CHAPTER 9

Equal to Any Troops

The Militia Accepts the Challenge

August–September 1774

BY MID-AUGUST, the Westmoreland County magistrates learned that when Pennsylvania’s Colonial Council, also known as the Provincial Council, met with Governor Penn in Philadelphia earlier in the month, it had taken up a number of matters concerning Pittsburgh and its surrounding area in light of the hostilities between the Shawnees and Virginia, and the continuing intercolonial boundary dispute. It first acted favorably on St. Clair’s advice to remove the colony’s trading concerns from Pittsburgh due to the “oppressive proceedings of Virginia.” The council concurred and recommended that Penn order a town to be immediately laid out “in the Proprietary Manor at Kittanning” to accommodate the traders and other inhabitants of Pittsburgh. Along with the order to lay out the town, the governor cautioned St. Clair that the order to erect a “stockade, or any other work, for the security of the place” that might involve the expenditure of provincial funds had to wait for concurrence of the provincial assembly.1

Reports from Pittsburgh suggested that the Shawnees and Delaware remained “entirely pacific” toward Pennsylvania, but the two Indian nations had experienced a rift. As the Shawnees continued to prepare for war against the Long Knife, who “seemed determined to pursue hostile measures against those Indians,” the Delaware remained on amicable terms with the Virginians. As a result, the Shawnees living closest to the Delaware removed their communities to their nation’s Lower Towns on the Scioto River. In response, the Pennsylvania Council recommended that the governor send messages to both tribes expressing concern over the recent disturbances and reassure them both of Pennsylvania’s continued friendship, and another message to Governor Dunmore urging him to seek accommodation with the Shawnees without resorting to war.2

In the messages, Penn would declare the province’s resolve to preserve the treaties of peace and friendship with both tribes. To the Shawnees, after expressing the great concern of Pennsylvania’s proprietary government at “the unfortunate disturbances” that occurred between them and “some of his Majesty’s subjects belonging to the Colony of Virginia,” he requested that they not strike the Virginians. Penn warned the Shawnees that harming any of His Majesty’s subjects would offend the king. He then instructed St. Clair to engage an agent the Indians trusted, suggesting the trader Matthew Elliott, who had done such work for the government in the past, to convey and interpret the written messages and accompanying wampum.3 Not surprisingly, Penn rejected the suggestion to hire Delaware warriors to defend the province’s frontier as “too delicate to intermeddle with,” but also deemed it improper to discharge the Westmoreland County rangers when their terms expired on August 10. He decided to “keep them on foot” at least until September, when he would place the matter before the assembly when it next convened.4

The governor’s correspondence reached Pittsburgh just before a number of Shawnee and Delaware chiefs gathered at Croghan’s plantation for a conference on August 21. In order to not offend the Six Nations, St. Clair had a “fair copy” of the original message addressed to the Delaware made for the visiting Iroquois deputies and presented it with some wampum at the meeting.5 When he then rose to address “the Chiefs and Warriors of the Delaware Indians,” St. Clair read Penn’s letter aloud. On behalf of the governor, St. Clair apologized for “some of our foolish young men” who had murdered John Weepy and for the Virginians who had killed some of their people below Fort Pitt. He then commended them for their having “a good heart” to not take it as a cause to go to war to exact revenge, but viewed the events in a “proper light.” St. Clair continued to tell the assembled Delaware and Iroquois deputies that Governor Penn intended to write the Virginia governor in an effort to restore friendship between the Big Knife and the Shawnees and asked their assistance to persuade the Shawnees to likewise “make up their differences with the Virginians.”6

After the conference, the Delaware learned that Penn had ordered “a trading place” erected at Kittanning. St. Clair relayed to the governor that the Indians expressed their gratitude and their concern. “They are in want of many things already,” he said, “and cannot come to Pittsburgh” owing to the boundary dispute and the looming Indian war.

St. Clair was always critical of the Virginians, and when he wrote the governor at the end of the month, he said he believed it “Impossible to tell what will be the Consequences of the Virginia Operation” into Shawnee country. He continued to deride their military capability and believed “they will not be able to bring on a war.” With the campaign season drawing to an end, he hoped Dunmore realized the “Necessity of Peace.” In his view, the Virginians’ “last Exploit”—the expedition against Wakatomika—did not give them “much stomach for another” military venture. St. Clair perceived “such Confusion amongst the Troops, and Dysention amongst the Officers,” that had they attempted another foray, he believed “they most certainly must have been cut off [destroyed]” by the Indians. To heighten his concern even more, St. Clair gleaned some disturbing intelligence from reading a letter from a trader in Detroit to a merchant in Pittsburgh. The trader revealed that the “Indians in that Country” will all join the Shawanees” to fight the Virginians. Braves returning from the Virginia frontier had brought enough scalps to encourage others, and leading warriors, eager to help the Shawnees fight the Big Knife, had a “general Rendezvous appointed on the Oubach [Wabash].”7

Instead of engaging a trader like Elliott, St. Clair entrusted the Delaware chief called Captain Pipe to deliver Penn’s message to “the Chiefs and Warriors of the Shawanese Indians.” On his arrival at their principal town of Chillicothe, Pipe expressed Penn’s gratitude for their ensuring the safety of Pennsylvania traders and had “kept fast hold of the chain of friendship” with his colony. He read the Pennsylvania governor’s urgent request that they resolve their differences with the Virginians and asked that when “any of the wicked people of Virginia” murdered their people, that the Shawnees not “take revenge upon innocent people” but complain to that colony’s governor to punish the guilty.

Pipe relayed Penn’s warning that if the Shawnees killed innocent people on account of the actions of some of their countrymen, “the Virginians must do the same thing by you, and then there will be nothing but war between you.” As he continued speaking for Penn, he warned the chiefs to “Consider . . . that the people of Virginia are like the leaves of the trees, very numerous,” and the Shawnee people “but few.” Their warriors might kill “ten thousand of their people for one that they kill of yours,” he said, but “they will at last wear you out and destroy you.” Any hostile action would only provoke the Virginians to “send a great army in your country and destroy your towns and your corn, and either kill your wives and children or drive them away.” Penn, through Pipe, reminded them that Pennsylvanians, Virginians, and Shawnees “were all children of the great King who lives beyond the great water.” They could therefore expect that the king would take his anger out on those at fault and punish them accordingly. Urging that they “forgive what is past and offer to make peace,” Penn offered to write Dunmore and persuade him to “join in mending the chain of friendship” that had been broken.8

THROUGHOUT Fincastle County, units of marching men, convoys of wagons and packhorses, and herds of cattle began to move. In some units, officers still had more men to recruit, organize, and train. Quartermaster and commissary officers still shuttled about their districts in the effort to engage packhorse and cattle drivers, and to gather what the troops needed, whether they were going on the expedition to take the fight to the enemy or guarding the backcountry communities from Indian irruption by manning garrisons, conducting patrols, or scouting the trails. In return, those farmers, herders, millers, smiths, merchants, and others who, in addition to performing military duty in many cases, gave the army the supplies and services it needed, received vouchers that acknowledged the colony’s debt to them. After the House of Burgesses convened and appointed the required commissioners to evaluate the muster rolls and public service claims, the colonial treasurer would redeem their receipts for payment.

