On the morning of 22 June 1941 Nazi Germany unleashed a sudden and massive offensive aimed at destroying the Soviet state. The ambitious German undertaking, based on the premise that the bulk of the Red Army could be annihilated in the immediate border regions by use of blitzkrieg conducted on a large scale, caught the Soviets only partially prepared for war. Force reconstruction and re-equipment programs were underway but incomplete and although the Soviets had ample warning, for as yet inexplicable reasons, Stalin forbid the Soviet military to take prudent defensive precautions—thus granting the Germans the equivalent of strategic, operational and tactical surprise. The German hammer blows staggered the Soviet armed forces and almost resulted in its destruction. By Soviet admission:
“our pre-war views on the conduct of armed struggle in the initial period of war did not investigate the possibility of concealed timely deployment and simultaneous enemy armed forces operational on the land, in the air and at sea. Mistakes in theory had a negative effect on resolving the practical questions of covering the state borders and deploying the armed forces which along with other reasons caused serious misfortunes in the war.”
“There were many problems in working out command and control and organizing communications with operational large units. The assertion that the defense found fullest expression only in the realm of army operations was incorrect, as was the view that the struggle for air superiority must be realized on the scale of front and army operations. The complicated views at the beginning of the war concerning the organization of the army and forces rear did not fully answer the demands of the theory of deep offensive operations and battle. Operational and forces rear services remained cumbersome and immobile.”
“There were also serious deficiencies in the theoretical training of commanders and in the combat training of forces.…”{1}
These Soviet admissions, as frank as they were, understated the scale of the problem. In the initial months of the war, Soviet commanders at higher levels displayed an ineptness only partially compensated for by the fervor of junior officers and the stoicism of the hard pressed troops. Front and army commanders, unable to construct coherent defenses against the German armored thrusts, displayed an alarming propensity for launching costly uncoordinated counterattacks predestined to failure. Only looming disaster drove the Soviet high command to action in a war which quickly became one of survival.
Ultimately, the Red Army successfully met this second great challenge and triumphed, but only after years of death, frustration, and an agonizing process of military re-education conducted during wartime. Throughout the war new generations of commanders emerged, new equipment was developed and fielded, and military theories matured after their late 1930s hiatus. In essence, the concept of deep operations, in fact if not in name, became the focal point of Soviet offensive theory and the means of converting tactical success into operational and even strategic success. By late 1943, Soviet military theory and the Soviet force structure were wed into a successful formula for achieving victory. During the ensuing two years of war the Soviets experimented with operational techniques, refined their force structure, and worked to overcome resource and logistical constraints. This second great renaissance in Soviet military thought and practice, often ignored in the west because of the Soviet disasters of 1941 and 1942, as related in the works of victorious German generals, is today viewed by the Soviets as the most important period in Soviet military affairs, a vast laboratory for military analysis and a repository of experience that can be and is tapped for inspiration and concrete advice.
For the sake of analysis, the Soviets subdivide their “Great Patriotic War” into three distinct periods, each characterized by broad unifying themes concerning Soviet fortunes in war and the state of military art. The first period of war (June 1941-November 1942) found the Soviets on the strategic defense punctuated by several Soviet attempts to undertake offensive operations on several important directions. The second period (December 1942-December 1943) was one of transition from defensive operations to a general Soviet offensive designed to wrest the strategic initiative from the Germans. The third period (1944-1945) was a period of general Soviet offensives culminating in the achievement of total victory.
The first and most difficult period commenced in June 1941 with the German invasion and the series of border battles during which the Germans swallowed up large segments of deployed Soviet forces. The large scale encirclements of Soviet forces at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Bryansk, and at Vyaz’ma culminated in the fall of 1941 when German forces tried to cap their victorious advance with the seizure of Moscow by one last envelopment. German failure to take Moscow prompted the first major Soviet attempt to regain the strategic initiative. A desperate Soviet winter offensive in the Moscow environs, broadened into an attempt to expand the offensive across the front from Leningrad to Rostov and the Crimea, foundered because of insufficient Soviet forces and material, and left the Soviets vulnerable to renewed German strategic thrusts in the summer of 1942. The ill-fated and costly Soviet offensive failure at Khar’kov in May 1942 was followed by the general German offensive in south Russia which, by late fall, reached the Volga at Stalingrad and the passes of the Caucasus Mountains. Like the 1941 German offensive campaign, by late fall the Germans were overextended while the Soviets again husbanded their resources for a counterattack. Unlike 1941, in 1942 the Soviets undertook organizational and theoretical measures to better parry the German offensive as it ran out of steam on the banks of the Volga. The November Soviet offensive around Stalingrad saw the strategic initiative pass into Soviet hands and marked the end of the first period of war.
