Torsten Weber
The concept of Asianism in China was a principal instrument in the justification of official Chinese collaboration with Japan during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). However, the Asianism proposed by the main Chinese collaborators—Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei, also Wang Zhaoming, 1883–1944) and his followers—was neither an invention for propaganda purposes nor a mere adoption of Japanese wartime rhetoric. Instead, it was part of an integrated attempt at seeking political legitimacy by claiming the intellectual heritage of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925; see II:5), the “Father of the Republic” (guofu). Wang’s Asianism, therefore, was a “restoration of Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism” (So 2007: 189), particularly as expressed in his famous Kobe speech of 1924. It was “primarily in this speech that Wang Ching-wei claimed to find the justification for his cooperation with Japan” (Jansen 1954: 213). By adopting Sun’s Asianism, Wang managed to combine his claim to Sun’s legacy with appeasing the Japanese on the one hand and offering a political alternative in the domestic arena to the united front of Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party (Guomindang [GMD], or Kuomintang) on the other. Eventually, Wang’s balancing act between pleasing the Japanese and appealing to the war-torn Chinese failed under the combined pressure of anti-Japanese resistance and the military success of the Allied forces. Before Wang died in 1944, he realized that his attempts to create an anticommunist and pro-Japanese China under his leadership had failed.
Wang Jingwei was born in Guangdong (Canton) and first visited Japan in 1904 as an exchange student at Hōsei University. In 1905, when Sun Yat-sen founded the Chinese Revolutionary League (Tongmenghui or T’ung-meng-hui; Japanese: Chūgoku Dōmeikai) in Tokyo, Wang became an editor of its party bulletin, the Minbao (People’s Paper). In 1910 Wang returned to China to assassinate the regent and father of the child-emperor Puyi but was arrested and sentenced to death before he accomplished his mission. Following the Republican Revolution of 1911, he was freed and became one of Sun’s closest followers. In the 1920s, he held several posts in Sun’s Revolutionary Government in Guangdong.
When Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, he left behind not only a war-torn and disintegrated China but also a vacancy in the succession to the GMD leadership. At first, Wang appeared as the most likely candidate. However, lacking military support at a time when China was de facto ruled by regional warlords, Wang was quickly outstripped by Chiang Kai-shek, then head of the Whampoa Military Academy. The military expedition to unify northern China with the south from 1926 onward further strengthened Chiang’s position. Subsequently, Wang—as the leader of the GMD’s left wing—became Chiang’s main inner-party rival, and the claim over the prerogative to Sun’s legacy became an important instrument in his challenge to Chiang’s leadership. Wang was eventually reconciled with Chiang after the Manchurian Incident (1931) and became premier of the GMD’s Nationalist Government (1932–1935). His rivalry with Chiang, however, continued. When Chiang was again forced to cooperate with the communists after the Xi’an Incident of 1936, Wang’s anticommunist and pro-Japanese stance estranged him further from the GMD leadership. Although Wang, together with Chiang and his GMD government, fled the Japanese invasion of China to Chongqing (Chungking) in 1938, he soon turned away from Chiang and began to look toward the Japanese.
Premier Konoe’s announcement of a new China policy (“New Order in East Asia”; see II:17) in November was interpreted—both in Japan and in China—as an implicit invitation to Wang to become the head of a pro-Japanese administration in occupied China. Just one month later Wang and his followers left Chongqing. After a period of refuge in Hanoi and Hong Kong, Wang decided to move to Shanghai, where he would directly negotiate the conditions of his collaboration with Japan. It is important to note that almost a year and a half passed between Wang’s defection and his assuming the leadership of a Japanese-sponsored government in Nanjing (Nanking) in March 1940. Studies that portray Wang as a traitor (hanjian)—still the predominant view in mainland China and Taiwan—overlook the fact that an appropriate political response to the situation was hotly debated within the Wang group. Once the decision to collaborate had been taken, Wang negotiated with the Japanese over the exact terms of his cooperation, which included the demand for a Japanese troop withdrawal. Seen in this light, Wang appears to have been much less of the passive toy in the hands of his Japanese masters than the frequent characterizations of his government as a “puppet regime” imply.
