The Umayyad caliphate was overthrown by a movement in favour of rule by the Family of the Prophet, Āl Muḥammad. In the nine decades since the death of ‘Alī, it had become accepted by many discontented Muslims that the problems of the community would never be solved until the lead was taken by a member of the Holy Family. An imām or mahdī from the Family would be able to interpret the Qur’ān and Sunna and would have the necessary divine guidance to put right the injustices of Umayyad rule and end the violent disputes between Muslims. A more detailed plan of reform was not necessary; the accession of the just ruler and government according to the Qur’ān and Sunna would solve all problems.
During this period, however, it was not entirely clear who was included within the Family of the Prophet or how the leader would be chosen from among the many men who could claim this relationship. In later centuries, the Family of the Prophet was taken to be the descendants of ‘Alī and Fāṭima, and both Twelver and Isma‘īlī Shī‘īs alike accepted that the progeny of al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Alī were the true imāms. In Umayyad times, however, this was much less clear-cut and the boundaries of the Family more vague. At the time of Muhktār’s revolt, the imām from the Family of the Prophet was to be Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya, a son of ‘Alī but not of Fāṭima, showing that direct descent from the Prophet was not considered essential. In the last decade of Umayyad rule, there was a large-scale rebellion, supported by many different opposition groups in Iraq and western Iran, in the name of ‘Abd Allāh b. Mu‘āwiya, a descendant of ‘Alī’s brother Ja‘far. It was therefore with some justice that the ‘Abbasid family, descendants of the Prophet’s paternal uncle al-‘Abbās, could claim to be members of the Family. They cultivated the idea that the Family consisted of the descendants of Hāshim, thus including the ‘Alids and ‘Abbasids but excluding the Umayyads. Later, Shī‘ī writers would restrict the Family to the descendants of ‘Alī, so condemning the ‘Abbasids as frauds and usurpers, but at the time of the ‘Abbasid revolution their claims seem to have met with a wide measure of acceptance.
The second problem was the choice of leader within this extended Family. There were three possible criteria. The first, the one which was later adopted by many of the Shī‘a, was that of hereditary succession in the line of al-Ḥusayn, but this idea was not universally accepted in Umayyad times. The second idea was the concept of naṣṣ, that is, designation by the previous imām. The person thus chosen would have to be a member of the Family but not necessarily the eldest son of the previous imām. The third was the Zaydī view that the imamate properly belonged to any member of the Family who was prepared to take up arms. Zayd b. ‘Alī had rebelled in Kūfa in 122/740. He claimed the leadership of the Family because he alone had the courage to lead them against the Umayyads. The rebellion was a dismal failure, but among some sections of opinion in Iraq, the idea persisted that the rightful imām was the one who took action against the oppressors.
The claim of the ‘Abbasid family was based on a combination of these elements. They were descendants of Hāshim and so could, in the climate of the Umayyad period, claim to be members of the Family. Al-‘Abbās himself fought against the Muslims at Badr and only converted to Islam at the time of Muḥammad’s conquest of Makka in 8/630. His son ‘Abd Allāh (d. 68/687–688) was an eminent Traditionist (that is to say one who passed on Traditions of the sayings and actions of the Prophet) but seems to have had no political ambitions, and it was not until the time of his grandson Muḥammad b. ‘Alī that the family began to make claims to political leadership. In 98/716–717, Abū Hāshim, the son of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥanafiyya, the mahdī to whom Mukhtār had pledged his allegiance, died. He had inherited a claim to the imamate from his father but he left no children to pass it on to. Various parties claimed that they had been designated as his successors, including Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-‘Abbāsī. This claim may have brought Muḥammad into contact with small groups of revolutionary activists in Iraq, and perhaps Khurāsān, who treasured the memory of Mukhtār, but it did not win general acceptance in the community. After their accession to power, the ‘Abbasids stressed that their claim was based more on Zaydī grounds, that they alone of the Hashimites had been able to overthrow the godless Umayyads and avenge al-Ḥusayn’s martyrdom and that this gave them the right to lead the Family. Later, Shī‘ī apologists were concerned to portray the ‘Abbasids as usurpers with no real claim to the throne, but by the standards of their time, their claim was in fact quite good. They were members of the Family, they could claim that Muḥammad b. ‘Alī had been designated by Abū Hāshim and it was clear that they had been able to translate the claims of the Family into reality.
The ‘Abbasids were able to do this because they secured the support of most of the Muslims of Khurāsān, the vast province on the northeastern frontiers of the Muslim world and the only one of the four quarters of the late Sasanian Empire to retain its identity after the Muslim conquest. As has already been explained, more Arabs settled in this area than in any other part of Iran during Umayyad times, and the settlement of large numbers of Muslims seems to have encouraged conversion among the local people. The integration of Arabs with local converts was aided by their participation in the long wars against Turkish raiders which led up to the final defeat of the Turgesh in Hishām’s reign. The frontier nature of the province also meant that a high proportion of the Muslims of Khurāsān were experienced soldiers, compared with, for example, the Muslims of Kūfa, and their military skill is clearly demonstrated by the series of victories they won over the veteran troops of Marwān II. The Muslims of Khurāsān had many of the same grievances against the Umayyad government as their contemporaries in Iraq: rule by alien governors sent from Damascus and attempts to secure financial contributions from the province. The Qays–Yaman disputes which had originated in Syria had now spread as far as Khurāsān, producing unrest and uncertainty, and there was a genuine longing to put an end to the fitna, the civil strife, which had become so damaging in the years since Hishām’s death. In Khurāsān, there was considerable integration between Arab and non-Arab. Many of the leaders of the ‘Abbasid movement were of Arab origin but spoke Persian and had intermarried with the local people. The efforts of Marwān’s Qaysī supporters to preserve their monopoly of power were not popular in these circumstances.
It was natural then that the Muslims of Khurāsān, like their contemporaries farther to the west, should look to the Family of the Prophet for leadership. How and when the ‘Abbasid connection with the area developed is uncertain; the traditional Arabic accounts in al-Ṭabarī and elsewhere suggest that the ‘Abbasid ḍā‘wa, or mission, began in the year 100/718–719 when the ‘Abbasids, based in Ḥumayma in southern Jordan, appointed twelve naqībs to represent their interests in Khurāsān, just as the Prophet a century before had appointed twelve to represent him in Medina before he arrived in person. Recent research has cast some doubt on this. There had probably been a movement in favour of the Family of the Prophet in Khurāsān for some years, but it was not until the failure and death of Zayd b. ‘Alī in 122/740 that the people of the area began to turn to the ‘Abbasid branch through the intermediary of a Kūfan supporter of the Āl Muḥammad called Bukayr b. Māhān, who won over leaders of the movement in Khurāsān, including Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb al-Ṭayyī. In 127/745, Qaḥṭaba came west for the ḥajj and pledged his allegiance in person to Ibrāhīm, who had succeeded his father Muḥammad as the leader of the ‘Abbasid clan. On his return, he took with him a freedman of the family known as Abū Muslim, who was to represent the ‘Abbasids in Khurāsān. Thus, the movement had three centres: Ḥumayma, where the ‘Abbasids lived; Kūfa, where Bukayr b. Māhān was replaced on his death by Abū Salama; and Khurāsān, where Abū Muslim coordinated the activities of Qaḥṭaba and other local supporters.
At this time, however, the propaganda simply called for a riḍā min Āl Muḥammad, a chosen one from the Family of Muḥammad, without specifying which branch he was to come from; probably, very few of the inner circle knew the true identity of the imām. The ‘Abbasid cause was also aided in Khurāsān in that the ‘Alids had not really established contacts in the province. In Kūfa, the legacy and memory of ‘Alī and al-Ḥusayn were too strong to be replaced, but in Khurāsān, there was no such attachment to a single branch of the Family. The ‘Abbasid message, like the message of many rebels from Mukhtār’s time onwards, seems to have emphasized the equality of all Muslims regardless of race and ancestry; the appointment of a freedman of obscure origins, Abū Muslim, to lead it is an indication of this aspect and it certainly attracted support in Khurāsān and elsewhere. The ‘Abbasid revolution was not a coup d’état led by one faction in the ruling élite against another; it was rather an attempt to reconstruct the Islamic polity, to reintegrate rulers and the ruled in the umma under the leadership of the Family of the Prophet, and the movement brought together many different strands in early Islamic thought.
The eastern frontiersmen of Khurāsān defeated the men from the Byzantine frontier who supported Marwān, but this did not automatically mean the triumph of the ‘Abbasid dynasty. The armies were directed by Abū Muslim and led by Khurāsānīs who had in many cases no direct contact with the ‘Abbasid family at all; none of the ‘Abbasids had participated in the long march across Iran and the fierce battles against the Umayyad armies of Nubāta b. Ḥanz-ala and ‘Āmir b. Ḍubāra. Their position was made even more marginal when the designated imām, Ibrāhīm, was arrested and executed by the Umayyads and their chief contact among the Khurāsānīs, Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb, was killed during the crossing of the Euphrates shortly before the ‘Abbasid armies took Kūfa. The problem that faced the ‘Abbasids was to have their authority accepted first by the Khurāsānīs and then by the wider Muslim world. Abū Salama, who had coordinated the movement in Kūfa, seized the opportunity to establish himself as a kingmaker and opened negotiations with various members of the ‘Alid family with a view to offering them the caliphate, but he had not counted on the loyalty and efficiency of the ‘Abbasids’ man in Khurāsān, Abū Muslim. Abū Muslim had nothing to gain from seeing power pass to the ‘Alids and Abū Salama, and he had clearly instructed his agents in the army to ensure that this did not happen. While Abū Salama negotiated, a small group of Abū Muslim’s men made contact with the ‘Abbasids, now in hiding in Kūfa, and selected a member of the family, Abu’l-‘Abbās, a brother of the imām Ibrāhīm, and brought him to the mosque at Kūfa, where, in Rabī‘ I 132/October 749 he was publicly acknowledged as the first ‘Abbasid caliph with the title of al-Saffāḥ. Confronted by the fait accompli, Abū Salama hastened to make his submissio
The proclamation of al-Saffāh. as caliph and his acceptance by the Khurāsānīs and the Kūfans only marked the beginning of the establishment of the ‘Abbasids. A number of questions remained to be decided, notably whether the ‘Abbasids were to be powerful sovereigns in the way that the Umayyads had been or simply symbolic rulers who would give legitimacy to Khurāsānī military rule, and the nature of the relationship between the Khurāsānī army and other elements in the Muslim community – in other words, would the military dictatorship of the Qaysīs simply be replaced by that of the Khurāsānīs? When al-Saffāḥ. was acknowledged as caliph, the answers to these questions were very uncertain and it would be hard to exaggerate the precariousness of the position of the new dynasty. That ‘Abbasid rule was established and accepted by most of the Muslim community was the achievement of the remarkable group of men who formed al-Saffāḥ’s immediate family and particularly of his own brother Abū Ja‘far, later the Caliph al-Manṣūr. Al-Saffāḥ. himself reigned for only four years (132–136/749–754), but this period saw the establishment of ‘Abbasid power as it was to remain until after the death of Hārūn al-Rashīd. The caliph himself is sometimes portrayed as a rather nondescript character, even a weakling, and Shaban has argued that he was chosen by the Khurāsānīs precisely because he was not likely to assert himself. But the historical record suggests a man who was at once cautious and determined and the establishment of the ‘Abbasids owed much to his low-key leadership in the early years.
