What is Analytical Marxism? And, what is its contribution to Marxist thought? There is no consensus on the appropriate answer to either question. There is substantive confusion concerning the very definition of Analytical Marxism and, perhaps as a logical consequence, significant controversy surrounds its contribution and legacy.
While various predecessors have been identified,1 the birth of Analytical Marxism (henceforth, AM) as a self-conscious school of thought dates back to the end of the 1970s, during the decline of structuralist Marxism, the renaissance of liberal egalitarianism, and the rebirth of interest in Marxism in analytical philosophy (Miller, 1983; Levine, 2003). In 1978, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence appears in which Canadian philosopher Jerry Cohen provides a reconstruction of historical materialism (henceforth, HM) guided only by “two constraints: on the one hand, what Marx wrote, and, on the other, those standards of clarity and rigour which distinguish twentieth-century analytical philosophy” (Cohen, 1978, p. ix). In 1979, the most prominent members of AM start to meet, forming the core of the so-called “No-Bullshit Marxism September Group,” or in short (and in somewhat more academically neutral terms) “September Group.”
In the following decades, AM has provided some of the most controversial, analytically sophisticated, and thorough interpretations of Marx’s theory, including some classic analyses in economic theory (Roemer, 1981, 1982); political philosophy (Elster, 1985; Cohen, 1988, 1995); history (Brenner, 1977); class theory (Wright, 1985, 1997); and political science (Przeworski, 1985a). AM has provided important insights on crucial topics in social theory, such as the theory of history, the class structure of advanced capitalist economies, and exploitation theory. AM analyses, however, have led to the rejection, or radical revision, of many concepts and propositions, such that the viability of a distinctively Marxist, or indeed analytical Marxist, perspective in social theory is put into question.
Thus, it should not come as a surprise that AM’s contribution to Marxism (and social theory in general) and legacy have been at the centre of a heated debate. Many critics simply dismiss AM. At worst, AM is considered but a “particularly virulent” part of the anti-Marxist tradition and a “fundamentally dishonest” (Hunt, 1992, p.105) theoretical enterprise. At best, AM analyses are deemed, “as A.E. Housman once wrote in a review, ‘little better than interruptions to our studies’” (Suchting, 1993, p.158).
Interestingly, a negative view on the legacy and future of AM is one of the few things that (some) analytical Marxists and their critics seemingly agree upon. As eloquently put by Levine, if the aim of AM was to discover the rational kernel of Marxist theory, and then reconstruct Marxism on that basis, it is tempting to conclude that “the operation succeeded (more or less), but the patient died” (Levine, 2003, p.132).
This paper aims to clarify the legacy and contribution of AM to social theory in general and Marxism in particular. As a first step in the investigation, the next section tries to define the object of analysis.
Given the theoretical, methodological, and even political heterogeneity of analytical Marxists, it is difficult to define the boundaries of AM, either theoretically or in terms of membership (Ware, 1989; Wright, 1989; Nielsen, 1993). Contrary to a popular view, for example, AM and the September Group do not coincide: several analytical Marxists have never been members of the Group and, conversely, various members have never defined themselves as Marxists (analytical or otherwise).2
Similarly, attempts to identify a set of substantive propositions that constitute the core of AM (e.g., Tarrit, 2006 and Goldstein, 2006) are unconvincing. For such attempts usually conflate methodological statements (e.g. the rejection of dialectics) and substantive propositions (e.g. the rejection of the labour theory of value) and, given their inevitable vagueness, they are often inaccurate. For example, it is incorrect, or at least misleading, to claim that all analytical Marxists attribute a lack of clarity and rigour to Marx himself (Tarrit, 2006, p.598). Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, in order to identify a minimum common denominator for such a diverse group of theorists, these lists simply do not help to identify the differences between AM and alternative approaches, as well as within AM itself. It is true that “no analytical Marxist …accepts the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall … and … only one, Brenner, … still holds the labour theory of value expounded in volume I to be true” (Callinicos, 1987, p. 68). But this hardly identifies them as a group.3
According to Ware, indeed, there is “no one theory of [AM], not even a way of doing [AM]” (Ware, 1989, p. 5). Some authors actually emphasise the “alarming lack of unity” of AM (Bertram, 1998, p. 236) and prefer to call it an “affinity group” (Gintis, 1987, p. 983), with some critics moving from the acknowledgement of such heterogeneity to the unpersuasive claim that the attempt to define AM is self-defeating for its deep theoretical flaws and inconsistencies (Suchting, 1993).