The German attack in 1941 smashed the large and complex Soviet force structure and clearly demonstrated that the Soviet officer corps was incapable of efficiently commanding and controlling so elaborate a force. Likewise, Soviet industry had been unable to supply the necessary weaponry to so extensive a force. Thus, by late summer 1941 the Soviets had dismantled that portion of their force structure the Germans had not already destroyed. The size of all units was severely truncated to improve span of control, and scarce artillery and armor assets were concentrated under High Command control (see tables 39-42). The Soviets abolished rifle corps and created smaller armies comprising rifle divisions and rifle brigades. Rifle divisions were reduced in strength and smaller, more easily controlled rifle brigades were formed to supplement rifle divisions. The Soviets abolished mechanized corps and their component mechanized and tank divisions and consolidated armor assets in a handful of small tank brigades earmarked to support the smaller armies. Field, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery, withdrawn from rifle divisions, corps and armies, were also formed into battalions, regiments and brigades under High Command control to reinforce armies operating along specific directions. The Soviets created numerous small cavalry divisions, united into cavalry corps in order to compensate for shortages in armor and provide some mobile offensive capability for the basically footbound Soviet army.{2} These measures, along with improvements in strategic and operational command and control, provided the basis for Soviet offensive successes in the winter of 1941-42. But it was clear that further improvements were necessary if the Soviets hoped to expand their limited offensive capabilities. In particular, larger and more effective mechanized formations were essential for developing operational success. Thus in the spring of 1942, while larger artillery units were evolving, and Soviet riflemen were being reequipped with an array of automatic weapons, the Soviets created new tank corps designated to exploit success in army operations (see table 43). Later, in the summer, tank armies of mixed composition (rifle, cavalry and infantry forces) were formed to conduct larger scale exploitation and in early fall, mechanized corps were formed which combined heavy armor and large numbers of mechanized infantry (often scarce in tank corps) (see tables 44-45).Although the new composite tank armies proved unwieldy and difficult to coordinate, the tank and mechanized corps provided the offensive punch necessary for the Soviets to unleash the successful Stalingrad counteroffensive in November 1942. These structural changes combined with increased Soviet production of the weapons of war and revitalized Soviet military theory to produce the turnabout in Soviet battlefield fortunes in the late fall of 1942.
Table 39. Rifle Forces, December 1941
Army
5-6 rifle divisions or rifle brigades
1-2 cavalry divisions
1-2 separate tank brigades or battalions
artillery regiments
guards mortar battalions (multiple rocket launchers)
1 sapper battalion
strength: 70,000 men
20-90 tanks
30-450 guns/mortars
8-19 multiple rocket launchers
Rifle Division
3 rifle regiments (4 x 76mm gun, 6 x 45mm AT)
1 artillery regiment (8 x 122mm, 16 x 76mm)
I antiaircraft battalion
1 antitank battalion (12 x 45mm)
1 sapper battalion
1 signal company
strength: 11,626 men
36 guns
162 mortars
Rifle Brigade
3 rifle battalions
1 artillery battalion
2 mortar battalions
1 antitank battalion
strength: 4,400 men
Table 40. Rifle Forces, 1942
May 1942 Rifle Army
6-10 rifle. divisions or rifle brigades
2-4 tank brigades, regiments or battalions
1 antiaircraft regiment
artillery regiments
1 guards mortar battalion
1 sapper battalion
1-2 tank corps (optional attachment)
strength: 80,000-100,000 men
250-450 tanks
1,000-2,500 guns/mortars
1942 Rifle Corps
2-3 rifle divisions
(no support)
July 1942 Rifle Brigade
4 rifle battalions
1 artillery battalion
1 mortar battalion (122mm)
1 automatic weapons battalion
1 antitank battalion
1 antitank rifle company
strength: 6,000 men
March 1942 Rifle Division
3 rifle regiments (4 x 76mm, 6 x 45)
1 artillery regiment (20 x76mm, 12 x 122mm)
1 antiaircraft battalion
1 antitank battalion (12 x 45mm)
1 sapper battalion
1 signal company
strength: 12,795 men
44 field guns
170 mortars
6 AA guns
30 AT guns
July 1942 Rifle Division
3 rifle regiments
(4 x 76mm, 6 x 45mm)
1 artillery regiment
(20 x 76mm, 12 x 122mm)
1 antiaircraft battalion
1 antitank battalion
1 sapper battalion
1 signal company
strength: 10,386 men
44 guns
188 mortars
6 AA guns
30 AT guns
July 1942 Rifle Brigade
4 rifle battalions
1 artillery battalion
1 mortar battalion (122mm)
1 automatic weapons battalion
1 antitank battalion
1 antitank rifle company
strength: 6,000 men
Table 41. Tank Forces, December 1941
Tank Brigade
2 tank battalions
1 heavy tank company
1 medium tank company
