the town fancy the person for a wife, husband, son, or daughter, then the person purchases the captive, and keeps him as his own.” If the elders decided on revenge, the level of pain inflicted significantly increased if the nation had suffered heavy losses in battle or the enemy had committed murders or other atrocities against their innocent women and children.¹⁵

According to Jones, among the customs of the Shawnee nation, he “reckoned” the cruelty they inflicted on the captives who they did not adopt was “singularly bad.” He observed one method of torture in which the captors ran a knife between the victims’ “wrist bones,” then drew deer sinews through their wounds, and bound them “naked to a post in the long house.” He claimed the Indians then enjoyed making “all imaginable diversion” of the helpless and agonizing captives. Some suffered having their noses cut off while their captors made fun of their disfigured appearance. When the sport no longer amused them, the warriors led the prisoners outside, scalped them while still alive, and killed them with tomahawk blows. Finally, they left their victims’ bodies where the “fowls of the air” consumed their mangled bodies.¹⁶ James Smith watched his captors prepare “about a dozen men, stripped naked, with their hands tied behind their backs,” for burning to death. They tied each victim to a stake and then kept touching him with firebrands and red-hot irons as he screamed “in a most doleful manner” while spectators yelled “like infernal spirits.”¹⁷ Mary Jemison recalled that she saw a number of heads, arms, legs, and other fragments of the bodies of some white people who had just been burned at the stake at Shawnee towns in the Ohio country. The Indians fastened the remaining parts and whole bodies to a spit supported at each end by a crotch from a tree branch stuck in the ground, and “were roasted or burnt black as coal” while the “fire was yet burning.”18 Once the celebrations ended, Logan and other leading warriors went about the process of exhorting the young men to join new war parties to go against the Long Knife enemy.

THUS FAR, Mingo and Shawnee raids had fallen hardest on the west district of Augusta County. In early June, Connolly developed a plan of “prudent steps” designed to “put a stop to further cruelties . . . [and] murders committed by the Indians.” Outlined in a letter sent to Governor Dunmore on June 7, Connolly proposed to raise and lead a force of three hundred to four hundred men “towards the Enemy’s Country.” On the way, he planned to halt and build a small fort on the high ground near the settlement at the mouth of Wheeling Creek for the protection of the frontier. Continuing downstream, Connolly planned to build another post at the mouth of Hockhocking Creek, on the opposite side of the Ohio, for use as a magazine, or “repository of Stores,” from which small detachments from Wheeling would operate continually on the north bank to alarm the Indians and “if possible keep the Enemy engaged in their own Country.” Executing his plan, Connolly believed, would “chastise” and “overawe the Indians” with Virginia’s military might.¹⁹

While waiting for the governor’s response and expected approval, the captain commandant began assembling the forces and gathering the supplies needed to execute his planned course of action. Despite their previous differences, continued animosity, and allegiance to opposite sides in the ongoing boundary dispute, Connolly approached the leader of the Westmoreland County magistrates about the possibility of combining their forces to act “in concert.” Although Croghan had previously predicted that such cooperation would result if the Indians attacked, St. Clair declined the invitation for the recently organized ranger company, or any other forces the county might raise, to participate in a Virginia expedition. He assured Governor Penn that he remained cautious of taking any step that would potentially “draw this Province into an active share in the War,” which Pennsylvania “had no hand in kindling.”²⁰

Although he sent Captain William Crawford with a company to begin the work of erecting the fort at Wheeling Creek, which they would name Fort Fincastle in honor of another of Dunmore’s hereditary titles, Connolly delayed the start of the offensive operation pending the governor’s approval. He remained at Fort Dunmore to coordinate the militia response to the attacks, such as Logan’s raids, against the district. When Aeneas Mackay learned about the Muddy Creek incident, he incorrectly assumed that Logan’s warriors had ambushed McClure’s company as it marched to join the forces assembling at Wheeling. The magistrate caustically charged that without suffering any casualties of their own, four Indians had defeated an entire company of Virginians and “knocked” Connolly’s scheme “in the head.” St. Clair unleashed his own volley of sarcasm, adding that Connolly had “instantly changed the plan” when news of McClure’s death persuaded him to remain safely in garrison while others fought the war he had started. Neither St. Clair nor Mackay knew that Connolly had ordered McClure’s company toward Redstone and did not receive the governor’s approval to execute the plan for offensive action that they derided until more than a week after the ambush.21

Because it complemented his instructions to the county lieutenants, specifically the recommendation to build a fort at the mouth of the Great Kanawha and conduct limited offensive operations on the north bank of the Ohio, the governor gave his endorsement on June 20. He directed Connolly to keep a constant correspondence with Colonel Andrew Lewis, the officer he designated to coordinate the efforts of all the frontier counties.²²

Dunmore also expanded on Connolly’s original concept and urged that he either “cooperate with Colonel Lewis, or strike the stroke” himself, provided he could so with minimal risk, and urged “the sooner it is done, the better.”

