Roger H. Brown
In May 1947, Ishiwara Kanji (1889–1949) testified before a special military court convened as part of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. While not under indictment himself, Ishiwara responded with indignation at what he viewed as American hypocrisy in trying Japanese for aggression and atrocities. Accusing prosecutors of being ignorant of their own country’s history of expansionism in East Asia, he neatly shifted responsibility for Japanese aggression to the Americans and other Westerners who set the aggressive example, bluntly suggesting that, if they wished to try someone, they should subpoena the American Commodore Matthew Perry, who, with his flotilla of “black ships,” forced the opening of Japan in 1853–1854. Disingenuous and evasive on the question of Japan’s militarism and expansionism, Ishiwara’s outburst illustrates aptly the manner in which Pan-Asianism served to both motivate and rationalize Japanese actions during the 1930s. Indeed, few individuals could match Ishiwara’s degree of personal involvement in setting Japan’s militarist quest for autarky in motion or close association with the pan-Asian ideology that accompanied that pursuit.
Ishiwara spent all but twenty-one years of his life in uniform (on Ishiwara’s life, see Aoe 1997; Peattie 1975). He received his commission with the Twenty-First Class of the Military Academy in 1909 and served as an infantry field and staff officer before being retired at the rank of lieutenant general in 1941. Ishiwara was one of the key conspirators in the Manchurian Incident of 1931, which he viewed as a first step toward gaining the resources necessary for Japan to mobilize for a coming global war. While calling for formation of a New Order for East Asia based on Japanese, Manchurian, and Chinese cooperation, he sought an early end to the “China Incident” that began in July 1937 so as not to undermine preparations for total war against the West. This view brought him increasingly into conflict with other officers on the Army General Staff, who saw the war as an opportunity to destroy Chinese resistance at one blow and, as their position gained ascendance, Ishiwara’s star began to fade. Leaving the General Staff for assignment with the Kwantung army in Manchukuo, Ishiwara made no secret of his unhappiness with the army’s corrupt dominance over that puppet state. Criticizing those he held responsible for this state of affairs—including Major General Tōjō Hideki—he soon returned to Japan in 1938.
Although Ishiwara’s army career was in eclipse, the years from 1939 to 1941 afforded him an opportunity to refine his thoughts regarding Japan’s pan-Asian destiny and preparations for a “final war” against the West (cf. Ishiwara 1993), ideas that found institutional expression via the East Asian League Association (Tōa Renmei Kyōkai). A former lecturer at the Army War College, he perceived in his study of military history a tale of technological progress and strategic alternation between protracted wars and decisive wars. A follower of Nichiren Buddhism since 1919, he drew inspiration from this ethnocentric and apocalyptic form of Buddhism, which reserved for Japan the central role of combining government and religious truth in order to regenerate the world and bring about peace and harmony. Under the influence of the Nichiren revivalist Tanaka Chigaku’s (1861–1939) blend of religious doctrine and emperor-centered ideology, Ishiwara conceived his theory of a “final war” (saishū sensō) between the champions of East and West, roles to be filled, respectively, by Japan and the United States.
Ishiwara envisioned a reorganization of domestic politics into “one country, one party” beneath “direct imperial rule,” which would in turn facilitate increased industrial production and the creation of the national defense state that would provide Japan with military superiority in relation to prospective future foes, including the Soviet Union and, ultimately, the United States. Ishiwara sought to extend this renovation to the rest of East Asia, thereby securing the independence and modernization of the region while simultaneously fulfilling Japan’s pan-Asian destiny. Japanese national mobilization would occur in tandem with the establishment of an alliance of East Asian nations to be led by Japan, harmonized through the creation of a new Asian morality rooted in the Kingly Way (ōdō) and animated by the spiritual qualities of the Japanese emperor. Facilitated through Japan’s foundational spirit, the resulting material preparedness and ideological and political unity would enable Japan to successfully prosecute the final world war against the West. Japanese victory in this decisive conflict, which he believed would occur some thirty years hence, would result in the realization of world peace in the form of hakkō ichiu (“the eight corners of the world under one roof”).
Although Ishiwara’s personal interest in pan-Asian thought developed early in his life and the idea of an alliance of East Asian nations took shape shortly after the creation of Manchukuo in 1932, the East Asian League Association was not founded until 1939. At its peak, the organization boasted numerous branches at home and abroad and at least 100,000 members. Among the League’s supporters were army officers in China, such as fellow Manchurian Incident conspirator and later Army Minister General Itagaki Seishirō (1885–1948), and members of the Japan-backed government in Nanjing, including President Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei; see II:23). The New Order envisioned by the League resembled an East Asian commonwealth of nations under Japanese leadership and, in theory, held out the possibility of a regional system less coercive than the New Order being pursued by the Japanese government. Nevertheless, it was clearly to be a league not only led by Japan but also formed in the service of Japanese mobilization for war with the West.