1 light tank company
1 motorized rifle battalion
1 reconnaissance company
1 repair, reconstruction company
1 transport company
1 medical platoon
strength: 1471 men
46 tanks (10 KV, 16 T-34, 20 T-60)
Separate Tank Battalion
I heavy tank company
1 medium tank company
2 light tank companies
strength: 202 men
36 tanks
(5 KV, 11 T-34, 20 T-60)
Table 42. Cavalry Forces, December 1941
Cavalry Corps
2-3 cavalry divisions and/or
2-3 light cavalry divisions
1 tank brigade (optional)
1-2 rifle divisions (optional)
1 artillery regiment
1 signal squadron
Cavalry Division
4 cavalry regiments
1 cavalry artillery battalion
1 antiaircraft battalion
1 reconnaissance battalion
1 signal squadron
1 sapper squadron
strength: 9,224 TOE
6,000 actual
Light Cavalry Division
3 cavalry regiments
1 cavalry artillery battalion
1 signal squadron
strength: 3447 men
Table 43. 1942 Tank Corps
March 1942 Tank Corps
2 tank brigades (3 in April)
1 motorized rifle brigade
(no supply or support units)
strength: 5603 men
100 tanks (20 KV, 40 T-34,
40 1-60/T-70)
96 guns/mortars
July 1942 Tank Corps
3 tank brigades
1 motorized rifle brigade
1 mortar battery
1 guards mortar battalion
1 motorcycle battalion
1 armored car battalion
1 transport company
1 engineers-mine company
2 repair companies
(tank, artillery)
strength: 7,800 men
168 tanks
(70 T-70, 98 T-34)
98 guns/mortars
Soviet theoretical military doctrine during the first period of war and during the war in general, was eclipsed by Soviet emphasis on implementing practical measures necessary to achieve victory. Under Stalin’s leadership, the General Staff made tremendous efforts to investigate strategic, operational, and tactical methods for preparing and conducting operations. Battlefield experiences were gathered, studied, analyzed and converted into directives, instructions and coherent regulations governing the conduct of war.{3} This practical work echoed practical methods undertaken to mobilize the will and resources of the nation for war. While ideology remained a strong ingredient and party control remained preeminent, the Soviets tapped memories of past “Russian” military glories to inspire the nation. A pantheon of Russian heroes: Peter the Great, Suvorov, Kutuzov and others re-emerged and their memories were commemorated in new military decorations for Soviet war heroes. New ranks and titles adorned the new Soviet officer corps and reinforced the older Soviet class discipline even while echoes of “holy” mother Russia could be heard. If the nature of Soviet military doctrine remained constant during wartime the tone of that doctrine perceptibly changed; driven by the necessity of survival and attaining victory in war.
The foremost strategic problem for the Soviet High Command during the first period of the war was that of conducting a successful strategic defense. Specifically, the Soviets had to halt the German general offensive, deprive the Germans of their initial advantages resulting from surprise and superiority in operational skills, establish defenses along a huge front, including around Moscow and Leningrad, and prepare to conduct critical counteroffensives. All this had to be done over tremendous distances in spite of tremendous losses in manpower, equipment, territory and in the nation’s productive base. The Red Army conducted strategic defensive operations simultaneously along several strategic directions, using several fronts cooperating according to STAVKA plans. This practice clashed with pre-war views which supposed that single fronts would conduct strategic defensive operations, and produced new concepts governing operations by groups of fronts. These operations were aimed at inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy, weakening and bleeding his main offensive groups while stopping his offensive, denying him possession of the most important economic and political regions, and creating conditions suitable for the launching of counteroffensives. Such defensive operations raged along frontages of from 200 to 800 kilometers to depths of from 100 to 600 kilometers. (total depth of 400 kilometers in 1941 and 600 kilometers in 1942) over a period of from 20-100 days. Strategic reserves played a significant role in the strategic defense by establishing new defense lines, liquidating enemy penetrations, and providing forces necessary to launch counteroffensives. During this period of the war the STAVKA retained between two and ten reserve armies under its direct control and these reserves were instrumental in launching the winter counteroffensive around Moscow in 1941-42 and the abortive Kharkov offensive in May 1942. Strategic offensives, usually begun in the form of counteroffensive, ranged in scope from 50-550 kilometers of frontage to depths of from 50-250 kilometers.{4} All were overly ambitious, and because of force and logistical inadequacies fell far short of expectations. The Soviet High Command still had to learn the art of the possible.
