Friedrich Max Müller and the Science of Religion
LOURENS VAN DEN BOSCH
INTRODUCTION
The scientific study of religion originated in the second half of the nineteenth century, a period marked by a widening of the cultural horizon as a result of progressing colonialism. However, it was also a period of unsettlement of Christian faith among educated people in Europe. First, a conflict was felt between science and religion and, second, one between history and revelation. These themes were raised in the work of Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900), who argued for a scientific and impartial study of religion and coined the term “science of religion.” Müller’s views often refer to academic debates in England and Germany; some of the main players are mentioned here.
Charles Lyell (1785–1863) argued in his Principles of Geology that life on earth had existed for millions of years, refuting traditional biblical chronology. Subsequently, Charles Darwin (1808–82) developed an alternative theory of creation in his Origin of Species, proposing a theory of evolution based on natural selection. Thomas Huxley (1825–95) adjusted this theory into “survival of the fittest by natural selection,” thus introducing progress. These scientists relegated biblical stories about creation and the like to the field of myth and legend. The conviction that science did not go well together with Christian creeds became more wide spread among educated people.
The center of Christianity was touched when the New Testament came under attack. Historical research developed methods to test the reliability of texts with respect to historical data. The Tübingen School with scholars like Ferdinand Baur (1792–1860) and Friedrich Strauss (1808–74) developed a “Higher Criticism of the Bible.” They tried to show that the historical Jesus defied the Christ of faith. Revelation was relegated to history, where its meaning had to be discovered. As a consequence of this, Christianity had to compete with the other world religions. In this changing intellectual climate Müller developed an evolutionary approach to the study of religion, but derived his formative ideas from his study in Germany. A short sketch of his life may suffice.
A PHILOLOGIST BECOMES SCHOLAR OF RELIGION
Müller was born in 1823 in an educated Lutheran family of officials in the service of the dukes of Dessau-Anhalt (Germany). After the untimely death of his father, Wilhelm Müller (poet of Winter Journey and the Beautiful Miller’s Daughter, set to music by Franz Schubert), in 1827, young Max received ducal support, which enabled him to study at various universities. He studied philology and philosophy—particularly Kant and Hegel—at the University of Leipzig, where he wrote his thesis on Spinoza’s Ethica in 1843. In these years he also developed a great interest in Sanskrit and its ancient literature.
In 1844, Müller went to Berlin to study the comparative grammar of Indo-European languages under Franz Bopp (1791–1867) and philosophy under Friedrich Schelling (1774–1854). Fascination with the Vedas brought him to Paris in 1845, where Eugène Burnouf (1801–52), specialist in Vedic texts, stimulated him to prepare a critical edition of the Rig-Veda. There he met Dwarkanath Tagore, a highly cultured Indian, who taught him about the Brahmo Samâj, a reform movement that wanted to undo Hinduism from its mythological accretions. Müller developed a great interest in these reform movements and became in touch with many of their leaders.
In 1846, Müller went to London to work in the library of the India Office, a treasury for Sanskrit manuscripts. There he collected the funds for his Rig-Veda project from the East India Company. He moved to Oxford, which was supposed to only be temporary, but he became enthralled by the city and stayed there for the rest of his life. Müller’s edition of the Rig-Veda with Sayana’s commentary appeared in six volumes between 1849 and 1874. He later often referred to the Rig-Veda, because it contained religious poetry expressive of the most ancient stages of mankind.
Müller, who was versed in German Romanticism and Idealism, functioned in England as an intermediary of German culture. In 1854, he became professor of European languages at a semiacademic institute. He focused his research particularly on linguistic origins and argued that the history of the human mind could be read in the records of language, thus introducing a kind of linguistic paleontology. Müller was passed over for the chair of Sanskrit in Oxford in 1860, because he was German and associated with modernism. He went on with linguistics and finally received a professorship in comparative philology at the University of Oxford in 1867, in recognition of his Lectures on the Science of Language. At that time, his interests were led toward the scientific study of religion. Colonial expansion had led to huge accumulation of materials for the study of the world religions. He wondered how to survey the whole field of religious thought, how to classify the religions of the past and the present, and how describe their main features adequately. This was the task he set himself for the rest of his life.
THE SCIENCE OF RELIGIONS AND THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD
Müller developed his view of religion in his Introduction to the Science of Religion. There he argued for the impartial and scientific comparison of the religions of the world. As a philologist, he focused on religions with written traditions and stated that the texts should be studied in their original languages with the methods that textual and historical research had developed. One should distinguish older from younger traditions, but remain aware of the continuity between past and present.
