13
Humans and Non‐human Animals

The question is not ‘can they reason?’ nor, ‘can they talk?’ but, ‘can they suffer?’

From Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham (1789)

‘Well, we’re sorry,’ said Mack. ‘…You see, we’re workin’ for some scientists. We’re tryin’ to get some frogs. They’re workin’ on cancer and we’re helpin’ out getting some frogs’.

‘What do they do with the frogs?’

‘Well sir,’ said Mack, ‘they give cancer to the frogs and then they can study and experiment and they got it nearly licked if they can just get some frogs’.

From Cannery Row, John Steinbeck (1945)

A non‐human animal had better have a good lawyer.

From We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves, Karen Joy Fowler (2013)

13.1 Introduction

The use of animals by humankind is a topic that can generate heated discussion. This chapter focusses on the background to that discussion and attempts to enable readers to make up their own minds. However, before doing that we need to be aware that there are huge differences between cultures in respect of attitudes to animals, as anyone from the Western world who has been to a market in China can attest. Even within a group of countries such as the European Union, in which many of the laws about animal welfare are applicable to all member states, there are nevertheless differences. For example, it has often been said by citizens of countries in mainland Europe that many British people have an over‐sentimental attitude to animals. Be that as it may, most of the examples we use in this chapter are from the United Kingdom; for readers in other countries, we are sure that the principles remain the same, even though details in laws and practices may differ.

In recent years, growing awareness of animal welfare issues combined with the activities of animal rights protesters has brought about significant changes in attitudes to the use of animals in the United Kingdom. For example, there are bans on fur farms and on using live animals in cosmetic testing, badgers are protected by special legislation ¹ and hunting mammals such as foxes and deer is prohibited by law.² However, recent decades represent a very short time in terms of human history; through nearly all that time, humans have lived with, relied on, cherished and exploited animals. In fact, it is true to say that other members of the animal kingdom are vital to us. So why have attitudes towards them changed so dramatically in recent history? How has political reaction to animal issues been so rapid? How have the protesters managed to become so effective?

In evolutionary terms, humans (Homo sapiens) is a very successful species. We can and often do dominate all the ecological niches we care to inhabit; further, our numbers are growing rapidly (see Chapter 15). As organisms we are dependent upon other organisms and the history of our success has involved our exploitation and manipulation of other species. This fact lies at the heart of several bioethical issues, several of which are considered in other chapters of this book. This chapter will consider some features of our association with other animals, especially vertebrates and particularly mammals and the ethical problems that these relationships create.

13.2 Humankind’s Place in the Animal Kingdom

As all who have studied biology during their secondary school (high school) education will know, all living things share most of the common characteristics of life: movement, respiration, sensitivity, growth, reproduction, excretion and nutrition. So what distinguishes humans from other members of the animal kingdom? The main characteristics are probably self‐consciousness and higher cognitive powers of being able to use language and, through that, to rationalise (including moral reasoning). While animals can obviously communicate with one another, it also seems clear that their level of communication has a limited vocabulary. There is some evidence that our closest relatives among the primates can understand human language. Washoe the chimpanzee and Koko the lowland gorilla, for example, have successfully been trained to respond to American Sign Language³ and there are many reported instances of communication in other animals such as dolphins and parrots. However, while we may not be alone in being able to learn and use language, there seems little doubt that the level of sophistication reached by even the simplest of human languages far exceeds any communication system developed in any other species. Many philosophers have claimed that humans alone have reason and that this is an all‐or‐nothing state. Reasoning in this sense goes beyond the ability consciously to make decisions relevant to our survival, because other animals are clearly able to do this. We can also decide what is right or wrong, in other words to moralise. This has, probably from the beginning of the history of our species, shaped the development of human communities and civilisations. The development of language has facilitated, enhanced and augmented the human ability to moralise through reasoning. In addition, although the social and cultural climate in the United Kingdom may hide the fact, a very high proportion of the world’s people have a religious faith, a factor that is also relevant to this discussion and, as has been mentioned earlier in this book, to ethics in general. Indeed, the philosopher Mary Warnock has said that even in our very secular age, we should not forget the influence that religion has had on ethical thinking.⁴

Most religious people believe that humans have a soul or spirit or spiritual dimension, which may be described variously as the divine Self in Hinduism, or as the product of conditions and causes in Buddhism, or as the core of the individual person, influencing his or her choices and deeds, in the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity and Islam). However, spirituality is not just the preserve of people with a religious faith; many people with no religious faith now talk about human spirituality as a dimension of consciousness. Addressing questions of the nature of spirituality and its relationship to mind and consciousness is well beyond the scope of this chapter, but it remains among the most profound and intriguing matters facing philosophers, scientists and theologians today. The increasing interest among neuroscientists about consciousness has given momentum to the debate, but whether consciousness is a uniquely human characteristic is at present an unanswerable question.

Because of these beliefs about the human condition, throughout history most cultures have come to regard people as being of greater intrinsic value than other animals and have therefore justified the use of animals for food, experiments, fashion and fun. Further, as will become apparent, attitudes to animals in the Western society have until recently been very much influenced by a particular Judaeo‐Christian understanding of the role of humans.

