Torsten Weber
With the rising political and economic power of China, a more proactive Chinese stance has emerged with regard to the claim to leadership in Asia. In this context, the value of Asianism has recently been “rediscovered” as a useful concept to appeal to an Asian commonality and to promote regional integration in East Asia. This “New Asianism” rests on a reevaluation of historical, mostly Japanese-led Asianism on the one hand and an affirmation of an implicitly China-centered cultural particularism on the other.
The academic groundwork for the current Chinese embrace of Asianism was laid by the historian Sheng Banghe, who, writing in the influential journal Lishi Yanjiu (Historical Research), in 2000, proposed a reevaluation of Japanese Asianism that extended thinking on the subject beyond the orthodox line—which hitherto had uniformly viewed Asianism as a Japanese ideology used to legitimize the conquest of China. Against this view, Sheng argued that some advocates of Japanese Asianism had initially promoted an “Asian alliance” (Yazhou tongmeng) and a concept of “Sino-Japanese mutual help and guidance” (Zhong-Ri lianxie) that was not directed against Asian countries but was rather a means of resistance against the Western powers (Sheng 2000: 125). A similar view was proposed by Wang Ping, a member of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and frequent commentator on Sino–Japanese relations for the central organ of the Chinese Communist Party, the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily). Wang claimed that “Asianism cannot indiscriminately be labeled invasionism” and contended that the central argument in “Classical Asianism” had indeed been Asian solidarity (Wang Ping 2004: 17). For the twenty-first century, she proposed a “New Classical Asianism” that would take the form of nonexclusive regional cooperation (Wang Ping 2004: 366–67). Although Wang Ping claims to oppose avowals of “Asian values” and “Asian thought,” or hegemonic hopes for an “Asian century,” her perception of an Asian commonality draws explicitly on the traditional Chinese values of Confucianism and the assumed singular characteristics of “Chinese civilization” (Zhonghua wenming). In many respects, Wang Yi’s call for a “Neo-Asianism for the twenty-first century” follows Wang Ping’s line of argumentation.
Wang Yi was born in Beijing in 1953 and during the Cultural Revolution was banished to do physical work (“xia fang”) in a rural area of China’s northernmost province of Heilongjiang. After Mao’s death in 1976, Wang returned to Beijing, where he studied at the Second Foreign Language Institute. In 1982, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was appointed director of the Asia Bureau in 1995. Between 2001 and 2004 he served as vice minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a post he returned to in 2007. During his time as Chinese ambassador in Japan (2004–2007), Wang, who speaks excellent Japanese, gained a reputation as an expert on Japan. His efforts to improve Sino–Japanese relations have been widely praised by the media in both China and Japan.
Wang served as ambassador in Tokyo at a time of particularly tense relations between the two countries. During the premiership of Koizumi Jun’ichirō (2001–2006), Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors deteriorated to an unprecedented degree in the postwar period, largely because of the controversial visits of Koizumi and other members of his cabinet to the Yasukuni Shrine and disputes over Japanese history textbooks. In spring 2005, tensions between China and Japan led to massive and violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, and there were no mutual visits between Chinese and Japanese leaders from October 2001 until October 2006. Throughout this crisis, Wang Yi continually appealed to a Sino–Japanese commonality and put particular emphasis on the significance of past and present cooperation within Asia. Interestingly, he frequently resorted to language that resembled the Japanese Asianist rhetoric of the early twentieth century. In 2005, in a speech at Tokyo’s Waseda University, he stressed that the “development of Asia in its entirety and the formation of an Asian consciousness” was necessary to accomplish the “revival of Asia” (Ajia fukkō). As in his article translated here, Wang explained that his vision of regional cooperation was premised on the idea of “reciprocal benefits and win-win relations” with other regions of the world. Nevertheless, like Wang Ping’s “New Classical Asianism,” Wang Yi’s Neo-Asianism also assumes that Asian—in particular Chinese—virtues are unique.