From local company catchments, the men marched to their respective district rendezvous camp for inspection by the major. Those in the Lower Holston district reported to Major Arthur Campbell at the Town House on Holston. The companies of the Upper Holston district marched to Fort Byrd at Culberston’s Bottom and reported to Major James Robertson. The majors inspected and accepted them into the county’s service, issued rations and camp equipment needed for the march, and sent them on their way. Some marched in company with packhorse trains laden with supplies and provisions, or herds of cattle that the quartermasters and commissaries had acquired and forwarded to the general rendezvous for use on the expedition.

Colonel Andrew Lewis informed Colonel Preston that in addition to what came for the Botetourt County contingent, packhorse driver John Criner carried “1 1/2 barrels” of much-needed gunpowder for the Fincastle troops to the rendezvous. He reminded Colonel Preston, the Fincastle County lieutenant, to have Colonel Christian give the agent a certificate for the powder and whatever else he delivered for his men. Because it still remained in short supply, Colonel Lewis asked Preston to ensure the Fincastle contingent brought “all ye powder that you can possibly spare” to the Great Levels. With the start of the expedition fast approaching, Lewis turned once more to the matter of recruiting and asked Preston to inform him of his success as soon as possible lest they have to resort to a draft.9

A detachment of eighty men from the companies of Captains William Campbell, Herbert, and Shelby marched “in high Spirits” from Royal Oak for the Lower Holston district’s rendezvous at the Town House on August 16, according to Major Arthur Campbell. However, the practices by which Captain Looney and Lieutenant Drake had attempted to recruit men in the catchment areas reserved for Campbell’s and Shelby’s companies, and Ensign Vance had similarly tried to recruit for Smith’s company in the area reserved for Russell’s, had hindered the ability of the units assigned to those sectors to achieve their required numbers in a timelier manner. Campbell still sought “to humour all parties” until they arrived at the district rendezvous. There he hoped such contention would become a matter of “indifference” and the men would all decide to “go on the Expedition cheerfully” with the officers to whom they first committed as volunteers. Most of all, he had sought to have all of the Lower Holston volunteers at the district rendezvous for Preston’s inspection by August 22.

Captain Russell wrote to Preston to express his disappointment and explain the cause for the delay of his company’s departure for the rendezvous. The troops that were expected to replace his men at the forts so the “Volunteers might March to the appointed place of Rendezvous for the expedition” had yet to arrive. Such “relief,” he reminded the colonel, had been promised the men when they “Engaged [enlisted]” and agreed to serve in the garrisons in the interim. Likewise, John Brander, the supplier, had not yet delivered the brown linen for making their hunting frocks, as Russell had promised they would receive for joining. His company otherwise stood ready to depart Castle’s Woods, and given the distance they had to travel, Russell requested the “same Indulgence” for an increased proportion of packhorses to men as the colonel had granted to Shelby.10 Russell then made an additional request. One of his men, “a very good Hand,” did not have a weapon. He recalled that when he “was in the service before, there was near twenty press’d Guns which the County freely pay’d for.” Citing the applicable provisions in the Militia Act for justification and the urgency of the situation, Russell requested his man be issued one without waiting for the court to conduct its inquiry.11

The Fincastle County militia officers met in a council of war on August 2 to develop a plan for “the Defense of the Frontiers, in the absence of the Troops [going on the proposed expedition].” The county lieutenant, Colonel Preston, ordered Captain Thompson to “guard the lower settlements on Clinch” with a company of sixty men, but as late as August 25, the “upper settlements” remained “uncovered.” The colonel therefore instructed Major Campbell to appoint Captain Daniel Smith, assisted by as many subaltern officers as the major deemed appropriate, to command a similar company to guard that sector. The colonel further instructed the major to form a new sixty-man company, with thirty of them drafted from the administrative companies of Captain Herbert and the late Captain Doack, with the subalterns appointed from the companies that produced the most men. Preston then instructed Campbell to “examine carefully into the number of Scouts on that Quarter,” in order to retain the most active and trustworthy, but reduce the overall number.12

A number of inhabitants on the Clinch submitted a petition for the county lieutenant to increase the number of troops on duty and employ more of them “in the Service” paid by the colony. Campbell forwarded the petition with his recommendations to Colonel Preston. In the interim, he informed the petitioners that all who performed “regular duty might be continued on the [active duty] Lists until a sufficient Number of Draughts” arrived to complete the companies defending their settlements. If more than the required numbers arrived, he pledged to recommend that in organizing their units, officers keep the “best Woodsmen” from among the locals in pay to serve as rangers before accepting volunteers from Holston or New River. Campbell endorsed the request by warning that a weak defense would cause more settlers to flee the frontier.13

Finally on the march, Captain Russell expected to arrive at the district rendezvous on Monday, August 29. With thirty-one rank and file “fit for the business,” and more to follow and join him at camp, he planned to have a full company before marching to the general rendezvous. John Brander had still not delivered the brown linen before they left Castle’s Woods. With his company “badly fix’d, for the want of Hunting shirts, and Blankets,” Russell took a “handful of men” to the supplier’s home while the rest continued their march to the Town House. Russell arrived only to discover Brander and his wagon away “on this side of New River,” but he was determined to get his men the supplies they lacked before they joined the rest of the army.14

Russell had never asked Preston to relieve him, as Major Campbell had suggested, but he knew that the county lieutenant wanted John Floyd to command a company on the expedition. Aware that little time remained for his fellow captain to recruit the required number of men, Russell offered to resign his “Interest . . . of the Volunteers” to Captain Floyd and assist him in recruiting the men still needed (if Preston so desired). In return, Russell requested that he command a company defending the Clinch River inhabitants for as long as the colony needed “to keep Men under pay, in this Quarter.” Knowing that Preston had appointed Captain James Thompson to command a company posted at Blackmore’s Fort, Russell recommended a shared responsibility. He said that Thompson could command toward the head of the river while he had the lower settlements. Regardless, Russell urged Thompson to use troops “that ought to be Ranging, besides those in the Forts, as Constant Guards” for the settlement. Finally, Russell assured the colonel of his preference to serve on the expedition.15