Some common traits do exist that define “a style of theorizing” (Wright, Levine, and Sober, 1994, p. 56) if not a “fully fledged paradigm” (Carling, 1986, p.55). One of the main tenets of AM, and its main departure from classical Marxism, is the denial of a specific Marxist methodology. The classical view has been famously expressed by Lukacs:
Orthodox Marxism … does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx’s investigations. It is not the “belief” in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a “sacred” book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method.
(Lukacs, 1971, p.1)
According to AM, there exists no such different methodology:
Too often, obscurantism protects itself behind a yoga of special terms and privileged logic. The yoga of Marxism is “dialectics”. Dialectical logic is based on several propositions which may have a certain inductive appeal, but are far from being rules of inference … In Marxian social science, dialectics is often used to justify a lazy kind of teleological reasoning.
(Roemer, 1986a, p. 191)
Instead, Marxism should “subject itself to the conventional standards of social science and analytical philosophy” (Wright, Levine, and Sober, 1992, pp. 5–6). More precisely, Erik Olin Wright identifies four commitments that characterise AM.
AM is defined by an analysis of Marxist concerns that is focused through:
| C1 | “A commitment to conventional scientific norms in the elaboration of theory and the conduct of research.” |
| C2 | “An emphasis on the importance of systematic conceptualisation […]. This involves careful attention to both definitions of concepts and the logical coherence of interconnected concepts.” |
| C3 | “A concern with a relatively fine-grained specification of the steps in the theoretical arguments linking concepts.” |
C4 |
“The importance accorded to the intentional action of individuals within both explanatory and normative theories.” |
Definition 1 forcefully suggests that the boundaries of AM are much wider and fuzzier than is commonly assumed. It encompasses all self-defined analytical Marxists; but it is sufficiently general to allow for a wide range of methodological and substantive positions, such that the school of British Marxist historians, and various analytically-oriented Marxist philosophers and social scientists may also be included, even if they do not explicitly associate themselves with AM. Indeed, “it would be arrogant to suggest that Marxism lacked these elements prior to the emergence of [AM] as a self-conscious school” (Wright, 1989, p. 39). Conversely, “Clarity and rigour are the virtues of good philosophy, of good thought in all fields. Analytical philosophy has no special monopoly on them” (Sayers, 1989, p. 81).
Nonetheless, C1–C4 are neither trivial nor uncontroversial. Two broad sets of objections can be identified in the literature. One focuses on AM’s emphasis on formal logic and mathematical models; another disputes more generally the appeal to the analytical method. The next sections analyse the two objections in turn.
Many critics question the very role of formal models in the social sciences, and the relevance of the results drawn from them. According to some, mathematical models are inherently associated with bourgeois science and politics. In the struggle for socialism “any means-ends or cost-benefit calculation would tend to produce reformist solutions” (Kieve, 1986, p. 574): the real issue is “not a question of quantitative, individualistic means-ends or petty cost-benefit calculations, but a question of life and death” (Ibid., p. 574). Somewhat less radically, Kirkpatrick claims that “The pursuit of mathematical clarity abolishes time, purges historical and social theory of their temporal dimension” (Kirkpatrick, 1994, p. 485; see also Bronner, 1990; Kennedy, 2005). As Bronner puts it:
all political phenomena in general, and movements in particular, become equalized through the mathematical or game-theoretical laws in which they gain their definition as social actors. At best, the question of qualitative change is circumvented … Usually, however, all classes and movements are identified with specific units of analysis which are treated in the same way. Their unique character, as well as the constitutive role of the qualitatively different ideologies informing them, is subsequently eradicated.