Frederick County had also begun to form units for active service. On Saturday, June 11, Major Angus McDonald sent Captain Daniel Morgan orders to form a unit of fifty to sixty men, in anticipation of the governor’s orders to join the force assembling at Wheeling. McDonald also notified the captains commanding three neighboring companies to “call a muster and know what men can be got.” If Morgan could not raise the required number from his own, McDonald authorized him to recruit what he needed from these other companies. The major told the captain that he did not want to draft, but only take volunteers, men “such as may be depended on,” to “do service to our Country.”²³

Notwithstanding any confidence he had earlier expressed in his abilities, the governor told Connolly that he considered it most necessary for him to remain at Fort Dunmore rather than command in the field. He therefore directed him to select a competent subordinate to lead the proposed expedition into Shawnee country and said he “could not do better” than appoint Captain William Crawford to command what men he could spare for the mission. Crawford had impressed the governor the year before when, on George Washington’s recommendation, he acted as Dunmore’s guide during his visit to the frontier district. The governor described the long-time militia member and French and Indian War veteran as a “prudent, active, and resolute” officer, “very fit to go on such an expedition.”

In executing the plan, the governor said Connolly should order all officers commanding the detachments going out on missions from Wheeling “to make as many prisoners they can of women and children.” The Virginians could use such captives for leverage in bringing hostile nations to a council that could negotiate a peace treaty as well as for arranging an exchange of prisoners. As with Logan’s capture of the Spicer orphans, Indian nations had employed and accepted the practice of taking captives when waging war long before European contact. In the division of labor in their societies, women and children usually provided the principal agricultural workforce, and their loss or capture could have an adverse effect on an Indian community’s economy. Since war parties often took women and children prisoners, it would seem rational to reply in kind to facilitate a reciprocal exchange and repatriation of captives—provided the officers could maintain order and discipline over their men in order to prevent atrocities like those Greathouse and his followers had committed against the Yellow Creek Mingoes at Baker’s Bottom.

Lord Dunmore further instructed Connolly to exert what diplomatic influence he could to “prevail on the Delawares, and the well affected part of the Mingoes” to separate themselves and “move off from the Shawanese.” Simultaneously, the Six Nations central council wielded its leadership to isolate the dissident and troublesome Shawnees and keep the Mingoes, Delawares, and other dependents neutral. The governor pledged to all militia commanders on the frontier that after Virginia ultimately prevailed and compelled the Shawnees to “sue for peace,” he would not end hostilities until they had effectively punished the enemy Indians for their “insolence.” He further pledged to neither grant peace terms nor ratify a war-ending treaty until the Shawnees delivered six chiefs as hostages in order to guarantee their nation’s future “good behavior.” Every year, on the anniversary of signing the peace treaty, the governor would expect the Shawnees to replace them with different hostage chiefs for the ensuing twelve months. And last, he pledged that the victors would require the vanquished Shawnees “to trade with us only,” not the rival Pennsylvanians, “for what they may want.”24

AS RELATIONS between the Virginia colony and the Shawnees and the hostile faction of Mingoes deteriorated, the likelihood of a war with the Cherokees persisted. The tensions that had gripped the Holston and Clinch settlements in the spring had eased but not abated. Virginians, as well as officials of the British Crown, feared the specter of “a Combination of all the Northern Indians together with the Cherokees; the Murders they will be capable to perpetuate, attended with a general Devastation of the Frontiers.” Captain William Russell probably spoke for many when he wrote, “I am too much afraid such a Confederacy will be form’d.” 25

Other settlers, primarily from North Carolina, had moved into the Watauga and Nolichucky river valleys on the mistaken premise that the Treaty of Lochaber and subsequent Cherokee cession had opened them for settlement. After negotiating a ten-year lease with the Cherokees in 1772, settlers formed the Watauga Association, which established a five-man court at Sycamore Shoals to perform many local government functions despite the absence of a royal charter. Although outside of the jurisdiction of any colonial government, the inhabitants self-identified as British subjects and informally associated with Virginia. And the Cherokees generally referred to the Watauga inhabitants, as well as all encroaching whites, as “Virginians.” Although mistrust ran deep, colonial government and Indian Department officials made efforts to resolve potential grievances before they flared into conflict, such as Captain Russell’s measures to curtail the inadvertent crossing of the Cherokee boundary. As a result, relations with that nation remained generally good.²⁶

In early June, a number of Cherokees joined settlers in watching horse races and other sporting events during a fair in the Watauga settlement. Without provocation, Isaac Crabtree brutally shot and killed an Indian man whom local residents knew as Cherokee Billy. As the other Indians left to go home, the victim’s two companions, a man and a woman, angrily intimated that the whites could expect reprisals from their people for the murder. Inhabitants of the backcountry knew that when warriors took the warpath to avenge such an injury, they did not only target the guilty party but his entire community. Major Arthur Campbell notified Colonel Preston that the news of the threat had greatly alarmed the inhabitants of Clinch and Holston Valleys. While some braced for the expected onslaught and others prepared to flee, Campbell requested reinforcements and ammunition to defend that part of the county. He also sought diplomatic assistance, possibly with an appeal to the respected chief Oconostota, to exert his influence in calming the agitated Cherokees.²⁷

Campbell feared that Crabtree and “a few misled followers” would frustrate any efforts to prevent the calamity of a war. The major had learned that the frontier ruffian had recently traveled to Nolichucky, intent on crossing into Cherokee territory to rob or kill some Indians. To his surprise, he found not the two or three “defenseless wretches” that he expected but thirty-seven warriors acquainted with his reputation and intentions who would not fail to “examine” the encroaching troublemaker. Crabtree immediately retreated “with precipitation” to the relative safety of the Fincastle settlements but soon made plans for another attempt. Campbell considered the well-known Indian hater as the principal suspect in Cherokee Billy’s murder but doubted the likelihood of bringing him to justice. Although “sober minded” frontier inhabitants detested his act and disapproved of his conduct, they also, however inconsistently, had sympathy for him. They knew that he had survived the ambush in Powell’s Valley the previous October, which claimed the lives of six companions, including the son of their neighbor John Drake.28