In order to legitimize his government in Nanjing, to appear to the Chinese as an attractive alternative to Chiang, and simultaneously to please the Japanese, Wang employed a number of striking political symbols and slogans (Cheung 1995). He adopted the same name and structure as Chiang’s Chongqing government and built his political program around the cornerstones of peace (heping), anticommunism (fangong), and national reconstruction (jianguo). These three slogans were usually displayed together with the national flag, the same one that had been adopted by the unified Nationalist government in 1928 (“blue sky–white sun–red earth”). Wang also insisted that his assumption of the leadership of the government in Nanjing would be publicized not as the creation of a new regime but as a “return to the capital” (huan du). Equally important, Wang linked the legitimacy of his government largely to the person of Sun Yat-sen. Together with Zhou Fohai (Chou Fu-hai, 1897–1948), a close follower of Wang, he visited Sun’s tomb in Nanjing prior to the official inauguration of his new government. Sun’s birthday (12 November) was also used as a symbol of Wang’s self-proclaimed succession of Sun’s leadership. For example, the opening of Nanjing’s Central Bank in 1940 was delayed to coincide with 12 November, and Wang’s speech, translated here, explicitly noted Sun’s birthday as the occasion on which it was written. While Wang openly embraced Japan’s pan-Asian rhetoric, he explicitly linked his pro-Japanese and antiresistance positions not to Japanese but exclusively to Sun Yat-sen’s Asianism. References to Sun soon became ubiquitous in Wang’s speeches and articles. In the foreword to a collection of Sun’s writings, which was published in 1941 and which included the text of Sun’s Greater Asianism speech, Wang wrote,
Racially, geographically and historically, as well as in respect of environment, culture and material development, it is natural for China and Japan to be friends, unnatural for them to be enemies. Any dispute which arises between the two nations should be regarded as a transitory aberration, and should be settled in an appropriate manner so that the natural relationship may resume its permanent and natural course of peace and friendship. This point has been expounded most clearly and most thoroughly in the teachings bequeathed us by our late Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. There are occasional passages to be found in those teachings in which he blames China for her errors; there are others in which he takes Japan to task for her mistakes; but at no time and in no place did he ever suggest that the two countries should be or remain enemies. Rather it was his constantly proclaimed hope that they would become friends, joining wholeheartedly in a united effort to promote the glorious cause of Greater Asianism. (Tang 1941: ix)
In order to solidify his claim to Sun’s legacy and to justify his collaboration with Japan, a number of journals were published in Japanese-occupied China that promoted Wang’s adoption of Sun’s Asianism, including the monthlies Da Yazhouzhuyi (Greater Asianism), Da Yazhouzhuyi yu Dongya lianmeng (Greater Asianism and an East Asian League), and Da Dongya (Greater East Asia). While these publications clearly functioned as instruments of propaganda, it should not be overlooked that Wang himself and many of his followers held sincere pro-Japanese sentiments. In addition, humanitarian and idealistic motives, such as putting an end to the ongoing slaughter on the battlefield and his well-known anticommunism, were among the reasons that led Wang to his betrayal of Chiang and to his cooperation with the Japanese. As Dongyoun Hwang points out, the nature of the differences between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei was “not merely political factionalism, but ideological” (Hwang 1998: 15).