13.3 Human Use of Animals: An Overview

13.3.1 Historic and Present‐Day Perspectives

Across the world and within all cultures, people use animals as pets, beasts of burden, subjects in experiments, objects of reverence and of study for financial gain and basis for subsistence. Thus humans have taken control of the lives of animals. How has belief in this right to commodify animals, even to the extent of determining the existence or disappearance of an entire species, come about? Again, the answer to this has its roots in religious thinking, which, although again it may not be immediately apparent, has greatly influenced attitudes towards animals for many centuries. As is also mentioned in the next chapter, in Jewish and Christian thought, much weight has been placed on the following:

Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the Earth and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the Earth.⁵

The significant word here is dominion, and the idea that it is right that humans should dominate all other species probably springs from this. However, as is discussed in Chapter 14, the term dominion has been misinterpreted over the years in that the sense of stewardship that is inherent in the original Hebrew word has been ignored. It was however rediscovered in the second half of the 20th century and on into the 21st with concomitant effects on thinking about relationships with the rest of the natural world.

Many belief systems have also been influenced by ancient Greek thinking and in particular that of the philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BCE). He first proposed the idea that humans alone are rational and suggested a natural hierarchy in which inanimate objects such as stones were below plants, which are alive; next came animals, which Aristotle deemed to be sentient. Above animals came humans, who are rational, and at the top was the state of perfect reason, occupied by a divine mind. Aristotle saw rationality as a godly virtue, so in his view humans alone among all living things have a divine element within them. In many faiths this is seen to be the soul or spirit or spiritual dimension,⁶ as mentioned earlier, and it is this that makes us humans able to act morally and have an understanding of concepts such as good and bad, just and unjust.

In early Christian thinking, St Augustine (AD 354–430) was also very influential. He taught that the commandment Thou shalt not kill⁷ does not apply to animals, because animals cannot reason and are different from humans because of this lack of rationality. Augustine thus believed that God subjected animals for the good of humans and that it is also right for people to keep animals alive for our own uses.

The French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596–1650) put forward a major interpretation of the relationship between humans and other animals, although many disagreed with him. His theory was based on the ideas that the mind and soul are one and the same thing and that possession of a mind or soul is an all‐or‐nothing matter, uniquely human. Descartes thought that animals were akin to machines – operating without consciousness – and that it was therefore not morally wrong to exploit them. However, most philosophers of the time agreed that animals could suffer and that inflicting suffering on them was wrong.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) believed in the idea of personhood as the quality that makes a being valuable and thus morally important. He thought that humans have no direct duties to animals because animals are not self‐conscious, so they cannot make judgments. The work of Carolus Linnaeus (1707–1778) may have informed Kant’s views. Linnaeus, sometimes known as the father of taxonomy, classified animals in a hierarchy of perfection, at the top of which was humankind. Although his ideas predated any notion of evolution, Kant held the view that animals are a means to an end and that end is human well‐being, so therefore animals may be humankind’s instruments. However, he did qualify this by stating that it is sometimes wrong to hurt animals. Kant believed that the way we treat an animal might affect or determine how we treat other humans. This has become known as the ‘indirect duty’ view of human/animal association. This idea suggests that the wanton inflicting of suffering actually harms the perpetrator. Put another way, we should be kind to animals not because of our duty to them directly, but because it is good practice for being kind to humans, who can judge us. Kant reasoned that we have no duties directly towards animals, not even those of compassion or sympathy, but we do have a direct moral obligation to other humans for compassion, and one effect of this will be to improve our society.

The English lawyer and philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) changed the views of many people’s attitudes towards animals. Rather than regarding them as inferior to humans because of their inability to reason as both Descartes and Kant had done, Bentham stated: The question is not ‘can they reason?’ nor, ‘can they talk?’ but, ‘can they suffer?’ He said that because animals were capable of pleasure and pain, their happiness was morally relevant. Arguing that considerable evidence showed that animals might suffer, Bentham reasoned that in a humane society, they should be given protection. This is a utilitarian view (see Chapter 2), and the change in thinking it represents has underpinned all contemporary animal legislation in the United Kingdom. In 1822 the first Act of Parliament to outlaw cruelty to animals was brought in by Richard Martin, who went on two years later to found the Society for the Protection of Animals, which subsequently became the Royal Society for the Protection of Animals and then the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). For many years, the RSPCA has been responsible for much humanitarian work in relation to animal welfare and has also played a major role in discussions on animal experiments and the ‘three Rs’ (see Section 13.5).

Through the 19th century, people were thinking more about the welfare of animals. The English physician and physiologist Marshall Hall, who, as a result of experiments on animals, was the first to describe reflex action, proposed a code of ethics for experiments in 1831. Queen Victoria was apparently opposed to animal research as she requested Joseph Lister to address a Royal Commission Enquiry into vivisection, asking him to ‘make some public statement in condemnation of these horrible practices’. This request presented a particularly difficult dilemma for Lister. As a devout Quaker, he condemned practices such as killing animals for pleasure, slavery and cruel treatment of offenders and the mentally ill. However, he recognised the need for animal experimentation, not only in his own research, to accomplish other advances in medicine and in scientific knowledge. He testified before the Royal Commission in 1875, emphasising the fact that restricting research in animals would prevent people from making discoveries that would benefit humanity. In the following year, the Cruelty to Animals Act was introduced, and, among other things, this law required that animal researchers must apply annually for a licence to practise and that any procedures that subjected animals to pain must have special permission.