Some weeks before the publication of Wang Yi’s Asianism text in China’s semiofficial Waijiao Pinglun (Foreign Affairs Review; Wang 2006b)—and only days after members of the Japanese Diet had once again visited the Yasukuni Shrine—Wang publicly put forward his vision of a “New Asianism” in Tokyo. In a speech titled “The future of Asia and the roles of Japan and China,” he maintained that the gradual development of a “collective Asian consciousness” (shūdanteki na Ajia ishiki) in postwar Asia, as manifested in various types of “pan-Asian projects” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], the Asian Cooperative Dialogue, and so on), heralded “a new Asianism for the twenty-first century” (Wang 2006a). This “New Asianism” should follow the principles of cooperation, openness, and harmony. Despite his repeated emphasis on equality, openness, and mutual benefits, Asia, as defined by Wang, is essentially an Asia centered on China—with “Chinese virtues” as its philosophical basis and China’s rising economy as its engine of development. Consequently, the current Chinese adoption of Asianist rhetoric is being carefully monitored in Japan as a potential Chinese attempt at marginalizing Japan’s role in Asia and promoting China to the position of regional spokesman and leader.
Source (translation from the Chinese original by Torsten Weber)
Wang Yi (2006b), “Sikao Ershiyi shiji de Xin Yazhouzhuyi” (Considering Neo-Asianism in the Twenty-First Century), Waijiao Pinglun (Foreign Affairs Review) 89, 6–10.
1 Early Asianism
In pre-modern Asia, there existed no clear geographical coordinates and intercontinental boundaries. Speaking in a general and traditional sense, the psychological limits of its people more or less comprised Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Southern Asia. But in a broader and practical sense, geographically Asia also includes Central Asia, West Asia, and the region east of Russia’s Ural Mountains. Asia’s entire territory covers approximately 30% of the whole land area of the earth and includes approximately 60% of the total world population. While this article treats Asia in this broader sense, it also places special emphasis on the region understood in the traditional sense.
For a long period, Asia stood at the forefront of history and made some distinguished contributions to the human race. Among the four great ancient civilizations of the world, three are in Asia: China, India, and old Babylon. The three great religions of the world, Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam, all have their origins in Asia. Asia’s classical Eastern philosophy continues to inspire human thought, and a number of outstanding inventions by Asians have influenced the progress of global civilization. Also, for a long time Asia was leading the world economy. As the data presented in Paul Bairoch’s article “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980” [Journal of European Economic History 11: 2, Spring 1982, 269–333] demonstrate, at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the West, Asia accounted for two thirds of the world’s GDP. In particular, China and India accounted for 32% and 24% respectively.
With the advent of the modern period, Asia fell behind as it could not keep up with the rapid tides of the Industrial Revolution and, confined to itself, the region gradually declined. In 1900, the combined GDP of China and India accounted for only 7.7% of the world total, while the six countries of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy made up 54.5%, and the USA alone accounted for 23.6%. From the year 1510 onwards, when the Portuguese colonizers occupied Goa in India, almost all the Asian countries declined to various degrees as a result of becoming targets of invasion and colonization by the Western powers. Their peoples bore the tremendous sufferings inflicted by war and collective humiliation.
Confronted with invasion by the [Western] powers and with internal decline, members of the political and cultural elites of the various Asian countries began examining the position of Asia and that of their own countries from the perspective of international relations. Step by step they began connecting the fate of their own country with the future of Asia. Working from their respective positions, they formulated the ideal of Asianism (Yazhouzhuyi) and formed the movement known as “early Asianism”.
