Just as the new armies in Europe were to live and fight underground, so the new navies were to fight underwater. The battle under the seas was the key to the outcome of the War and had Germany been less timid in the initial use of her Unterseeboots she might have been the victor and not the loser.
The British public, confident in the knowledge that their Grand Fleet had almost complete command of the sea in 1914, were expecting a major battle between the opposing surface fleets in which the enemy would be destroyed. Since the turn of the century naval development in most powerful nations had concentrated on the all big gun armoured battleship, championed in Britain by Admiral John (Jacky) Arbuthnot Fisher, who re-organized the Navy during his six years as First Sea Lord from 1904. The type was known as ‘Dreadnoughts’ after the first British vessel, and in 1914 Britain had 29 of them and Germany 18.
Unlike Britain, however, the Germans, under the direction of Admiral von Tirpitz, had appreciated the potential of the submarine. Tirpitz did not rush into building U-boats as France had done around 1900, but waited to see what mistakes would be made in their development. Following secret trials in the North Sea in 1912 and the emergence of the concept of diesel power for surface movement and electric batteries for underwater movement, Germany put maximum effort into submarine production. Thus by 1914 she had twice as many submarines building or in commission as had Britain, although Britain had more afloat.
The Kaiser was determined to keep his High Seas Fleet intact by avoiding a direct confrontation with the British Home Fleet. Thus German policy was based on maintaining a threat of a naval action sufficient to tie the Home Fleet to the North Sea, but only to venture out from time to time in order to prove that the battle threat was a real one. The surface war at sea therefore became a series of isolated incidents, like Heligoland, the Falkland Islands and Jutland. Thus in collecting the picture postcards of the naval war it is possible to concentrate upon clearly defined actions and to build up a representation of both sides involved, just as is possible with opposing generals in set piece battles.
The picture cards of ships are scarce. Firstly there are many collectors, and as a result ‘undiscovered’ cards are hard to find. Secondly the Germans very quickly imposed censorship upon the picture postcard and prevented their vessels being photographed. The British were slower and postcards showing H.M. Ships were still being sent to neutral countries in 1916. However, on 6 June 1916, further postcards picturing H.M. Ships were forbidden and although there were some Admiralty authorized exceptions, such as the Photochrom Series published in June 1916 showing scenes from Britain Prepared, the official film of the Fleet, very few later cards can be found today. The British cards, therefore, tend to chronicle the early actions of the War, and the German cards are all preoccupied with the U-boat and its more significant exploits.
Surface actions began off Heligoland in the same month that War broke out. The British with a force of battle cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers and submarines raided German patrols off Heligoland on 28 August 1914 hoping to entice their capital ships out from their lair at Wilhelmshaven. The presence of the cruisers and submarines was concealed, the Germans being led into believing that only destroyers were involved. The S.M.S. Strassburg and S.M.S. Mainz were among the first German arrivals and the British decoy destroyers were subjected to a heavy battering, particularly from the Mainz. Accordingly the battle cruisers were called up and five of them, including the Queen Mary under the command of Admiral Beatty, came to the rescue. The Mainz and two other German cruisers were sunk and many of the other German ships would have suffered the same fate had not a heavy mist allowed them to escape.