The key to ‘Abbasid success was to leave eastern Iran in the hands of the Khurāsāniyya (the men from Khurāsān who had made up the ‘Abbasid army) and Abū Muslim while establishing members of the ‘Abbasid family as commanders of armies and governors of provinces in Iraq, Syria, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. As soon as al-Saffāḥ. became caliph, he sent his uncle ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Alī to lead the armies opposing Marwān on the river Zāb, while his brother Abū Ja‘far went to take command of the army besieging the last Umayyad governor of Iraq, Yazīd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra in Wāsiṭ. Both ‘Abd Allāh and Abū Ja‘far thus acquired a following among the Khurāsāniyya in the armies who came to associate their interests with those of their ‘Abbasid leaders. But both men also realized that to rely exclusively on the Khurāsāniyya was a recipe for disaster; it would mean that they were little more than puppets in the hands of the military leaders and that they would incur the lasting hostility of all the other groups in the western half of the Islamic world. It would be, in fact, a denial of all the objectives of the revolution. Among the other groups, they turned to of course the Arabs of the Yamanī party, who had opposed Marwān II. The most famous of these were the Muhallabī family, whose influence had survived the fall of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab from political power and who had attempted to take their hometown of Baṣra for the ‘Abbasids at the time of the revolution. The family was now rewarded by governorships, in Baṣra itself and other areas, notably Ifrīqiya, and they enjoyed a new golden age of prosperity. Also rewarded was the family of another leading figure of the Yamāmī opposition, Hishām’s long-serving governor of the east, Khālid b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Qasrī, whose son Muḥammad had brought over the town of Kūfa to the ‘Abbasid cause and was now rewarded with government appointments, although his family never achieved the eminence of the Muhallabīs.
More striking were the efforts the early ‘Abbasids made to win over the leaders of the Qays. Abū Ja‘far seems to have attempted a compromise with the arch-Qaysī Yazīd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra, but was thwarted by Abū Muslim, who instructed al-Saffāḥ. to have Yazīd executed. Both ‘Abd Allāh and Abū Ja‘far did, however, win over many of the Qaysīs of the Byzantine and Armenian frontier lands, notably Marwān’s right-hand man in the area, Isḥāq b. Muslim al-‘Uqaylī, who was to become part of al-Manṣūr’s inner circle of advisers. Another Qaysī family which survived to enjoy honour and power were the descendants of Qutayba b. Muslim, the conqueror of Bukhārā and Samarqand, whose associations with the Umayyad cause did not prevent them from being recruited to the ‘Abbasids. One group alone was excluded from this general reconciliation: the members of the Umayyad family itself. All the prominent Umayyads were hunted down and many of them executed by ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Alī when he took over Syria – only one, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Mu‘āwiya, a grandson of the Caliph Hishām, escaped to join supporters in Muslim Spain, where he founded a long-lived and successful branch of the dynasty at the western end of the Islamic world.
The reign of al-Saffāḥ. was not without strains and stresses; there were Qaysīs in Syria who refused to accept the new regime and went into open rebellion. And there were those among the Khurāsāniyya who were reluctant to acknowledge the growing authority of the dynasty or to share power with other groups, but in the main the policy was extremely successful. Compared with the Umayyad period, the early ‘Abbasid period is free from major internal dissensions; even the Syrians seem to have come to terms with the new government, and much of the credit for this must rest with the members of the ruling family.
Al-Saffāḥ died in Dhu’l-Ḥijja 136/June 754 at a time of growing crisis. This crisis concerned the relationship between the three most powerful men in the state after the caliph himself: Abū Ja‘far, ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Alī and Abū Muslim; all three were determined and able, all three could call on numerous committed supporters, and a struggle for power was inevitable. Ominous signs were appearing in the months before the caliph’s death that all was not well in the relationship between Abū Muslim and the ‘Abbasids; Abū Ja‘far had been sent on a mission to Khurāsān to see Abū Muslim and was dismayed to find him behaving very much as an independent potentate, and a cruel and violent one at that. Abū Muslim also felt that he should visit the west, perhaps to reestablish his influence among the Khurāsāniyya who had settled there, and announced his intention of making the ḥajj. Shortly before al-Saffāḥ. died, he and Abū Ja‘far set off from Kūfa, the temporary capital, to Mecca. It was at this crucial juncture that the caliph died, nominating Abū Ja‘far as his heir, to be succeeded, on his death, by his nephew ‘īsā b. Mūsā. As soon as he heard the news, Abū Ja‘far hurried back to secure his position. He had no time to lose; his uncle ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Alī was preparing a major campaign on the Byzantine frontier when the news reached him and he immediately decided to make a bid for the title of caliph. He could count on the support of many of the Khurāsānī army commanders he had with him and of many Qaysī tribal leaders from Syria, where he had been the governor for the previous four years. He based his claims on the fact that it had been he who had led the ‘Abbasid troops which finally defeated Marwān, and this gave him a superior right to his nephew, Abū Ja‘far.
Faced with this formidable threat, more dangerous because it divided ‘Abbasid supporters, the new caliph turned to the one man whom most of the Khurāsāniyya would accept as a leader, Abū Muslim. It was here that the caliph’s political skill began to show; Abū Muslim was persuaded to lead the army against ‘Abd Allāh. In a confrontation near Niṣībīn in Jumādā II 137/November 754, Abū Muslim worsted ‘Abd Allāh, who was forced to flee to Baṣra, where he was sheltered by a brother of his, Sulaymān b. ‘Alī. The presence of Abū Muslim had led many among the Khurāsāniyya to abandon ‘Abd Allāh’s cause, while many Syrians could feel little confidence in a man who had defeated them at the battle of the river Zāb only four years before. ‘Abd Allāh suspected treachery all around and fled before the battle really developed. The incident showed the continuing power of the Qays, and after the victory, al-Manṣūr was careful once again to conciliate them and make peace, a very different and much more successful approach than Marwān’s brutal suppression of the Yamanīs when he had been caliph.
‘Abd Allāh had been defeated and was later to die in captivity, but al-Manṣūr knew he had to strike against Abū Muslim. After the victory over ‘Abd Allāh, relations between Abū Muslim and the caliph became increasingly strained. Abū Muslim was determined to return to Khurāsān, where he would be safe and could count on loyal support, but the caliph knew that if he missed this chance to dispose of his rival, he might never get another one. By a mixture of threats and persuasion, Abū Muslim, against his own better judgement and the advice of his counsellors, allowed himself to be lured to the caliph’s camp, where he was quickly murdered. It is easy to condemn al-Manṣūr for ingratitude after all that Abū Muslim had done for the ‘Abbasids, but Abū Muslim had made his own position impossible; the caliph was determined to secure the unity of the Muslim world under ‘Abbasid rule and could not tolerate a virtually independent Khurāsān under Abū Muslim, nor could he allow Abū Muslim to remain as a rival focus of loyalty among the Khurāsāniyya. Once the deed was done, al-Manṣūr took immediate steps to reconcile Abū Muslim’s leading supporters; the governorate of Khurāsān and the tax revenues remained in the hands of the Khurāsāniyya and most of the leaders who had supported the dead man are later found in the caliph’s service. After the death of Abū Muslim, the Khurāsāniyya looked to the caliph and, increasingly, to his son Muḥammad, later the Caliph al-Mahdī, for leadership.
Al-Manṣūr’s rule faced a third and more difficult threat. The ‘Abbasids had come to power as representatives of the House of the Prophet, and both al-Saffāh. and al-Manṣūr had made attempts to win over the ‘Alid branch of the family. To a considerable extent, they had succeeded, and ‘Alids were now honoured guests at court with high pensions, a marked improvement in their status under the Umayyad caliphs. There were, however, some members of the ‘Alid family who saw the ‘Abbasids as usurpers, refused to give up their claims and preferred to go into hiding instead. From this position, they attracted the allegiance of those who were dissatisfied with ‘Abbasid rule. The most active of these was Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh from the Hasanid branch of the ‘Alid family, and his brother Ibrāhīm. Al-Manṣūr was well aware that these two were plotting a revolt but it was impossible for him to know where or when. The traditional centre of ‘Alid support in Kūfa was kept under very careful watch and the brothers were unable to establish themselves there – but in the end they decided on a two-pronged revolt, with Muḥammad in Medina and Ibrāhīm in Baṣra, rather improbably, since that city had no record of devotion to the ‘Alid cause. The caliph put pressure on other members of the ‘Alid family and in the end forced Muḥammad to come out in open rebellion, in Rajab 145/September 762, before his brother was ready. Muḥammad was known as the Pure Soul, and despite his courage was a somewhat unworldly, even romantic, individual. He attracted considerable support in Medina, both from the Anṣār and from members of old Muhājirūn families who now lived there in virtual obscurity, but he refused to leave the city and seek support elsewhere as his practical advisers urged, preferring, like his distinguished ancestor, to endure a siege in Medina itself. The caliph was relieved that Muḥammad had declared himself in such a vulnerable place; he was able to cut off the grain supplies from Egypt on which the city depended and to despatch an army under the command of his nephew ‘īsā b. Mūsā. In Ramaḍān 145/November 762, the ‘Abbasid army arrived outside Medina, and Muḥammad, with about 300 supporters, was killed, fighting bravely.