We can divide early Asianism into roughly two periods. The first lasted from the Opium War [1839–1842] and the Japanese-American “Black Ships Incident” in the mid-nineteenth century [the “opening” of Japan by the United States in 1853–1854] until 1894, just before the Sino-Japanese War. In this period, a group of Japanese intellectuals took the lead in proposing the idea of an Asian alliance (Yazhou lianhe). They argued that Japan, China, and Korea were all members of an Eastern civilization (dongfang wenming) faced with increasing pressure from the advancing Western powers. Therefore, a Sino-Japanese alliance was desirable, and a triple alliance of Japan, China, and Korea also needed to be formed. At the same time, some important political figures and thinkers at the Qing [Ch’ing] court were making similar claims.
However, also at this very time, in Japan the domestic debate over national strategy came to a boil and eventually the argument for “leaving Asia, entering Europe,” as represented by Fukuzawa Yukichi, prevailed. In 1889 and 1890 respectively, Japan promulgated an “Imperial Constitution” and instituted an “Imperial Diet.” It adopted a political system based on a constitutional monarchy and imitated the “rich country, strong army” course characteristic of the Western powers. First of all, it directed its newfound aggression against Korea and China.
The second period lasted from the [beginning of the] Sino-Japanese War in 1894 to 1927 when the Japanese Prime Minister, Tanaka [Gi’ichi], called for an Eastern Conference (Dongfang Huiyi) and put forward his “Policy Outline on China,” aiming at the invasion of China. In this period, the Western powers took a further step in their partition of the countries of Asia, in particular of China. Although Japan and the Western powers mutually colluded, they also checked each other. At the same time, Japan rapidly expanded its forces against Asia. Anti-Japanese resistance in Asia, particularly in China, intensified as the chief opposition to Japanese expansionism.
In the course of this process, in 1897 Japan established the Tōakai in Tokyo and the Dōbunkai the following year [sic]. Later, both merged into the Tōa Dōbunkai [all three organizations were in fact founded in 1898; see I:9] which became the chief center for Japanese research into Asian, particularly Chinese, issues and produced various relatively systematic ideologies of Asianism. At the same time, this early Asianism was increasingly diverted down a side road and gradually lost credibility as a tool of, and pretext for, the invasion and monopolization of Asia.
From the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, early Chinese revolutionaries and thinkers such as Sun Yat-sen, Zhang Taiyan [Zhang Binglin, 1869–1936], Liang Qichao [1873–1929], and Li Dazhao also started to examine and elaborate Asianist thought from different perspectives. A number of intellectuals from India, such as Gandhi and Tagore, and others from Korea and Southeast Asia, subsequently added their contributions. Asianism became the common currency of the Asian political and intellectual world.
To sum up, the various forms of early Asianism share a number of common features:
First of all, it was a direct response to the oppression of the Western powers, which elicited the preliminary consciousness of ethnic nationalism and anti-colonialism.
Secondly, it was an intellectual and cultural phenomenon that followed the demise of the traditional East Asian international order. It forced the Asian elites to consider the reasons for the turn from prosperity to decay in their own countries, and in Asia in general, and it prompted a profound reconsideration of the common character of the destiny, interests, and culture of the countries affected.
Thirdly, it contained a relatively clear sense of resistance and exclusion. For example, right from the outset the Japanese scholar [politician and bureaucrat] Katsu Kaishū understood Asianism as “a coalition for a united resistance to the West.”
Fourthly, Japan explored this option more vigorously than its neighbors, and at the same time nurtured and extended its strategic consciousness of the need to expand its influence abroad and to control Asia.
The development of early Asianism was never smooth, and the movement died prematurely. There were three main reasons for this outcome:
The first was the extreme weakness of the Eastern countries at that period, in particular as regards Asia’s major power, China. It suffered from poverty and political weakness and this period is regarded as the most troubled in its history. Compared to the major world power blocs, Asia was very weak and it lacked the support of an adequate physical base for Asianism to flourish.
Secondly, the ideology of Asianism was formulated with relative haste and lacked theoretical direction. Also, it failed to elicit a sympathetic response from the leaders of the various Asian countries and, in particular, from the masses. Under the banner of Asianism, the demands of all sorts and varieties of narrow-minded ethnic nationalisms were combined.