By the end of the 19th century, some writers, such as Lewis Gompertz,⁸ himself an early RSPCA member, and Henry S. Salt,⁹ defended the rights of animals but it was not until the second half of the 20th century that the strong defence of animals’ interests became an increasingly important issue in the public debate. In 1975 the Australian ethicist and philosopher Peter Singer (now at Princeton, USA) put forward the view that animal and human interests are comparable in moral terms, arguing that since a difference of species entails no moral distinction between sentient beings, it is wrong to mistreat non‐human animals. It therefore follows that animal experimentation and the eating of animal flesh are morally indefensible.¹⁰ Singer argues that the capacity for suffering is the vital characteristic that entitles a being to equal consideration. If we define suffering as the susceptibility to pain, awareness of being in pain or about to be in pain, there is little doubt that most vertebrates can suffer. However, the extent to which they are aware is questionable, but there is good evidence to suggest that the great apes have a high degree of self‐awareness. This raises the question of the extent to which sentience contributes to consciousness and thus raises again the question of the extent to which consciousness is a purely human characteristic. Immanuel Kant thought that personhood was the defining characteristic of humanity and Singer believes that the distinction of personhood should be decided on the basis of whether or not a being is self‐conscious. This immediately raises the problem of whether this state is attributable to all humans and not to animals.

13.3.2 ‘Speciesism’

Some members of humanity, such as babies, little children and people with certain forms of autism, Alzheimer’s disease or other cognitive disorders, do not have the rational, self‐reflective capacities associated with normal personhood. But does that make them less human? Peter Singer argues that logically in this respect the intellectually impaired, the disabled, infants and embryos are akin to non‐human animals. He has controversially used this argument as the basis for equating the justification of animal experiments with them. A central tenet of Singer’s argument is that if we say it is acceptable to use animals for our own ends in ways that cause them to suffer just because they belong to another species – because they are only animals – then we are showing a form of prejudice akin to racism or sexism. Thus the word speciesism was coined in the 1970s by the psychologist Richard Ryder, meaning human intolerance or discrimination on the basis of species, especially as manifested by cruelty to or exploitation of animals. To those who believe in it, speciesism underlies all our uses of animals that cause them harm.

The contemporary American philosophers Tom Regan¹¹ and Evelyn Pluhar¹² oppose claims that human beings alone are rational and therefore entitled to superior moral status. Regan defends the inherent value of all living individuals and also decries speciesism, which attempts to separate human from non‐human animals. Independent of any benefits humans might derive from exploiting animals, Regan clearly states that on a philosophical level, there is no sustainable defence for separating human and non‐human animals as beings of absolute, as opposed to instrumental, value. He has offered a detailed analysis and critique of Peter Singer’s philosophy and then put forward an alternative understanding of humanity’s moral obligations to animals. Regan developed the idea of animal rights, arguing that animals possess morally important characteristics and those that we use for food, experiments, sport and fashion all have inherent value that is equal to our own. Animals have an equal right to be treated with respect, not to be used as mere resources. Regan argues that this right is violated by our current practices and goes on to call for a total abolition of the use of animals in science, agriculture and sport. He rejects both the indirect duty view of Kant and Singer’s utilitarian ideas because he believes that a good end does not justify evil means. Some people however claim that equating speciesism with racism and sexism is mistaken because there is a moral distinction between humans and animals, for example, that human pain has more moral importance than animal pain.

13.4 Vivisection and the Use of Animals in Research

13.4.1 Definitions, Laws and Numbers

We need to start the discussion of this issue, which is, for some, very contentious, by defining our terms. ‘Vivisection’ is the performance of surgical experiments on living animals in a laboratory for the advancement of (especially medical) knowledge. With respect to vertebrates (and, interestingly, one species of octopus), in the United Kingdom, this type of procedure can only be done if it is licensed under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act of 1986 (ASPA). Further, it must be clear for any specific procedure that there are no feasible alternatives to the use of animals. Many invertebrates such as fruit flies (Drosophila) and worms (Caenorhabditis) are also used in research, but are not protected under the British law.

In 2013, ASPA was revised, partly to include newer European Union directives on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes and to take recent developments into account. The Act covers any procedure that is likely to bring harm or suffering to an animal; about 2.08 million such procedures using ‘normal’ laboratory animals per year fall into this category (data from 2015). As we have seen in Chapter 9, it is now possible to produce animals with precise genetic modifications for the purposes of scientific research. The use of such especially bred animals has steadily increased since the mid‐1990s at a time when the overall use of animals was declining (from a peak in the 1970s). These trends are clearly illustrated in Figure 13.1, which covers the period from 1960 to 2003.

Bar graph of millions vs. years (1960–2003) displaying vertical bars of various shades representing animal experiments (dark), procedures (normal animals) (gray), and procedure (animals with defects) (light). — **Figure 13.1** Experimental procedures on animals in the United Kingdom, 1960–2003.

*Source:* From the Research Defence Society, with permission. (Note: the RDS no longer exists as a separate organisation; it merged with the Coalition for Medical Progress to form Understanding Animal Research. www.understandinganimalresearch.org.uk.) © Understanding Animal Research.