To no one’s surprise, Preston wanted the experienced Russell to go on the expedition. Although the county lieutenant accommodated Floyd’s request to raise and command his own company, the colonel had no intention of having him replace Russell. By August 26, Floyd had “engaged only 3 men,” but Sergeant Ephraim and Lieutenant Joseph Drake claimed they could enlist another eight. The lieutenant, who wished to command his own company, added that forty more men waited to join at the Town House, but he insisted they would only serve under him.16

The practices of officers like Drake raised questions and threatened the cohesion of several units. Not only did he lead Floyd to believe he acted on his behalf, Drake had designs on commanding his own unit. Furthermore, he had recruited men who resided in catchments reserved for other captains and thus added needless competition that increased the difficulty of raising expeditionary units. When Major Campbell informed some men that Drake had improperly recruited them, he explained such “former faults or breaches of their Words would now be overlook’d, provided they marched to the Camp” as Colonel Preston had ordered. Most of them agreed and seemed eager to get started on the expedition without further delay. Drake, however, became quite “incensed” at Campbell’s actions and accused the field officer of further interference when he learned that Floyd released six men he had recruited to rejoin their original captains’ companies upon his arrival at the Town House.17

When Captain Floyd conveyed Preston’s order for Lieutenant Drake and Ensign Vance to serve as the subalterns, both agreed to march as part of his company. An hour later, after having spoken with some of the men, Vance had a change of mind and refused. Major Campbell publicly gave him a direct order, but the recalcitrant ensign once more refused. When the major ordered someone else to take charge, Drake objected in a “Clamorous manner” and said he would march them himself. Campbell did not wish to cause a further delay in getting the men to the rendezvous. He issued provisions and sent the men with Vance and recommended that Preston consider Drake’s behavior grounds for dismissal from the service.18

Once he learned the truth about Drake’s duplicity in recruiting, Floyd doubted the ability to raise his company. Counting those Drake had recruited, several of whom either lived within the catchment of Captain Campbell—from which his officers could not recruit—or had enlisted from outside of the colony, he had fifteen men on hand. Since Major Campbell sent them all to the rendezvous, and Captain Campbell’s had a full complement, Floyd anticipated no further cause for resentment if the men recruited remained in his. As a possible means of completing Floyd’s company, Major Campbell suggested that Preston appoint Daniel Boone, a lieutenant in Russell’s administrative company, to recruit the balance of Floyd’s unit. According to Russell, Boone had applied to go on the expedition as soon as he returned from his search for the surveyors. A “very popular Officer where he is known,” Campbell believed Boone could raise and march enough men to the Town House in time to complete Floyd’s company.19

Floyd finally thought everything was in order, and the company ready to march, when Ensign Vance refused to go. Most of the men then “revolted” and refused to serve on the expedition with “nobody but Capt. Drake.” In Drake’s absence, those men blamed Floyd and accused him of only wanting them to march under Vance’s command to “get some of my own ends answered.” Floyd now regretted having “undertaken any such thing as raising a company,” which, if given the choice, he would not do again “for a £100.”20

By the last day of August, Colonel Christian had a battalion composed of the better part of six Lower Holston district companies, plus one chaplain, one armorer, and two butchers, prepared to march. After taking roll, Captains Walter Crockett, William Herbert, William Russell, Evan Shelby, William Campbell, and James Harrod reported having a total of 15 company officers, 16 sergeants, 2 musicians, and 222 “rank and file”—corporals and privates— ready to proceed. A packhorse train loaded with baggage, supplies, and equipment, plus a herd of cattle, completed the unit. Crockett assigned six of his soldiers to the train, one as the officers’ batman, or personal servant, and five as packhorse drivers. In addition, fourteen-year-old John Canterbury volunteered “to assist in driving Cattle for the supply of the Army.” As the battalion marched, the train and herd increased as Christian accepted additional horses, beeves, and supplies at various points along the seventy-five-mile route to the Great Levels.21

Three men who had not answered the roll call before their units departed remained unaccounted for, and Christian notified Colonel Preston to “Advertise them as Deserters.” Major Campbell remained at the Town House to command the district’s defenses and forward late-arriving individuals, units, parts of companies, and supplies to the general rendezvous. Campbell also assumed responsibility for sorting out recruiting controversies, dealing with disciplinary problems, and accommodating the three men left behind as too ill to march with their companies. Once fit for duty, the latter would depart Camp Union with a follow-on unit or convoy escort.22

At Fort Byrd, Major Robertson dealt with a number of problems, some of them similar to what Campbell experienced, as he prepared the Upper Holston district companies to march. Although he had “picked up Some” men, he and other commanders experienced “poor Success” in recruitment. To bring their units to strength, they had to “Stir up Some Backward Scoundrels . . . to turn Out or Else force them for neither Honour nor Intreatys will move them [to serve their county].” The time had come to implement impressment, albeit with reluctance.23 Announcing the likelihood of a draft, he believed, might motivate a few fence-sitting potential recruits to enlist, as a verse of The Recruiting Officer suggested:

 

Hear that brave Boys, and let us go,

Or else we shall be ’prest you know,

Then ’list and enter into Pay,

And o’er the Hills and far away.24

 

Recommending that other commanders follow his example, Robertson called a muster of his administrative company for Saturday, September 3. In accordance with Preston’s instructions, he planned to draft only “Hulking young dogs [who had thus far avoided honoring their obligations] that Can well be Spar’d,” but no men who had families. Once accomplished, he planned to march to “Overtake the Army” at the Great Levels a week later. Unfortunately, a disappointed Robertson lamented that “not one of the younger fellows Appeared [at the muster] that could go.”25

In the equally critical task of gathering equipment, supplies, and provisions, Major Robertson’s report reflected similar frustrations. On September 4, for example, he waited at Culberston’s Bottom for delivery of two beeves and a load of flour, which he would forward wherever the county needed it. One farmer brought two hundred bushels of corn, which he already had ground into flour at a local mill, and would “fondly spare” for the expedition. Such contributions of the civic-minded stood in stark contrast to the likes of “Two Cursed Scoundrels.” He referred to a father and son who shirked their own military duty but looked on the emergency as an opportunity to reap a financial harvest while they enjoyed the protection provided by the men who shouldered muskets in the ranks. The opportunists had “Corn, Beef and Old Bacon Plenty to Spare” but refused to accept the receipt to redeem for a public service claim later and would “by no means Let it go with out the Ready Cash.” Robertson paid them the money but suspected they “would do all they Can to Hurt the Expedition.”26