Müller acknowledged that it was impossible for one scholar to study all the texts in the original languages. In 1874, he proposed to the International Orientalist Congress in London that he edit a series of annotated translations of the authoritative texts, known as Sacred Books of the East, in which fifty-one volumes appeared between 1879 and 1901. He included in this series all those books that had been formally recognized by religious communities as the highest authorities in matters of religion. In making this decision, he founded his selection of texts on the acknowledgment of religious communities, thus distancing himself from criteria current in monotheistic traditions. However, the sponsors of the Oxford University Press rejected his proposal to include the Old and New Testament in the series, because it would place Christianity on a par with the other “book religions.” Müller viewed Christianity as a historical manifestation of religion, but was convinced that it could stand the test of being compared with other religions.
The comparative method had produced many important results in the natural sciences. For this reason, scholars in the humanities started to apply this approach as well. Taking Goethe’s well-known epigram that “he who knows one language knows none,” Müller argued that he who knows one religion knows none. He stressed that empirical knowledge of a single religious datum did not lead to scientific knowledge. The diversity in religions made him wonder what the world religions shared in common and where they differed, and further, how they rise and decline. He took as a guideline: divide et impera. The classification and comparison of religious concepts were of central importance in achieving scientific knowledge about religion.
Müller proposed a classification of religions according to linguistic criteria. The discovery of a common origin of the Indo-European languages and peoples enabled him to search for common religious concepts. By comparing linguistically related concepts, he tried to reconstruct the main religious ideas of the Indo-European peoples. But it also enabled him to trace the historical progress of religious concepts in the course of time. He suggested a similar program for the Semitic languages and its peoples, so that a typology could be made of the original religions of both groups. The manifestation of God in nature was the most important feature of the Indo-European people, while the manifestation of God in history was essential for the religion of the Semitic people. With this approach, he followed in the footsteps of Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), and Hegel, who had argued for a close relationship between religion, language, and ethnos. Müller tried to fortify their views by referring to comparative linguistics.
Müller distinguished two aspects in studying religion, a historical and a theoretical one. The historical dimension focused on religion as a doctrinal system, handed down in books, rituals, and so on. But religion also had a psychological dimension that could not be reduced to its concrete historical manifestations. Religions all sprang from the same sacred soil, the human heart. He initially defined religion as a mental disposition that, independent of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the Infinite under different names and under different disguises. A vague sense of the Infinite was the first impulse behind all religion. Müller’s debt to Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) is evident in this view, but he gave his own twist to it by arguing that all religions were human endeavors to express this feeling. He thus gave an anthropological foundation to religion.
Müller regarded the Vedas as essential to the study of the origin and growth of religion. These texts enabled him to trace the various attempts of naming the Infinite in ancient India: from the pristine concepts in the Rig-Veda to the elevated ideas of the Upanishads. The Rig-Veda represented religion in a primeval stage, through which other religions had already passed, enabling him to study the initial growth of a theogony, in which there was no clear-cut system of religion and mythology. The text showed far more convincingly than any special revelation how the human mind went from the perception of the great phenomena of nature to the conception of agents behind these phenomena, the gods of nature. Müller introduced the term “henotheism” in order to denote this vague notion of the Divine, evoked by the perception of nature. As a stage, henotheism preceded polytheism (belief in many separate gods connected with specific natural phenomena) and polytheism preceded monotheism (belief in one god).
Müller illustrated his view by the example of the sun, a natural phenomenon that became connected with the idea of order and regularity, with trust, and developed from a mere luminary into a creator, preserver, and ruler of the world, in fact into a divine Supreme Being. At the same time, the sun had to share this idea of being divine with gods to whom similar features had been attributed. Gradually, the deities were divested of their material characteristics and fused into the concept of one god as manifested in monotheistic traditions.
A detailed analysis of the history of religions and a comparison of religious ideas were the basis for Müller’s philosophy of religion. With Schelling and Hegel, Müller agreed that the history of religions also was a history of God’s gradual disclosure. God’s spirit had its influence on the mind of man in all ages and everywhere; there was “Truth” in all religions. Müller, therefore, accepted religious plurality and gave it a basis by referring to Kantian epistemology, but he regarded it also as a challenge for reflection on the human condition. He believed history to be a site for divine education. Religious dialogue that was based on the sacred books of mankind might contribute to better understanding of the message underlying all religions. The religions of the past served to understand the present. They formed the basis for a universal religion, sometimes also denoted by him as a religion of humanity.
In his Gifford Lectures on natural religion (1888–92), Müller developed a philosophy of religion that culminated in theosophy with panentheistic features. True theosophy, the highest ken within the reach of the human mind, would lead to a new universal religion, to a new view of man, and to a new brotherhood. For this reason, Müller supported the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893.