(Bronner, 1990, p. 250)
The idea that formal models are inherently incompatible with Marxism is not wholly convincing: as Smolinski (1973) and Matthews (2002) have forcefully shown, Marx studied pure mathematics and was convinced about the opportunity to apply it to the social sciences. Further, the objection relies on the rather arbitrary claim that there is no mathematical object (in a potentially infinite set) that can be used to analyse any parts of Marx’s theory. Finally, there is simply no reason to believe that mathematical models necessarily lead to static or ahistoric theories, let alone to the liquidation of “the normative purpose of the entire theoretical and practical enterprise” (Bronner, 1990, p. 248). This position seems as one-sided as the “mathematical fetishism” often attributed to AM.
Some objections reflect a post-modern epistemological stance that reduces mathematics, and indeed all scientific languages, to mere “discourses.” Post-modern critics (Resnick and Wolff, 1987; Ruccio, 1988; Amariglio, Callari, and Cullenberg, 1989) deflate the explanatory power of formal models to the vanishing point, by interpreting mathematics as a “form of ‘illustration.’ For Marxists, mathematical concepts and models can be understood as metaphors or heuristic devices” (Ruccio, 1988, p. 36). Yet it is unclear that this methodological stance can be supported by Marx’s writings: Ruccio (1988) provides no textual evidence, whereas—as already noted—Smolinski (1973) and Matthews (2002) suggest a very different view. Another, well-known problem with this approach is that it is unclear how competing hypotheses can be rationally evaluated, let alone tested. Finally, this conception of mathematics reflects the post-modern denial of the explanatory power of theoretical abstractions.4 Yet the emphasis on rather elusive “historically concrete social processes” does not lead beyond the formulation of rather vague general statements, such as the claim that Marxian classes “can be analysed as the determinate result of the entire constellation of social processes that can be said to make up a society or social formation at any point in time; in turn, it will be only one of the myriad determinants of those nonclass social processes” (Ruccio, 1988, p. 38).
Other critics argue that the emphasis on formalism leads AM to neglect important theoretical and political issues that resist mathematical formulation, whereas some critical facts about capitalist societies “can be established without mathematical proof” (Wood, 1989, p. 466). An emphasis on formalism can obscure important theoretical and political issues and “enervate Marxist theory in the name of rigor” (Anderson and Thompson, 1988, p. 228). Moreover, beyond its limited scope of application, the abstraction “loses in social and historical relevance what it gains in logical and analytical rigor” (Dymski and Elliott, 1989, p. 367). More generally, AM’s formalism can obscure issues of empirical relevance since “‘Does it make sense?’ has priority over the question of its empirical truth” (Kirkpatrick, 1994, p. 43).
As acknowledged by analytical Marxists themselves (e.g. Roemer, 1981, pp. 2–4), these objections raise relevant issues and cannot be dismissed a priori. Yet, although they may provide robust support for methodological pluralism, they do not justify the rejection of AM because of its use of formal models. For AM is consistent with a methodological approach that acknowledges the usefulness of mathematics, but at the same time assigns no exclusive role to formal models and advocates a rigorous interpretation of assumptions and results, of their scope and limitations.
Indeed, these objections do not support the view that formal modelling should be rejected. Theoretical abstraction is essential to isolate the core features of a problem and the fundamental causal links. Formal modelling is one rigorous way of deriving causal explanations from a clearly stated set of assumptions. Besides, “lurking behind every informal causal explanation is a tacit formal model. All explanatory theories contain assumptions, claims about the conditions under which the explanations hold, claims about how the various mechanisms fit together” (Wright, 1989, p. 45). By making the assumptions explicit, proper formal modelling helps to subject them to critical scrutiny.