Only about two weeks before his brother’s death, Ibrāhīm finally declared himself in Baṣra. Despite the unfortunate timing, this revolt proved much more threatening than the one in Medina, and attracted widespread support. Why so many should have come out for Ibrāhīm in this traditionally anti-‘Alid centre is not at all clear, but it would seem that the motives were connected more with local grievances than with commitment to the ‘Alid cause. At first, the rebellion was a great success; Ahwāz, Fārs and Wāsiṭ were taken and Ibrāhīm established a dīwān in Baṣra which was said to have had 100,000 names on it, but disagreements soon began to emerge. A body of committed ‘Alid activists had slipped away from Kūfa, which remained under government control throughout, and now urged the Basrans to march on their hometown. Many in Baṣra, however, seem to have wanted to stay put and make terms. The delay enabled al-Manṣūr to summon troops from Syria and Iran, while the dissension lost Ibrāhīm much support. When the ‘Abbasid and ‘Alid armies finally met at Bākhamrā, on the road from Baṣra to Kūfa in Dhu’l-Qa‘ada 145/February 763, Ibrāhīm’s force had dwindled to some 15,000. His defeat and death mark the end of large-scale ‘Alid rebellions for the next half-century.
The ‘Alids failed to make good their claim essentially because they failed to attract the support of any powerful military groups; Khurāsāniyya, Qaysīs and Yamāmīs were alike identified with the ‘Abbasid cause as a result of al-Manṣūr’s policies. Furthermore, the ‘Alids were divided among themselves. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh’s claims to leadership were rejected by many, including the main Husaynid contender, the sixth imām, Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq, who refused to swear allegiance not because he felt that his branch of the Family had the only true right to lead, but because Muḥammad was so young. Under Ja‘far’s guidance, it became possible to accept the spiritual role of the Husaynid imāms without committing oneself to open and violent opposition to the government. The old ‘Alid constituency of discontented Iraqis, especially Kūfans, was now hopelessly divided by al-Manṣūr’s claims to lead the Family of the Prophet, by the establishment of Iraq as the centre of government, and by differing views among the ‘Alids themselves about their role in the community. Not until ‘Abbasid power began to disintegrate for other reasons were the ‘Alids able to make another serious attempt to mobilize popular support in their favour.
After the disturbances of the early years, the period from 145/763 until the caliph’s death in 158/775 was a time of comparative peace and calm. The political foundations which al-Manṣūr had laid proved durable and strong. The early ‘Abbasid state owed much to the Umayyad example, and al-Manṣūr himself is said to have acknowledged the debt he owed to the examples of ‘Abd al-Malik and Hishām. The ‘Abbasid family played a part in government very similar to that of the Marwanids. In some cases, branches of the family established themselves as property owners and political leaders in the provinces, like Ṣālih. b. ‘Alī and his family, who took over many of the Umayyad estates in Syria. At times too, they were appointed as governors of Syria, but the post was not hereditary and they could be, and were, deposed by the caliph. The acceptance of ‘Abbasid rule in the area was in part the consequence of there being a resident branch of the ruling dynasty with whose interests the Syrians could identify themselves. The caliph and his advisers also chose provincial governors from other groups, like the Khurāsāniyya and the Muhallabīs. Although these might be appointed to areas where they had influence, the caliphs were powerful enough to appoint and dismiss governors at will.
In some ways, the early ‘Abbasid state seems to have been more centralized than the Umayyad, especially in the fiscal administration, and this was a development which gathered pace under the Barmakid rule during the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd. It is clear that there was an attempt to ensure that the provinces made substantial contributions to the finance of central government. We are particularly well informed about this in the case of Egypt, where determined efforts were made to extract surplus revenue. The large sums of money left by al-Manṣūr and Hārūn al-Rashīd would suggest that the government had some success in this. Nonetheless, the revenues of Iraq, the home province, so to speak, of the ‘Abbasid government, remained of crucial importance. Approximate figures suggest that Iraq and the adjacent irrigated lands of Khuzistan supplied four times as much revenue to the Baghdad government as the next most productive province, Egypt, and five times as much as all the districts of Syria and Palestine combined. Caliphs from al-Manṣūr to Hārūn also spent money on developing and extending the ṣawāfī, the state lands, and these probably continued to be an important source of revenue. Another aspect of government control was the appointment of qāḍīs (Muslim judges), a function which was now taken over by the central government. In Egypt under the Umayyads, for example, the qāḍīs had been appointed by the local governors, but this power was taken out of their hands under the early ‘Abbasids. From al-Mahdī’s reign onwards, qaḍīs were appointed from Baghdad.
While the ‘Abbasid state was in many ways a development of the Umayyad, there were important differences. The most obvious of these was the fact that the centre of government moved from Syria to Iraq. The ‘Abbasids seem to have had no hesitation in choosing Iraq as their base. Khurāsān was on the fringes of the Islamic world and was, in any case, quite unfamiliar to them, while Syria, with its Umayyad connections, was hardly appropriate. Iraq had had a long tradition of attachment to the Family of the Prophet. There were also sound economic reasons for the shift. Iraq was by far the largest contributor to the revenues of the caliphate, and the revenue from Iraq was now made all the more valuable by the fact that the area was close to the centre of administration and so the revenue was easier to collect. Iraq was the breadbasket of the caliphate.
The shift of the centre of political activity also represented a change in the nature of the political élite. The Umayyad caliphate had essentially been run by Arabs for Arabs. In a time when most Muslims were Arabs, this was justifiable, but as conversion to Islam began to gather pace, the Arabness of the regime was less reasonable. The ‘Abbasid revolution was in part an attempt to break down these barriers. The early ‘Abbasid ruling class was much more varied in composition. There were still Arab tribal leaders, like Yazīd b. Mazyad al-Shaybānī, who would have seemed quite at home in the Umayyad court, but there were many others as well. The most important of these were the Khurāsāniyya who had come west at the time of the revolution and later. While many of their leaders seem to have been of Arab descent, and no doubt spoke Arabic, a large proportion of the rank and file were Iranian Muslims and Persian was widely spoken.
These Khurāsāniyya certainly appeared foreign to local Christian observers in Syria, and they were established in garrison towns like Baghdad and Raqqa and on the Byzantine frontier. These troops and their descendants also became known as abnā’ al-dawla, sons of the (‘Abbasid) dynasty or state, or more simply as abnā’, a designation which harkened back to the abnā’ of Yaman, the Persian settlers who were converted to Islam during the Prophet’s lifetime and supported the Muslims at the time of the Ridda wars. In the administration, clerks of Christian origin from Syria continued to play an important role, but they were joined by Iranians like the Barmakids and, increasingly, by dihqāns, small landowners of non-Arab extraction from the Sawād of Iraq whose expertise and local knowledge made them indispensable to the regime. ‘Abbasid government is sometimes said to be Persian in character and personnel, in contrast to the Arab rule of the Umayyads. There is some truth in this, and it is clear that people of Iranian origin became more important in both army and administration. One of the most obvious signs of this Iranian influence was the adoption of the tall conical qalansuwa as court headdress. The qalansuwa had been worn by the late Sasanian élite but not, apparently, at the Umayyad court. Under the early ‘Abbasids, it became an essential part of the black court dress of the time and seems to have remained so until the collapse of the caliphate in the fourth/tenth century. Nonetheless, Arabs still held very high positions, and Arabic remained the language of administration and all court culture. The early ‘Abbasid state was essentially a Muslim state, rather than a purely Arab or Persian one.
In the early days after the revolution, the caliphs had been based in Kūfa or in temporary settlements nearby, each known as Hāshimiyya. In 145/762, however, al-Manṣūr began the construction of a purpose-built capital at Baghdad to which he gave the official title of Madīnat al-Salām, or City of Peace. The location was at the northern end of the Sawād, but unlike Kūfa, it also lay on the great road from Iraq to Khurāsān, now such a strategic highway. This meant, among other things, that pilgrims from the eastern provinces of the caliphate would pass through Baghdad on their way to the ḥajj, and admire the splendours of the caliph’s capital and seek the company of its scholars. It also had very good river communications with Baṣra to the south, and along the Tigris and the Euphrates with Mosul, Raqqa and the rich grain-growing areas of the Jazīra. Not only did these communications encourage trade, they also allowed Baghdad to import large amounts of food. The city rapidly expanded beyond the size which could be supplied from the immediate hinterland, and the grain of the Jazīra and the dates of Baṣra were vital for its inhabitants, a fact which gave rise to acute crises of supply when civil war or political unrest interfered with communications. The site was ideally chosen, and the subsequent prosperity of the city bears witness to the acumen of its founder. The city rapidly grew way beyond its official centre in the Round City. By the mid-third/ninth century, estimates suggest that it had a population of between 300,000 and 500,000 (at a time when London probably had less that 10,000 and Paris less than 20,000). Even the temporary movement of the administrative capital to Sāmarrā does not seem to have affected the vitality of the city as a commercial and cultural centre.
There were also political reasons for the establishment of Baghdad. It was founded to provide a base for the Khurāsāniyya, far from their homeland. They needed houses, obviously, but they also needed economic opportunities. The Khurāsāniyya were paid salaries and were supposed to be available for military service, but commerce and property owning also contributed to their prosperity. Leaders of the Khurāsāniyya were given plots of land to distribute to their followers and to rent out to merchants. Since the court was established in the city, the economic opportunities were very considerable, and the caliph was able to reward his followers handsomely. There was also the need for security, which had been graphically demonstrated some four years previously when the caliph had almost been murdered during a riot by some of his troops. To this end, he built a round, administrative city, sheltering a palace, a mosque and a garrison of picked troops and defended by a high wall. This was the nucleus of the city, but most people lived beyond the walls of the Round City, in the rapidly proliferating suburbs and the new quarters developed across the Tigris on the east bank by the caliph’s son al-Mahdī. Baghdad became the prototype for numerous Islamic “new towns” (of which Sāmarrā and Cairo are the best known) founded by rulers to house their followers and to generate income, and al-Manṣūr’s work had a lasting influence on urban development in the Near East.