Thirdly, Japan, the first [Asian] country to break away from the control of the [Western] powers and to embark on an industrial civilization, made the wrong choice and turned Asianism on its head. First, Japan opted for the doctrine of “leaving Asia, entering Europe,” thus denying its own Asian identity. Following this, it associated itself with the Western powers and threatened the countries of Asia in a similar militaristic and aggressive spirit. Finally, it formed an alliance with international fascism and embarked on a path of militarism and aggression abroad, taking it beyond the point of no return. As early as 1919, Li Dazhao, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, hit the nail on the head when he pointed out that “Japan’s Greater Asianism is not a principle of peace, but of invasion; it is not the principle of national self-determination (minzu zijue zhuyi) but imperialism that annexes small and weak peoples; it is not Asian democracy but Japanese militarism.”
In 1924, shortly before Dr. Sun Yat-sen fell ill and died, he made a famous speech in Kobe, Japan. At a crucial juncture of history, with his life-long political experience behind him, he issued a final warning to Japan (see II:5): “Japan to-day has become acquainted with the Western civilization of the rule of Might, but retains the characteristics of the Oriental civilization of the rule of Right. Now the question remains whether Japan will be the hawk of the Western civilization of the rule of Might, or the tower of strength of the Orient. This is the choice which lies before the people of Japan.”
It is a pity that Japan paid no heed to the warnings and admonitions of both its neighbor and of the international community. Japan’s militarism went ever further down the road of aggressive expansionism and brought disaster—not only to the peoples of Asia, but in the end it caused Japan itself to suffer heavy retribution.
2 The Transitional Period
The period of nearly half a century from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War was a period of transition for Asianism.
Following World War II, a large number of new countries in Asia and Africa which had broken away from colonial control once more raised the flag of regional alliance. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Nehru, Sukarno and other leaders vigorously advocated an Asian-African Assembly and released the profoundly influential Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference [1955]. The spirit of unity, collaboration, and of the putting aside of differences in the quest for commonality (qiutong cunyi) promoted by the conference gave the Asian countries a powerful collective boost and also prompted the re-emergence of Asianism. However, the Asian-African Assembly had a short life and renascent Asianism found itself stymied at its first step. The reasons for this were threefold:
Firstly, Asia was living under the shadow of the Cold War and the Asian countries were by and large split into two large confrontational camps, meaning that Asianism lacked a fundamental political consensus and a comprehensive ideology.
Secondly, although the Asian countries had broken away from foreign occupation and colonial control in rapid succession and had gained a new political life of their own, they constantly fought among themselves and their rates of economic growth varied considerably. Consequently, Asianism lacked a stable environment and material base on which to build.
Thirdly, there was the influence of factors operating within the major Asian countries and affecting their mutual relations. For a long time, China faced blocking and containment by America and other Western countries. For all practical purposes, it was excluded from the international system. Japan implemented the principle of economic priority and maintained political harmony with the USA. India mainly directed its energies toward South Asia and the non-aligned movement. For a long time, Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian relations could not be normalized. Asianism lacked a leading force and more importantly, it lacked proper coordination between the major players.
From the 1970s onwards, Western Europe accelerated the process of political and economic integration and achieved a number of well-known and widely acknowledged goals. While on the global level the trend toward regionalization was still insignificant, it formed a major incentive to Asian countries. At the end of the 1970s, Japanese Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi [1910–1980] proposed the “idea of a Pacific Economic Sphere.” Following the 1980s, the USA, Japan, Australia and other countries launched the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and promoted the organization for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The planning and realization of these transitional stages of regional cooperation set the stage for this new period of Asian cooperation and a new Asianism. . . .