Since 2003, the number of procedures has actually risen again to about 4.14 million but the increase is largely accounted for the creation and breeding of genetically modified (GM) animals.¹³ These now make up about 50% of the total numbers, compared with 8% in 1995. It is also worth pointing out that 87% of these GM animals are rats and mice. Of the 2.08 million experimental procedures (i.e. not the creation or breeding of GM animals) carried out in 2015, the majority involved mice (60%), fish (14%), rats (12%) and birds (7% – many of these were fertilised hens’ eggs). Other minor components of the total were small mammals other than rodents, mostly rabbits and ferrets (1%), sheep, cows, pigs and other large mammals (0.4%), dogs and cats specially bred for research – no strays or unwanted pets can be used – (0.2%) and monkeys such as marmosets and macaques (0.1%). Chimpanzees, orangutans and gorillas have not been used in the United Kingdom for over 30 years and their use is now banned.

The apparently large numbers of animals used in research may be difficult to envisage. Even to one of us (JB) who, as a keen birdwatcher, has observed flocks of several thousand individuals, 3.9 million per year seems a lot. However, the human population of the United Kingdom is just over 65 million (2016 figures) and it is estimated that the meat and fish eaters in that population (the majority) consume a total of well over a billion animals every year (see also Section 13.7). According to Understanding Animal Research,¹⁴ ‘Official figures show that UK abattoirs slaughter 900 million poultry, and 30 million cattle, sheep and pigs every year. These figures do not include imported meat; the UK is probably a net importer so it is likely that we consume close to 1 billion farm animals a year. Tonnage figures from the Marine Management Organisation together with estimates for average weight of fish suggest that, in addition, we consume about 1500 million sea fish and 80 million farmed salmon.’ We quote these figures not to ‘prove’ the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of research using animals (see Section 13.5), but simply to put the numbers into perspective.

13.4.2 Reasons for Experimenting on Animals

Animal experiments cover all types of investigation from toxicity testing to verifying the effectiveness of a newly discovered vaccine. These activities take place in a variety of venues, including pharmaceutical laboratories, public research institutes and university medical schools. They are frequently the focus of protest activities and in recent years, well‐organised campaigns, sometimes with increasingly violent actions, have succeeded in intimidating employees and suppliers of some pharmaceutical laboratories and animal breeding establishments. Further, in 2012 several airlines and ferry companies responded to demands from animal rights groups by banning the importation of mice especially bred for experiments. Overall, these actions meant that some areas of animal research in the United Kingdom were for a while under serious threat.¹⁵

As we have seen in Chapters 6 and 9, our understanding of the genetic basis of life and disease has increased dramatically in the last 30 years. The breakdown of numbers in Figure 13.1 shows that the breeding of transgenic animals, together with the related biological and biomedical research in which they are used, accounts for the majority of animal procedures currently taking place in the United Kingdom (Table 13.1).

Table 13.1 Main areas of research and testing that involve animals.

Source: Data from Understanding Animal Research. http://www.understandinganimalresearch.org.uk/#scientists.

Basic biological and medical research	27%
Development of new treatments, incl vaccines	18%
Regulatory testing of products for agriculture and industry	1.3%
Development of new diagnostic tests	0.8%
Breeding of animals, mainly GM mice, for research and development of new treatments	50%

Product testing is a very small but to some people a very important element. Health and safety legislation requires that the wide range of everyday chemicals used in household, medical, agricultural or manufactured products must be tested to ensure that they are safe to use and to handle. This process is essential to avoid, for example, causing cancer or birth defects in both humans and animals. Testing of these commodities accounts for nearly half of the total number of product tests. Environmental protection is also important in this regard and accounts for about a third of all the product testing that is done. Food and food additive safety involves about 7% of total testing of products. There has been no animal testing of cosmetics or toiletries since 1998 and in the United Kingdom no household products have been tested on animals since 2015.

13.4.3 All Animals Are Equal, or Are They?

We have seen that several different animal species are used in research (although the overwhelming majority are rodents). The question arises as to whether they are of equal ethical importance (or as some philosophers put it, do they have equal moral significance?). Although Darwin said, ‘the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and not kind’, surely the complexity of this relationship has its foundations in more than phylogenetic taxonomy. Carolus Linnaeus’ ordering of organic forms in the volumes that comprise the Systema Naturae (1735) was developed in a large measure to categorise the types of organisms and animals included. The Linnaean system was meant to showcase the ‘Creator’s handiwork’, how each set of animal types leads to higher and higher types (from slugs to man) in a ladder‐like rise to perfection. Pre‐Darwinian scholars defined species in a way that was closely linked to their theological views on the origin of the universe. We ourselves are mammals and so it is not unreasonable that we may feel a closer affinity to other mammals than we would, for example, to amphibians or fish. Among the mammals, certain species have become historically and culturally particularly close as we have tamed, bred and domesticated them, so cats and dogs have a greater importance to some people than, for example, rats. But as we have seen, there are those who profoundly disagree with this and would wish treat all animals (or more probably all vertebrate animals) equally. Nevertheless, as mentioned already, UK law certainly makes a distinction between primates, especially the great apes, and other animals.

13.5 The Ethics of Animal Research

Those who support the use of animals in research into human health and welfare – let us call them the biomedical lobby – cite a number of arguments each of which have been countered by those opposed to research on animals; let us call them the animal rights lobby. Table 13.2 summarises these arguments.

Table 13.2 The arguments for and against the use of animals in biomedical science.