In addition to Sun’s Greater Asianism, Wang and his supporters also adopted Sun’s Three People’s Principles (Sanminzhuyi; cf. Itō 1989) as theoretical underpinnings of the new Nanjing regime—and took considerable pains to convince the Japanese of the compatibility of these principles with Asianism. Reportedly, the nationalism (minzuzhuyi), democracy (minquanzhuyi), and livelihood (minshengzhuyi) that Sun had extensively lectured on in the summer of 1924 were viewed as “a menace” in Japan (Boyle 1972: 246). In this context, Zhou Huaren’s text reproduced here can be read as an attempt to assuage Japanese concerns over the Three Principles, in particular nationalism. Although Zhou paid great attention to showing the conformity of the principles with the ideals of Greater Asianism, the text had to be edited to fit the Japanese rhetoric before it appeared in translation in Japan. For example, the Japanese version explicitly affirms Konoe’s declaration of a New Order (“to share the responsibility for erecting a New Order in East Asia”), whereas Zhou’s original text does not mention the “New Order” but speaks only of “the responsibility for building a stabilized East Asia.” Wang’s writings were similarly altered to remove any references to Chinese nationalist aspirations that ran counter to the official Japanese political rhetoric. The fact that such editing was necessary further demonstrates that condemnations of Wang as a Chinese quisling who “perverted Sun’s Greater Asianism . . . in search of a theoretical basis for his own disgraceful behavior or treason” (Shi 2002: 217) are, at best, greatly exaggerated (see Hwang 1998: 2–6).
Zhou Huaren (1902–?) was vice minister of transportation in the Wang government. He represented Nanjing-China at the first of three Greater East Asian Writers’ Conferences (see II:25), which was held in Tokyo in November 1942 to obtain the support of writers for the Greater East Asian War and “to create a Greater East Asian Literature.” Zhou was also vice chairman of the Propaganda Committee of the All-Chinese Society for an East Asian League and chairman of the China branch of the Tōa Renmei Kyōkai (East Asian League Association; see II:22), founded in February 1941. Though he did not belong to the innermost circle of Wang’s confidants, he quickly emerged as the regime’s main propagandist, in particular with regard to propagating the concept of Greater Asianism as a means of justifying Sino–Japanese collaboration. Zhou contributed numerous articles to Da Yazhouzhuyi from 1940 onward and authored the 168-page Da Yazhouzhuyi Gangyao (Outline of Greater Asianism, 1940), which set out the guiding principles of Wang’s collaborationist politics according to the template provided by Sun’s theoretical heritage. Zhou’s writings in Japanese translation appeared mostly in Dai Ajiashugi (Greater Asianism), published by the Greater Asia Association, while some were also reprinted in magazines such as Kaizō (Reconstruction) and Nihon Hyōron (Japan Review).
Source 1 (translation from the Chinese original by Torsten Weber)
Wang Jingwei, “Minzuzhuyi yu Da Yazhouzhuyi” (Nationalism and Greater Asianism). Da Yazhouzhuyi (Greater Asianism), 1:4 (November 1940), 1–5.
On the occasion of the anniversary of President Dr. Sun’s birthday, 12 November, 29th year [of the Republic, 1940]
“For about forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the People’s Revolution (guomin geming), with the aim of gaining freedom and equality for China,” said Dr. Sun Yat-sen. There can be no doubt that China’s national consciousness derives from the great work of Dr. Sun. Ever since there have been national groups in China there has also been a national consciousness. This has displayed itself to some extent over a history spanning more than 4000 years. But it is really only as a result of the life-long efforts of Dr. Sun that a concentrated form of this national consciousness—a combination of a sophisticated contemporary national consciousness with the nationalism of the past—could be established theoretically and was also pushed forward practically. In his last moments he passed this task on to his surviving comrades and compatriots.
This year marks the centenary of the Opium War [1839–1842]. In the hundred years from 1840 to 1940 the imperialism of economic penetration, assisted by military invasion, has been the main factor in the ceaseless repression of China’s national consciousness. We must say that this repression has caused considerable suffering to the Chinese nation. But, as China’s national consciousness had already been formed, this kind of repression could never be lethal. On the contrary, the more attempts at disintegration, the greater the unity, and the more pressure, the greater the solidarity.