Captain Michael Woods commanded a company but was unable to reach its required strength. Although someone told him he could expect some volunteers from Pittsylvania County, Woods held no illusions he could raise a full company in the time that remained. A few of those whom the captain engaged “some time agone” had since changed their attitudes and refused to march. He asked Preston for advice on how to best proceed with such persons. In a more optimistic vein, Woods reported that his unit had fourteen soldiers “willing to go to the Shawanese towns” and requested to “Join Companies with Major Robertson” and go on the expedition, realizing he would serve in the capacity and pay of a lieutenant.27

After going thirty-two miles, Colonel Christian and the lead element of Fincastle troops reached the head of Rich Creek on September 2, with forty-two miles to go. The march had taken longer than expected since the troops spent so much time finding the horses and gathering cattle every morning before they could start. As planned, they had acquired more beeves as they went so that the colonel now counted two hundred head in the herd. Christian recommended that if Robertson had trouble getting enough cattle in his area he could collect the difference at Rich Creek. The colonel estimated it would take Robertson two days to reach Rich Creek, plus two more to drive the cattle to the Great Levels.

Because it would take them too far off his route to get the “between 7 and eight hundred pounds of Flour” stored at Woods’s fort, Christian told the captain to move it. He instructed Woods to send four of his active-duty men to obtain or exchange some poor horses and pack saddles at Smithfield for more serviceable ones, and once “better fixed,” return to move the flour to the Great Levels. After checking with Colonel Preston, Christian also told Woods to march his men to Culberston’s Bottom and join Major Robertson for the expedition.28

COLONEL CHARLES LEWIS, the county lieutenant, called the units of Augusta County to assemble in Staunton at the ordinary kept by Sampson Mathews, who was a major in the militia. He established his headquarters at the rendezvous and, except for taking time to execute his last will and testament at the courthouse on Wednesday, August 10, Lewis devoted his time to preparing the battalion for the expedition. Companies soon began to arrive. Captains George Mathews (Sampson’s younger brother) and Alexander McClanahan “Marched with noble Companies all cheerfully willing to go to the Shawnee towns,” according to Reverend John Brown of the New Providence Presbyterian congregation. When Captain Samuel McDowell marched into town on August 18, however, his company did not have “the number of men allotted to him.”29

Like their counterparts in Fincastle County, the company commanders in Augusta worked diligently to bring their units to full strength before they marched to the rendezvous in Staunton. Those militia soldiers already on duty represented a source of men predisposed to military service that they could recruit, although they had to replace them at the forts. While serving at a post defending the Tygert valley settlements, Sergeant Benjamin Cleaver “was called on & volunteered to go.” Other captains resorted to a draft if they could not recruit enough privates for their expeditionary companies. A drafted man, such as one named Cox, enrolled in the company of Captain John Dickinson, had to either serve or face legal consequences unless he could furnish a substitute. John Cox, although still “quite a youth, volunteered as a substitute” to go in his father’s place.30 The draft proved less successful in other companies. Reverend Brown heard “25 that were drafted refuse to go” with Captain McDowell “& design to run the hazard of the fine.” The clergyman expressed sorrow “that both parents & those that have refused speak & act so unreasonably relative to the present expedition.”31

Major Mathews, the Augusta County quartermaster, had served as a commissary officer in the French and Indian War and knew his business well. He and his assistants worked tirelessly to gather the packhorses, cattle, provisions, and supplies the Augusta County units needed. Although “several Companies were at the Warm Springs,” about six hundred troops had assembled at Mathews’s inn. With Colonel Lewis at their head, Augusta “Men & provisions” began marching for the Great Levels on August 30.32

DUNMORE HAD designated Winchester, seat of Frederick County, as the place of rendezvous for most units of the expedition’s right wing. Located in the lower Shenandoah valley, Winchester had become “one of the largest towns . . . in this Colony” by 1774. The gentleman traveler Nicholas Cresswell, after observing the surveyed half-acre plots aligned on parallel streets, described it as “Regularly laid out in squares the buildings are of limestone,” and containing a courthouse and “Two Churches, one English and one Dutch.”33

As August drew to a close, the pace of militia mobilization quickened. Once the companies from Frederick, Hampshire, Berkeley, and Dunmore Counties had assembled, including those who previously went on McDonald’s raid, they would begin the march to Pittsburgh on the first leg of the expedition. Now Major-Commandant John Connolly, who supervised the raising of companies and gathering of supplies in the West Augusta district, came down from Fort Dunmore to join the rest of Dunmore’s staff in planning the operation.

Colonel Adam Stephen wrote from Berkeley Courthouse on August 27 to inform his friend, Richard Henry Lee, that Lord Dunmore had ordered him to the Ohio to “put matters on a footing to establish a lasting peace with the brave natives.” Stephen expressed his opinion that the Indians “would behave well, were they not poisoned by the blackguard traders allowed to go among them, [and] to their different towns.” Colonel Stephen’s military duty precluded his attendance at the congress, where he “would expect to see the spirit of the Amphyctions shine, as that illustrious council did in their purest times, before debauched with the Persian gold.”

In his letter, Stephen outlined some of the grievances British Americans wanted redressed and hoped the congress could facilitate that resolution. “The fate of America depends upon your meeting,” he told Lee, “and the eyes of the European world hang upon you, waiting the event.” Speaking of the unpopular Quebec Act, Stephen warned that “Despotism, and the Roman Catholic religion is established in Canada.” Likewise, with regard to the Administration of Justice Act, the colonel questioned if British Americans could “enjoy liberty, if the villain who ravishes our wives, deflowers our daughters, or murders our sons, can evade punishment, by being tried in Britain, where no evidence can pursue him?” At the same time, if “A governor to suppose me of a crime,” Stephen said, he could not expect a “fair trial in America.”34

Stephen said he had written mainly to inform Lee that due to performing military service, he could not attend the General Congress in Philadelphia. His explanation, however, modestly understated the role he would fill. The governor had designated Stephen, the county lieutenant of Berkeley County, to command the right wing of the expedition. When Lieutenant Augustine Prevost of the British 60th Regiment of Foot met Stephen in Pittsburgh a few weeks later, he described the Virginia colonel as “a gentleman . . . who had seen some service during the last war who bears a worthy good character.”35 Stephen had actually served throughout the French and Indian War. Starting as a captain in command of a company in 1754, he rose to the rank of colonel and command of the 1st Virginia Regiment before the conflict ended, and he commanded a provincial rifle battalion that guarded the frontier and accompanied Bouquet’s expedition against the Shawnees in Pontiac’s War. In addition to wartime contributions, Stephen was an officer of both the court and militia of Frederick County until a 1772 act of the General Assembly created Berkeley County, at which time Governor Dunmore appointed him its sheriff and county lieutenant.