Biomedical lobby	Animal rights lobby
Human life is intrinsically more morally valuable than animal life: we are more important than them	All sentient animals have equal moral worth: their lives are as valuable as ours
No major medical advance is possible without animal experiments	Animal experiments make little or no difference to human life expectancy or disease rate
There are no scientifically valid alternatives	Non‐animal alternatives such as in vitro studies, epidemiological studies and computer models have validity
New medical and scientific practitioners cannot be trained without using animal experiments to mimic surgical or physiological processes in humans	Students are often desensitised by the educational process
The existing legislation provides adequate protection against the undue exploitation of animals	There is clear evidence of cruelty
Research Ethics Committees of funding bodies are rigorous in their consideration of animal welfare when deciding where to deploy their limited monies	Much research is trivial

In spite of the heat generated by debate, which has on occasions spilled over into violence, there is a surprising amount of common ground. This has been listed by David DeGrazia,¹⁶ who suggests that areas on which the biomedical and animal protection communities can agree may form a useful platform for future dialogue. The first principle is acknowledgement that ethical issues are raised by the use of animals in research. Few would doubt that human health as a main goal of such research is of ethical importance, as is the use of government funding of such research. However, important though human health is, its ends are not justified by all means, as would be the case under a purely utilitarian/consequentialist ethical framework (see Chapter 2). For instance, there is no doubting the instant reaction of repugnance to the notion of human experiments, and for many people that repugnance extends to at least some types of animal experimentation.

The next point of agreement is that sentient animals deserve moral protection and that not doing so offends many people’s sensibilities. This is recognised by most governments in countries where biomedical research involves the use of animals and is enshrined in those countries’ legislations. Further to this is that animals’ quality of life (‘experiential well‐being’) itself deserves protection. Everyone recognises that some social animals suffer considerable deprivation if kept in isolation. Primates, equines and canines, for example, develop social structures such as hierarchies and alliances and maintain long‐term relationships that are very important to them. Some species deserve particularly strong protection. Examples would include endangered species and individual higher primates that are no longer useful for research, such as older laboratory chimpanzees.¹⁷

The biomedical community often cites as the guiding principles of research the ‘3Rs’ argument, that is,

Refinement – To make sure animals suffer as little as possible
Reduction – To minimise the number of animals used
Replacement – To replace animal procedures with non‐animal techniques wherever possible

The ‘soft’ end of the animal protection lobby does not disagree with this but at the ‘hard’ end there is pressure to abandon all lines of biomedical research involving animals.

It is at this ‘hard’ end of the animal rights movement that we meet a denial that there are significant moral differences between humans and animals, differences that most people accept. These moral differences are linked with notions of levels of consciousness and autonomy. The latter is in effect only enjoyed by competent adult humans (but see later in this paragraph). Children and animals, though sentient, are not covered by this principle; for example, it is sometimes appropriate to limit their freedom of action by preventing a child from running into the road or, in the context of this chapter, limiting an obese pet’s diet. Finding common ground (with the exception of the views at the hard end of the animal rights movement) in this argument can be extended to the idea that the moral presumption in favour of life is stronger in humans than at least in most animals. This view is expressed clearly in these words by the writer and journalist Cristina Odone: ‘I see no moral dilemma here: on one side, a tiny lobby clamours for the rights of rats; on the other, millions of men, women and children affected by fatal or debilitating conditions stand a chance to be cured. I saw how crucial animal experiments were in the battle to save my half‐brother Lorenzo from adrenoleukodystrophy, a rare neurological disorder; but even without this personal experience, I would give humans the priority.’¹⁸ In other words, few would disagree that the lives of humans are more valuable than the lives of animals, even those animals to which we have attributed moral status.¹⁹ (It is interesting in this context to note that DeGrazia uses the relative pronoun who instead of which, attributing personhood to animals.) But the key question remains: does that difference in ‘moral value’ justify the use of animals in experiments? For some the answer is No and interestingly their ethical argument is often based on a form of autonomy. Thus, the animal rights organisation PETA‐UK²⁰ states: Animals are not ours to experiment on. They feel pain and fear just as we do, and their overwhelming natural instincts – like ours – are to be free and to protect their own lives.

However, DeGrazia recognises that the majority in both communities agree that some animal research is justified, particularly that where no harm is done to the animal, such as observations of their natural behaviour in their normal habitat (although the latter is clearly not animal experimentation).

It is clear from previous sections of this chapter that many animals are still used in experiments and in this section we have seen that proponents of this research argue their case on ethical grounds. Indeed, one of us (JB) has met a biomedical scientist who, in his personal life choices, was a vegetarian (believing that it is wrong to kill animals for food when there are other abundant sources) but who uses animals in his research (because there are no other ways of obtaining data that provide a common good for humankind). Considerable sums of money have been invested in the search for alternative methods (as with the 3Rs – see above) and there has been progress in some areas. Leaving aside the creation and breeding of GM animals, many are using fewer animals now than in the 1970s (as discussed earlier). For example, the much‐reviled LD50 test²¹ has now been abandoned and although every new drug for human use has to be tested on two species, the practice of using lower vertebrates, some invertebrates and even in some instances microorganisms is gaining ground. The use of statistics, computer modelling and cell culture and technologies such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) to probe the human body non‐invasively is increasing. At present, however, most biomedical scientists, while they accept that minimising the number and degree of suffering of laboratory animals is very important, cannot actually see an end to their use.

