The sky is the roof of human life and has been since man first lifted himself off his knuckles. He has always had ideas about that roof, and they have become more marvelous rather than less. This should confound those who believe that Change and Hopelessness go hand in hand. Who would not agree that an expanding universe with countless fires is a more wonderful place to live in than any cosmic scheme that went before it?

Yet in our pride of knowledge, we should not dismiss the most primitive concepts as the fairy tales of man’s infancy. They were attempts to explain things, and they used what knowledge was available. It is a salutary exercise to think, sometimes, how we ourselves should fare if we stood where our ancestors did.

Take the ancient Egyptians, for example. If you were an Egyptian, you knew that the level of the Nile rose when a star called Nephthys’ Tear fell into the river. This was a thing, like the passage of the sun across the sky, that a man could see for himself. There were ceremonies to be performed when the star fell — that is, dropped below the southern horizon — and your mind was never clear whether the ceremonies made the river rise, or whether the star would fall if the river didn’t rise, and so on. There was one thing you would never think, that the position of the star and the rise of the Nile were coincidental. It couldn’t be coincidence, not if you felt the unity of things, the overriding human necessity of finding a link between separate phenomena.

You were never quite sure, of course, how long the year was. You were confused by the time the sun took to get across the sky in his boat — how else could it cross all that blue, waterlike stuff? — and the time the stars took to get across it. So your year was never quite long enough. You got to 365 days but were beaten by the bit left over. If a man thinks the computation should be easy, he should try doing it in ancient Egyptian, with a system of numbers even clumsier than the Roman. So the calendar was wrong and stayed that way, and the ceremonies connected with the seasons drifted farther away from them, until after about a thousand years they had worked right through the calendar. As a failure in astronomical prediction, it was spectacular.

The first step toward a rational account of the sky — one depending on observation — was taken by the Greeks. We must talk about them, since an essentially Greek view of the universe dominated Western thought until the seventeenth century. Their arguments were, as one would expect, reasonable. Clearly, the sky is the abode of God; and since God is perfect, so must the sky be. What figure is more perfect than the sphere? However you turn a sphere about its center, it remains changeless in every part. Moreover, it is obvious to naked-eye observation that the heavens are spherical. If you doubt that, go out and look at them. So all the movements in the sky must be circular, or the result of some complex of circular movements. It stands to reason. As for the spheres themselves, they must be made of some changeless crystalline substance; for they look just like that.

The man who gave definition to this system was Ptolemy, the greatest astronomer of the ancient world, who lived in the second century after Christ. His system endured without much alteration for nearly fifteen hundred years. The spheres were concentric, the moon moving in one, the sun in another, planets in yet more, and the stars in the last one on the outside. The earth was a globe at the center, motionless at the heart of all this movement. It must be motionless; otherwise an arrow shot straight up would not return to the bowman. When all these spheres moved over each other — since God’s sky must be perfect — they did not grate like cartwheels but made heavenly music. This, too, was reasonable.

Certain wild philosophers had suggested that the earth itself rotated — had suggested, indeed, that the sun might stand still and the earth move around it, but their ideas never made any headway. The weight of common-sense opinion was too heavy, where there was no possibility of proof. This is one example of the social pressures on astronomers: even when they were ahead of the rest of humanity, they could not convince men before they were ready to be convinced. We can see in this the operation of that most mysterious and elusive thing, the climate of popular opinion. For thousands of years, astronomy had to accord, more or less, with the experience of the uninformed common man. No philosopher who proposed a radical change was persecuted; he was simply ignored, and his ideas disappeared or remained unread in some forgotten manuscript.

So the Ptolemaic system, with its reliance on the fairly accurate, but limited ideas of Aristotle, triumphed because people were prepared to accept it as a useful summation of the universe. Nevertheless there remained unsolved problems. More accurate observation showed that only the stars have the perfect circular movement. The planets, the wanderers, do not conform to it. If you look at a planet at midnight and remember where it stood among the stars, then midnight by midnight you will see how it has shifted among them, drifting westward. In time, each planet will drift right across the sky. More than this, a planet sometimes seems to slow down, stop, reverse its direction, stop again, then drift westward once more. These movements have always seemed significant to man — but how can they be called perfect? How, in other words, can the astronomer reduce these random movements to the circular movement which alone was thought worthy of God? What is more, if he cannot account for them, he cannot predict them — and bang! goes the calendar.