Although Stephen held the title, Dunmore exercised actual direct command of the wing. Stephen therefore functioned as his second in command and assumed responsibility for executing all of the associated administrative and logistical functions. When the two wings met and combined, Dunmore would become commander in chief while Stephen assumed actual command of the right wing. The unpleasant duty of contending with Lieutenant Colonel Horatio Gates therefore fell to the de facto second in command. Gates, a former major in the British army, had retired on half-pay to Berkeley County and redeemed the land bounty he received for his service during the Seven Years War to acquire the property he named Traveler’s Rest. In 1773, Dunmore commissioned Gates “as a lieutenant colonel of militia of Berkeley County, whereof Adam Stephen, Esq., is Lieutenant and Chief Commander.”36 With hope and confidence in the abilities and experience of the former regular officer, the governor appointed Gates to command the Berkeley County contingent on the expedition.

In a shocking and ill-advised August 22 reply to Dunmore, Gates not only declined the appointment but questioned the governor’s authority to call him to actual service under the now-expired Militia Act. Two days later, Colonel Stephen informed his subordinate that “his Lordship Testifyd his Surprise that you should Suppose he would act under a Law that had no Existence.” Not yet done, Stephen continued on the governor’s behalf, “His Lordship therefore Commands me to acquaint you that he expects you will join him directly, & take the Command of the Detachment of Berkley Militia, now marching under Orders by Virtue of that Law.”37 Gates remained unconvinced, but his reply lacked the courage of conviction as he wrote, “I am at present confin’d to my House by a Violent Intestinal Fever.” Attempting a graceful withdrawal, Gates replied to Stephen, “as soon as I am able to ride, I shall wait on Lord Dunmore.”38

The right wing broke camp and began the march along Braddock’s Military Road to Pittsburgh in the last week of August. Lord Dunmore then had a force of “upwards of Seven hundred with him,” which included the “400 that march’d with Maj. McDonald & three hundred with himself.”39 On August 30, Dunmore halted at Oldtown, Maryland, on the Potomac River about sixty miles from Winchester. After he visited the Cresap family home to pay his respects to Colonel Thomas Cresap, Michael’s father, the governor took the opportunity, with Colonel Stephen and Major Connolly “at his elbow,” to send a letter informing Colonel Andrew Lewis at Camp Union of a change in plan. Dunmore now instructed Lewis to march the left wing to the mouth of the Little Kanawha to meet the rest of the army.40

The Northern Division of the army resumed its march and halted at Redstone, where additional companies joined the expedition and the column split. Dunmore continued on the road toward Pittsburgh at the head of between three hundred and four hundred men and a convoy of twelve wagons. On September 20, the recently promoted Major William Crawford led a detachment of five hundred men with a train of fifty packhorses and a herd of two hundred head of cattle to Fort Fincastle at Wheeling. Connolly rode on ahead to Pittsburgh when the slower moving column stopped at the Great Meadows. He would join Major McDonald, who had previously led a supply convoy to Fort Dunmore, to help direct the efforts of the West Augusta district’s officers as they continued recruiting men and as Captain William Herrod, the quartermaster general, and his commissary officers acquired cattle, provisions, and other supplies for the right wing.41

COLONEL ANDREW LEWIS had designated the Great Levels, a savannah situated on the Greenbrier River about eight miles from White Sulphur Springs, as the location for the general rendezvous of the left wing, or Southern Division. He named it Camp Union because it represented the place where troops from Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle Counties united for the expedition. Due to the close proximity of their home communities to the rendezvous, the Botetourt County companies of Captains John Stuart and Matthew Arbuckle arrived first and established their bivouacs by August 27, but no other units arrived for five more days.

The sound of drums and fifes heralded the arrival of Colonel Charles Lewis and most of the Augusta County contingent on September 1, prompting Colonel William Fleming, who arrived shortly behind them, to remark that “Companies have been coming in every day since.” Camp Union quickly became a very busy place. Reveille beat every morning before daybreak as the signal to rise in the camps and for sentinels to cease challenging. In the respective lines, captains commanding companies formed their men, called the rolls, and examined arms. Officers met in councils of war to discuss plans. Martial music filled the air as fifers and drummers practiced and beat the required calls at the appropriate times for guard mount and other camp duties. Soldiers drilled, melted lead into molds to make bullets, performed work details and guard duty, and on Sunday attended divine services. Convoys of supply wagons and packhorses, and herds of cattle delivered the sinews of war. Every duty day ended at sunset with the beating of retreat, when the soldiers returned to their tents for the evening and sentries were required to challenge all who approached their posts.42

Despite militia troops being posted at the various forts, on the march, and now encamped at the Great Levels, the backcountry remained dangerous. Indian war parties roamed near the settlements and looked for easy targets to attack, which caused the prudent settlers to remain vigilant and cautious. Colonel Fleming had left his Belmont estate for Camp Union on Monday, August 21, but did not arrive until more than a week later. He had “delayed a day or two on purpose,” waiting to “fall in with some provision escorts” rather than travel alone. Although he did not find a unit to accompany, his caution proved well founded when he learned that the assembling army had “some Indian Spies attending us” who occasionally fired on “a straggling person” whom they could catch at a disadvantage when “not too near the camp.”