4 The Fundamental Structure and
Chronological Implications of New Asianism
The objectives of New Asianism for the twenty-first century have been indicated by Chinese President Hu Jintao [1942–]. We must establish a harmonious Asia that works together in the political sphere, is economically even-handed and mutually beneficial, is marked by mutual trust and cooperation with regard to security, and cooperates freely in the areas of cultural exchanges and academic research. Whether or not the twenty-first century can formulate a new Asianism depends on the following factors: firstly, whether the Asian countries, in particular the countries of East Asia, can make a clean break with the past and begin afresh; secondly, whether Asia can continue to draw on its outstanding cultural and spiritual heritage; and thirdly, whether the road to Asian development continues to be smooth and whether it is widely recognized and accepted by the international community. . . .
. . . [I]n Japan justifications for Japan’s aggression and attempts to excuse Japanese war crimes were still frequently voiced in public. While the vitality of a new Asianism depends on opening up and molding the future of Asia, its foundations will comprise the totality of the lessons taught by history as well as a basic consensus on the verdict of history. The more thoroughly this process of collective recognition can be accomplished, the firmer the intellectual basis of New Asianism will be.
Asia possesses a precious cultural heritage consisting of Confucianism and the best features of many different religions. Through long practice, Asians have formulated moral values and standards of behavior manifested in idioms such as the “unity of heaven and the people” (tian ren he yi), “harmony in difference” (he er bu tong), “insights from balance” (zhong yong da guan), and “honesty guards belief” (cheng shi shou xin). As in all other regions, Asia has now entered the new age of globalization and information. The vitality of the new Asianism will depend on whether it can equip this new era with a sense of meaning and purpose derived from this spiritual heritage, adapt this heritage to present and future developments, and promote the utilization of its gifts on the basis of the values of the past.
In terms of development, Asia has already achieved some remarkable successes but at the same time it is also confronted with a number of difficulties and challenges. Levels of development among the various countries in the region are extremely disproportionate. From time to time frictions arise among the regional powers, weapons of mass destruction are continuing to spread, and the threat of famine and natural disasters is always present. The vitality of a new Asianism depends on the integrated development and lasting stability of the region, the energetic advancement of cooperation across many different fields, and the integration and optimal allocation of natural resources. It also depends on the willingness to advance further down a new conceptual pathway that will continue to develop and be welcomed by countries within the region and by the international community.
What is the fundamental content of the new Asianism of the twenty-first century? . . .
Above all, this must be a cooperative Asianism. Cooperation is the constant theme of Asianism. If there is no cooperation among the Asian countries, it will be difficult to ensure the stability of peace in Asia. And if there is no cooperation between Asia and other regions of the world, Asia will be unable to realize the potential of its increasing international significance.
The aim of cooperation is the realization of common benefits and common development. Asia still has a population of some hundreds of millions of impoverished people. The gap between per capita incomes in the most prosperous and the least developed countries is still more than a hundredfold. . . .
The principle of cooperation is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations as the core international legal standard, comprising mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and mutual non-interference in internal affairs, and also including the peaceful settlement of international disputes and not resorting to force or threatening to do so. At present, all Asian countries lay emphasis on walking the path of peaceful development, and all are opposed to the ideology of hegemony. As a result, there are no major conflicts on the horizon. We should not regard neighboring countries as threats, but rather we should all regard the development of our neighbors as opportunities to pursue our own development.
As for the channels of cooperation, the main basis of regional cooperation is bilateral cooperation. Regional cooperation is both the main platform for the implementation of regionalism and also constitutes its theory. As the European experience makes clear, regional cooperation begins in the economic domain—gradually intensifying from the creation of a free-trade zone and customs union, to a common market, and then a currency and economic union, in addition to completing several stages of economic unification. After a relative maturity has been achieved economically, the process of unification on the political, social, diplomatic and security fronts can begin. East Asia and, indeed, all of Asia are at present still in the first stage of economic unification. We still have a very long way to go. The countries of East Asia have already set the goal of creating an East Asian Common Body (Dongya Gongtongti). This common body must first be a collective body based on economic values. At the same time it can also strengthen multi-level dialogue in such areas as culture, politics, society and security, begin any necessary cooperation and advance the quest for the common good.