Whatever ultimate form the East Asian League may have taken must remain speculative since the organization quickly ran afoul of General Tōjō, who, first as army minister in the second and third cabinets of Premier Konoe Fumimaro and then as prime minister in the successor administration, oversaw the League’s suppression and ultimate disbanding. Tōjō’s antipathy arose from both personal and political differences with the League and its leader. First, the League, reflecting Ishiwara’s personal outlook, advocated a less hard-line approach to relations with China, something that Tōjō viewed as defeatist and antithetical to his own hard-line policy. Second, there was the obvious potential of the League to serve as a political base from which Ishiwara might challenge both Tōjō personally and government policy in general. Indeed, it was his perception of the League as a tool for getting at him personally that led Tōjō to initiate a crackdown in the fall of 1940. On the receiving end of this attention, Ishiwara fought back vigorously and publicly, his efforts culminating in a speech at Kyoto Imperial University in which he identified Tōjō and his allies rather than the Chinese as the true enemies of Japan and as men who should be arrested and executed. Nevertheless, it was a losing battle, and in March 1941, Ishiwara was placed on the retired list. A brief stint lecturing at Ritsumeikan University also ended under pressure from the authorities, and Ishiwara returned to his hometown for the remainder of the war.
It was there that occupation authorities later found him, outlawing his early postwar efforts to update and spread his ideas and deposing him for the war crimes tribunal. Meanwhile, the East Asian League Association was dissolved in 1942, then reorganized under the name East Asian League Comrades Association (Tōa Renmei Dōshikai), and finally purged by American occupation authorities in 1946.
The following translation is comprised of the East Asian League Association’s manifesto and an explanation of the historical necessity for forming the League and realizing a “New Order” for East Asia. These passages are taken from the association’s Tōa Renmei Kensetsu Yōkō (Prospectus for Constructing the East Asian League), which goes on to enunciate the League’s ideals and plans in greater detail before ending with an appended essay by Satomi Kishio (1897–1974)—the son of Tanaka Chigaku who was an Ishiwara
associate—arguing for the compatibility of the Confucian Kingly Way with Japan’s Imperial Way.
Source (translation from the Japanese original by Roger H. Brown)
“Sengen” (Manifesto) and “Tōa Renmei no Hitsuzensei” (The Inevitability of the East Asian League), Tōa Renmei Kyōkai (ed.) (1940), Tōa Renmei Kensetsu Yōkō (Prospectus for Constructing the East Asian League). Ritsumeikan Shuppanbu, 1–7.
Manifesto
The final world war that is the great pivot of human history will arrive in the coming few decades. The Shōwa Restoration is none other than the unified application of the total abilities of the East Asian peoples in expectation of certain victory in this decisive battle.
Specifically, the aims of the Shōwa Restoration are as follows:
1. Out of the various states of the region form an East Asian League capable of eliminating the oppression of Euro-American imperialism.
2. Through assertive and reformist construction within the League rapidly increase true strength and prepare the conditions for certain victory in the decisive war.
3. En route to constructing the above, establish the leadership principles of a new age rooted in the Kingly Way.
11 February 2600 [1940]
East Asian League Association
The Inevitability of the East Asian League
Establishing absolute world peace has long been humanity’s ideal. That so long as humanity exists there will be no end to war is contemporary common sense. According to theoretical and idealistic thinking, eradicating war is fundamentally impossible; however, progressive development in perfecting the art of war will, through a final world war giving full play to mankind’s capacity for strife, ultimately bring about the end of war itself. Bringing an end to war is the realization of global unity, the first step toward absolute world peace.
In the “New Thesis on the Shōwa Restoration” we have already made the case that the final world war will arrive within about the next thirty years and that global unity ought to be realized within about fifty years.
Looking at the development of human society it is clear that the spheres of states grow ever larger even as their number grows ever fewer and that the inevitable trend of history is that there will soon be unification into a world state. Through the rapid development of communications, transportation, culture, and industry the world’s space is being increasingly reduced and regional contiguous states are drawing together. Following the first great European war the world evolved from the era of states confronting states to the age of state alliances confronting state alliances; however, through the second great European war, the world is now dividing into four groups, namely, Europe, the Soviet Union, South and North America, and East Asia. In this manner one can imagine the world henceforth will ultimately divide into two groups of states representing the civilizations of the Kingly Way and of the Despotic Way, and that these two groups of states will then deploy for the final world war centered on the Pacific, the result of which will be the unification of the world.