Colonel Andrew Lewis, the commander in chief, arrived on September 1. Before he left for camp he ordered three men to guard Fleming’s Belmont plantation in his subordinate’s absence. Captain Stephen Trigg, who remained behind to command the defenses in the area, would increase, replace, or dismiss the guards if Fleming’s wife, Nancy, desired.43

First Sergeant William Kennerly, who had volunteered for service in Captain George Mathews’s Augusta County company, recalled receiving orders for a detached mission. After they had marched from the county rendezvous at Staunton to Camp Union, Colonel Lewis sent Matthews’s and Captain George Moffett’s companies to the Tygart River valley, where they built a small post. Named Warwick’s fort, for Jacob Warwick, the owner of the property and member of Captain John Dickinson’s company, it was to shelter the region’s inhabitants. When the two companies returned to Camp Union to participate in the expedition, Kennerly remained to command the sixteen-man detachment left as the garrison.44

On September 2, Fleming’s first full day at the Great Levels, a messenger brought word that Indians had attacked “Stewart’s fort,” about four miles away. The detachment of soldiers dispatched to the scene found that Indians had fired on and “slightly wounded” one man, who managed to escape. The next day, a patrol brought “a Countryman from another Quarter,” named McGuire, into camp. The “much wounded” McGuire suffered from a “Shot through the Jaw” and had to have “a bullet cut out of his Cheek.” Although the braves preferred to target the “country People” who lived “near little Forts about 3 miles” distant, they had otherwise caused little damage. Fleming believed that the frontier would become “altogether safe” after the army marched, since its motions would “fully employ” the warriors in defending their own country and thereby draw their attention away from the settlements.45

The troops estimated two enemy war parties of four or five men each operated in the area. The officers therefore took measures to keep the encampment secure while the companies trained and made ready, and quartermaster and commissary officers had their men unload, inventory, and prepare supplies for the campaign. Following the procedure prescribed in General Bland’s Treatise on Military Discipline, each battalion in camp detailed troops that contributed to a variety of camp guards every day, with the main guard and picket guards considered the most important.

The main guard provided the camp’s external security. It usually consisted of a company commanded by a captain, with its men posted as sentinels around the camp’s perimeter and at special installations, such as the baggage train, boats, cattle, packhorses, and, if it had one, the artillery park. Each of the camp’s tenant battalions also provided a daily picket guard. Under the command of a captain, the picket guard consisted of one lieutenant, one ensign, three sergeants, and fifty rank-and-file soldiers for a twenty-four-hour period.46

After standing the daily guard mount, each company-sized body of men maintained themselves “always ready to march at a moment’s warning” either to sustain outposts, escort foraging parties, or “in case the enemy should endeavor to surprise . . . [the] camp, to march out and attack them, in order to give the army time to draw up” in line of battle. If an alarm sounded, each captain would form his men and lead them to a designated point of rendezvous with the other battalions’ guards. The field officer of the day would then assume command and lead the temporary battalion to meet the enemy while the rest of the army assembled.47

The Indians, according to their custom of warfare, approached the camp to cause as much “mischief” as possible while they gathered and seized all the horses they could take. For example, after the captain of the September 4 picket guard from Botetourt County detailed a sergeant and twelve men to march to the ford on the Greenbrier River to escort any baggage trains or packhorse brigades to camp, he assigned the rest of his men to another mission. Dividing them “in such small parties . . . thought most likely to discover & Annoy” any warriors skulking around the camp, the captain sent them beyond the line of picket posts “in quest of the Enemy.”48

After spending much of the day in fruitless searches, one patrol encountered some men “in the Woods on Horseback.” The intruders, “Wearing blankets over their heads to deceive the sentries,” dismounted and approached a number of grazing packhorses. After each of the strangers had mounted one and prepared to steal more animals, a sentinel detected the ruse and shouted, “Here they are boys!” The picket guards reacted to the alarm, but the Indians had “time to slip off the Horses without being fired at” and fled into the woods. Although they had “no Opportunity of firing,” the picket guards recovered the stolen horses and found “several Buffalo hide halters, a tomahawk,” and other items the intruders had dropped nearby. As darkness approached, the captain of the guard recalled his men back to camp.49

The next day, in addition to the usual guards, Colonel Charles Lewis, acting as field officer of the day, ordered twenty men “paraded immediately” and provided each with a packhorse. Thus mounted, the guards scoured the woods for two miles all around the camp to “dislodge any Scouting Indians & make it safe for the Pack horse men to gather up their horses.” Simultaneously, the captains led that day’s picket guards “in quest of the Indians that were discovered” the previous day. Again operating in small units, they had orders to patrol until evening, unless they could overtake and engage the enemy.50

Even with the distraction of the daily guard mount, the rendezvous camp provided the captains commanding companies the best opportunity to train their men and develop a degree of unit cohesion not possible by the attendance of a one-day muster every three months. Although it did not make them as attentive as regulars, the military environment also proved conducive to instilling a degree of discipline, a characteristic often lacking in militia organizations. Captains and orderly sergeants read to the men of their companies the punitive articles of the Militia Act, the applicable provisions in the Acts for Repelling Invasions and Insurrections, and “every order by which their conduct is regulated.” The leaders let the members know, in no uncertain terms, the consequences for disobeying orders and the punishment that a trial by court-martial could impose on a refractory militiaman. Certain militia members never adjusted well to regimentation, whether on the expedition or in the garrisons. Although cases of insubordination, desertion, and other offenses occurred, the companies generally conducted themselves well. Finally, owing largely to the continuing shortage of gunpowder, the field officers urged captains and subalterns to “exert themselves” in preventing their men from the “infamous practice of shooting away their Ammunition for no good purpose” and demanded that they fire only with their officers’ permission.51

Although educated as physicians, Captains Thomas Buford, Robert McClennahan, and Colonel William Fleming served as line officers. They, along with the Augusta line’s surgeon, Doctor John Watkins, provided the army’s left wing with the nucleus of a competent medical staff. As more staff officers arrived in camp, they saw to their respective duties in earnest. Major Thomas Posey, as the quartermaster and commissary general, coordinated the expedition’s logistical support. Captains Thomas Ingles and Anthony Bledsoe, quartermaster of Botetourt County and commissary of Fincastle County, respectively, became his principal deputies. Major Sampson Mathews, quartermaster of Augusta, assumed the role of “master driver of cattle,” assisted by deputies, or chief drivers of cattle, Captains John Lyle and William McClure. Captains John Hughes and John Taylor became chief packhorse masters. John Warwick was the chief butcher. Largely through the efforts of this staff, supplies and provisions for the expedition arrived steadily. Although shortages continued to plague the force, the subordinate agents in the counties continued to acquire and forward the necessary items to the Great Levels.