Another factor which distinguished the early ‘Abbasid state from its Umayyad predecessor was the changed position of Khurāsān. Under the Umayyads, Khurāsān had been a remote frontier province, usually ruled by governors despatched by the Umayyad viceroys in Wāsiṭ. The role that the Khurāsāniyya played in the establishment of the dynasty, and even more, the role they continued to play in the armies of the caliphate, made the province much more important. After the departure of Abū Muslim, it was integrated into the ‘Abbasid state, but the governors were always chosen from among people of local origin, a privilege given to no other area. In 141/758–759, the caliph appointed his son Muḥammad to be the governor of Khurāsān, but he supervised the affairs of the province from Rayy on the western borders, prudently allowing local men to exercise authority on the spot. This period was important, however, because it meant that Muḥammad established close links with the Khurāsāniyya, many of whom accompanied him back to Baghdad when he returned ten years later. The support of the Khurāsāniyya was to be of crucial significance in the struggle for the succession. Khurāsān was not peaceful in the early ‘Abbasid period. There were many rebellions, notably those of Ustādhsīs in the Badhghīs area north of Harāt in 150/767 and of al-Muqanna‘ in the mountains between the Oxus and Zarafshān valleys in 159–163/775–780. The accounts of these movements are frequently very confused, and it is difficult to explain them all. It seems, however, that most of them were anti-Islamic, usually in the name of a “false prophet”, and that they originated in, and were largely confined to, mountainous areas on the edges of Muslim control. We should probably see them as attempts by the local people to maintain religious, political and cultural autonomy in the face of pressure from the Muslims of the plains, rather than as movements designed to overthrow the ‘Abbasid government. Nevertheless, it meant that the province was frequently disturbed and that the Khurāsāniyya often had to defend their homeland.
The question of the succession to al-Manṣūr was a complex one. When al-Saffāh. had made him heir apparent, he had stipulated that ‘īsā b. Mūsā should succeed him. This was probably a precaution in case al-Manṣūr, at that time on the ḥajj with Abū Muslim, should be murdered or die suddenly before he could assume control. ‘īsā b. Mūsā remained heir apparent, however, even after the crisis was passed. He was a friend of Abū Muslim and rendered valuable service to the ‘Abbasid state; he was for many years the governor of Kūfa and led the army which suppressed the rebellion of Muḥammad the Pure Soul in Medina. In spite of this, he seems to have been very unpopular with many elements in the Khurāsāniyya, and the caliph was determined to replace him with his own son Muḥammad. After threatening demonstrations by the military, ‘īsā was forced to resign his claim in 147/764 in return for vast compensation and the right to succeed Muḥammad. He then retired from politics to the vast and imposing palace he had built at Ukhayḍir in the desert to the west of Kūfa.
This meant that when the caliph, now in his mid-sixties, died in Dhu’l- Ḥijja 158/October 775 he was succeeded by his son – who took the name of al-Mahdī – without any overt opposition. In many ways, al-Mahdī’s reign was a continuation of his father’s and he relied on the same supporters, notably the Khurāsāniyya, but there were significant changes of policy. The most obvious of these was the attempt to heal the rift between ‘Abbasids and ‘Alids and restore the unity of the Family of the Prophet. His own regnal title of al-Mahdī was, of course, one that had often been adopted by members of the Family. He sought to win over the ‘Alids by kindness and gifts, by granting them estates and positions at court. He also attempted to win over the supporters of the ‘Alids in the Ḥijāz, and 500 of the Anṣār of Medina were recruited as a special guard for the caliph. The caliph also demonstrated his care for Islam by the building of mosques, notably the mosque at Mecca and the Aqṣā mosque in Jerusalem. The concern for religion and the well-being of the Prophet’s Family was an integral part of the attempt to gain general approval for ‘Abbasid rule. The move was largely successful. Only a small group of ‘Alid supporters, led by ‘īsā b. Zayd – son of that Zayd b. ‘Alī who had attempted to rouse the Kufans against the Umayyads in 122/740 – formed a clandestine group to keep the flame of resistance alive, and were thus constantly harassed by government agents.
The caliph’s main intermediary in his efforts to win over the ‘Alids and their supporters was his secretary, Ya‘qūb b. Dāwūd, who had originally been imprisoned as an ‘Alid supporter and now placed his contacts at the disposal of the caliph. For six years, 160–166 (777–782/3), he remained the caliph’s chief adviser, using his position to secure control over many other aspects of the administration. Never before had a member of the bureaucracy established such control over policymaking. In the end, his power made him vulnerable. His ambitions made him many enemies, he failed to discover and reconcile ‘Īsā b. Zayd and his control of the administration was increasingly resented, until finally he was trapped by his enemies, dismissed and brutally punished.
The influence Ya‘qūb achieved points to the growing importance of two elements in the ‘Abbasid élite, the secretaries and the mawālī (freedmen in this context) of the caliph. All rulers and governors had had secretaries to write their letters since the time of the Prophet. In early ‘Abbasid times, however, these men began to grow in importance. The increasingly centralized nature of the administration and the complexities of revenue collection in the Sawād meant that the number of bureaucrats or kuttāb (plural of kātib = a secretary) increased until they became an important pressure group, under the leadership of the Barmakid family, whose name has passed into English as the Barmecides. The Barmakids, originally guardians of a great Buddhist shrine near Balkh in modern Afghanistan, had converted to Islam in the Umayyad period and had come west with the armies of the ‘Abbasid revolution, soon establishing themselves in the administration. Yaḥyā b. Khālid the Barmakid became a close friend and adviser of al-Mahdī in the days when he had been acting as the governor in Rayy, and he became the tutor to al-Mahdī’s young son Hārūn, to whom he was virtually a father. The Barmakids provided political leadership for the kuttāb, and it was largely through this that the bureaucrats became an important force in the ‘Abbasid state. Long after the fall of the Barmakids, the kuttāb played a vital role in both the politics and the culture of the period, and in their writings they kept the memory of the family green.
The other group who emerged into prominence at this time were the palace servants, led by the ex-slave al-Rabī‘ b. Yūnus, who had been the ḥājib (chamberlain) and close confidant of al-Manṣūr and continued to advise his son. The fact that the ‘Abbasid caliphs were frequently settled in one place, often in vast labyrinthine palaces like the surviving examples at Ukhayāir and Sāmarrā, meant that large numbers of servants were recruited to run the establishments and prepare the increasingly complex ceremonial. The ḥājib became a very powerful figure, since he could control access to the caliph and prevent his opponents from being able to put their cases, as al-Rabī‘ b. Yūnus did. Palace servants were of little importance at the simple peripatetic courts of the Umayyads; in the increasingly settled and complex world of the ‘Abbasid palace, they became powerful and influential, although they seldom produced either statesmen or writers, as the kuttāb did. In the crisis years of the early fourth/tenth century, the ‘Abbasid caliphs were virtually dominated by the kuttāb and the palace servants, and these developments can be traced back to the days of the early ‘Abbasid rulers.
A sinister development was the growing tension between the newly emerging civil élite of secretaries and palace servants and the military leaders of the Khurāsāniyya. The dispute was basically about power and control of the administration. The civil party sought to centralize the administration as much as possible, since it was above all in the capital that their power lay. The military leaders tended to be more powerful as governors in the provinces, especially those like Khurāsān and Armenia where the situation meant that large numbers of troops were required. Since the civil administration collected the taxes which paid the soldiers’ salaries, there was ample cause for disagreement. Increasingly the parties were sharply differentiated; the growing intricacy of the administration meant that most military men were effectively excluded from it, while it was rare for those trained as kuttāb (let alone as palace servants) to be given military commands or governorates. This tension between civilian administrators and the military was to be an increasingly important feature of the politics of the ‘Abbasid caliphate until the final triumph of the military with the introduction of the office of amīr al-umarā’ and the development of the iqṭā‘ system in the first half of the fourth/tenth century. It is noteworthy that such tensions are not apparent in Umayyad times but are found in the more sophisticated bureaucratic state of eleventh-century Byzantium.
As so often in early Islamic history, the divisions within the ruling class were reflected in the arrangements for the succession. Two sons of al-Mahdī had emerged as heirs to the throne. The elder was Mūsā, later the Caliph al-Hādī. He had acted as his father’s deputy in Baghdad on several occasions and seems to have developed close links with military leaders in the city, which were certainly strengthened when in 167/783–784 he was given command of a large army sent to pacify the province of Jurjān at the southeastern corner of the Caspian Sea. The other candidate was his brother Hārūn, later to become the Caliph al-Rashīd. His education was entrusted to Yaḥyā the Barmakid, and while he was given military training in wars on the Byzantine frontier and overall supervision of the western provinces of the caliphate, his ties remained very much with the court party, with Yaḥyā his mentor and with al-Rabī‘ b. Yūnus the ḥājib and head of the palace mawālī. He also had another admirer in the person of al-Khayzurān. She was mother to both Mūsā and Hārūn but, for reasons that are not clear, seems to have favoured Hārūn above his elder brother. The original succession agreement was that Mūsā should be caliph until his death, when he would be succeeded by his brother, but there were rumours that al-Mahdī was intending to change these provisions and make Hārūn his immediate heir. Whether this was true can never be known, for in Muḥarram 169/August 785, the caliph was killed, apparently in a hunting accident, in the foothills of the Zagros Mountains to the east of Baghdad.