MYTHOLOGY
One of Müller’s central aims was to discover reason behind the unreason of mythology. He did not accept the assumption of contemporaries that there was little point in looking for deeper meaning in the myths of ancient Greece. He argued that these irrational myths called for a scientific explanation that allowed for their origin and development. The etymological method of comparative philology proved valuable in reconstructing the oldest strata of Indo-European mythology. Müller focused on common mythical traditions and tried to identify the names of the principal actors in myths. The correct etymology of their names offered a clue to solve many riddles. This convinced him that ancient mythology had a physical basis. A fixed symbolic order lay beneath the chaotic surface of mythology, which referred to the great regular phenomena in nature: day and night, sun and moon, dawn and dusk, light and darkness. Early mankind had selected these phenomena as metaphors of sacred reality, because regularity in nature suggested order and gave meaning to existence. On account of his stress on the physical aspects of early religion, Müller was regarded as the main protagonist of the Nature Myth School.
Müller used the myth of Daphne and Phoibos Apollo to show his approach to mythology. Apollo fell in love with Daphne, but she was afraid of him and fled from him, praying to her mother, the earth, to guard her. The earth took her in her lap and at the place where she had disappeared a laurel tree sprang up. The word phoibos, “bright shining,” was originally an epithet of the sun, but it developed into an independent deity associated with the rising sun. This deity fused with Apollo. Daphne was etymologically related to the Sanskrit ahanâ, “dawn.” The word went back to an Indo-European root dah, “to burn” or to “be bright.” The nymph Daphne was thus originally dawn. The love of the rising sun for dawn and its tragic consequences could be seen every day at sunrise, the fading away of dawn on account of the fiery rays of the sun and her disappearance in the lap of the earth. All these elements belonged to common Indo-European mythology and had parallels in Vedic lore. The last part of the story, the change of Daphne into a laurel tree, was a pure Greek legend. The laurel was a much-sought-after firewood because of its bright burning qualities and was therefore called Daphne, derived from the same verbal root, dah. Thus the original meaning of the myth and its subsequent development was traced.
When the original meaning of the names was forgotten and these names became petrified and nontransparent, new interpretations became current. The nomina became numina and started to live their own life. Phoibos became a beautiful youth in love with an equally beautiful girl, Daphne, but it remained unclear why she had fled and had disappeared in the lap of the earth. When people no longer understood their metaphors, they went astray and became embezzled by their own language. Müller called this development a disease of language, which affected human thought. It was the task of philosophy to fight against this kind of mythology.
CRITICAL EVALUATION
Müller’s theories of mythology came in the course of time under attack from many sides. Andrew Lang (1844–1912), for instance, was one of the first who argued that Müller did not explain the more violent aspects of mythology. He drew attention to the worldwide parallels in mythology and lobbied for comparative studies within the context of ethnology, the science promoted by Edward Tylor (1832–1917). The disease of language could not explain myths about murder, incest, rape, sodomy, or castration, and foreclosed the exploration of the darker aspects of human existence as embodied in myth. Müller’s naturalistic view of mythology was therefore inadequate. He focused too much on the origin of myth and not enough on its historical development. Moreover, his linguistic approach prevented him from dealing with the various influences exerted by the social, cultural, and physical settings in which myths originated.
Müller’s view of religion also did not stand the test of time, intertwined as it was with mythology and language. Cornelis Tiele (1830–1907), another founding father of the study of religion, was one of the first to criticize him. Religion is expressed not only in words, but also in rituals. Therefore, it should not be reduced to a sacred dialect of human speech, but it requires the study of rituals as well.
Müller’s definition of religion was also refuted. Though he claimed it to be founded on religious materials, it was highly abstract and derived from philosophy. It was based on a subjective perception of the individual and did not take the social dimension of religion into account. It was rooted in protestant belief, in which words as vehicles of ideas are central to the interpretation of religion. Müller was a proponent of a theological view of the science of religion, a view that gave priority to the study of concepts expressed in words; he made the study of rites and other aspects of religion of subordinate importance.
Müller’s aspiration to find a message for humanity in the history of religions pervaded his study of religion and caused flaws. He often mixed up descriptions of historical processes with theological interpretations that originated in his personal view of Christianity. This disqualified him in the eyes of later generations of scholars in the field. Nonetheless, his contributions to the science of religion have been of great importance.1 He was one of the first scholars to propose a theory for a scientific study of religion and to promote its development. By lecturing publicly, he presented the new discipline to a broad, educated audience and fostered its goodwill. His publications stimulated many contemporary scholars, although the comparative study of religion moved away from the theology of religions he proposed.
NOTE
1. Lourens P. van den Bosch, “Friedrich Max Müller: His Contributions to the Science of Religion,” in Comparative Studies in the History of Religions, ed. E. R. Sand and J. P. Sorenson (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculum Press, 1999), 11–39. For further readings, see J. R. Stone, ed., The Essential Max Müller: On Language, Mythology and Religion (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); H. G. Kippenberg, Discovering Religious History in the Modern Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); and E. J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1986).