A rumor soon circulated that the Cherokee had initiated their reprisals with an attack that killed a family on Copper Creek, a tributary of the Clinch. As the alarm following the alleged depredations spread, militia companies mustered, and residents became even less inclined to punish a neighbor for killing a single Indian. Campbell turned to the county lieutenant seeking guidance on how to proceed. Colonel William Christian—Preston’s deputy and highest ranking subordinate—noted that some settlers were “so desirous” of an Indian war that they “were sorry, exceedingly so,” to learn that the rumors concerning the Copper Creek massacre were unfounded. Christian lamented that such sentiment had prompted only “the most worthless” and least dependable men in the county to turn out for military service.²⁹

Along with his reply to Campbell, Preston enclosed a personal communication for Oconostota. The county lieutenant explained that Virginia authorities considered Crabtree a fugitive who would receive justice in court and appealed for the chief to dissuade Cherokee braves from taking the warpath. Campbell forwarded the missive to Watauga Association officials at Sycamore Shoals, who had planned a similar mission of peace, for “speedy conveyance” to the middle Cherokee towns. The major added his own letter to his acquaintance, Alexander Cameron of the Indian Department, asking him to use his good offices to resolve the matter. Campbell condemned Crabtree’s act with the highest “detestation” but also blamed the southern district deputy superintendent’s “Orders . . . to perhaps the profligate part of the nation” when encountering any Virginians on Cherokee lands to summarily act as both their “Judges and executioners . . . for robberies [committed].”30

Before composing and forwarding his and Preston’s letters to Watauga, Major Campbell ordered Captain John Campbell, his younger brother, to go downriver to the settlement closest to the “Indian Line,” the boundary with the Cherokees, for a special task. The captain personally engaged a man familiar with Cherokee country, especially the area on the Holston near its confluence with the French Broad River, to act as a “Spy” to watch the adversary’s activities and obtain intelligence.³¹

The captain instructed the volunteer to select a concealed position where he could observe the nearby ford and watch traffic on the path for most of the day. He would break twice each day to range some distance up and down the river looking for evidence that a large party of warriors had passed through the area. If he discovered any indication of an enemy advance toward the Virginia settlements, the spy had orders to return, report his findings, and alert the militia. After informing Preston of the preparations, Major Campbell confided his opinion that the Cherokees would willingly avoid a war unless Crabtree, or someone like him, committed an “affront” that provoked them to it. The major assured the colonel that he would transmit “an account of any true alarm that may happen,” as his duty required, and requested the county lieutenant to inform him when and “if the War has actually broke out to the Northward.”³²

While those at Pittsburgh had concerns for traders still in Indian country, the people of Fincastle County worried about the safety of the surveyors with Captain Floyd. Christian remarked to Preston that he believed they remained safe and “would not all be killed if fallen on,” or attacked, before returning. He proposed that Preston write to Crabtree’s company commander, either Captain James Thompson or William Campbell. The major suggested that the company commander encourage Crabtree to volunteer to go search for the surveyors and warn them to come home lest they encounter hostile Indians. Christian suggested that if Crabtree accepted the assignment and performed his mission well, it might serve to atone for his guilt.³³

The orders Preston had sent to the captains the previous month remained in effect. With an experience similar to that of Daniel Smith at Indian Creek, Captain Russell reported that at his company’s muster on June 25, the men voted to immediately build two forts in the Clinch River area “in as convenient Places as we can get.” Russell advised his superior that the shortage of gunpowder continued to hamper his company’s ability to defend the settlement, and he trusted that the colonel’s efforts to obtain some would meet success. Russell, like Smith, found that invoking the Invasions and Insurrections Act helped him to effectively halt the flight of nervous inhabitants. He was optimistic that in a future emergency he could “call for any Number of Men from Holston” as reinforcements whenever the service required.34 He added that since his unit covered a large regional catchment with men settled in very remote locations, he requested that Colonel Preston allow his company one additional subaltern. If approved, the colonel could either appoint a new lieutenant or ensign, or provide a blank commission, presigned by Governor Dunmore, so that Russell could select a deserving and qualified man.³⁵

Both sensible and sympathetic to the county lieutenant’s “Uncommon concern for the Security of Capt. Floyd and the Gentlemen with him,” the Fincastle County militia officers turned their attention to finding and notifying the surveyors of the danger they faced. Russell arguably understood their predicament best and expressed his fervent desire to locate and guide the men to safety before “they should fall a Prey, to such Inhuman, Bloodthirsty Devils, as I have so lately suffered.” He knew that sending out scouts offered the best chance for securing their survival and safe return, and prayed for God to shield them from harm until they could be found. Russell engaged Daniel Boone and Michael Stoner, “two of the best Hands” in his company, and instructed them “to search the Country, as low as the falls” of the Ohio, and return by way of Mansco’s Lick on the Cumberland, and through Cumberland Gap. With no time to spare, he sent them out to warn Floyd’s party of the danger and urge them to hasten their return home.³⁶

Despite the increased tensions, Preston expressed reservations about his legal authority to order the county’s militia into active service before the enemy actually invaded the colony. Christian opined that he could legally “encourage men to rise up and go without expressly ordering them” and bring their own horses and enough provisions to last four or five weeks. Christian believed Preston could easily assemble at least one hundred volunteers willing to take their chance at pay for themselves and stipends for the use of their horses and other private property until the General Assembly resolved the issue of the recently expired Militia Law.