Mūsā was still in Jurjān when news came of his father’s death, but his brother, who was on the spot, made no attempt to usurp the throne, and Mūsā succeeded, as the Caliph al-Hādī, without any overt opposition. When he was safely installed, the new caliph showed that he intended to follow different policies from those of his father. The military leaders were naturally to be his closest advisers, while Yaḥyā the Barmakid was arrested and al-Rabī‘ b. Yūnus only escaped a similar fate by his death from natural causes. Along with this reliance on the military party went a much harder line towards the ‘Alids. They were deprived of many of their allowances and ceased to enjoy the privileged status at court they had had during his father’s reign. In response to this, one ‘Alid leader, al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Alī, organized a rebellion in Medina in Dhu’l-Qa‘da 169/May 786. In some ways, he was following in the steps of Muḥammad the Pure Soul a quarter of a century before, but his revolt was much smaller and much less well planned. He found supporters only in Medina, and even there many of those groups who had supported Muḥammad – the Anṣār and the old Muhājirūn families, for example – were now loyal to the ‘Abbasids. In the end, al-Ḥusayn could recruit only about 300 followers to oppose the ‘Abbasid army, which arrived shortly afterwards with the ḥajj, and his cause, as so often with the ‘Alids, was doomed to failure. Al-Ḥusayn was killed as he fled towards Mecca. It would seem that al-Mahdī’s policies had, to some extent, succeeded in drawing the sting of the ‘Alid threat. The failure did, however, have the effect of dispersing the ‘Alid family. One of the participants, Idrīs b. ‘Abd Allāh, fled to Morocco, where he founded an ‘Alid dynasty, while his brother Yaḥyā fled to the mountains of Daylam at the southern end of the Caspian Sea, where he established a connection between the local people and the ‘Alids which was to last until Buyid times. The spread of ‘Alid loyalties to outlying regions of the Muslim world, a development with lasting and important consequences, was essentially the result of the policies of the early ‘Abbasid caliphs and the failure of the ‘Alids to mobilize widespread popular support in the central Islamic lands.
It is difficult to assess al-Hādī’s policies fairly because he died, in mysterious circumstances, after a reign of only thirteen months. He is said to have been ill for some time before his death but circumstantial evidence suggests that he was the victim of a plot. Once again, the question of the succession dominated political life. Under the terms of the arrangements made by al-Mahdī, Hārūn was to succeed his brother. This was clearly repugnant to al-Hādī’s military supporters, who realized that the accession of Hārūn would be a victory for Yaḥyā the Barmakid and his supporters in the civil administration. It was not difficult to persuade al-Hādī that Hārūn should be removed from the position of heir apparent and replaced by his own son Ja‘far, and the proposal was made more tempting because Hārūūn himself seems to have been prepared to renounce his rights. But the caliph and his advisers had not counted on the influence of his mother. It seems that relations between al-Khayzurān and her elder son had deteriorated sharply. Towards the end of al-Mahdī’s life, she had been an influential figure in the counsels of the caliphate, but al-Hādī made it clear, in public, that he would not tolerate any interference. It may have been al-Khayzurān, therefore, who arranged that the caliph should be smothered in his sleep by one of the slave-girls of the palace. Whatever the truth of the matter, al-Hādī died in his bed in Rabī‘ I 170/September 786 and Hārūn’s supporters were able to take rapid action. Yaḥyā the Barmakid was released from prison, al-Hādī’s son Ja‘far arrested and Hārūn proclaimed as caliph. The coup was swift and efficient, and al-Hādī’s followers were unable to organize any serious resistance.
Hārūn al-Rashīd, the most famous of the ‘Abbasid caliphs, came to power as a result of an effective coup d’état mounted by his supporters, most prominent of them being the Barmakid family. It was inevitable, then, that they should have a powerful voice in the new administration, and the first ten years of his rule (170–80/786–96) can fairly be described as the decade of the Barmakids. Yaḥyā, his brother Muḥammad and his two sons al-Faḍl and Ja‘far effectively monopolized the central administration. Their policy was to concentrate power at the centre in Baghdad. In political terms, this meant that provincial governors became much less important. Under al-Manṣūr’s rule, the governors of Baṣra, Kūfa and Egypt had enjoyed long terms of office and had been among the most important figures in the state; under Hārūn, the governors were changed so frequently that the chronicles often fail to record their names, and real power now lay at court. This political centralization was paralleled by fiscal centralization; we can see this most clearly in the case of Egypt, where special investigators were sent from Baghdad to root out abuses in the tax collection, and the governor was on two occasions obliged to bring the revenues and the accounts in person to Baghdad to have them checked.
The weakness of the Barmakid policy lay in the lack of reliable military support. Many of the leading figures in the army of al-Hādī had retired or been disgraced with the accession of Hārūn and they could not easily be replaced. Barmakid fiscal measures aroused considerable discontent, which sometimes expressed itself in violent rebellion. The family made an effort to recruit more men, notably when al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā was sent as the governor to Khurāsān and recruited 50,000 new men, of whom 20,000 were sent to the west and used to pacify north Africa. Matters came to a head in 178/794 with the rebellion of Walīd b. Ṭarīf, al-Khārijī who was able to dominate much of the Jazīra area and prevent the government from collecting any revenues. The success of his movement was partly due to the mobility of his followers, who could seek refuge in the mountains of eastern Anatolia if the need arose, but partly too because government taxation policies assured him a wide measure of sympathy from the local population, and the Barmakids had no military force capable of taking on so formidable an opponent. In the end, Harun was forced to call on the services of one of al-Hādī’s closest collaborators, the bedouin chief Yazīd b. Mazyad al-Shaybānī, who with the support of his tribesmen defeated and killed the rebel. There could not have been a clearer indication of the weaknesses of Barmakid rule, and it was after this that their monopoly of power began to be broken, with Yazīd and other military leaders being returned to favour.
There was another field in which Barmakid policy attracted adverse comment and that was in its attitude to the ‘Alids. Although Hārūn had rejected many of his brother’s attitudes, he continued the policy of hostility to members of the ‘Alid family. The Barmakids, however, advocated a more generous line, similar to that which had pertained in al-Mahdī’s time. This did not mean that they were Shi‘ites or sought to replace the ‘Abbasid by ‘Alids but rather that they wished to reconcile all the members of the Family of the Prophet. It is not entirely clear why they should have taken this line. The literary assemblies the Barmakids held were notable for the freedom with which unusual opinions were voiced, but it may be that there was a political dimension to this as well, that the Barmakids believed that the dynasty should aspire to a more absolute religious authority of the sort that supporters of the ‘Alids advocated. In these ways, the views of the Barmakids anticipate those developed by the Mu‘tazilī party at court in the next century. At the time, however, these views seem to have incurred the hostility of the caliph, as when al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā gave a binding safe conduct to Yaḥyā b. ‘Abd Allāh to persuade him to leave his mountain refuge in Daylam, a safe conduct which the caliph soon breached by having the unfortunate ‘Alid executed.
In 180/796–797, the power of the family began to decline, although Ja‘far b. Yaḥyā remained a close friend of the caliph, and when the end came with the famous fall of the Barmakids in 187/803, it was more the last phase of this decline than a radical change. The reasons for the fall of the Barmakids, the imprisonment of Yaḥyā b. Khālid and his son al-Faḍl and the dramatic murder of his other son Ja‘far, Hārūn’s closest friend, were a mystery to contemporaries and have remained so ever since. Part of the explanation lies in Hārūn’s increasing political independence and his reluctance to be dominated by any particular group in the state. Since about 180/796, he had been attempting to balance Barmakid influence by favouring military leaders like Yazīd b. Mazyad and promoting the son of the old ḥājib, al-Faḍl b. al-Rabī‘ b. Yūnus, as a rival power in the central government. He now seems to have wished to remove their influence entirely, feeling that they were still overmighty subjects.
The immediate cause of the disgrace of the Barmakids was probably tension over the arrangements for the succession. Hārūn, like his father before him, decided that the caliphate should pass to several of his sons in succession, but he was determined that conflict should be avoided by specifying publicly and in great detail the rights which each was to enjoy. To this end, he, and most of the leading figures in the ‘Abbasid regime, went to Mecca for the pilgrimage of 186/802, where formal and binding agreements were drawn up. The two most important contenders for the throne were his two sons Muḥammad, later al-Amīn, and ‘Abd Allāh, later al-Ma’mūn, although some reports say that a third son was subsequently introduced as well. Muḥammad was the elder of the two, although both were born in the same year, 170/786, and he had originally been nominated as heir as early as 175/791–792. Although his first tutor was al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā the Barmakid, he had subsequently become closely identified with the abnā’, the Khurāsānī soldiers settled in Baghdad, and had been left in the city as deputy during his father’s frequent absences. ‘Abd Allāh, however, had been nominated in 182/798–799 and remained under the influence of his Barmakid tutor, Ja‘far b. Yaḥyā and his associates. The agreement stipulated that Muḥammad should succeed his father as caliph but that ‘Abd Allāh should have during Muḥammad’s lifetime an enlarged Khurāsān as an almost independent principality into which the caliph’s agents were not allowed to penetrate.
This was the most elaborate of similar arrangements for dividing the caliphate between the sons of the ruler made by ‘Abbasids from al-Mahdī through to al-Rāḍī. The object was probably to secure the succession should the heir apparent die suddenly, to administer the vast empire more efficiently and to contain the growing polarization within the ruling class, Muḥammad being effectively the leader of the abnā’, while ‘Abd Allāh became the leader of the Barmakid party. The agreement was doomed to failure precisely because these tensions had become so marked and because there were small groups of men on each side who were determined to destroy the other party entirely, but it was not necessarily an unintelligent approach to the problems faced by the caliphate. The continuing power of the Barmakids could only be an obstacle to the peaceful working of these arrangements; if Muḥammad was to have any chance of establishing himself as caliph, they had to be removed, and the fall of the Barmakids took place as soon as the court returned to Iraq from Mecca.
The fall of the Barmakids caught the imagination of contemporaries and later historians. The suddenness and completeness with which the greatest family in the Muslim state had been brought low typified the uncertainties of political fortune and the unreliability of rulers. But this should not obscure the importance of the contribution they made to the ‘Abbasid caliphate. They were the architects of the centralized administration that was developed to its full extent under al-Mu‘taṣim and al-Wāthiq in the next century. They may have perished, but their influence lived on in the work of Ja‘far’s pupil ‘Abd Allāh, later the caliph al-Ma’mūn, and bureaucrats such as al-Faḍl b. Sahl and al-Faḍl b. Marwān who were their protégés.