“Mathematics,” or models, cannot capture all that is contained in a theory. A model is necessarily one schematic image of a theory, and one must not be so myopic as to believe other schematic images cannot exist. Nevertheless … the production of different and contradicting models of the same theory can be the very process that directs our focus to the gray areas of the theory.
(Roemer, 1981, p. 3)
Formal models can also play a role in empirical social analysis: “since in real-life social situations it is generally hard to construct real experimental conditions for revealing the operation of causal mechanisms (or even, through comparative methods, quasi-experimental designs), thought experiments are essential to give plausibility to the causal claim we actually make about any concrete problem” (Wright, 1989, p. 45).
In summary, formal models cannot capture all that is relevant in Marxist theory, and the AM emphasis on the “contemporary tools of logic, mathematics, and model building … [and the] unabashed commitment to the necessity for abstraction” (Roemer, 1986b, p. 3) are neither trivial nor innocuous. Nor does the adoption of formal models make AM superior to alternative Marxist approaches. Nonetheless, no argument is provided that conclusively establishes the inherent inadequacy of formal approaches in social theory, or that warrants the rejection of AM on a priori methodological grounds. From this perspective, the choice of the appropriate analytical framework is more important than abstract discussions on mathematics. And it is important to stress that AM does not entail the endorsement of a specific model, as discussed in the next section.
One of the most fundamental objections to AM on philosophical and methodological grounds focuses on the emphasis on analytical philosophy. According to some critics, the analytical method is based on “a framework of rigid and exclusive dichotomies” (Sayers, 1989, p. 83) and so produces “not clarity and rigour, but systematic misunderstanding and misinterpretation” (Sayers, 1989, p. 82). Others argue that the appeal to the clarity (potentially) gained in applying the analytical method is not neutral, “[C]larity was never a virtue of praxis theory, critical theory or …Althusserian Marxism. Nor is clarity particularly a virtue of neofunctionalism, postmodernism, or structuration theory” (Porpora, 1995, p. 169). Furthermore:
There may be disagreement over what it means to make an argument clear ... We may want to reflect on why we value clarity as much as we do, and on whether the same standards of clarity hold for any theoretical discourse, regardless of the nature of its object or objects.
(Kirkpatrick, 1994, p. 36)
According to these authors, the adoption of analytical philosophy fundamentally and inevitably distorts Marxist theory, which should be analysed using a specific Marxist methodology, based on dialectics and/or methodological holism.
These sweeping criticisms are not entirely convincing, as they rest on an unproven impossibility claim and, most often, on a conceptual misunderstanding concerning the exact definition of AM.
First, there exists no convincing general proof, or robust argument, that no part of Marx’s theory can be fruitfully analysed using analytical philosophy. Sayers (1989) argues that the debate on Marx and morality within AM is an example of the inability of analytical philosophy to capture the historical nature of Marx’s theory. However Levine (1982) provides a reconstruction of Marx’s approach that is broadly consonant to Sayers’ own. According to Kirkpatrick (1994, p. 39), Cohen’s “theory of history is subject to limitations of scope that would have been alien to Marx, who frequently makes use of the idea of history as an all-encompassing ‘totality’.” Yet, Cohen (1978) provides an exegetically rigorous, if not orthodox, analysis of HM, as acknowledged also by critics: “Karl Marx’s Theory of History, whatever one thinks of the interpretation of [HM] offered there, is one of the classics of twentieth-century Marxist philosophy” (Callinicos, 2001, p. 171).
Second, an appeal to the appropriate Marxist methodology against the analytical emphasis of AM is rather misleading as there are several definitions of dialectics, and even methodological holism can be articulated in many different ways. Indeed, it is unclear that a dialectic approach is inherently incompatible with formal logic and there have been several recent formulation of dialectics in analytical terms (see, for example, the discussion of the concept of totality in Wright, Levine, and Sober, 1994, and the analytical approach to dialectics in Arnsperger, 2003, and Wood, 2004).