Christian recommended that the county lieutenant seek the volunteers from four companies and embody them under the command of a capable and energetic officer. In accordance with Dunmore’s instructions, they would march down the Warriors’ Path on the left bank of the Great Kanawha, intercept any invaders coming from the other direction, and build a fort at its mouth. Even if they did not fight them, any Indians who noticed signs of the militia’s presence would most likely retreat. With the proposed number of volunteers, they could erect a small fort in about one week. The completed post would then serve to defend the frontier and provide a base from which patrols could continuously operate to “serve the Inhabitants, & perhaps cover the retreat of the Surveyors.” Christian knew that when the first volunteers’ time expired, the recruitment of replacements might prove difficult. He argued that if a war ensued as anticipated, the General Assembly would no doubt approve the expense, and Preston could order a draft for the necessary men to relieve the garrison.37

After considering the recommendation, Preston received intelligence of a “large party of Cherokees,” led by a warrior known as the Raven, headed either to or from the Shawnee towns in order to cooperate with them against the Virginians. Realizing the implications, Preston developed his plan. He reasoned that, “The present defenseless Situation of the Frontier Inhabitants of the County of Fincastle make it absolutely necessary [to] Raise & keep on foot a Number of Men, to Protect the Frontiers & annoy the Enemy.” He noted that neighboring counties, although no more exposed than Fincastle, had already raised men on the understanding that Lord Dunmore’s orders justified the measure. Under his authority as county lieutenant, Preston decided to raise a force of rangers.³⁸

Preston selected his deputy, Colonel Christian, to command the ranging force. He could not have chosen better.³⁹ First commissioned as an ensign in the militia at age fifteen, he had served as an officer in the 2nd Virginia Regiment in provincial service during the French and Indian War and rose to the rank of captain at eighteen. A brave and efficient officer, he participated in the Cherokee Expedition of 1760 and commanded rangers for frontier defense through Pontiac’s War. At thirty-one, he now held the rank of colonel. As deputy, Christian served as county lieutenant in Preston’s absence and commanded Fincastle County troops in the field. He was married to Anne Henry and studied law with her brother, Patrick Henry. When the General Assembly established Fincastle County, he received an appointment as a deputy clerk of the court and won election as one of the county’s two representatives in the House of Burgesses, where he served in the 1773 and 1774 sessions.

Colonel Preston held a council of war at Fort Chiswell, near the county seat at the New River community called the Lead Mines. Preston informed Christian of the mission, and the commanders of the companies what he expected of them. He ordered six captains to muster all the men of their companies, from which they would each raise 20 “good” men, “either as Volunteers or by Draught,” and asked for 30 additional volunteers from among the other companies, for a total force of 150 men, not counting the necessary officers. Once all the detachments assembled at the ordinary called the Town House on Holston—an “ordinary” being an inn or tavern licensed to serve food and drink to the public at a fixed price—located on the property of Captain James Thompson on the high ground between the Middle Fork and Sulphur Spring Creek, Christian would organize them into a corps of three companies. Preston had selected Captains Walter Crockett and William Campbell to each command one of the fifty-man companies, assisted by a lieutenant and an ensign. Christian exercised overall command, as well as that of the remaining fifty-man company. In addition to the normal complement of two officers for that company, Preston allowed him an additional subaltern, Ensign William Buchanan.40

The rangers served on foot, but Preston wanted the captains to encourage as many of the men as possible to bring their own horses to carry the required baggage. Trusting that the General Assembly would authorize paying the troops the necessary stipends, Christian preferred it to impressing pack animals from third parties. In addition to the supplies and provisions the quartermasters could procure, Preston wanted each of the men to bring enough from home so they could “Endeavour to Stay out a month or Six weeks.” In accordance with the current Invasions and Insurrections Act, Preston appointed “two honest men on Oath” to appraise the private property used for public service at the rendezvous, and present the owners with the certificates necessary to file their claims for the government to pay.

According to the original plan, after they assembled and organized at the Town House, Christian would lead the three companies to the Clinch and cross Cumberland Mountain by one of the gaps. After arriving at the “head branches of the Kentucky” River, they would “Range together or in separate parties & at such places” as Christian judged most likely for them to be able to discover, intercept, and repulse the enemy as they approached the Fincastle settlements. With seventy Cherokees reported on the move to “Join our Enemies,” many still hoped they would refrain from hostilities and remain neutral. The uncertainty prompted Preston to recommend that Christian exercise the utmost caution and discretion, but left it to his field commander’s “Prudence” on how to treat the Indians if encountered and “Judge by the Manner of their approach” before opposing their advance. If the Cherokees came on in a hostile manner, the rangers could anticipate that a number of Shawnees or other enemy Indians accompanied them, which “may render them formidable to your party.” Should the rangers encounter Floyd and the surveyors, Preston wanted Christian to warn them—if they were not already aware—of the danger that attended them and to return to the settlements.⁴¹