Major Posey reported to the commander in chief every evening on the number of packhorses, bullocks, and other cattle. The commissaries had their men find and gather all the cattle lost on the march or wandering around camp into an established “bullock pen” with guards posted. Warwick and the army’s butchers had a “Slaughtering pen” made where they could butcher the meat and “kill the Cattle otherwise than by Shooting them.”52

For transport, by the time the left wing marched, Posey expected to have eight hundred horses “employed” in carrying supplies.53 Armies of the day usually organized their packhorses into “brigades,” each under the control of a packhorse master who held authority over those assigned to the train and staff responsibilities roughly equivalent to a captain of the line. A brigade typically had about forty horses, with one driver controlling a team of two horses, plus additional packhorse men. The latter, often augmented by soldiers detailed from the line companies, assisted the drivers and helped to load, unload, feed, and care for the animals. Furnished with a packsaddle, a horse could carry about two hundred pounds of cargo.54 John Criner, for example, drove his team into camp and delivered “1 1/2 barrels” of powder for the Fincastle companies, and “1 [whole] & 2 half barrels of gun Powder,” plus “16 galls Spirits & Sundry other Articles,” which—excluding the liquor and powder—came to about “150 lbs.” for the Botetourt County contingent.55

Posey informed the battalion commanders that they could expect kettles “to be distributed amongst the whole in equal proportion to the Number [of soldiers] in each line.”56 By the time the army marched, the quartermasters also expected to issue each company entrenching tools, four felling axes, and one broadax. While still on the way to Camp Union, Colonel Christian received word that his men would find “Tents plenty and all goods necessary for the men such as Shirts, Blankets [and] Leggings” when they arrived.57

John F. D. Smyth, a British traveler who witnessed the left wing assemble, recorded his impressions about the frontier soldiers’ appearance. He described “Their whole dress” as “also very singular, and not very materially different from that of the Indians.” Each man wore “a hunting shirt,” a functional garment that resembled a “wagonner’s frock, ornamented with a great many fringes” that he fastened about the middle with a broad belt. Smyth elaborated on the belt, calling it “much decorated” but utilitarian. Into his belt, a soldier usually secured his tomahawk, “an instrument that serves every purpose of defense and convenience,” a tool that functioned as a hammer on one side and a hatchet on the other. The soldiers’ kits included accouterments that they would “hang from their necks on one shoulder,” such as a shot bag and powder horn. On the latter, many men often carved a “variety of whimsical figures and devices.” The preferred headgear was a “flapped hat, of a reddish hue,” to protect the wearer “from the intensely hot beams of the sun.”

On their legs below the frocks the men often wore “leather britches, made of Indian dressed elk, or deer skins, but more frequently thin trousers” with the addition of the very practical “Indian boots, or leggings.” Made from coarse woolen cloth and either wrapped loosely and tied with garters or laced on the outside, the leggings “always come better than half way up the thigh” to offer the wearer “great defense and preservative” against poisonous insect and snake bites, as well as the scratches of thorns, briars, scrubby bushes, and underwood, “with which this whole country is infested and overspread.” For footwear, Smyth wrote that frontiersmen sometimes wore pumps of “their own manufacture” but more often wore “Indian moccasins . . . of their own construction also.” Made of strong elk or buckskin, which they “dress thence round the fore part of the middle ankle, without a seam,” the moccasins fit the wearer “close to the feet, and are perfectly easy and pliant.”

As for the hue of their hunting frocks, or rifle shirts, Smyth said that although some men dyed them in a variety of colors, including yellow, red, or brown, “many wear them quite white.” Smyth concluded, “Thus habited and accoutered, with his rifle upon his shoulder, or in his hand,” the well-appointed “backwoods’ man is completely equipped for visiting, courtship, travel, hunting, or war.” Smyth added, with a touch of irony, “And according to the number and variety of fringes on his hunting shirt, and the decorations on his powder horn, belt, and rifle,” such a man “estimates his finery.” Smyth then observed that a Virginian “absolutely conceives himself of equal consequence, more civilized, polite and more elegantly dressed than the most brilliant peer at St. James’s in a splendid and expensive birthday suit, of the first fashion and taste, and most costly materials.” For the benefit of his European reading audience, he conceded, “Such sentiments as those I have just exposed to notice are neither so ridiculous nor surprising,” when one considered the circumstances “with due attention, that prompt the backwoods’ American to such a train of thinking, and in which light it is, that he feels his own consequence, for he finds all his resources himself.”58

Although all of the troops, provisions, and supplies had not yet arrived, the time for the left wing to begin its campaign had come. Such expeditions in the past could usually rely on their accompanying packhorse trains and cattle herds, supplemented by carrying some of the bulk material by canoe, to provide enough supplies and provisions needed to sustain them during the entire operation. This one proved different. Despite the problems some officers had experienced in raising their units, the assembled force had “a much Larger Number than was Expected.” Although the officers had already expended a great deal of effort to raise and assemble their half of the expeditionary army, it paled in comparison to the task of getting it where it could do the work for which it existed. While the increased number of troops that had turned out represented an advantage, Lewis realized that the logistical requirements had increased commensurately as well. The estimated distances—140 miles from Camp Union to the mouth of the Kanawha and 70 more to the objective Shawnee Indian towns—further magnified the difficulty of the enterprise. The army had more before it than a walk in the woods.59

Colonel Andrew Lewis called the field officers and senior captains together for a council of war and discussed the march to join Lord Dunmore and the right wing on the banks of the Ohio. The size of the force and insufficient number of packhorses necessitated a phased march order of subordinate units and “an Equal addition of Provisions than originally ordered, & Brought out, & carried from this Camp by ye Last Marching Party to ye Mouth of Elk.” Instead of simply forwarding some supplies down the Kanawha by canoe, the troops would have to build a magazine “where it must be stored, & taken down by water as we shall have occasion for it.”60 The phased movement of multiple marching units and the more robust and responsive flow of supplies required a well-developed plan executed with a professional level of competence consistent with the best practices of European armies.