Besides, even assuming that there is a unique correct definition of dialectics, critics of AM acknowledge that an analytical approach provides a possibly partial, but not necessarily false picture of social reality (Devine, 1993, p. 51). For example, Sayers (1984, p. 3) argues that, albeit one-sided, analysis is “an indispensable feature of any scientific account.” In the analysis of collective action, Bronner (1990, p. 252) argues that “rational choice can prove enormously useful within a broader theory with respect to showing the barriers to class consciousness.” McCarney (1989, pp. 154ff) suggests that in Elster’s account of dialectics—which he deems unsatisfactory—there are “elements … that will serve as building blocks for a more adequate account of Marx.” Finally, and perhaps more importantly, it is unclear how “dialectical logic” would per se be able to revert the negative conclusions reached by AM, especially in economics. The idea that the standard labour theory of value can be defended from AM criticisms based on “dialectics” (Moggach, 1991), for example, is rather unconvincing.5
Third, it may indeed be difficult to transpose Marxist theory within the positivist-empiricist tradition in analytical philosophy. And one may argue that the mainly negative conclusions of AM prove that “the dangers of using philosophical tools especially designed to bury Marxism have been realised” (Kennedy, 2005, p. 341), including not only the analytical method but also methodological individualism and rational choice theory. Yet, these arguments conflate AM as identified in Definition 1 with a sub-school within AM, also known as Rational Choice Marxism (henceforth, RCM), whose main exponents are Jon Elster, Adam Przeworski, and John Roemer. RCM adopts C2 and C3 of Definition 1, but endorses more restrictive principles than those stated in C1 and C4, namely:6
| C1' | The use of “state of the arts methods of analytical philosophy and ‘positivist’ social science” (Roemer, 1986b, pp. 3–4). |
| C4' | Methodological individualism (henceforth, MI) and rational choice explanations. |
AM and RCM should be clearly distinguished. C1' and C4' are much stronger than C1 and C4, and RCM endorses a strongly reductionist stance that is not shared by all analytical Marxists. In Cohen’s interpretation of HM, “Marxism is fundamentally concerned not with behaviour but with the forces and relations constraining and directing it” (Cohen, 1982, p. 489). Wright (1989) endorses a realist view of science and a pluralist methodological position. He (Wright, 1985, 1997, 2005) proposes a theory of class whose pivotal concepts are class relations and class structure, and “the rights and powers people have over productive resources are important for the structured interactive quality of human action” (Wright, 2005, p. 9). This:
leaves open the best way to theorize choosing and acting … There is … no implication, as methodological individualists would like to argue, that the explanation of social processes can be reduced to the attributes of the individuals choosing and acting. The [social, or class] relations themselves can be explanatory.
(Wright, 2005, fn.11)
The difference between AM and RCM is often overlooked, or considered secondary, however, both by analytical Marxists and by their critics. Carling (1986) claims C4' to apply to AM due to a very weak, if loose interpretation of rational choice and MI, which collapses C4' into C4.7 Tarrit (2006) incorrectly ascribes logical positivism to AM. Philp and Young (2002) state that AM “involves the use of rational actor models” (2002, p. 314) and that reductionism is a “further hallmark of AM” (2002, p. 316).8
This leads to some confusion in the evaluation of AM. For the distinction between AM and RCM is theoretically important and has relevant consequences. It is inappropriate to argue that AM is inherently wrong because it subscribes to logical positivism. Although much of AM is indeed “grounded philosophically in an empiricist, and more specifically positivist, commitment to an instrumentalist theory of meaning” (Weldes, 1989, p. 360ff), contrary to a popular view (e.g., Kirkpatrick, 1994; Tarrit, 2006), AM does not necessarily endorse a positivist and empiricist stance. Marxist philosophers working within the analytical tradition argue that the latter is not defined by a set of common doctrines, but by common standards of successful practice (Ware, 1989; Nielsen, 1993; Wood, 2004), and have proposed interesting post-positivist analytical approaches to Marx where “the style of analytic philosophy is divorced from positivist substance” (Miller, 1984, p. 4). From this perspective, C1 only requires that Marxist propositions be subjected to rigorous empirical and theoretical scrutiny.