In “Rules for Marching” found in his Treatise of Military Discipline, the basic doctrinal manual for officers of the British army, Humphrey Bland wrote, “There is not any thing in which an Officer shews his want of conduct so much, as in suffering himself to be surprised . . . and by not having taken the necessary precautions to prevent it.”42 Familiar with its precepts and armed with his experience, Preston reminded Christian to keep “some active Men” out “to the distance of a mile” on the right and left flanks of his main body, and in his front and rear, while on the march, and to post sentinels when in camp. Such measures prevented surprise attack, “which is too often attended with fatal Consequences” and “above all things ought ever to be Guarded against.” Preston further emphasized, “Nor should this part of the duty be Neglected or even Relaxed on any occasion whatever.”⁴³

Although he probably did not have to tell Christian, Preston added a reminder to “keep up good order & Discipline . . . according to the Militia Law now in force.” He stressed the importance of consulting regularly with his subordinate officers, all of whom “will not only be very alert & obedient in their Duty; but they will keep Good order & Discipline in their companies” and remain cooperative and friendly among themselves so that “every Intention of Sending out the Party may be fully answered.” By saving the surveyors and performing the duty of rangers, Preston told Christian and his men, they would “render an Essential Service to the Country, as many lives thereby may be sav’d.” Preston concluded by telling Christian that he had instructed the captains commanding the companies providing the soldiers to select “none but choice officers & men on this little Expedition” because “the Eyes of the Country” were all on them. He harbored no doubt that every soldier would exert himself to “answer the wishes & expectations of his Country” and serve it as much as was in his power.⁴⁴

After receiving his orders on June 27, Christian notified Preston that he wanted to leave for the rendezvous the following Monday, July 4. Meanwhile, he sought to locate wagons and “a parcel” of seven or eight men willing to volunteer for the expedition whom Captain Daniel Trigg could spare from his company. While the captains mustered their companies, the colonels anxiously waited to learn the latest intelligence before putting the rangers into motion.⁴⁵

AS THE Shawnees and their Mingo allies prepared for war, runners traveled to neighboring tribes and implored other Ohio country nations, especially the Cherokees, Miamis, Wyandots, the various tribes of Unami and Munsee Delawares, as well as any others who would listen, to join or ally with their confederation against the Long Knife. They even appealed to the Six Nations, hoping they would join them and bring their dependents and allies into a pan-Indian military alliance—the worst fear of British America. War fever raged through the towns and villages of the five septs of the Shawnee nation and the bands of Mingoes they had taken under their influence and protection. Moderate voices failed to persuade young men, eager to display their martial prowess, to stay home. Talk of war was on everyone’s lips.

The missionary John Heckewelder described the “Shawanos” as “good warriors and hunters.” From personal observation, he saw them as “courageous, high spirited and manly, and more careful in providing a supply of ammunition to keep in reserve for an emergency, than any other nation” of the Ohio valley.46 Every warrior, he said, possessed the essential and indispensable qualifications of “Courage, art, and circumspection.”⁴⁷ In contrast, David Jones did not have such a high opinion of their military prowess or respect for Shawnee warriors as his Moravian counterpart. The traveling Baptist preacher described them as having “more timorous spirits, far from possessing anything heroick.” He wrote that they “seek all advantages” and never engaged in battle “without a manifest prospect of victory.” Jones concluded that an opponent need not fear Shawnee warriors “being saucy,” unless they had the advantage of “more than a double number [over their enemy].” While he admitted that they killed many in the last war, Jones hastened to add that most of their victims “were timorous women scared more than half dead at their sight, or else persons devoid of arms to defend themselves.”⁴⁸ Regardless of what a contemporary may have thought about their motivation or skill, the mere rumor of Shawnee warriors moving at large caused alarm and inspired panic along the frontier.

Indians rarely gave quarter to enemy combatants and often killed noncombatants as well. The practice of taking captives and assimilating them into their tribal families was intended to diminish an opponent’s community as well as offering condolence and replacing their own losses. Unlike Europeans, they did not look for, but avoided, pitched battles whenever possible and were at their best in individual combat. Unless surrounded with no chance of escape, Indian warriors would sooner retire from an engagement once they no longer held a tactical advantage rather than accept the cost of achieving an objective in the European sense. They preferred conducting raids and ambushes in order to inflict casualties as well as terrorize their enemy.

Regardless of the operation, warriors sought to fight only on their own terms, according to Heckewelder, by “stealing upon the enemy unawares, and deceiving and surprising him in various ways.”⁴⁹ The bloody and devastating raids of the French and Indian War and Pontiac’s War, such as those that Cornstalk had led against the Greenbrier Valley settlements in 1763, remained vivid in the memories of many backcountry inhabitants.