13.6 Animals in Sport, Companionship, Leisure and Fashion

13.6.1 Sport

These are all very important aspects of human association with animals, but none is free of ethical implications. Indeed, some of the groups who campaign against the use of animals in research also oppose any use of animals by humans.²² In the UK Parliament, the debate about hunting with hounds came to a head with the passage of Hunting Bill (2004), which banned in England and Wales the pursuit of wild mammals with dogs. Hunting had been outlawed in Scotland two years previously but it is still legal in Northern Ireland as it is in the neighbouring Republic of Ireland. The passing into law (in England and Wales) of the Hunting Act (2004) represents the culmination of many years of campaigning by anti‐hunting campaigners who see the sport as cruel and, within human society, divisive. Hunting people, on the other hand, defend the right to choose how they pursue their lives in the countryside and argue that hunting with hounds is not an inhumane method of vermin control (foxes) or of conservation of a healthy herd (deer). Indeed, supporters of hunting have themselves protested in their hundreds of thousands about what they see as an infringement of their liberty and, in some cases, livelihood. The pro‐hunting people argue that they have a genuine interest in the welfare of animals and that hunting is a natural way to maintain a healthy population, for example, of foxes, but its opponents believe that other methods of control are more humane. ‘Country sports’ supporters are worried that shooting and fishing may be next to be banned although at present there is no indication that this is being considered. All these traditional pastimes have characterised the UK countryside for hundreds of years, and, in spite of society’s changing attitudes, most fox and stag hunts in England, Wales and Scotland have continued their way of life, finding ways to hunt within the law. The whole issue of hunting with hounds remains highly politicised and seems set to be contentious for some time to come.

Throughout history, horses have held particularly important places in people’s lives, and since the Industrial Revolution, one of those places has been in sport rather than in work. Thus, the Grand National is a famously arduous horse race: a steeplechase, over four miles (about 6.5 km) long with over 30 large fences for the 40‐odd runners and riders to jump. It takes place every spring at Aintree, near Liverpool in North West England, and always attracts protesters claiming that it is cruel. Racehorses and other competition horses such as show jumpers and eventers are highly bred and rigorously trained to peak fitness. They can very easily suffer injuries in their sports, and often these injuries are difficult or impossible to treat. Sometimes it is economical to try to save a horse for breeding, but generally if the injury is severe, owners will cut their losses and have the animal destroyed (i.e. shot). Animal protection groups see this as a form of cruelty that should be stopped and increasingly organise protests at races (not just at the Grand National) and other equestrian meetings.

13.6.2 Companion Animals and Pets

Companion animals, such as dogs, cats and caged birds, come into a similar moral category to the horse, although perhaps the physical strains that people put upon them are not usually so great. However, ethical questions have been asked about certain breeding programmes to produce characteristics for people’s aesthetic satisfaction. For example, the English bulldog (Figure 13.2) breed has become so refined by selective breeding that it has difficulty in breathing and giving birth naturally.²³

Photo of an English bulldog standing. — **Figure 13.2** English bulldog.

For some people, companion animals, especially dogs and cats, have the status of children or friends. Ownership of a pet may also promote the welfare of the owner by improving their mental health and well‐being. Pets are normally kept at the owner’s home, usually in fact in the home and, in line with discussions earlier in this chapter, owners have a moral obligation to promote their welfare. Occasionally this objective strays into areas where the animal may be harmed, for example, when a pet is excessively pampered. Some people believe that pampering pets is a form of cruelty. In some cases, where their health is affected, such as happens when an animal is overfed, this may well be true. But subjecting them to, for instance, beauty treatments is more difficult in respect of deciding ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ because many pets may enjoy this sort of attention. However there is no doubt that this constitutes a subversion of their natural behaviour and, on that basis, some oppose it.²⁴

13.6.3 Fashion and Fur

Direct action with its attendant publicity, including the ‘I’d rather go naked’ campaign featuring well‐known fashion models, has ensured a high profile for opponents of the fur trade. Long regarded as a luxury item of clothing, fur has become less fashionable since the marked increase in people’s awareness of animal welfare and conservation issues. Nevertheless, although the big cats such as leopard and jaguar are protected, there is still a demand for spotted cat skins for the fashion trade and in the United States thousands of wild lynx and bobcats are trapped for their fur each year. Fur farming was banned in the United Kingdom following the passage of the Fur Farming (Prohibition) Bill in 2003. However, there are still thousands of fur farms across the European Union, while wild mink in the United Kingdom, themselves escapees from fur farms, are regarded as a nuisance and trapped and hunted.

13.7 Working Animals

If we had been alive, even as recently as 100 years ago, the concept of working animals would be completely normal to us. Horses, mules and donkeys (and, in some places, oxen and bullocks) worked on farms and in towns and villages, providing ‘motive power’ for ploughing, for transport (both of individual riders and of groups, e.g. in horse‐drawn cabs and coaches), for haulage, including down in mines, and so on. The invention of petrol‐ and diesel‐driven engines has changed all that. Gone are horse‐drawn carts,²⁵ brewers ‘drays’, pit ponies, milk floats and hansom cabs.