Even the negative conclusions reached by AM can be seen in a different light if AM and RCM are properly distinguished. The key point here is that C1′ and C4′ have much more stringent methodological and substantive implications than C1 and C4. After trying to analyse key parts of Marx’s writings within the straightjacket of C4′, RCM concludes that much (if not most) of Marxist theory has to be discarded, including the whole of Marxian economics, scientific socialism, dialectical materialism, and the theory of productive forces and relations of production (Elster, 1985), and the Marxist theory of class struggle and revolution (Elster, 1985; Przeworski, 1985a); or it has to be so substantially revised as to end up carrying only a distant similarity to the original theory, as in the case of Roemer’s (1982) theory of exploitation. As Przeworski puts it:
[I]f one accepts the methodological validity of individualistic postulates, most if not all traditional concerns of Marxist theory must be radically reformulated. Whether the eventual results will confirm any of the substantive propositions of Marxist theory of history and whether the ensuing theory will be in any distinct sense “Marxist”, I do not know.
(Przeworski, 1985b, p. 400)
The contribution of AM is quite different. For AM has reconstructed a set of core propositions that aim to provide the foundations of a distinctive Marxist approach in social theory.
According to AM, Marxism remains distinctive “in organizing its agenda around a set of fundamental questions or problems which other theoretical traditions either ignore or marginalize, and identifying a distinctive set of interconnected causal processes relevant to those questions” (Wright, 2009, p. 102). Levine (2003) argues that the rational kernel of Marxism reconstructed by AM comprises at least four components.
First is the Marxist theory of history, or HM, which aims to provide a theoretical explanation of long term historical trajectories. Unlike most currents of Western Marxism, AM considers HM as the most important distinctive theoretical component of Marxism. The AM interpretation of HM is articulated into two main theses. The first states that the level of development of productive forces (functionally) explains the nature of the economic structure. The second states that the nature of the economic structure (functionally) explains legal, political, and ideological superstructures.
According to AM, given the inherent tendency for the forces of production to develop, HM detects an endogenous process that supplies history with a determinate trajectory from one mode of production to another (Cohen, 1978; Wright et al., 1992). In recent contributions, analytical Marxists interpret HM as “a theory of historical possibilities opened up by the development of ‘productive forces’” (Levine, 2003, p. 164). From this perspective, HM provides an account of socialism as a possible product of the materialist dynamics and contradictions of capitalism, which can “unify what would otherwise be a motley of well-meaning, but mainly reactive, causes into a movement with a serious prospect of changing life for the better” (Levine, 2003, p. 171). HM is thus the foundational theory of scientific socialism and a fundamental part of Marxist emancipatory social theory.
Second is a Marxist theory of classes, according to which the class structure of a society is central in the explanation of individual economic outcomes and life opportunities, class conflicts, and a range of key social phenomena (Wright, 1997, 2005). The main contribution of AM in class theory consists in the development of a rigorous conceptual apparatus for analysing complex class structures in advanced capitalist economies. Distinctive of Marxist class theory is the conception of classes “as being structured by mechanisms of domination and exploitation, in which economic positions accord some people power over the lives and activities of others” (Wright, 2009, p. 102). The standard Marxist analysis focuses on the exploitation resulting from differential ownership of capital. Whereas this explains the main class cleavage in capitalism, and the core difference with previous social formations, at a lower level of abstraction it is insufficient to analyse the complexities of class structure and class behaviour in advanced capitalism. Building on Roemer’s (1982) theory of exploitation,10 Wright identifies other types of productive assets—such as skills and organisational assets—that are unequally distributed among agents and give rise to specific relations of domination and exploitation. Then the class structure of an economy is multidimensionally defined by the ownership and control of the three types of productive assets.