A number of chiefs and leading warriors had recruited new war parties in some Shawnee and Mingo towns. The day after the customary war dance, the warriors assembled early in the morning. With their heads and faces painted and packs on their backs, they marched away. As each war party left its village, it proceeded in silence, except for the chief. Leading from the front, he sang the band’s traveling song until the last warrior passed the edge of town, at which time they all discharged their firearms, and those who remained behind shouted encouragement and war whoops.50

WAR PARTIES crossed the Ohio to strike settlements in Augusta County. To reach their objectives and achieve complete surprise, the braves took great pains to conceal their tracks or any other evidence that gave their presence away. Large war parties divided into smaller ones, and they marched at some distance from each other for a full day at a time. The Shawnees had a well-known ability to deceive enemies by imitating the cries or calls of animals, such as a fawn or turkey during the appropriate season, to decoy or lure them into an ambush or “gain the opportunity to surround them.” Similarly, when scattered in the woods, they could easily locate one another by imitating the calls of different birds at appropriate times of the day, repeated from time to time, until they reassembled to camp for the night or to attack.⁵¹

On some occasions they marched single file, “treading carefully in each other’s steps so that their numbers could not be ascertained by the prints of their feet.”⁵² Captive Mary Jemison explained, “It is the custom of Indians when scouting, or on private expeditions, to step carefully and where no impression of their feet can be left.” Whenever possible, they walked on hard, stony, and rocky ground and avoided soft surfaces, to make it more difficult for an enemy to track them. “They seldom take hold of a bush or limb, and never break one,” Jemison continued, “and by . . . setting up the weeds and grass which they necessarily lop, they completely elude the sagacity” of any pursuers. Furthermore, the last man followed the file with a “long staff” and picked up all the grass and weeds that were matted down by others walking over them. The amazed Jemison said that he performed the task so well that he made a pursuit impossible, “for each weed was so nicely placed in its natural position that no one would have suspected that we had passed that way.”⁵³

The warriors became more attentive as they approached closer to the enemy. Jones remarked that Shawnees possessed an astonishing sharpness and quickness of sight. The training and experience that allowed them to notice trodden-down grass or the least impression left on grass or weeds where someone had walked provided another remarkable ability. Watching them in action convinced Jones that a Shawnee warrior could determine the sex and nationality of a person simply by looking at the footprints.54

Early in the morning of June 29, the sound of gunfire and war whoops shattered the stillness and reawakened nightmares of 1763, when Shawnee warriors struck the Greenbrier Valley settlements of Augusta County. In an engagement with a unit of local militia, the Indians killed one soldier and wounded the lieutenant in command before compelling them to retreat to Captain John Dickinson’s fortified house. Although their action had delayed the attackers long enough for more troops to assemble and noncombatants to find refuge, the Indians soon had Dickinson’s fort under siege. The captain sent runners to inform his counterparts commanding the companies in neighboring communities and he requested their immediate assistance.⁵⁵

AS THE Shawnees and Mingoes spoke of war at Wakatomika and Chillicothe, sent raiding parties across the Ohio, and sought allies, Oconostota called all the principal chiefs of the Overhill Cherokees to Chota, their principal town, or capital, on the Little Tennessee River. One day as they met in council, a serious disturbance disrupted their discussions. James Robertson and William Falling (or Faulin) arrived carrying the conciliatory letters from Watauga Association and Virginia officials on “behalf of the People to endeavor to Compromise the affair of killing the Cherokee at the Races.”

When they saw Robertson and Falling, many of the warriors joined the relatives and friends of the murdered Billy in calling for immediate reprisal starting with the two emissaries, despite the messages of peace they carried. Falling said they would have succeeded if not for the “interposition of some of their chiefs” who dissuaded them taking such a “rash step.” A number of the traders present in the town saw the commotion, grew timid, and fled for their lives before knowing the outcome. Some “set out for Carolina” or the Holston and Clinch settlements of Fincastle County, where they spread the rumors that caused alarm and resulted in panic and the calling out of additional militia.⁵⁶

The chiefs had discussed and debated the issues surrounding the increased tensions and the potential of war with Virginia. Speaking for all, Oconostota told Robertson and Falling that the discussions covered their people’s involvement with the murders of young Russell and Boone—and the rest of their party—in Powell’s Valley, the recent robberies of Virginia hunters, and Crabtree killing Billy at the races in Watauga. They denied that those guilty of the Boone-Russell murders acted with their approval. Although they admitted their people robbed hunters, they maintained that they did so with “Mr. Cameron’s authority.” Oconostota told them that The Raven had gone to the Shawnees without the nation’s approbation, but no one had heard from him since, and they suspected the Shawnees had killed him. They had rejected Shawnee appeals to join in fighting their common enemy, and as a result, some Shawnees had recently killed one of their people within sight of a Cherokee town.57 They accepted the messages the two emissaries delivered and promised to give them a reply to carry on their return.

AFTER READING the express from Greenbrier in Augusta County, Colonel Christian had to assume that more war parties roamed at large, including in Fincastle County, and alerted the vulnerable settlements to the danger. He directed Captain Joseph Cloyd to alert the companies at Walker’s Creek, Blue Stone River, and along New River to be on their guard and move their families to shelter until they determined the enemy’s strength and intentions. Swollen rivers in the area fortuitously hindered the Indians’ ability to make more attacks on the south bank of the New River, but militia leaders knew the short-lived relief would end as soon as the water receded.58

Christian directed Cloyd to have the men he had previously ordered to muster for ranger service assemble at the Town House as planned to receive further orders. The colonel directed that all of them should bring a horse loaded with all the ammunition and provisions they could carry, as he could not predict how long they might have to remain in the field before the emergency subsided or others came to their relief. Besides those being called out for actual service, Christian also directed Cloyd to determine the best places where the men of his company who were not marching should immediately erect forts. Christian believed that seeing the activity would encourage the timid local inhabitants to take heart and not flee.⁵⁹