The pattern of cooperation adopted must fit the special characteristics of Asia and must develop multiple initiatives. At present in Asia there already exist many regional or pan-regional multilateral organizations such as ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC], the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO], 10+3 [ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea], as well as East Asian summit meetings, the Six-Party Talks [over the North Korean nuclear weapons program], and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue [ACD]. . . .
The second [major principle] is that of an open Asianism. In physics, there is an important law—closed systems will inevitably heat up and self-destruct. However, open systems will continue operating for a long time without decay. A single country and a single region must in the same way replace the old with the new or spit out the old and accept the new. This will enable it to flourish and develop even more successfully. . . .
New Asianism must be an open regionalism, not relying on exclusion and protectionism, or pointing in one direction in particular. “Open” does not only mean mutual openness among countries within the region, but openness to other regions and also to the world. Asian cooperation, and particularly East Asian cooperation, requires the regular maintenance of relations with different regions, involving organizations such as APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, initiated in 1989], ASEM [Asia-Europe Meeting, started in 1996], and the Forum for East Asian-Latin American cooperation. The East Asian summit of 2005 held in Malaysia included India, Australia and New Zealand, and exemplified the open character of East Asian cooperation.
The United States of America has important interests and a traditional influence in Asia. While these interests have an historical basis, they are also objective realities in the present. Asian cooperation should strengthen communication with America and other countries outside the region, promote understanding and welcome the active role played by America and others for the stability and development of Asia. Traditional and recent arrangements for trade and security in Asia should not be seen as antagonistic, but as operating alongside one another, mutually tolerant, and competing in a positive spirit. China hopes that it and America will respect each other’s interests in Asia and at the same time constantly develop new points of common interest.
The third [principle] is that of a harmonious (hexie de) Asianism. Eastern culture upholds the ideal of “harmony in difference,” and emphasizes the belief that “it does no harm to hold up 10,000 things next to each other, and paths running in parallel do not run counter.” Asia’s greatest strength lies within the great framework of Eastern civilization, a setting of rich and varied diversity. The political and economic systems of the various countries are not all identical, and their historical and cultural backgrounds each have their own distinctive features. Also, there exist relatively large differences with regard to levels of development and talents. History shows that diversity is not in itself an obstacle to cooperation, but rather a force for cooperation. Much more importantly, it is the source of exchange, innovation, and creativity. Cooperation between Asian nations can and must respect the diverse characteristics found within our region, make a virtue of diversity and promote the development of diversification.
Attentive to the basic norms of international relations and universal human values, New Asianism must seek to respect differences of culture, religion, political systems, and forms of consciousness. And, furthermore, desiring peaceful co-existence among different countries, ethnic and other groups within the same region, it must pursue peaceful relations and harmony among member countries.
Over the past 50 to 60 years, the Asian countries have developed heterogeneously, adopting different political systems and democratic models. For example, those of China, Japan, Korea, India, and Singapore are by no means identical, but have each formed their own characteristics. These different patterns have their basis in the unique conditions and historical and cultural backgrounds of each country. At the same time, they also have their own unique vitality. To demand unilaterally the values associated with a particular model, or to attempt to force a homogeneous political system onto Asia has proven to fail historically, will lead nowhere in our present circumstances, and will also be difficult to justify in the future.
The new Asianism of the twenty-first century must be based on the massive changes that have occurred on the Asian mainland over the past 100 years, bearing in mind future directions for the development of Asia. Such development must be appropriate for the age of globalization and take the right direction in terms of historical progress. In this way, development will provide Asianism with a completely new context. To achieve this, we must take one further step and clarify the necessary roles and actions that the countries of Asia should undertake, and investigate ways of achieving the needed proactive coordination and interaction between Asia and the various extra-regional powers. In this way we can promote the healthy development of a New Asianism.