Ploughing with horses is now mostly confined to demonstrations of traditional skills at agricultural shows. In the United States, the transition from animal power to motor power on farms has led to the abandonment of millions of hectares of land previously used for growing food for the working animals.²⁶ In more densely populated countries such as those in Western Europe, the land was immediately put to use in growing food (or for the grazing of sheep and cattle) for human consumption.

However, on a global basis the transition from animal power to motor power is far from complete. Even in some Eastern European countries, it is still possible to see carts pulled by horses, mules or oxen among the motor traffic in city streets, while in parts of North Africa and Asia, such encounters are almost commonplace. One of us (JB) once saw an unlit ox‐pulled cart, full of harvested sugar cane, travelling at night on the main road south of Delhi. And it is in India and other Asian countries that elephants are still widely used for ‘haulage’, for example, dragging felled trees out of forests and plantations, often in locations difficult for tractors. There are also locations where mules, horses and sometimes donkeys are used as pack animals, working in groups to transport goods. Further, horse‐drawn carriages may still be seen as tourist vehicles in cities in many countries, providing a leisurely, low‐carbon (see Chapter 14) way of seeing the sights.

Humankind’s use of animals for work actually goes back a long way; there is evidence that even before the advent of organised agriculture, hunter‐gatherer communities used dogs to help with hunting. However, it was agriculture and increased intercommunity trading that brought about a major increase in the use of animals for work. They were also used in warfare and, as that became more brutal, so the animals suffered as much as did their human handlers, as depicted so clearly in the film and the play War Horse.²⁷ However, in general, working animals were so valuable to their owners that most were well looked after, at least in the context of the general social attitudes of the times. Indeed, concern for the welfare of working animals was expressed among ancient cultures, exemplified by the instruction ‘Do not muzzle an ox while it is treading out the grain’²⁸. The animal that was being used to separate the grain from the chaff should be allowed to eat some of the grain.

However, as already indicated, for most of us living in developed countries, this is mostly a matter of the past. Nevertheless, there are still thousands of animals that are used for specialist types of work in modern society. These include ‘sniffer’ dogs trained to detect drugs or explosives, police dogs that assist in catching criminals, horses for use by mounted police and the ceremonial troops of the army, sheep dogs that help in managing flocks of sheep and guide and assistance dogs, trained to help people who are blind or suffer from some other forms of disability. Guide/assistance dogs are also companion animals (see Section 13.6.2); to some extent this is also true of sheep dogs and, in general, animals in both these categories are much valued and well looked after. Even those working animals that do not become companion animals are often regarded with some affection and respect by their handlers and are again in general well looked after. Nevertheless, we cannot escape the fact that these animals are working for humans and have no choice in the matter. Some animal rights organisations will suggest that this treats animals as ‘mere commodities’ and denies their autonomy. However, for many, this must be traded against the benefits to the welfare of individual humans and to wider well‐being of society in general.

13.8 Animals for Food

Humans have consumed meat and fish from the earliest times of their existence, dating back 200,000 years. For thousands of years, this meant hunting land animals and catching wild fish but over the centuries, keeping of animals for meat, milk and skins became more organised. Some cultures even started fish farming, as in ancient China, 3500 BCE. Today we are used to the idea of farming our food animals; in developed countries very little animal protein comes from the wild, although the bulk of the fish we consume is still caught from the natural but increasingly overexploited wild populations (despite increasing numbers of fish farms). In terms of individual consumption and focussing only on meat (i.e. not including fish consumption), the average meat eater in a typical developed industrialised country will consume, over a period of 70 years, about 30 sheep, 30 pigs, 1600 chickens and a small herd of five cows. Numbers of course vary from country to country as does the balance between animals. In the average American diet, for example, sheep is hardly featured but the number of cows consumed is between eight and nine. Overall, it is clear that in these ‘Western’ diets a lot of meat protein is consumed. This represents a very different, more meat‐rich diet than that consumed by even relatively recent previous generations. We also need to remind ourselves that in many poorer countries, especially in Asia and parts of Africa and of South America, little or no meat protein is consumed in the average diet. Indeed, up to four billion people rely entirely or nearly entirely on plant‐based foods, while up to another billion consume a mixed diet of plant‐based food and fish.

Returning to the topic of the ‘Western diet’, in developed countries, the rise of the supermarkets and particularly their purchasing power means that relative to income, food has never been cheaper. This is one of the factors contributing to the increasing rates of obesity and related illnesses such as heart disease and non‐insulin‐dependent (Type 2) diabetes. There is also growing concern that the increase in the amount of meat protein in our diets (and in the diets in countries that are becoming more affluent, such as China) is having serious effects on the environment and climate, as discussed in other chapters of this book (see particularly Chapter 15). Interestingly then, we also see, among a minority of ‘Westerners’, a move to vegetarian (or at least more plant‐rich) diets both for reasons of personal and of environmental concerns. Further, we have already mentioned in passing that some people believe it to be wrong to consume animals for food and on those grounds are vegetarian or vegan.

