Sven Saaler
Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946) was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan, a region that many influential politicians of modern Japan have called home. Matsuoka went to the United States at the age of twenty. After graduating from Oregon University’s Law School (Ano 1997), he returned to Japan and after 1904 pursued a diplomatic career at the Foreign Ministry. In 1921 he became a director of the state-owned South Manchurian Railway Company (Mantetsu). In 1930 he was elected to the House of Representatives on the Seiyūkai ticket. As a politician, he continued to advocate Japanese expansion in Manchuria and the creation of a Japanese puppet state there.
Matsuoka gained international notoriety in 1933 when he announced, as Japan’s representative to the League of Nations in Geneva, that his country would resign from the League after the League condemned the establishment of Manchukuo as an act of aggression. Between 1935 and 1939, Matsuoka was back in Manchuria as president of the South Manchurian Railway Company, but he quit this important position when, in July 1940, he was appointed foreign minister in the second Konoe Fumimaro cabinet. During his tenure, he signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy (27 September 1940) and the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union (13 April 1941) but was forced out of the government in July 1941 after the German attack on the Soviet Union. After Japan’s defeat in 1945, he was arrested as a class A war criminal but died in prison of tuberculosis before receiving his sentence.
As a vocal advocate of Japanese expansion in Manchuria, Matsuoka had from early on envisaged a scheme of regional integration in East Asia under the leadership of the Japanese Empire (Eizawa 1995: 88–94). In January 1933 he claimed, in an interview reported in a two-page feature in the New York Times (8 January 1933), “a world spiritual mission” for Japan as well as a leadership role in East Asia. In 1941, in a speech to the Japanese Imperial Diet (reproduced here), Matsuoka called for the establishment of “a sphere of co-prosperity throughout greater East Asia with Japan, Manchukuo and China as its pivotal point.” This idea of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitōa kyōeiken), which he also advocated in his popular book Kōa no Taigyō (Matsuoka 1941b), would become one of the major wartime slogans, aiming at legitimizing Japanese leadership in East Asia, shutting out Western interests in Asia, and mobilizing manpower and raw materials to support Japan’s war effort (see also the following chapters).
The concept was rooted in older forms of Pan-Asianism and was directly linked to Konoe’s proclamation of a “New Order in East Asia” in 1938 (see II:17), Konoe’s attempts to form a pan-Asian core by installing a Japan-friendly government in China under Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei; see II:23), and the reaffirmation of these policies by the Hiranuma cabinet (see II:21). Matsuoka had been an early advocate of the concept of Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity and used the term as early as 1938 when he was president of the Mantetsu. The concept continued to be prevalent after the end of Matsuoka’s tenure as foreign minister and was, once again, reaffirmed as official policy by the third Konoe cabinet in July 1941 (New York Times, 20 July 1941). It became of pressing importance when the government utilized Co-Prosperity rhetoric in order to justify Japan’s occupation of French Indochina. As the Japanese government declared,
French Indo-China and Japan have from olden times been closely bound in cultural, historical and economic relations. Prior to the closing of Japan to foreign intercourse [in the 1630s] . . . , there were two Japanese towns each in Annam and Cambodia and very prosperous trade was carried on with Japan. . . .
In recent times Indo-China has re-established her old relations with Japan in a new sense as a source of materials for the industries of Japan. Relations of late steadily have become closer and more cordial, with Indo-China constituting an important link in the sphere of common prosperity in Great East Asia which Japan is endeavoring to establish. (quoted in the New York Times, 27 July 1941)
The idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere eventually reached its zenith with the creation of a Ministry for Greater East Asia (Daitōashō) in November 1942 and the calling of an “Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations” in Tokyo in November 1943 (see II:27). However, it was not an idea of Asian solidarity only. At least in Matsuoka’s case, it implied universal validity—and the long-term political aim to extend the benevolent rule of the Tennō to the whole world. In this sense, the idea of East Asian Co-Prosperity overlapped with the concept of “The Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof,” or hakkō ichiu (Eizawa 1995: 94f).
Certainly, these concepts found some support among the Japanese and also among some of the peoples of the region. Many Japanese soldiers who fought in Southeast Asia testify in their diaries and recollections that they believed that they were fighting for a pan-Asian cause, that is, for the liberation of Asian peoples (Yoshimi 1987: 189). The previously mentioned Tokyo Conference of November 1943 was accompanied by a “People’s Mass Meeting for Solidarity with Greater East Asia” in Hibiya Park, which was reportedly attended by over 120,000 people (Go 1944). However, the idea of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere lost its attraction after Japan’s defeat in World War II. Ever since, it has been associated with Japanese expansionism, and thus even today the idea remains an important and problematic historical legacy for Japan—a legacy that is considered by many as a major obstacle to regional integration in contemporary East Asia.
Source (English in the original)
Address by the Foreign Minister of Japan, Yosuke Matsuoka, delivered before the 76th session of the Imperial Diet, 21 January 1941. Contemporary Japan, February 1941.