Strict centralization of command and control at the highest level made successful strategic defense possible. Early attempts to create three Groups of Fronts covering the three main strategic directions (northwest, west, and southwest) failed during the disastrous operations in the summer of 1941. Consequently, to provide “uninterrupted and qualified command and control” Stalin created the STAVKA of the Supreme High Command (STAVKA VGK). Organized first on 23 June 1941, by 8 August the composition was fixed with Stalin himself as Supreme High Commander.{5} The STAVKA, either directly or through its representatives, familiarized commanders of directions and fronts with the aims of each operation, provided forces and weaponry, designated missions, and organized cooperation between fronts and other large units. It also provided a link between political and military leaders and as such provided clear political control over the conduct of the war.
In the operational arena the Soviets amassed considerable experience in conducting front and army defensive operations. Fronts covered operational directions in accordance with STAVKA plans while armies defended according to front plans. Shortages of men and material forced the deployment of the bulk of forces in a single operational echelon (in violation of pre-war concepts) with only small reserves(see tables 46-47). These shallow poorly prepared defenses were easily pierced by concentrated German armor supported by aviation (see Map 7). As Soviet mobilization progressed and weapons production improved, increased weapons densities and deeper defenses evolved. By the fall of 1942 combined arms armies created army artillery groups, air defense groups, and artillery and antitank reserves (see tables 48-49). The army’s defensive depth increased to as much as 20 kilometers, the average operational density to 10 kilometers of front per rifle division, and the average weapons density to 15-25 guns per 1 kilometer of front. By late 1942 army and front defensive depths{6} averaged 15 and 30 kilometers, respectively, with the first defensive belt best developed, consisting of battalion defensive regions. However, the fragmented nature of the defense isolated subunits and hindered maneuver of forces along the front and in its depths. The Soviets emphasized improvements in antitank defenses which were ineffective early in the war due to the paucity of weapons and the tendency of commanders to scatter them evenly across the front. Heavy caliber artillery and aviation was ineffective against tanks for the same reason. Although antitank artillery remained in scarce supply (less than 5 guns per kilometer), by mid-1942 the Soviets began creating antitank regions (strong points) echeloned in depth along likely tank axes of advance. The detachment of antitank reserves from front and army commands to lower command echelons also increased the density and mobility of antitank defenses. After the summer of 1941, artillery customarily engaged enemy armor units to supplement antitank defenses (often in a direct fire role).{7}
Offensive experiences in 1941-42 provided the Soviets with the basis for improving their operational techniques in 1943. In the largest offensive, the winter campaign of 1941-42, Soviet fronts advanced in sectors of from 300-400 kilometers and armies in sectors of 20-80 kilometers with objectives at depths of 120-250 kilometers for fronts and 30-35 kilometers for armies which were to be secured over a period of 6-8 days. The tendency on the part of Soviet commanders to disperse attacking forces over a wide front prompted STAVKA corrective action during the winter offensive. STAVKA Directive 3 (10 January 1942) required creation of shock groups in order to mass forces on relatively narrow frontages in critical sectors at all levels of command.{8} The directive established penetration sectors of 30 kilometers for fronts and 15 kilometers for armies. That permitted creation of higher artillery densities on main attack directions (from 7-12 guns/mortars per 1 kilometer in summer-autumn 1941 to 45-65 guns/mortars in the summer of 1942). The offensive operational formation of fronts in the entire first period of war was single echelon, at first with a two or three rifle division reserve, and later with a tank or cavalry corps in reserve (see tables 50-51 and Maps 8-15). Armies also formed in single echelon (see table 52). However, in 1942 a growth in forces allowed armies to deploy in two echelons with a combined arms reserve, mobile forces, artillery groups and antitank, tank, and engineer reserves (see table 53). The depth of the army operational formation increased to 15-20 kilometers and in some instances, 30-40 kilometers.{9}