In this way, following the inevitable tendency of world history, it is most natural that the various East Asian peoples who adjoin regionally, approximate racially, and are similar culturally must unite as one.
The idea of East Asian Unity is not necessarily new. There were among our Meiji predecessors more than a few who called for the unification of the three countries of Japan, Korea and China, and Sun Yat-sen also advocated Great Asianism. However, in their day, the objective conditions in East Asia did not yet allow for East Asian unification. As an idea, the case for an East Asian community has existed previously, but when it came to connecting this to the realities of East Asia, the time was not yet right. However, today that is no longer the case. The objective conditions are ripe for realizing the unification of the various peoples of East Asia and for forming the East Asian League. If so, then what are those objective conditions?
First, Japan has obtained the capability to strike back from East Asia against the forces of Euro-American imperialism. Following the Meiji Restoration, Japan first endeavored necessarily to free itself from the shackles of the unequal treaties imposed by the Euro-American countries. After the Sino-Japanese War, she at long last succeeded in treaty revision and then fought and won against Russia which was seeking to occupy Manchuria and annex Korea. At that time Japan was respected by the various races of Asia as a liberator and Japanese, too, thought of East Asian revival; however, regrettably Japan was then incapable of rivaling the forces of Euro-American imperialism and thus imitated the forms of imperialism, cooperating especially with the various Euro-American countries and, moreover, we must admit the truth here, oppressed the various races of East Asia who should have been our allies. However, having availed itself of the opportunity presented by the Manchurian Incident, Japan’s capabilities increased rapidly. At the same time self-confidence in that power unconsciously stirred moral instinct that attained the conscious awareness to liberate the races of East Asia from the bonds of Euro-American imperialism. The unity of East Asia takes as its prerequisite the liberation of East Asia. Japan, availing itself of the opportunity presented by the recent [China] incident, has secured the capability to expel the forces of Euro-American imperialism and this, we must say, is the most important condition for the formation of the East Asian League.
Second, there is the decline of Euro-American imperialist power in East Asia. Led by Great Britain, the first country to complete the industrial revolution, the Euro-American countries advanced into East Asia during the nineteenth century by means of cannons and goods. In the age of imperialism, through banks and railways they invaded East Asia and, except for Japan, placed virtually all the races of East Asia under their control. However, rule over East Asia by Euro-American imperialism was shaken in the wake of the first great European war and is now collapsing because of the China Incident and the second great European war. In particular, Great Britain, the pioneer of aggression against East Asia, is now experiencing its downfall. Construction of the New Order for East Asia, i.e., formation of the East Asian League, will be accomplished only through the expulsion from East Asia of the political and military power of the Anglo-American countries that fail to cooperate with this venture. Today, the three countries of Japan, Germany, and Italy, who share the objective of constructing a New World Order, have concluded an alliance, and both Germany and Italy now recognize the leadership of Japan in East Asia. Thus, with the liberating of East Asia and its victimized peoples from the bonds of Anglo-American financial and military control, one can consider the objective conditions demanding the formation of the East Asian League to be ripening.
The third vital factor is the decline of liberal thought and the rise of a new East Asian world view originating in the Kingly Way. As we all know, liberalism has its origins in Great Britain and accompanied the establishment of Great Britain’s global hegemony and, from the eighteenth century through the early twentieth century, constituted the zeitgeist that dominated the world. Thus, the world order of this age was established with this spirit as the foundation. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to call this order that existed in indivisible relation to the development of Great Britain, the British Order. Nevertheless, this liberal order must now conform to the general trend of the world. Since the first great European war, totalitarian systems have been set up in the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany. In particular, the overwhelming victory of Germany and Italy in the second great European war is a triumph of the totalitarian world view. In East Asia, as well, liberalism is being increasingly liquidated and, furthermore, on the basis of traditional spiritual culture there is developing a new world view refining modern thought. Beneath this new East Asian world view originating in the Kingly Way is a general trend demanding the construction of a New Order for East Asia.
As stated above, following the progressive development of humanity, advancement from small regional states to large regional state alliances is an historical inevitability. The current shifting from the age of state confrontations to the age of state unions is the inevitable advance of world history. No power can avert this inevitable current of world history. At this moment the objective basis is being constructed for unification of the East Asian states, i.e., for the necessary formation of the East Asian League. However, the East Asian League will never be realized if things are allowed to naturally take their own course. Formation of the East Asian League will only come about through the endless cooperative efforts of the three peoples of Japan, Manchuria, and China who must be the core and each work tirelessly for that construction. In other words, as argued above, the East Asian League will be constructed atop the foundation of various objective relations in accord with world historical necessity, but only by directing our subjective will to work toward this can that construction be realized.