Apart from the fact of this repression [of national consciousness], its exploitation is also deplorable. This is the new method used by the Communist Party. While openly claiming that the worker has no fatherland, it exploits China’s national consciousness when demanding national salvation. While openly advocating class struggle, it employs China’s national consciousness by loudly insisting on a national united front. This tactic of using a sheep’s head to sell dog meat brings suffering to the Chinese people, which is even greater when added to the reality of repression. But this tactic will not prove fatal either, because it can only be temporary and before long the people will wake up and then they will not be deceived again.
At the time of Dr. Sun’s death, the true character of the Communist Party had not yet become apparent. . . . The target of Dr. Sun’s national revolution was an end to the outrage of Imperialism. He was born in 1866, 22 [sic] years after the Opium War. He started his efforts to achieve a national revolution in 1885, 45 years after the Opium War, and when he died in 1925, 85 years after the Opium War, he said: “In Yiyou, the year of our defeat in the Sino-French War, I made up my mind to overthrow the Qing [Ch`ing] dynasty and create a republic.” Yiyou is the year 1885, when Sun was 23 [sic] years old. He had witnessed this foreign threat and decided to turn against the Qing court and strive for the People’s Revolution.
The foreign threat was mainly economic penetration backed up by military invasion. It was not easy for China to resist this kind of foreign threat. Without nationalism it could not achieve the self-awakening of the Chinese masses and unify their strength. And without the concept of Greater Asianism, it was impossible to bring about the self-awakening of the masses of East Asia and to unify the strength of its peoples. For this reason, after he had delivered his lecture on the Three People’s Principles on 24 August of the 13th year [of the Republic, 1924], he lectured in Kobe on 28 November of the same year on Greater Asianism.
In his will, Sun Yat-sen stated: “Through the experiences of the past 40 years I have come to understand that in order to achieve this goal, we must raise the masses and ally with those peoples who treat us as equals and fight jointly with them.” Many people have interpreted the phrase “those peoples who treat us as equals” as denoting the Soviet Union, but in his will no particular country is specified. If Japan is treating us as equals, then this is exactly what is envisaged by Greater Asianism. Why must we—apart from awakening the masses—also ally ourselves with those peoples who treat us as equals and fight alongside them? Because the power of imperialism, based on economic penetration backed up by military invasion, has already put down deep roots. The red race in America, the brown race in Australia, and the black race in Africa have all gradually been oppressed and conquered and have all either been subjugated or enslaved. For China to resist this kind of force, it is fundamental to achieve the self-awakening of the people and unify the power of the Chinese masses.
But merely to draw attention to this situation while disregarding the wider context is not only insufficient but also impractical. Formerly, a country did not undertake alliances lightly because alliances meant sharing another’s fate, experiencing some good fortune together and then dying together in misery. To avoid such an outcome, it was considered better to remain isolated. But as regards the general international situation, seen both economically and militarily, there is a trend away from unilateral action to the formation of blocs. Already powerful countries can no longer avoid resorting to alliances, let alone countries that have only just started to rise or those planning their reconstruction after having fallen behind. This is exactly where Greater Asianism originates from. As I have said above, one after another, the three continents of America, Australia, and Africa have gone under and the threat has now come to the yellow races of Asia. After the Opium War, the imperialist invasion did not stop at China, but Japan was also threatened at the same time. However, Japan escaped this threat of invasion and thus achieved freedom and equality some decades before China. However, unless the aggressive forces of imperialism are extinguished, there is the danger that Japan will one day be subjected to invasion again. This is the very point that makes the destinies of the two countries of China and Japan identical. It is a great pity that we have neglected this fact of our identical destinies, but rather antagonized each other. After a process of reflection, we are now working hard to face our common destiny together. Fifteen years after the death of Dr. Sun, the ideals of Greater Asianism gleam with new splendor and illuminate the future path of two great peoples who are going forward together.