Yet with all these shortcomings, there was a very good reason why the system held the field for so long. By the end of the fifth century the Roman Empire was tottering, and its fall brought in a dark age that lasted for nearly a thousand years. Men had little time or inclination to think of the physical heavens. All they wanted was security, and the finite crystal spheres gave them the feeling of it. Nor could an astronomical team assemble — astronomy has usually been a matter of teamwork, for all its many great names — because Europe was splintered and travel was a dangerous adventure. So for that thousand years, the Ptolemaic system staggered on, emended, elaborated, but never seriously questioned. Indeed, with the rise of the Catholic Church, prediction was frowned on, since it was closely linked with astrology, which seemed to deny man’s free will by giving him a predestined future. Astronomy remained intellectually frozen.

There were two forces that tended all the time to unfreeze it. One was the given nature of man. Faced nightly with an appallingly beautiful and inexplicable phenomenon, some men could not but wonder, examine, speculate — though no one realized that what was wanted was an imaginative break-away from the whole system. The second freeing force was what we might call a practical matter. With the fading of the Dark Ages, commerce revived; and commerce needs an accurate calendar. The law itself was at stake. How are you going to enter into an agreement with someone for a number of years if you don’t know how long a year is? Machines were being invented. Voyages of discovery were acquainting men with new places and new ideas. The speculations of the ancients were being rediscovered.

The creaking calendar had become such an irritant that the Pope himself finally looked around for a competent astronomer who was as little contaminated by astrology as possible. He settled on a canon of the cathedral of Frauenburg, who was also a doctor of canon law, a doctor of medicine, business executive of the cathedral chapter, an amateur painter, and a passionately interested astronomer in his spare time. But when the canon read the Pope’s appeal to him, he asked to be excused.

The canon’s name was Nikolaus Koppernigk. By birth he was either Pole or German — the argument is endless. It seems likely that Nikolaus himself would be uninterested in the question. He would have thought of himself not as a Pole or German but as a Catholic. His father was a businessman in Prussian Poland, and Nikolaus was born at Thorn; but in his youth he was virtually adopted by his uncle, the Bishop of Ermeland. From that time forward his life lay between the chapter houses of cathedrals and the high tables of the universities. He never became a priest, but always and wholly he was of the Church.

He was a serious-minded young man and very much an intellectual. Yet looking at the early portraits of him, one wonders. There is a kind of sensitivity about the face that could well belong to another sort of person. Sometimes, in the early woodcuts, he holds a lily in his left hand. One has preposterous memories of Oscar Wilde walking down a London street with a lily in his hand; and there is a minor sense in which there may be some connection. If Koppernigk was not an aesthete in the nineteenth-century sense, I believe, nevertheless, that the key to an understanding of his work is that it was aesthetic.

However this may be, his uncle recognized his intelligence and sent him off to be educated; and henceforth his name was no longer Polish/German Koppernigk but Latin Copernicus, as befitted a man who had joined the supremely supranationalistic organization of the Catholic Church. He studied mathematics first. Then, at the age of twenty-three, he went for further study to Bologna, where he was deflected toward astronomy by the lectures of one Domenico da Novara. This was not necessarily a profound study, since a certain acquaintance with the crystal spheres (still endlessly revolving) was a part of every young man’s education. He studied medicine too, and canon law. It was a time when the sum of knowledge was not too wide for one intellect and one memory. Did not Faust take all the doctorates and apply to the devil for more knowledge when he had learned all that anyone else could teach him? But Copernicus was no Faust. Two doctorates were enough, though he was to change the world far more than Faust did. Copernicus was austere, controlled and reliable. When he went back to Poland, it was to an appointment as personal physician to his uncle.

That is the visible total of what happened to Copernicus in Italy; but there is something more hinted at, and when we know what that is, we may fancy that we can find traces of it written in his face. The Renaissance had brought to Italy all the precious wisdom of the ancient world. Men were prepared to ask questions again, perhaps even to try all things and hold fast to that which is good. Copernicus met Neoplatonists in Italy, and Neopythagoreans — men ready for the adventures of philosophical speculation with no holds barred. These men knew — for they were responsible teachers — that it was a dangerous business, not necessarily for the philosopher himself but for those little ones who might be taught; that the new ideas must go no farther than the few people qualified both to understand them and to bear their implications.

