Chapter 4:
Marines Defeated at Penobscot Bay

 

 

Due to the success of American privateers capturing British shipping between New York and Halifax, the British had need of a closer base for launching patrols of their shipping lanes. They set about establishing a base in Penobscot Bay, Maine, with the further hope that a refuge and a colony might take hold, attracting Loyalists from the rebelling colonies.

The Council of Massachusetts Bay asked the Navy Board of the Eastern Department for assistance in repelling the British. The British forces there were the 74th and the 82nd regiments of foot, a total of 640 men. The readied American fleet consisted of four Continental navy ships, three Massachusetts state navy ships, 12 privateers and 20 transports. Three companies of Continental and state marines under Captain Walsh, along with 1,500 militia, were assembled. Only 873 militiamen were fit to fight—and those were ill-trained.

The American fleet sailed on July 24, 1779 and found the British warships formed in a line across the entrance to Bagaduce harbor. They were protecting their half-finished fort at this site and their fleet of transports farther up the harbor. There was a steep precipice to the west of the fort, while the south was protected by cannon from inside the walls. The other two sides were inaccessible. Even so, Marine Sergeant Tom Philbrook said “the fort was only three and a half feet high which our men could straddle over without much difficulty.” The fort had two cannon in barbette with chevaux-de-frise on the ramparts. The British had removed their ships’ starboard cannon and placed them in the fort, on the mainland, and on other peninsulas.

The 60 Marines under Capt. Walsh were ordered to land and take possession of Banks Island at the entrance of the river. The 1st division was to land on the opposite side of the peninsula. Twenty British marines retired leaving four artillery pieces. Under cover of night, the Americans set up two 18- and one 12-pounder cannon. On Tuesday, the island was secured in a brilliantly executed maneuver. By capturing the island, the British were forced to move their ships farther up the bay to escape battery fire.

Disagreement then arose between the naval and army commanders. The Army wanted the British ships attacked. The Navy didn’t want to attack while under the guns of the fort and insisted the assault was to begin on the precipitous cliffs. The Navy refused to talk about the matter anymore, and relegated further discussion to junior officers. At a council of war, it was determined that the Army and Marines were to proceed with the landing before the attack on the enemy ships would begin.

Eight hundred fifty militia and 227 Continental and state marines—with 80 of Colonel Paul Revere’s cannoneers—were in the 1st division. The Marines were on the right with the left composed of the Cumberland County regiment. The 2nd division, the Lincoln County militia with Revere’s men, was to be held in reserve. The troops were tired and had low morale from waiting in cramped, standing-room-only ships. Forty-five ships were lined parallel to the shore giving fire into the woods to “scour the enemy.”

At first light, the boats approached the shore. The Marines were supposed to form in line of battle, but the perpendicular precipice made them climb in groups, unable to return fire, because both hands were needed to climb the cliff. The Marines met the stiffest resistance, especially from the harbor battery firing at close range. Capt. Walsh was killed and Lt. William Hamilton was severely wounded. Thirty-two Marines were killed or wounded here.

Then, Sattonstall decided not to attack the British ships! The land force stopped before reaching the fort, afraid of flanking fire from the British ships. Commodore Sattonstall had hesitated and retreated after only one of his ships was hit. He was definitely not the forceful commander this assault needed.

The Americans surrounded the fort with cannon but went into a defensive posture, their morale very low. Sattonstall would not attack the British ships until the fort was taken—and the Army wouldn’t attack the fort till after Sattonstall’s ships had engaged—so a command stalemate ensued. For three weeks, nothing happened.

A new British squadron of seven ships appeared with 1,530 experienced and heavily armed men. The American ships were defeated, their fleet either fled into small tributaries or scuttled by their own crews. The Marines, sailors and militia fled through the woods, all of the 200 miles to Boston, mostly on foot.

By September, troops were filtering back into Boston with their account of the botched attack. Commodore Sattonstall was found guilty at court martial and declared unfit to command a Continental vessel. Not only was the expedition a failure, but it was a financial disaster for Massachusetts, which lost 11 million pounds sterling—and its entire fleet in Maine.

Overall, this was a demoralizing defeat with a direct impact on subsequent amphibious operations. It was not until the Mexican War, 68 years later, that Marines would again attempt to launch a sizable amphibious operation. The defeat had been caused by a divided command, poor planning, poorly trained forces and lack of aggressive leadership. However, the successful occupation of Banks Island and gaining the heights at Bagaduce attested to the Marines’ bravery and determination.