“The hour that I so much dreaded (as to the peace of this Country) is now I am apprehensive near at hand,” wrote Major Arthur Campbell to Colonel Preston on Friday, July 1. Fear spread through the countryside as fleeing traders spread the bad tidings throughout the frontier districts. Some of the refugees told Campbell that the Cherokees had murdered the two messengers who carried the conciliatory messages to their chiefs as well as all the traders who remained in their towns when the rampage began. Based on this information, the major reported that the Cherokees had “at length commenced hostilities.” Some of the refugee traders also reported seeing at least forty Shawnee warriors arrive in the Cherokee towns, which caused Campbell to expect imminent attacks against the Holston and Clinch settlements. As soon as the bad news spread, the officer expected a number of residents to flee from their homes. As the situation deteriorated further, the captains commanding companies complained that the scarcity of ammunition compromised their ability to defend their communities. As the senior officer in the district, Major Campbell requested reinforcements and expressed his hope that Bedford and Pittsylvania Counties—the adjacent counties east of the Blue Ridge—would recognize the emergency and call out their militias to help. If the three counties joined forces “to face them [the Indians] about the lower settlements on this River,” he believed “the War might not be so calamitous.” He took the precaution to instruct some of the district’s captains to muster half of the men in their companies at the Town House in four days, starting on Tuesday, if not sooner.⁶⁰

Necessity dictated that Preston take every measure in his power to defend the country. In addition to the three ranging companies, he instructed Christian to call on the commanding officers of seven companies to draft 280 men to defend the Clinch River settlements. That force included fifty men each from the companies of Captains William Herbert and Thomas Madison, thirty each from those of Captains Walter Crockett and Robert Doack, and forty each from the companies commanded by Captains James Thompson, William Campbell, and Major Arthur Campbell. Once they completed the drafts, the men were to assemble at the Town House as quickly as possible. Should they need additional reinforcement, Preston directed the captains commanding the three companies on the Lower Holston River to keep eighty of their men ready to march on the shortest notice.

Meanwhile, Preston directed Christian to use the available forces at his command— drafted militia and rangers—to defend the various frontier communities as best he could. Because the Indians could strike anywhere, Christian sent a thirty-man patrol under a lieutenant and ensign to “range at the heads of Sandy Creek & Clinch” to gather intelligence and provide early warning, and a seventy-five-man detachment, with the necessary complement of officers, from the first draft to reinforce the local militia on the Clinch. Preston wanted his deputy to personally march the rest of his command down the Holston to either the lower road to the Clinch or the road through Moccasin Gap to the Holston. Preston trusted Christian’s judgment that from there, based on the latest intelligence, he would either continue to the Clinch or proceed down the Holston. In choosing the latter course, Christian would combine his unit with the drafted militia under his command. If the situation dictated that he use the drafted men as a separate detachment, Preston authorized Christian to place them under the command of such officers as he thought proper to appoint. Furthermore, if the situation dictated a need for additional scouts, Christian had the authority to select “not only good Woodsmen but Men of Property and Veracity” for the service.

As express riders hurried to deliver messages between superior and subordinate officers, Preston knew he could rely on Christian in any situation. To demonstrate the high level of confidence he placed in his field commander, Preston allowed Christian “to take any Measures for the Defense of the Frontiers” not specified in his written instructions. With an eye toward economy, the county lieutenant urged his deputy “not to Incur any Expense to the Country” except those “absolutely Necessary for the Protection of the People.” Otherwise, Preston only cautioned Christian not to commit forces far down the Holston unless acting on “well attested” intelligence. He only required Christian to send reports as often as possible, and immediately if “anything Extraordinary” happened.61

Panic followed close behind news that an Indian war had started. Many inhabitants deserted the settlements and fled east, but others resolved to meet the danger after seeing to the safety of their families. A number of the people settled on the New River as far up as the mouth of Reed Creek moved to the safety of the fort at Bell’s Meadows, where Christian knew some of his officers had also taken their wives and children before returning to their units. Others stayed closer to their farms but sheltered their families at neighbors’ fortified homes. Christian placed Captain Daniel Trigg in temporary command of the activated militia so he could remove his own family to safety at Colonel William Fleming’s Belmont estate in Botetourt County. Before leaving, he confided to Preston his belief that the panic would soon wane as militia officers exerted their authority. “I can’t think the people on the [New] river in the least danger if they would stay home,” he continued, “but I am afraid to over persuade them, as they will return of their own accord in some days.” Fifty pounds of much-needed gunpowder arrived, but Christian told his superior that in order to keep enough to supply the pending expedition, he would not “undertake to touch it” for distribution to local commanders unless the county lieutenant so ordered, or “the neighborhood is really attacked.”62

Elsewhere, panic spread. At the end of the first week of July, Captain Daniel Smith informed Preston that the constant rumor of pending Indian attacks had frightened inhabitants from almost the entire settlement at the head of the north fork of the Clinch to the Bluestone. The people at Indian Creek became so frightened from listening to and believing so many “propagators of false reports in the country” that he had difficulty restraining them from panic. Smith had no doubt that hostilities had commenced but lamented that “by passing thro’ the mouths of imprudent people,” reports that ought to have stirred the inhabitants to the common defense and caused neighbors to rely on each other for strength had the exact opposite effect. The rumormongers exacerbated the actual damage because they incited “timorous people to run away” instead of making a stand.