Theoretically, this provides a unified framework to understand complex class structures in which “middle classes” are not seen as an exception or a transitory phenomenon in increasingly polarised societies, but arise from “contradictory class locations”, whereby they may be exploited in one dimension (e.g., because they own little or no physical capital), but exploiters in others (e.g., thanks to their ownership of skills or organisational assets). Hence, this framework allows for a sophisticated analysis of class behaviour: for example, it clarifies the (complex) structure of material interests underlying the possibility of class alliances. Empirically, this theory has provided a fruitful framework for the construction of precise maps of class structures in advanced economies based on the ownership and control of productive assets, which can be consistently used to analyse classes over time and across countries (Wright, 1997; 2005).
Third is a Marxist theory of the state, which views states as expressing the rule of the economically dominant class: to each economic structure, there corresponds a different form of state. According to AM, the proletarian state is the only state whose historical aim is to eliminate the need for states, and socialists should aim to establish institutions that are progressively self-effacing, a view that is incompatible with the exclusive emphasis on the state common to all strains of modern political philosophy (see Levine, 2008).
Fourth is a set of socialist—albeit not specifically Marxist—normative commitments. The systematic discussion, and defence, of the normative dimension of Marxism is one of the most relevant contributions of AM. For “All classical Marxists believed in some kind of equality, even if many would have refused to acknowledge that they believed in it and none, perhaps, could have stated precisely what principle of equality he believed in” (Cohen, 1995, p. 5). According to AM, Marx was “a steadfast opponent of applications of moral theory in class-divided societies” (Levine, 2003, p. 137), but he did not oppose moral theory as such and was not shy “in condemning economic, social and political arrangements in normative and even moralistic terms” (Levine, 2003, p. 139). Marx’s normative commitments include self-realisation, community, autonomy, and equality in a classless society (see Cohen, 1995).
The rigorous reconstruction of these propositions is arguably a significant, positive contribution of AM, which may play an important role for a revival of socialist theory.
1 For example, Nowak (1998) identifies a Polish school of Analytical Marxism in the 1950s and 1960s.
2 For example, other members of the “September Group” include Sam Bowles, Robert van der Veen, Pranhab Bardhan, and Hillel Steiner. However, it is not clear whether they should also be considered as analytical Marxists, according to Definition 1 above and therefore their work is not considered here.
3 Somewhat puzzlingly, after having listed a set of propositions that define AM, later in his analysis Tarrit (2006, p. 607) claims that the rejection of the falling rate of profit “is the only theoretical element on which all analytical Marxists agree.”
4 See, for example, the concept of overdetermination developed by Resnick and Wolff (1987), which is a direct critique of the idea that it is possible to identify causes of social outcomes that are not themselves effects. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
5 Some authors have offered a logically coherent explanation of the relationship between value and exchange-value based on a postmodern approach (see Wolff, Callari and Roberts, 1982). Yet, this involves a radical reconceptualisation of the labour theory of value and it is unclear what role “dialectics” plays, if any, in their formalism. For a more thorough discussion, see Mohun and Veneziani (2016).
6 For a thorough discussion of RCM, see Veneziani (2012).
7 Carling (1994) has later acknowledged the difference between AM and RCM.
8 Indeed, it is misleading to say that “[AM] cannot claim that their endeavours are within an analytical or positivist tradition and simultaneously subscribe to a critical realist view of science” (Philp and Young, 2002, p. 316). The alleged tension disappears provided one properly distinguishes AM and RCM.
9 The discussion in this section draws on Veneziani (2012).
10 For a thorough discussion, see Veneziani (2007; 2012; 2013).
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