However, even for the many who do not have moral problems in consuming animals and animal products, there are real ethical issues that stem from the methods by which the meat, poultry and fish arrive in such plentiful, affordable and sanitised arrays on the supermarket shelves. In particular, there is ‘factory farming’ in which animals are kept in conditions that are detrimental to their health and welfare and that would not be permitted, for example, in the housing of animals used in biomedical experiments (Section 13.5). In response to this, the international organisation Compassion in World Farming (CWIF) seeks to achieve the global abolition of factory farming and the adoption of agricultural systems that meet the welfare needs of farm animals in the belief that this will also benefit humanity and the environment. In respect of factory farming, their aim is not only to achieve its abolition but also the cessation of other practices, technologies and trades that impose suffering on farmed animals. By hard‐hitting campaigning, public education and vigorous political lobbying CIWF have brought about reviews and in many case outright bans on animal welfare issues such as prolonged animal transportation for slaughter or further fattening, the practice of keeping sows tethered in gestation pens, battery cages for laying hens, veal crates and fur farms. Thus, taking just one example, supermarkets now offer eggs from chickens that roam free in large barns and from ‘free‐range’ chickens.

Further, over the past ten years in the United Kingdom, a number of ‘celebrity’ chefs have run campaigns about healthy eating and environmental sustainability linked to animal concerns. See, for example, the efforts of Hugh Fearnley‐Whittingstall²⁹ and Jamie Oliver³⁰ for ending the practice of ‘discards’, that is, throwing back unwanted fish, and of John Torode³¹ for promoting the healthy consumption of oily fish from sustainable sources.

Keeping the balance of interests between animals, the environment, the farmer and the retail chain/consumer is among the most complex of current economic, social and political challenges, and at the various levels of well‐being, autonomy (choice) and justice (fairness) for each of their constituencies is fraught with ethical dilemmas. For farmers, their well‐being will depend upon whether they have a satisfactory income and whether their farms thrive; their autonomy will be through their managerial freedom and their exercise of justice through fair trade rules by which, it is hoped, they sell their produce. For the animals, their well‐being will depend upon the care given to them and their autonomy through the degree to which they can engage in their natural behaviour, while justice for animals resides in respect of their intrinsic value (see Chapter 14). For the farmers and the animals, the forces exerted by the well‐being, autonomy and justice for the consumers via the retail trade cause the ethical problems. For example, bacon is cheaper for consumers (their well‐being and autonomy) if the breeding sow is kept tethered in a stall to prevent her from rolling onto the piglets and crushing them. However this compromises the well‐being and autonomy of the sow and the practice of justice towards her. Nevertheless, it is possible that the consumers, through exercise of their own free choice, may actually opt to pay more for bacon in order to protect the welfare of the sow (and, see above, in relation to eggs). However, for many people of limited means, this is not an option. This is therefore another indication of the complexities and possible clashes of principle that occur in much ethical decision‐making.

13.9 Concluding Comments

This chapter has considered the historical associations of humans and animals and the moral and ethical issues that arise from their places in our lives. Perhaps we can put the animals we have discussed into three categories:

Wild animals
Domesticated animals
Companion animals.

Only a few examples of ethical matters concerning wild animals have been given here; these are discussed more fully in Chapter 14. In this chapter we have focussed on the impact on the lives of those animals that we have tamed and bred for our own ends, and to which/whom we may have a moral duty of care. The tension between human use of animals, even taking into account their welfare, and animal ‘rights’ has been apparent throughout. As we have seen, there is a range of ethical positions on the many‐faceted spectrum of human and animal associations, which may make it very difficult to decide on one’s own moral position. In the final analysis, it is a personal matter, but as we learn more detail of the genetics, physiology, psychology, behaviour and ecology of the many non‐human animals on which we depend and with whom we share this world, it will become an increasingly important task.

Key References and Suggestions for Further Reading

Armstrong SJ, Botzler RG, eds (2008) The Animal Ethics Reader. Routledge/Taylor & Francis, London and Oxford.
BBC (2016) Vets Warn People Against Buying ‘Flat‐Faced’ Dogs. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‐37423040 (accessed 12 September 2017).
Carruthers P (1992) The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Dolins FL, ed. (1999) Attitudes towards Animals: Views on Animal Welfare. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Fowler KJ (2013) We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves. Serpent’s Tail/Profile Books, London. NB: This is a novel that raises a number of issues about experimenting with animals.
Frey RG (2002) Human use of non‐human animals: a philosopher’s perspective. In Bioethics for Scientists, eds Bryant J, la Velle LB, Searle J. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, Chichester, pp 101–111.
Hursthouse R (2000) Ethics, Humans and Other Animals: An Introduction with Readings. Routledge/Taylor & Francis, London and Oxford.
Linzey A, Cohn P, eds (2016) The Palgrave Macmillan Series on Animal Ethics. Titles include: Cochrane A. An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory. Knight A. The Costs and Benefits of Animal Experiments. Molloy C. Popular Media and Animal Ethics. O’Sullivan S. Animals, Equality and Democracy. Ryan T. Animals and Social Work: A Moral Introduction. Schaffner J. An Introduction to Animals and the Law. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Paton W (1989) Man and Mouse: Animals in Medical Research. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Regan T, Singer P, eds (1989) Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Roberts A (2017) Tamed ‐ Ten Species that Changed our World. Penguin/Random House, London.
Scruton R (2006) Animal Rights and Wrongs. Demos, London. http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Animalrightsandwrongs2nded.pdf (accessed 12 September 2017).
UK Home Office (2016) Annual Statistics of Scientific Procedures on Living Animals, Great Britain 2015. UK Government Publications, London.