The years after the fall of the Barmakids were marked by Hārūn’s campaigns against the Byzantine Empire and by his attempts to solve the problems of Khurāsān. Under the Umayyads, the Muslims had undertaken major expeditions by land and sea with the object of taking Constantinople and destroying the Byzantine Empire. In late Umayyad times, from the reign of Hishām onwards, there was a change in policy. The frontier was stabilized, with the Muslims establishing garrison cities in the Cilician plain at Adana, Maṣṣīṣa and Tarsus and in the mountains farther to the east in Mar‘ash, Ḥadath and Malaṭya. Settlement was encouraged and the inhabitants of these military outposts received generous tax concessions to persuade them to stay. During his father’s lifetime, Hārūn had made two major expeditions against the Byzantines, and when he became caliph, he took a more direct interest than any previous member of his family in the Holy War, establishing himself in Raqqa much of the time, to be close to the frontier zones. He also established a separate province called al-‘Awāṣim behind the actual frontier zone (the Thughūr), the resources of which were to be devoted to warfare against the Greeks. In 190/806 and again the next year, he led the largest expeditions against the Byzantine Empire ever launched by the ‘Abbasids. The results were not spectacular; frontier districts were raided but no permanent gains were made. The real purpose of the effort was, perhaps, to emphasize the caliph’s role as the leader of the Muslims against the traditional enemy. Campaigns against the Byzantine Empire were the only military activities ‘Abbasid caliphs undertook in person and should probably be compared to the leading of the ḥajj as a symbolic affirmation of the caliph’s importance in the life of the Islamic community.
The other problem with which the caliph was forced to come to grips was the government of Khurāsān. From the time of the ‘Abbasid revolution, the province had been ruled by representatives of the Khurāsāniyya military, the abnā’, who had originated in the province but were now mostly based in Baghdad and Raqqa. This policy resulted in growing unrest in the province, led by the local landowners and semi-independent princes of the frontier and mountain areas. This resentment may have been in part social – the abnā’ were thought to be inferior to the established local ruling families – but a more fundamental issue was also raised: the spending of the tax revenues of the province. Since the time of the Caliph ‘Uthmān, there had been tension between those who believed that the revenues should be spent for the benefit of the Muslims in the province where they were collected, and those who thought that the caliph should control the collection and distribution of revenue. In the early ‘Abbasid period, the abnā’ demanded that the revenues of Khurāsān be brought west to Baghdad to supply their salaries and pensions, but many notables in eastern Iran objected to this, arguing that the bulk of the money should be kept in the province and spent locally, as had happened during the brief governorate of al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā the Barmakid. This was totally unacceptable to the abnā’ of Baghdad, since they would lose control of the sources of their own livelihood, and they were determined to preserve their domination of Khurāsān, by force if necessary.
The grievances recorded in the Arabic sources certainly seem to be connected with taxation rather than class antagonisms. Under the Barmakids, this pattern was changed when in 177/793–794 al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā was appointed the governor of the province. The Barmakids themselves came from an important eastern Iranian family, and al-Faḍl’s rule was popular among the local notables; he spent money on building projects and military expeditions on the frontiers. This interlude did not last long, however, perhaps because of the opposition it aroused among the abnā’ of Baghdad. In 180/796, Hārūn acceded to this pressure by appointing as the governor of Khurāsān one of the leading figures among the abnā’, ‘Alī b. ‘īsā b. Māhān. Although the sources are hostile to him and must be treated with caution, it seems that ‘Alī tried to exploit the resources of the provinces more ruthlessly than any of his predecessors. Inevitably, this aroused new opposition. There were Kharijite rebellions on a scale previously unknown in the province and a growing volume of complaints from the notables of the area. For some time, Hārūn remained deaf to their pleas, partly because ‘Alī gave him a generous share of his gains, but in 190/805–806, a serious rebellion broke out in Samarqand led by Rāfi‘ b. Layth, the grandson of Naṣr b. Sayyār, the last Umayyad governor of the province. ‘Alī was quite unable to reestablish control, and this rebellion, coupled with the growing Kharijite menace, obliged Hārūn to dismiss him. Even in this, he was compelled to act by stealth, sending his right-hand military man, Harthama b. A‘yan, ostensibly to support the governor, but in fact to depose him. In spite of this, the unrest remained, and in 192/808 Hārūn decided to go east to investigate the affairs of the province. Perhaps surprisingly, considering the important part it played in ‘Abbasid history, Hārūn was the only reigning caliph of the dynasty ever to visit Khurāsān in person. It was while he was on this expedition, in 193/809, that he died near the Khurāsānī city of Ṭūs.
The reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd has gone down in popular memory as the “golden prime” of the ‘Abbasid caliphate. Reading the contemporary annals, it is at first difficult to see why this should have been so. The caliph himself appears as a curiously nondescript character. Al-Manṣūr had been famous for his miserliness and cunning; al-Mahdī for his openness and generosity, but Hārūn seems to have had no clear characteristics of that sort. Nor, again unlike his grandfather and father, does he seem to have had any clear and consistent policies; during the first years of his reign, he was content to allow the Barmakid family to exercise power in his name, and even later on he seems to have taken little interest in the day-to-day business of government. Furthermore, his caliphate was constantly challenged by rebellions which the government often had difficulty suppressing, even when, like the revolt of Walīd b. Ṭarīf, they were in Iraq itself.
To understand Hārūn’s later reputation, it is important to see it against the background of the disturbances and disasters which followed his death: the catastrophic civil war between his sons and the later domination of the caliphate by Turkish soldiers, while the economy of Iraq inexorably declined and provinces slipped out of the control of Baghdad. Hārūn’s reign was the last period when all the central Islamic lands from Ifrīqiya in the west to Sind in the east were under the control of the caliph. It was also a period when the caliphate was still extremely wealthy. Hārūn left a vast surplus in the treasury – it seems that the civil war which followed his death saw the beginning of the economic problems which were to plague the ‘Abbasid caliphs in the next century. Under his rule, there were no mutinies by irate troops demanding their pay; a magnificent and cultured court was maintained; and golden dīnārs were showered on successful poets. Baghdad was an expanding and prosperous city and the caliph in person led the united armies of Islam against the Byzantine foe. He was also a great patron of the ḥajj. He went on the pilgrimage to Makka no less than eight times during the course of his rule: he was also the last reigning ‘Abbasid caliph ever to do so. His caliphate also saw the fullest development of the Darb Zubayda. This route (darb means path or road), named after his mother Zubayda, who contributed much of the costs from her private fortune, was the largest civil engineering project of the early Islamic period. As well as the clearing of the road itself, there were cisterns, guardposts and wells to enable the faithful to make the difficult journey from Iraq, across the Arabian Desert to the Holy Cities. It was clear testimony to the wealth and organizational capacity of the caliphate at this time. It is not surprising that the court and capital of Hārūn al-Rashīd became the setting for the earliest Arabic contributions to the “Thousand and One Nights”. It was also the period when the kuttāb under the leadership of the Barmakids established themselves as a major political and cultural force in the caliphate, and since many of the historians on whom we depend for information about Hārūn were themselves kuttāb or had links with the bureaucracy, it was natural that they would stress their wealth, magnificence and political wisdom. All these factors combined to shed a sort of golden glow over Hārūn’s caliphate, and for later writers – working against a background of continuous political and financial crisis, when Baghdad was degenerating into a collection of hostile villages and the great Round City of al-Manṣūr was a decrepit ruin – this was a period to look back on with deep nostalgia; it was easy to ignore the more prosaic reality.
Hārūn’s reputation was also known to a wider world. Diplomatic relations between Byzantium and the ‘Abbasids were conducted on a more regular basis than they had been with the Umayyads and were sometimes cordial. In the reign of al-Manṣūr, it was a visiting Byzantine ambassador who advised the caliph to move the markets outside the new Round City he had constructed, and in the time of al-Mahdī, a visiting Greek dignitary was provided with money by the caliph to build some water mills in Baghdad and the profits from these were even forwarded to him when he returned to Constantinople. Hārūn’s relations with the Byzantines were less friendly, especially when he began raiding deep into Byzantine territory towards the end of his life, but the existence of embassies is a sign that the ‘Abbasids accepted that the Byzantine Empire was a power with which they had to deal on equal terms.
More tantalizing is our fragmentary evidence of ambassadors sent to Hārūn by his great contemporary, the Frankish Emperor Charlemagne. These are not recorded in any Arabic source but Latin annals mention that Charlemagne sent envoys in 180–181/797 and 190/807 and that Hārūn returned the compliment on both occasions, including the sending of an elephant as a gift in 185/801. What the purpose of these missions was is difficult to tell – indeed, some writers have suggested that they never occurred at all. It does seem, however, that Charlemagne was interested in the Holy Places in Jerusalem, where he founded a hostel and library for pilgrims, and his missions to Baghdad may have been connected with that. The disintegration of the Carolingian Empire after his death in 198/814 meant that these initiatives were not followed up.
Soon after Hārūn died, the problems he had tried to avert in the succession arrangements began to appear once more. At first, all went according to plan. Muḥammad, who had remained in Baghdad while his father went east, immediately became caliph with the title of al-Amīn, and his popularity in the city ensured that there was no opposition. ‘Abd Allāh, however, had already established himself in the administrative centre of Khurāsān at Marv, where he was planning to campaign against the rebels. Trouble began to develop over the status of the province of Khurāsān. The succession agreements made at Mecca in 186/802 had envisaged that Khurāsān, under al-Ma’mūn, should be effectively self-governing, but it is clear that this was totally unacceptable to an important group in the abnā’, led by ‘Alī b. ‘īsā b. Māhān, who had been in prison in Baghdad when Hārūn died but was immediately released. They began to put pressure on al-Amīn to reestablish the control of Baghdad over the province, even if it meant deposing his brother and breaking his sworn agreements. ‘Alī was joined in his determination by the ḥājib al-Faḍl b. al-Rabī‘, who had become the most powerful figure in the civil administration in Baghdad after the fall of the Barmakids. Many others, senior figures in the army and members of the ‘Abbasid family, were very reluctant to break their oaths or to provoke a civil war, but they lacked a leader and were unable to prevent the onset of war.