It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity of explaining at the reopening of the 76th session of the Diet the recent course of our country’s foreign affairs.
Needless to say, the aim of Japan’s foreign policy is that of enabling all nations of the world each to take its own proper place, in accordance with the spirit of the Hakko Ichiu [“The Eight Corners of the World under One Roof,” a wartime slogan used to justify Japanese territorial expansion], the very ideal which inspired the foundation of our Empire. The object of the Three Power Pact, concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy on September 27 [1940] last, is none other than the realization of the same great ideal. . . .
The Three Power Pact stipulates that Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia. It is our avowed purpose to bring all the peoples in greater East Asia to revert to their innate and proper aspect, promoting conciliation and co-operation among them, and thereby setting the example of universal concord. . . .
Of the nations in greater East Asia, Manchukuo has special and inseparable relations with this country [Japan]. As you are aware, during the ten years which have already elapsed since her emergence as an independent nation, her national foundations have become strong and secure while her international position has been greatly enhanced, her teeming millions ever enjoying an increasing measure of prosperity. In June last year, the Emperor of Manchukuo paid a visit to Japan to offer his felicitations personally to our Imperial House on the auspicious occasion of the 2,600th anniversary of the foundation of our Empire. This is a source of genuine congratulation for the peoples of Japan and Manchukuo as it is a conspicuous manifestation of the unique relations subsisting between the two nations, sharing, as they do, common aims and aspirations. By the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty concluded with the National Government at Nanking, and through the Joint Declaration made by Japan, Manchukuo and China, the Republic of China recognized Manchukuo, with the result that an exchange of ambassadors has been arranged between them.
Inasmuch as an early settlement of the China Affair [Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945] is desirable in the interests of the creation of this sphere of common prosperity throughout greater East Asia, the present Government ever since its formation, has urged the Chiang Kai-shek regime to reconsider and reverse its attitude, with a view of bringing about its amalgamation with the Nanking Government, but it remains still struggling against Japan. . . .
In the light of such an international situation, the Japanese Government, in pursuance of their fixed policy, recognized the National Government at Nanking and on November 30 of last year concluded with the latter the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty. This treaty embodies the three basic principles of good neighbourliness, economic co-operation and joint defence against communist activities. It stipulates that both Japan and China respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and undertake close economic co-operation on the basis of equality and reciprocity, and that Japanese forces be stationed in certain specified areas in Mengchiang [also transliterated Mengjiang, an autonomous region in Inner Mongolia, 1936–1945, under the control of the Mongol United Autonomous Government, informally under the control of the Japanese army] and North China. Not only does Japan demand no territorial cession and no indemnities, but she has willingly pledged to China a policy of abolishing extraterritoriality and also of restoring the “concessions” to China. This is an eloquent testimony of her sincere desire for the attainment of a moral union of the Asiatic peoples. . . .
We have thus maintained an attitude to surmount all obstacles for the purpose of establishing a sphere of co-prosperity throughout greater East Asia with Japan, Manchukuo and China as its pivotal point.
Let me now make a brief survey of our relations with the Netherlands East Indies, French Indo-China, and Thailand, which lie within the above-mentioned sphere of common prosperity.
The Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, if only for geographical reasons, should be in intimate and inseparable relationship with our country. Therefore, the situation which has hitherto thwarted the development of this natural relationship must be thoroughly remedied, and relations of good neighbourliness secured for the promotion of mutual prosperity. . . .
As regards French Indo-China, it formed the most important route of supply for Chungking since the beginning of the China Affair. Consequent, however, upon the sudden change in the European situation last June, a change has occurred in the relations between Japan and French Indo-China, resulting in the closure of the border between French Indo-China and China itself, and the entry by agreement, of Japanese armed forces into French Indo-China. . . .
In June, last year, a Treaty of Amity and Neutrality was concluded by Japan with Thailand. With the exchange of ratifications, completed on December 23 at Bangkok, the bonds of friendship between the two countries have been drawn still closer. . . .
The relations between Japan and Near Eastern countries have recently increased in cordiality. Our ratification of the Treaty of Amity with Iran is only one of many proofs that illustrate this happy state of affairs. . . .
In establishing a sphere of common prosperity in greater East Asia, and ensuring the peace of the Orient, it is not desirable that the present diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union should be left as they are. The utmost efforts are being made, therefore, to remove mutual misunderstandings and, if possible, to bring about a fundamental and far-reaching adjustment of diplomatic relations. . . .
The prevailing confusion of the international situation shows no sign of subsiding, but, on the contrary, it tends to increase. Should the United States unfortunately become involved in the European war, and should Japan, too, be compelled to participate in the war, another great World War both in name and reality would ensue, precipitating a situation which would defy all attempts at saving it. Should the war take its furious course, unleashing formidable new weapons which have not hitherto been used, no one could guarantee that it would not develop into a war spelling the downfall of modern civilization. The Three Power Pact has been concluded for the purpose not only of making sustained efforts for the establishment of a sphere of common prosperity throughout greater East Asia, but of preventing, in its course, any further extension of the present disturbances.