Colonel Andrew Lewis proposed “building Canoes, and a Fort at the mouth of Elk,” about eighty-five miles away, “and a Fort at the mouth of Kanawha” on the Ohio, sixty more miles distant as the army marched toward enemy territory. The fort on the Elk would include a magazine, or “a small store house, for the provisions.” From there, the commissary officers would use canoes to transport the flour and other supplies from the magazine down the Kanawha River to the Ohio. The logistical system would ultimately consist of a rear support base at Camp Union, the intermediate magazine at Elk River, and a forward base at Point Pleasant on the Ohio from which the army planned to enter Indian country. The advanced party, as the first march division, would halt at the mouth of Elk River on the Kanawha to establish a camp. Once the main body arrived, the men would build a fortification, magazine, and canoes. As soon as the packhorse men unloaded their cargo, most of the unburdened pack animals would return to Camp Union for another load and accompany the rear body on its march. Once completed, the quartermaster and commissary officers could send most of the flour forward by canoe, taking maximum advantage of water carriage that not only facilitated movement but made the best use of the limited number of available packhorses. The arrangement also facilitated a continuous flow of provisions, ammunition, and other material forward, as well as the evacuation of the ambulatory wounded back, as the army moved farther from its base of supply.61

The wing’s commander in chief designated that his brother, Colonel Charles Lewis, would lead the advanced body. Because Captain Matthew Arbuckle of Botetourt County knew the way to Point Pleasant along a branch of the Warriors’ Path known as the Kanawha Trail, Colonel Andrew Lewis appointed him as the chief guide and assigned his company to the division. Consisting of the entire Augusta County contingent in camp, nine companies, or “595 officers and men,” with Arbuckle’s Botetourt company attached, they would march on Tuesday, September 6, accompanied by a commissary officer, a train of loaded packhorses, and a herd of cattle. The main body, or second division, which was commanded by Colonel Fleming and which Colonel Andrew Lewis would accompany, consisted mostly of Botetourt County troops plus packhorses and cattle, and would leave Camp Union six days later. The Fincastle County contingent, under the command of Colonel Christian, which Lewis expected to reach Camp Union any day, would follow with the remaining supplies and provisions, pack animals, and cattle as the rear body, as it brought up the rear as the final division to march.62

On Sunday, September 4, while the picket guards engaged Indian marauders skulking around the camp’s perimeter and just two days before the first units marched, a messenger arrived with the letter from Dunmore. Written from Oldtown, Maryland, five days before, the letter expressed Dunmore’s “warmest wishes” for Andrew Lewis to march his wing to join the rest of the army at the mouth of the Little Kanawha. Given such short notice, Lewis replied that “it is not in my Power to alter our route” and explained the circumstances that prevented his complying with the commander in chief’s instruction. In a private letter to Colonel Preston, Lewis said that he wished the governor had explained his reasons for the sudden change in plan.63

On Monday, Colonel Fleming’s Botetourt troops took over routine camp duties and the daily guard mount, which allowed Colonel Charles Lewis’s companies to work without distraction. The men of the first division devoted their energies to preparations for the march. Meanwhile, the packhorse men fixed a quantity of salt, fifty-four thousand pounds of flour, and all tools not issued to companies for loading on the packhorses. The cattle drovers gathered their herds to have them ready. Colonel Andrew Lewis issued an order that forbade the sutlers from “distributing Liquors in such Quantities as will make any of the Troops drunk— otherwise,” he threatened, “a total stop will be put to the Retailing of Liquors” in camp.64 On the same day in Philadelphia, delegates from twelve colonies convened in the General Congress—later known as the First Continental Congress—at Carpenters’ Hall.

After the fifes and drums of the Augusta line beat the general, used in lieu of reveille, at daybreak on September 6 as the signal to begin the day and prepare to break camp and march, the other lines observed the normal camp routine. The men dressed and ate breakfast, and each captain inspected his men and their weapons. In those companies preparing to depart, the officers ordered any soldiers deemed not healthy enough to go on the expedition to remain in camp and rejoin their units by marching with one of the following divisions or as convoy escorts after they regained their strength. The quartermasters finally arrived with and distributed camp kettles, axes, and other tools to the companies, and issued enough ammunition so that each soldier in Lewis’s division had “1/4 pound of powder and 1/2 pound of ball” to begin the campaign. The men checked and packed personal gear and unit equipment. When the drums beat assembly, the Augusta soldiers and those of the attached Botetourt company struck their tents, loaded their baggage onto packhorses, drew up in their respective companies, and stood ready for the next signal. On hearing the musicians beat a march, the companies took their places in the formation and marched out of Camp Union, followed by 400 packhorses and 108 head of cattle. Captain John Taylor, although from Fincastle, prepared to march in command of the “Brigade of horses” and would “return as fast as they can” to Camp Union after they unloaded the packsaddles at Elk River.65

Not long after Colonel Charles Lewis and the advanced body marched away, Colonel Christian and most of the Fincastle County contingent for the expedition arrived at Camp Union. Colonel Fleming greeted him, and the next day wrote a letter to tell his wife, Nancy, that her “brother & the Companies from Fincastle reach’d this place Yesterday.”66 When the Fincastle County officer reported to the wing’s commander in chief, Colonel Andrew Lewis told him that he believed that the number of men present or expected to arrive greatly exceeded his expectations. The next day, Christian wrote to inform Colonel Preston that Lewis had ordered the county lieutenant of Fincastle County to “let but 100 more men follow me.” Lewis personally wrote Preston to tell him to only send enough additional men to bring Fincastle County’s contingent to about three hundred rank and file, and that he “could employ Any others that are raised to protect your Frontiers.” Lewis then added that if Preston sent any more troops to Camp Union, to please “furnish them with Powder,” otherwise they would “not have more than 1/4 lb pr Man.” Lewis concluded by telling Preston, “It is with pleasure I can inform you that I have had but little Trouble with ye Troops to what I expected and I hope they will continue to do their duty with the same cheerfulness.”67

Colonel John Field of Culpepper County also marched into Camp Union with one company of thirty-five men soon after the advanced party had departed. When he reported to Colonel Lewis, he informed the commander that he expected another one hundred men to arrive in camp the next day. Field then presented orders that required Lewis to accept the Culpepper County companies for service in the colony’s pay as a single corp. Although everyone continued to address him by the title of his permanent rank, Colonel Lewis referred to Field in correspondence as holding the grade of major. According to the Militia Law, given the number of men under his command, “major” reflected the compensation Field could expect to receive after the House of Burgesses voted to settle the colony’s military expenses. Without waiting for the rest of the battalion, Field and the single Culpepper company left the following evening to join Colonel Charles Lewis’s division on the way to the Elk.68

With the army starting to move, many people in the backcountry hoped that the offensive would succeed in bringing enemy depredations against their settlements to an end. Three weeks after the left wing began its campaign, Colonel Preston described the frontier situation in an open letter to Purdie and Dixon of the Virginia Gazette. Reflecting his pride for the soldiers of colonial Virginia, especially his own Fincastle and the neighboring Augusta and Botetourt Counties, he wrote, “This body of militia being mostly armed with rifle guns, and a great part of them good woodsmen, are looked upon to be at least equal to any troops for the number that have been raised in America.” As they marched to face the enemy, he continued, “It is earnestly hoped that they will, in conjunction with the other party [the right wing], be able to chastise the Ohio Indians for the many murders and robberies they have committed on our frontiers for many years past.”69