When, in the past, the destinies of China and Japan were in conflict, it appeared that nationalism and Greater Asianism were incompatible ideals. Now, in the age of a joint Sino-Japanese future, they are not only intertwined but one could say they have even melded into one. If China fails to acquire its independence and freedom it will not be qualified to share responsibility for East Asia, and if East Asia is not liberated China’s independence and freedom cannot be achieved or guaranteed. This is what every Chinese must bear in mind. Since Japan expects China to shoulder its share of responsibility for East Asia, it will naturally treat us on the basis of equality. Ever since the Konoe Declaration [of a “New Order in East Asia,” November 1938; see II:17], this has been Japan’s unyielding national policy and the expression of a unified public opinion.
Source 2 (translation from the Chinese original by Torsten Weber)
Zhou Huaren, “Da Yazhouzhuyi yu Sanminzhuyi” (Greater Asianism and the Three People’s Principles). Da Yazhouzhuyi (Greater Asianism), 1:2 (September 1940), 11–15.
1
Greater Asianism and the Three People’s Principles are essentially identical. President Sun said: “The Three People’s Principles are the principles of national salvation.” Mr. Wang [Jingwei] says: “If we can realize the Three People’s Principles, we will naturally achieve the status of freedom and equality and at the same time we will increase our strength and share with Japan the responsibility for creating a stable East Asia. Thus, speaking from the perspective of China, the Three People’s Principles relate to saving the nation and from the perspective of East Asia, the Three People’s Principles are equivalent to Greater Asianism” (from Wang’s “The Theory and Reality of the Three People’s Principles”) [Zhou’s remark in the original text]. To be sure, Japan is the strongest country in Asia and China is the largest country in Asia. If we cannot direct the power of both countries to become the driving forces behind a revival movement, Asia cannot possibly be saved. Japan has already gathered up its strength. As China is currently in the process of building a modern nation state, China’s present ambitions are twofold—to save China itself but also at the same time to save Asia. It is for precisely this reason that we can say that the Three People’s Principles are equivalent to Greater Asianism.
. . . The Japanese [politician] Kōno Mitsu [1897–1981] reviewed the Three People’s Principles and Greater Asianism as follows: “Sun Yat-sen’s philosophy of the people’s livelihood as an element of nationalism will strengthen the independence of the Chinese people and assist the revival of all Asian peoples. And it also informs the World Principle of Great Harmony (Datong de Shijiezhuyi), to be achieved through Greater Asianism. . . . We can confidently say that, at a profound level, Sun’s ideals envisioned first creating a strong new China and then, building on policies of neighborliness and cordiality, planning the revival of Asia and the liberation of the Asian countries from oppression by the Whites through the realization of Greater Asianism.”
What he observed was correct. We must realize the Three People’s Principles to demand equality for ourselves and, at the same time, we must implement the ideals of Greater Asianism to demand equality for other nations. This way of thinking corresponds with the philosophical ideals of ancient China, in particular, with the concept of “taking responsibility for the welfare of the people” and “having a constant concern for the suffering of the people.” Through promoting and expanding these ideals, we will find the spirit of Greater Asianism. Dr. Sun’s principle of Greater Asianism is wholly derived from these ideals.
In addition, when we analyze the practical contents of Greater Asianism, we see that they correspond to the Three People’s Principles. The key point of nationalism is the demand for the indiscriminate equality of all people within one country. It then involves raising the international status of the Chinese nation to a position of equality and, finally, pursuing equal status for Asian nations with those on other continents. It demands the independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and—taking matters one step further—aims at the independence and liberation of the peoples of East Asia. The final ideal of nationalism is a great union of the world (shijie datong). These ideals form the consistent expression of Dr. Sun’s spirit and thought.
2
The methods to be used in realizing the ideals of Greater Asianism and of nationalism are identical. The President [Sun] has said that, in order to make Greater Asianism a reality, the traditional culture of the East must be revived. This culture embodies the Kingly Way (wang dao), or the ideals of benevolence and virtue (renyi daode). Only if we succeed in creating a union of the Asian peoples on this basis can Greater Asianism be realized. And the key point for the realization of nationalism is the unity of the Chinese people themselves and the revival of the traditional morality of the Chinese people, as well as the revival of benevolence and virtue and the promotion of the Kingly Way. . . .