The operational role of armor increased both in a defensive role and on the offensive. The Soviets used the small tank brigades of 1941/42 in concert with cavalry (and air assault forces) to stiffen the infantry, launch counterattacks or spearhead pursuits. However, these mobile forces had limited sustaining power and they were difficult to resupply and coordinate with foot infantry. In 1942, the new tank armies, tank corps, and mechanized corps provided better means for countering German armored thrusts and exploiting success while functioning as mobile groups of fronts and armies. However, their composition was unbalanced by a marked shortage of mechanized infantry. Hence, they were difficult to coordinate with other types of forces; they were vulnerable when isolated from their supporting infantry, and Soviet commanders simply had not learned how to properly use them. A special order of the People’s Commissariat of Defense (Order #325, 16 October 1942) pondered mobile group failures (such as the debacle at Khar’kov in May 1942), directed that tank and mechanized corps be used as single entities for powerful attacks or counterattacks, and prohibited the fragmented use of those valuable operational formations.{10}
At the outbreak of war, Soviet tactics suffered from the same general malaise as operational art. Understrength divisions (5000-6000 men) defending in extended sectors (14-20 kilometers) were forced to deploy in single echelon defenses with a depth of only 3-5 kilometers (see table 54). The small reserves had little capability for sustained counterattacking and infantry support artillery groups were weak. Inadequate tactical densities of .5 battalions and 3 guns/mortars per 1 kilometer of frontage resulted. Division defenses, subdivided into battalion defense regions were non-contiguous and had little engineer support or antitank defenses. By late 1941 more extensive engineer support permitted construction of trenches and the evolution of a truly interconnected first defensive position. Increases in manpower and weaponry improved the defenses in 1942. Divisions began creating second echelons, tank and antitank reserves, and stronger artillery groups (see table 55). Second echelons of rifle regiments and rifle divisions created battalion defense regions which later would become second and third defensive positions. Meanwhile, division defenses remained shallow (one defensive belt) and weak in antitank means. By the end of the first period of war, tactical densities rose to 1 battalion and 20 guns/mortars per kilometer of front.{11}
Soviet offensive tactics deviated from those recommended in pre-war regulations. Rifle divisions at first deployed in the recommended two echelon formation meaning that only eight of twenty-seven rifle companies actually participated directly in the attack. Because of the weakness of rifle divisions and the shallow enemy defenses this combat formation was futile and vulnerable as well to enemy air and artillery fire. Thus a Commissariat of Defense Order (No. 306—8 October 1942) required use of a single echelon combat formation in all units from company to division and creation of a reserve of l/9th of the force.{12}This effectively mandated forward use of 80 percent of a division’s combat power and facilitated achievement of penetrations, but it also made it difficult to sustain the attack. By the winter of 1941-42, rifle divisions attacked in sectors of from 5-6 kilometers (on occasions as much as 10 kilometers) to achieve objectives from 5-7 to 8-12 kilometers deep (in some instances 20 kilometers) (see table 56). After January 1942, when enemy defenses became deeper, rifle divisions attacked in sectors of 3-4 kilometers against objectives 5-7 kilometers deep which, in reality, took several days to secure (see table 57). Tactical densities increased from 1-2 rifle battalions, 20-30 guns/mortars and 2-3 tanks per 1 kilometer of frontage during the winter of 1941-1942 to 2-4 battalions, 30-40 guns/mortars, and 10-14 tanks per 1 kilometer of frontage in the summer of 1942.{13} Fire support increased in each division with the creation of infantry support artillery groups (PP) and, in some instances, long range action artillery groups (DD). Centralized artillery preparations before the attack were followed by decentralized support of each rifle battalion by one artillery battery during the attack. Armor support for attacking units in 1941 was poor and resulted in heavy tank losses. After Order No. 325 was issued in October 1942, the Soviets used tank brigades and separate tank battalions as complete units to support attacking infantry, but only after proper reconnaissance and coordination with appropriate infantry/artillery and aviation commanders. After the spring of 1942, the rifle division received increased engineer support, and air support, virtually non-existent before that time, began to contribute to pre-attack preparations and provide some tactical air support as well.
The first period of war was a harsh and costly experience for the Soviet nation and the military in particular. It pointed out vividly the gap between the promises of 1936 and the realities of 1941. But it was a necessary stage for future victory. The division, army and front commanders who emerged in 1942 would lead their units and the Red Army to victory in 1945. The rules, regulations and theoretical principles which emerged by 1942 would be adjusted in 1943 and perfected in 1944-45. The military weaponry flowing off Soviet assembly lines in 1942 would flood the theater by 1944 and swamp the best of German equipment by wars end. The prerequisites for eventual victory were established in 1942 and would be capitalized upon in 1943. The best indication of Soviet progress was the offensive that the Soviets unleashed in November 1942 to mark the opening of the second period of war — the offensive at Stalingrad.