For two years, attempts were made to find a negotiated settlement. Al-Amīn made a number of requests of his brother: that the western areas of Khurāsān should be transferred to him, that he should be allowed to keep agents in al-Ma’mūn’s areas and, most important, that the revenue from the province should be sent to Baghdad. Al-Ma’mūn was very ill-equipped to withstand this kind of pressure. His military forces were small and their loyalty doubtful and he would probably have accepted his brother’s demands had it not been for the advice of his wazīr, al-Faḍl b. Sahl. Al-Faḍl came from a Persian family, small landowners in the Sawād of Iraq. He had risen to importance through the patronage of the Barmakids and after their fall had been attached to the court of the young al-Ma’mūn. He is credited with strong Persian sympathies in some sources and does not seem to have become a Muslim until the very end of Hārūn’s reign. He was determined to preserve the traditions of the Barmakids and it was this resourceful politician who showed the vacillating al-Ma’mūn the way out of his difficulties. He persuaded the young prince to make an alliance with those groups in Khurāsān, notably the princes and magnates of the peripheral areas, who had opposed the rule of ‘Alī b. ‘īsā b. Māhān, since both they and al-Ma’mūn had a common interest in opposing control from Baghdad. While his brother continued his attempts to browbeat him into submission, al-Ma’mūn had himself proclaimed not caliph (that would come later), but imām. It was the first time a member of the ‘Abbasid family had adopted this title (although all future caliphs were to use it) and it is probable that it was intentionally ambiguous, demonstrating his independent status without being openly provocative. The title was, of course, essentially a religious one, used of members of the ‘Alid family, and al-Ma’mūn was certainly following in the footsteps of al-Mahdī and the Barmakids in emphasizing the religious nature of his rule, a development which would become more important as his reign progressed.
Fortified by his new alliance with the magnates of Khurāsān, al-Ma’mūn was able to turn a deaf ear to his brother’s proposals. In Baghdad, ‘Alī b. ‘Īsā and al-Faḍl b. al-Rabī‘ began to organize a massive military expedition which would once again bring Khurāsān under the control of the abnā’. Meanwhile, the breach had become final when in ṣafar 195/November 810, al-Amīn had his own son Mūsā acknowledged as heir apparent, thus removing al-Ma’mūn from his place in the succession. Two months later (Rabī‘ II 195/January 811), ‘Alī b. ‘īsā was appointed the governor of Khurāsān and an army assembled from the abnā’; it was reputed to number 40,000 and people in Baghdad said that it was the biggest army they had ever seen. Equipped with silver chains to secure the person of al-Ma’mūn, this mighty force then moved across Iran towards Rayy, the western frontier town of Khurāsān.
The arrival of this vast host threw al-Ma’mūn and his supporters into something of a panic and he himself considered fleeing. Against ‘Alī’s army, he sent Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn to Rayy. Ṭāhir came from a family of Arab origin which had been settled in Khurāsān since Umayyad times and had become the governing family of the little town of Būshang, near Herāt. The force he commanded was small, probably under 5,000, and many at al-Ma’mūn’s court, including Ṭāhir’s own father, considered the mission doomed to failure, but when in Sha‘bān 195/May 811 the two armies met outside the city walls of Rayy, Ṭāhir won a decisive victory, ‘Alī b. ‘īsā was killed and his army fled west in disorder.
The battle at Rayy was a turning point; the policy of al-Faḍl b. Sahl was totally vindicated, and al-Ma’mūn’s position in Khurāsān was now secure, so much so that he was proclaimed caliph. For the abnā’, it was an unqualified disaster – their prestige and power were damaged beyond repair and their most experienced and dynamic leader was dead. From this point, they were struggling for survival. Ṭāhir lost no time in following up his victory, defeating another, smaller army of abnā’ at Hamadhān and establishing himself, before winter set in, in Ḥulwān on the edge of the Iraqi plains, only a few days’ journey from Baghdad itself. In Baghdad, al-Amīn attempted to raise new armies to supplement the now depleted abnā’; he looked first to Arab tribal leaders like the Shaybānīs, whom his father had employed to put down the rebellion of al-Walīd b. Ṭarīf the Kharijite, and then to the Qaysīs of northern Syria, but in both cases the abnā’ proved unwilling to cooperate with their supposed allies, while the Arabs were reluctant to fight for al-Amīn without substantial political concessions and payments. All attempts to organize a coalition foundered on the rock of abnā’ intransigence.
The next year (196/812) saw a swift deterioration in al-Amīn’s military position. In the spring, Ṭāhir was joined by a large army under the command of Harthama b. A‘yan and was able to capture the cities of southern Iraq without any real difficulty. In Mosul, Egypt and the Ḥijāz, there were coups in favour of al-Ma’mūn, while Syria was taken over by different groups of Qaysī or Yamanī Arabs. Only in Baghdad and the immediately surrounding area did al-Amīn exercise any authority, and even there he faced challenges. The pressures of defeat led to an increasing rift between the caliph and the abnā’, some of whom felt that he was betraying their interests by trying to raise support among the Arabs. By the summer, the forces of Ṭāhir and Harthama were preparing to attack Baghdad itself and al-Amīn felt that his position was increasingly desperate. In this extremity, he turned for support to the people of Baghdad – not the military abnā’, but the ordinary civilian population, to whom he now gave arms and gifts. The abnā’ now felt that he had finally abandoned them and turned to Ṭāhir. By the time the siege of Baghdad closed in Dhu’l-Ḥijja 196/August 812, most of the abnā’ leaders had joined Ṭāhir’s army, and the Ḥarbiyya quarter, where many of them lived, became his base of operations. This alliance between Ṭāhir and his family and the abnā’ was to continue long after the civil war had ended.
The siege of Baghdad, which lasted slightly over a year, was an episode almost without parallel in the history of early Islamic society. Al-Amīn had taken the decisive step of arming the people of the city and the Arab sources give us a clear picture of the social classes to which these people belonged. Contemptuously referred to as ‘ayyārūn (vagabonds), they were clearly the urban proletariat, not large property owners or the more substantial merchants, but rather people who sold trifles on the streets. They have left their own record in some remarkable poems in which they glory in the fact that they do not come from any noble family, that their “armour” was made of wool and their helmets of palm leaves, and they lament the barbarity of their attackers and the destruction of the city. There is also a strongly anti-military, even anti-war, strand in this poetry which is both striking and unusual. They fought for al-Amīn and for Baghdad but they do not seem to have had any particular religious viewpoint. We should probably see them as people from the country who had flocked to Baghdad in the previous two generations and had been unable to establish themselves as merchants or property owners; many of them are described as sleeping in the mosques and baths. The movement was a genuinely popular uprising and was perhaps the nearest that early Islamic history came to an attempt at social revolution.
In the end, military experience, as well as blockade and famine, began to tell. There was much hard hand-to-hand fighting and bombardment of the city by siege engines. In the end, it was diplomacy rather than military force which enabled the attackers to triumph. At the beginning of 198/September 813, Ṭāhir persuaded a number of the richer and more established citizens, increasingly apprehensive about the revolutionary situation in Baghdad, to cut the pontoon bridges which crossed the Tigris and provided the besieged with a vital means of communication between east and west Baghdad. This done, the eastern side of the city was easily occupied by Harthama and his men, while Ṭāhir launched a new attack on the west. Al-Amīn now attempted to surrender to his father’s old friend Harthama, who sent a boat across the river to fetch him – but Ṭāhir was suspicious of any private deals which excluded him, the boat was overturned and the caliph captured and executed. Most of his misfortunes had been of his own making, but his death saddened many supporters of the dynasty, even his own brother, and it is arguable that the prestige of the ‘Abbasid family never fully recovered from the murder of the caliph in this way. And like the murders of ‘Uthmān and al-Walīd II, the murder of al-Amīn solved no problems and was simply the prelude to new conflict within the Muslim community.
The years between the death of al-Amīn in 198/813 and the arrival of al-Ma’mūn in Baghdad in 204/819 saw prolonged and destructive fighting throughout the Near East but especially in Baghdad and the surrounding countryside. The local struggles for power seemed to generate their own momentum, and all over the area groups which had coexisted in peaceful rivalry for the previous half-century now took to arms. The fighting once begun was increasingly difficult to stop, and bāb al-fitna, the gate of civil strife, once opened, proved very difficult to close. Only a few areas remained immune, like Khurāsān under al-Ma’mūn and, perhaps ironically, the Byzantine frontier areas around Tarsus, described as a haven of peace.
The fundamental cause of the conflict lay in the policy of al-Faḍl b. Sahl and the influence he exercised over al-Ma’mūn. Al-Faḍl had forged the alliance between al-Ma’mūn and the leading Khurāsānīs which had ensured success in the struggle with al-Amīn. He was now determined not to lose the fruits of victory and, above all, that al-Ma’mūn should remain in Khurāsān and that Marv should be the capital of the caliphate. This was not just a question of geography; it meant that policy and government would be conducted by al-Ma’mūn’s supporters; there would be no place in the new order for groups like the abnā’ or the Qaysī Arabs, and Baghdad would become no more than a provincial town. It is hardly surprising that these policies aroused strong and active resistance. If al-Ma’mūn had come to Baghdad after his brother’s death, he would probably have taken over the caliphate without any serious opposition, but attempts to govern from Marv proved, in the end, wholly impractical. In the attainment of his objective, al-Faḍl b. Sahl showed himself deeply distrustful of others who had contributed to al-Ma’mūn’s victory. This included Ṭāhir, who was sent into virtual exile in Raqqa, where he remained in retirement until the fall of al-Faḍl, and Harthama b. A‘yan, who was eventually recalled from Iraq and executed, on the wazīr’s orders, for treachery. This meant that the supporters of al-Ma’mūn were deprived of their two most experienced soldiers and the two men who could command the allegiance of substantial forces in the west. Furthermore, as time went on and disturbances still raged in Iraq, al-Faḍl b. Sahl was forced to deceive the caliph himself, by assuring him that all was under control. It was not until 202/817 that the caliph was convinced that these policies were leading to disaster. He had al-Faḍl murdered and began the move back to Iraq.