Captain Smith trusted the many men who said they would return after taking their wives and children to safety. He not only remained optimistic but planned accordingly. Before Lieutenant James Maxwell departed to visit his family in Botetourt County, Smith developed a plan to temporarily reorganize the men into two “separate companies, for the convenience of the inhabitants.” Each company, consisting of about half of the enrolled men, would take primary responsibility for defending half of the community and would support or reinforce the other in case of invasion. Such a disposition, they reasoned, provided the entire settlement more protection and would convince more settlers to stay instead of evacuating.

Some of those who had considered or actually evacuated Indian Creek blamed their timidity on a perception that Smith had not sent out the patrols to provide early warning. Without it, they felt the settlement offered a tempting and vulnerable target to Indian raiders. Smith had actually sent two scouts down Sandy Creek to reconnoiter, but they “brought no account of Indians” on their return. Within a short while, Smith sent out two more patrols. One two-man patrol ranged to the head of streams falling to the Louisa, and the other, consisting of Thomas Maxwell (James’s brother) and Israel Harmon, scouted down Sandy Creek. Instead of looking for evidence of enemy activity downriver, Maxwell and Harmon went in the opposite direction— to the head of the Sandy. They imprudently told inhabitants that remaining in their homes invited great danger. The two scouts then helped Jacob Harmon move his family and baggage to New River. When he learned that no one had gone down the Sandy, Smith immediately sent two reliable men to do the reconnaissance. As he waited two days for their return, the captain convinced some of the inhabitants who had considered leaving to stay. Smith wanted Thomas Maxwell called to account for his “Highly unworthy” behavior before a court-martial under the still subsisting Militia Law.

In spite of Smith’s efforts, his company’s strength dwindled. Poor attendance at the most recent muster convinced him that the men who remained suffered low morale, and he would have difficulty providing the drafts Preston ordered. He advised the county lieutenant that keeping a company of fewer than twenty unmotivated men in active service would serve no good purpose if they did nothing but help build forts in the busy time for laying by corn. The captain requested that the colonel instead permit him to keep his men at home but ready to march against any enemy the scouts discovered or join any company that required reinforcement. He knew that allowing them to work their fields between alarms gave purpose to their remaining on their farms and improved their spirits while it kept them available for militia service.63

As Preston managed the defense of Fincastle County, an express rider arrived from Williamsburg with Dunmore’s reply to his last report. The governor expressed his approval of the measures he and the other county lieutenants had taken and believed they would effectively prevent the “Savages” from inflicting much damage in the frontier districts. Should the Indians attempt to strike, Dunmore expected that the joint forces of the frontier counties would prove sufficient to not only repel but effectively “Chastise those restless and inveterate Enemys of Virginia.” He remained convinced of the need to build a fort for security at the mouth of the Great Kanawha as well as to take offensive action. He told Preston that marching “a Body of Men . . . into the Enemy’s Country” would certainly “put a Speedy and effectual end to the War, and Secure you a lasting peace.” In response to Preston’s request, Dunmore had also enclosed two majors’ commissions and authorized Preston to appoint the additional field officers.64

Despite rumors of their deaths, Robertson and Falling returned from Chota alive and safe. Major Campbell wrote to Colonel Preston with guarded optimism that after hearing their reports, he “would willingly believe that peace may yet be preserved with the Cherokees.” His optimism depended on preventing that “very insolent person” from committing some new provocation, but the major believed that Isaac Crabtree’s “timidity . . . will get the better of his ferocity.”⁶⁵ While making his way to Reed Creek on July 5, Colonel Christian met Falling and promptly informed Preston that his report satisfied him that Virginia had nothing to fear from the Cherokees, and he recommended that the county halt all the last-ordered drafts.⁶⁶

About a week later, Colonel Preston received a letter from Oconostota, addressed to him and Colonel Andrew Lewis, that William Kennedy certified was a “true Copy as Delivered to me from the Interpreters.” The chief acknowledged having received the condolence messages the colonels sent Robertson and Falling to read to them, and he replied, “All our Towns are met here [at Chota], and have heard this talk and think it a very good one.” The sachem expressed his pleasure and the satisfaction of his people with the Virginians’ renunciation of Crabtree’s heinous act and pledge to bring the murderer to justice, which made retribution unnecessary. Oconostota said he shared the Virginians’ desire for their peoples to “keep the path clean” on both sides of the boundary and to remain at peace. He promised that he would personally urge his nation’s young men to refrain from taking the warpath. In return, Oconostota requested that Preston and Lewis exhort Virginians to desist from encroaching on Cherokee country and respect the boundary line surveyed in 1772.⁶⁷

After he forwarded Oconostota’s letter to Lewis, Preston composed his reply to “the Chief of the Warlike Nation of the Cherokees, Friends & Brethren.” The colonel stated that he shared the desire for both sides to maintain peaceful relations to their mutual benefit. Preston then revealed that he knew that some Cherokees had already gone out to join with the Shawnees and informed Oconostota that Lord Dunmore would soon lead a punitive expedition against Virginia’s enemies. The colonel asked Oconostota to admonish his people against letting any French traders in their towns sway them to join with the hostile Shawnees. He warned that those who renounced neutrality would suffer the same consequences that awaited the Shawnees. Given the diminished possibility of war with the Cherokees, the need to maintain all the drafted militia in active service now represented an unnecessary expense. Major Campbell therefore discharged and sent them home to await the next alarm.68