In his lecture on nationalism he stated: “To take up the issue of culture again, the culture of China predates European culture by some one thousand years. The finest period of European culture was in the heyday of Greece and Rome, and with Rome it reached its zenith. However, the Roman Empire was contemporaneous with China’s Han dynasty [206 BC–AD 220]. From this we can see that at the time of the Han dynasty China’s ideals of peace were already well established, as China did not advocate war against foreigners” (4th Lecture on Nationalism). In subsequent passages, Sun gave examples of countries and regions such as the South Seas [Pacific Islands], Nepal, and Siam to illustrate the similarities with the Kingly Way in Greater Asianism.
The culture of the East (dongfang) has always been very strong. But in order to resist the material civilization of Western Europe, virtue and benevolence are not enough on their own. Thus the President encouraged the study of Western science, a point which he also stressed in his lectures on nationalism. In his lecture on Greater Asianism, he argued that one should study science on the basis of virtue and benevolence, and again in his lecture on nationalism he stated that Asians must make an effort to catch up with developments in Western science. However, when China becomes strong again, the traditional duties of the Kingly Way “to relieve the weak and help the needy” must not be neglected (6th Lecture). In sum, we can say that the methods of realizing Greater Asianism and of achieving nationalism are identical and can be compared as follows:
Greater Asianism:
1. Revive Eastern culture, with an emphasis on benevolence and virtue
2. Create an alliance of the peoples of East Asia
3. Study Western science, but with benevolence and virtue as a foundation; promote industry as a means of self-defense
Nationalism:
1. Revive China’s traditional virtues, including benevolence and virtue
2. The unification of the different peoples within China should result in the creation of a nation (guozu)
3. Make efforts to catch up with developments in European science, but with the ideals of the Kingly Way as the foundation
The individual elements of this three-point structure correspond to one another. The scope of the second point in the first list separates East Asia from China but, as it involves the union of the same race, it resembles the watery element of blood. The substance is the same.
. . .
4
As the ideals underpinning Greater Asianism and the Three People’s Principles are substantially identical, can we not simply promote Greater Asianism and set aside the Three People’s Principles? As the principles explained above range from the intimate to the unfamiliar and from the close to the distant, we clearly cannot do this.
On the other hand, if we affirm the Three People’s Principles, why must we also advocate Greater Asianism? The reasons for this are also very simple:
1. China is just one among the countries of Asia and its political, economic, and social structures are closely linked with those of its neighbors. Without forming alliances with other Asian nations, the independence and liberation of any one country cannot easily be achieved.
2. The twentieth century is the age of national alliances. The continents of Europe and America have formed various blocs and the Pan-American alliance has already achieved some notable results. (Although the Pan-American Alliance deserves some criticism, without it many countries in America, in particular the small countries of Central America, would be unable to maintain their independence.)
Economic alliances are even more important than political alliances. It was because the League of Nations paid no attention to economic problems that it failed. Following the current European War, the European nations will certainly form an alliance. In the future, Europe will present itself to the world in the form of an alliance, and the Americas have already formed an alliance as a means of resistance. Therefore, the Asian peoples must also inevitably form a grouping based on their common beliefs and practices.
In conclusion, insofar as we are Chinese we advocate the Three People’s Principles, but insofar as we are East Asians, we support Greater Asianism. In substance, both are identical and have the same goals. For this reason we must first of all strive for the independence, equality and freedom of China, to the best of our ability. At the same time, because China is a part of Asia and thus China and Asia possess an inseparable character, and also because the objective situation requires it, we must also work for the independence and liberation of all of Asia.
The Three People’s Principles and the ideals of Greater Asianism are not only mutually inclusive, but in fact are reciprocal and complementary. To our own people we recommend the Three People’s Principles and to the Asians we advocate Greater Asianism. Both go back to one common root; they are the two sides of the same coin. These are the teachings of President Sun and should not be interpreted as two separate concepts. This point should not be overlooked when researching Greater Asianism.