The civil wars in Iraq were confused and prolonged. They were essentially fought by different groups of ex-soldiers trying to establish their rights to government salaries. The main protagonists were the abnā’ of Baghdad. They demanded that they should be paid regular salaries and that the capital should be returned to Baghdad. In this, they were supported by other inhabitants of the area and by many members of the ‘Abbasid family. At first, they recognized al-Ma’mūn, while demanding that he should change both his advisers and his policies. From 201/817 onwards, however, they gave allegiance to a rival caliph, Ibrāhīm, son of al-Mahdī, but he proved more successful as a poet than a politician and his caliphate never gained general acceptance. When al-Ma’mūn approached Baghdad, Ibrāhīm was forced into hiding.
Faced with the intransigence of the people of Iraq, al-Faḍl b. Sahl was forced to look for expedients. He tried to govern Iraq through his brother al-Ḥasan. The attempt was not a success, partly because al-Ḥasan seems to have been very inept, with little understanding of local politics, and partly because the Baghdadis would not accept an agreement which denied them political influence. The fundamental problem was that al-Ma’mūn’s faction had no firm base of support in the area and it was probably in an effort to remedy this that al-Ma’mūn adopted an ‘Alid as his heir apparent. To understand this measure, it is important to note that popular enthusiasm for the ‘Alid cause was by no means dead in Iraq and it is likely that the hardships of the war and resentment against the government in Marv encouraged people to look for leadership from that quarter. In Jumādā II 199/January 815, a rebellion broke out in Kūfa, led by an ex-soldier, Abu’l-Sarāyā, in the name of an ‘Alid, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, known as Ibn Ṭabāṭabā. The rebellion was initially very successful, attracting widespread support. The rebels came to control most of southern Iraq and almost reached Baghdad. Al-Ḥasan b. Sahl was forced to turn to his rival, Harthama b. A‘yan (shortly to be executed for his help), and the rebellion was crushed. It showed, however, that an ‘Alid candidate to the throne could command a considerable militant following, which was exactly what al-Ma’mūn’s cause lacked.
In Ramaḍān 201/March 817 in Marv, al-Ma’mūn proclaimed as his heir ‘Alī b. Mūsā the ‘Alid, called al-Riḍā, “the Chosen One”. At first, this might seem to have been a handing over of the state to the ‘Alids and their supporters, but this was not quite the case. It has already been pointed out that reconciling the ‘Alids and unifying the Family of the Prophet had been an important objective of the policies of al-Mahdī and al-Faḍl b. Sahl’s mentors, the Barmakids. According to the propaganda put out by the caliph’s advisers, ‘Alī was adopted as heir not because he was a direct descendant of ‘Alī and al-Ḥusayn (which he was) but because al-Ma’mūn had considered all the available members of the house of the Prophet (‘Alids and ‘Abbasids) and found him the most suitable. Faced with the opposition of almost all the members of the ‘Abbasid family to his policies, this was hardly surprising. Another factor suggesting that a radical break was not intended was that ‘Alī was actually some twenty years older than the man whose heir he was supposed to be; thus while it was not impossible, it was unlikely that he would ever inherit.
In practical terms, the move was a disaster. News of it arrived in Iraq at a time when peace between the Baghdadis and al-Ḥasan b. Sahl seemed possible, and it provoked an immediate reaction, a new rebellion in the city led by members of the ‘Abbasid family. Nor did it generate much popular enthusiasm among ‘Alid supporters, since it promised no change in the unpopular policy of rule from Khurāsān. It also proved the undoing of al-Faḍl b. Sahl. ‘Alī b. Mūsā, who had had first-hand experience of the position in Iraq, managed to persuade al-Ma’mūn that he had, essentially, been deceived by the Sahl brothers as to the scope and severity of the opposition and that only if he came to Baghdad in person could his government be accepted. In Jumādā II 202/December 817, he decided to leave Khurāsān. This meant a break with al-Faḍl, who was murdered, almost certainly on the caliph’s orders. It also proved the undoing of the unfortunate ‘Alī b. Mūsā, who was poisoned, his burial place at Mashhad in Khurāsān becoming one of the great Shi‘ite pilgrimage centres.
Al-Ma’mūn’s progress to Baghdad took over a year and a half, but when he arrived, in ṣafar 204/August 819, the opposition melted away and the rival caliph, Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī, went into hiding. Almost a decade of warfare came to an end and a start could be made at reconstructing the state.
Al-Ma’mūn’s coming to Baghdad was in itself a gesture of compromise, and he proceeded to reconcile as many groups as he could. The ‘Alid succession was abandoned. ‘Alid green was replaced by ‘Abbasid black as the official colour of the court. The unpopular al-Ḥasan b. Sahl, who was probably ill already, was retired, while Ṭāhir was received back into favour and he and his family given important positions at court. Despite the peaceful takeover of Baghdad, formidable problems faced the new administration. Many areas, including all of Syria, Palestine and Egypt, remained outside the control of the government. The loss of these provinces and the destruction caused by the fighting in Iraq must have meant that government revenues were severely depleted. Al-Ma’mūn also faced the problem that he did not command a large, loyal army. There was no equivalent of the Khurāsāniyya who supported the early ‘Abbasids. He had had to compromise to be accepted in Baghdad, and he had to negotiate for military support.
To aid him in the work, al-Ma’mūn turned to Ṭāhir and his family. Ṭāhir had refused to help al-Ḥasan b. Sahl in his attempts to exercise power in Iraq and had probably watched his discomfiture with quiet satisfaction from his retreat at Raqqa. The contacts which he had made among the abnā’ during the siege of Baghdad now proved very useful and he was able to secure their acceptance of al-Ma’mūn while he was allowed to choose the administrators of the city. This connection between the Ṭāhirids and the Baghdadis was to last for the next half-century and secured the peace of the city even when the court moved to Sāmarrā. Ṭāhir himself was appointed to Khurāsān as the governor in Rabī‘ II 206/September 821 but remained there for only just over a year before his death in Jumādā II 207/October 822. His return to his native province seems to have brought problems, and he found it difficult to reconcile his duties to the caliph with his obligations to old colleagues. At the time of his death, he is said to have omitted the caliph’s name from the Friday prayers, a sign of rebellion. He was succeeded by his son Ṭalḥa. This did not in any sense mark the independence of Khurāsān, which remained an integral part of the ‘Abbasid state, or at least as much an integral part as it had been since the ‘Abbasid revolution, and the Tahirids remained as much concerned with affairs in Baghdad as in the east.
The lead in restoring the power of the caliphate in the west came from another member of the Tahirid family, ‘Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir. The first objective was northern Syria, which was in the hands of the Qaysī tribesmen who had dominated the area since Umayyad times, led by Naṣr b. Shabath al-‘Uqaylī. Naṣr was prepared to accept al-Ma’mūn as caliph but demanded concessions for his Qaysī followers and the end to rule by the ‘ajam (a contemptuous term for Persians or other foreigners). In the end, it took a show of force outside his base at Kaysūm, in 209/824–825, to induce him to accept terms. Even then it was a peace of reconciliation rather than subjection. ‘Abd Allāh moved on from Syria to Egypt. The long civil war had seen Egypt slide into virtual anarchy. There were prolonged and bitter disputes between the garrison of Fusṭāṭ, led by ‘Ubayd Allāh b. al-Sarrī b. al-Ḥakam, and the Qaysī Arabs settled in the delta area, led by ‘Alī al-Jarawī. To add to the confusion, Alexandria had been seized by refugees from Muslim Spain who maintained their independence. These rivalries meant that ‘Abd Allāh’s task was much easier. ‘Alī al-Jarawī hastened to join him and offered his services as a naval commander, while ‘Ubayd Allāh was forced to ask for terms and was exiled to Baghdad. After this, the refugees were forced to abandon Alexandria and remove themselves to Crete, and Egypt was once more effectively under the control of the ‘Abbasid caliphate. ‘Abd Allāh returned to Baghdad in triumph in late 211 or early 212 (827). Despite his slender military resources, his political and diplomatic skill had succeeded in regaining control of these areas with very little fighting or loss of life. The next year, 213/828, he replaced his brother Ṭalḥa as the governor of Khurāsān, while his role in the west was taken over by Abū Isḥāq, the caliph’s brother, whose small but efficient private army of Turks was making him one of the most powerful men in the state.
If al-Ma’mūn’s reign had its successes, it also had its failures. The province of Ifrīqiya was never regained after the civil war and remained in the hands of the Aghlabid family. Closer to home, Āzarbayjān was troubled by the anti-Muslim resistance movement led by Bābak among the indigenous mountain people of the area. Significantly, al-Ma’mūn lacked the military resources to suppress the rebellion directly. He relied instead on a series of commanders who offered to raise and pay armies at their own expense in exchange for the revenues of the province when it should be captured. Despite their ambitions, none of these entrepreneurs was able to make much headway in the difficult terrain, and it was not until al-Mu‘taṣim turned his much more effective military machine in that direction that Bābak was finally crushed.
The reign of al-Ma’mūn marks the divide between the early and middle phases of the ‘Abbasid caliphate. Many of the groups who had sustained the caliphate during the early years now disappeared from the scene. The most important of these were the abnā’ of Baghdad, the descendants of the Khurāsāniyya who had made the ‘Abbasid revolution and who had continued to form the military backbone of the old regime. They continued to have some influence in Tahirid Baghdad but no longer formed an important element in the armies of the caliphate and gradually lost both their military function and their group identity. The ‘Abbasid family had been very important under the early caliphs, but again they played little part in the new state. Members of the family were no longer given important governorates or the command of armies, and only the caliph and his heir or heirs seem to have had any important political function. Equally, many of the old Arab families like the Muhallabīs and the chiefs of Shaybān disappear from the caliphal court.
During the course of al-Ma’mūn’s reign, these groups were replaced by new men with a new ideology and new methods of government. The most important and powerful of these was the caliph’s brother Abū Isḥāq, who succeeded in 218/833 as the Caliph al-Mu‘taṣim and began a new era in ‘Abbasid history.