In this almost secret society, there were some who held that the sun stands still and that the earth moves around it. Today, we can find no intellectual heresy which is the equivalent of that. It would have to be a possibility known only to a handful of scientists, yet so radical and devastating that, if it got known publicly, it would overthrow society altogether. This sounds like science fiction; but it was the exact position in Europe at the end of the fifteenth century. We have no clear account of what happened in Copernicus’ mind in those critical years; but it seems likely that, when he left Italy for home, he believed the sun was at the center of our system.

Here we come to the crux: why did Copernicus believe this? He had no proof and he had not worked out a mathematical cosmology. He was well enough acquainted with Ptolemy — or with the corrupt Latin translation of the corrupt Arabic translation of the original Greek — but he had achieved no original work. Does the key lie in the lily, a sign to initiates, perhaps, that here was a member of their society? Does it lie in the sensitive, thoughtful face? For it is the face of a poet. In Pythagoras, religion, mathematics and poetry meet. Is that not what the lily means? There was a supreme and dangerous knowledge, and initiates felt toward it as a poet feels — by intuition. Copernicus had that intuition, but he was a mathematician; the rest of his life had to be devoted to proving what he already believed.

The proof lay in the planets. So important is the idea, that we must stay with it for a while. Draw three concentric circles, and let the common center of them be the sun. The inner circle is the orbit of the earth, the next one that of another planet, and the outer one the circle of the stars. Let the earth move more rapidly than the planet. Then, by drawing lines to join various positions of the earth and the planet and extending the lines until they cut the circle of the stars, you can see how the planet will appear to move among them; and sure enough, you find that the planet appears to wander with a movement similar to the one you can observe in the sky. Copernicus committed himself to equating the results of observation to this hypothesis, because the hypothesis was an aesthetic one; a scheme not known nor proved but felt to be true.

Somehow, in the world of the Church and scholarship, news of his purpose, and of his plausible diagrams, got around. In that closed community, he became famous long before he published anything. He would not publish for many reasons. In the first place, he was a faithful child of the Church; before he published, she would have to approve. Secondly, for all his intuition, proof was a long time coming. Thirdly, he still believed the circle to be the perfect movement; and no matter how he rearranged the solar system with the sun at the center, still the old system of circles and circles on circles did not allow exact prediction. Worst of all, perhaps, the astronomical tables he had to use were inaccurate. Year after year, then, he fumbled with a heliocentric system and all the old spheres, trying to get them to work. We have seen how he refused to reorganize the calendar. It may be that he would have none of a system which he believed to be false, and knew himself still unable to prove the reality of his own.

Nevertheless, interest in his work was growing and spreading. He compiled a series of notes and sent them in manuscript to his friends. They were not technical notes precisely, but they showed the way his mind was moving. One copy reached Pope Clement VII; and in 1536, Nicolas Schonberg, Cardinal of Capua, wrote to him, formally ordering him to complete and publish his work.

Now it is worth remembering that all this took place in Latin, the international means of communication, which was also a kind of safety net spread between layfolk and dangerous ideas. Ideas could be caged in Latin, and as long as they never got out, none but the learned would know about them. Nor can Pope Clement or Cardinal Schonberg have worked out the implications of the new ideas; but even if they had, they would have felt secure behind Latin, and in the knowledge that to the end of time, men would have to scan the heavens with the naked eye. No one at that time could have foreseen what the world would be if the plowman as well as the priest were to find his earth moving faster than a cannon ball through empty space. It is perhaps for this reason that Copernicus worked so slowly and seemed so indifferent to fame. His proof could never be more than an abstruse mathematical, argument, and his fame limited to those qualified to understand it.

His limited fame attracted pupils. There was Andreas Osiander, who was to contribute a brief foreword to his master’s book. There was Erasmus Reinhold, a great compiler of  astronomical tables. Most important of all there was Georg Joachim Rhaeticus, a man devoted to Copernicus personally and a famous trigonometrician in his own right. These three were young, and they urged the older man forward. It is a gleam of light in that dark age, that Rhaeticus, who was an Austrian and a Protestant, worked as pupil and friend for years with Copernicus, who was a Pole and a Catholic. The young man gave the older one his love, his enthusiasm and his energy, and at last the book was ready. It is a key book in Western thought; and by the time it was completed, Copernicus was a dying man.

The book — Concerning the Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies — contains two elements which it is necessary to understand. One, of course, was a detailed mathematical examination of his own system and an attempt to square it with the results of observation. This was beyond the comprehension of all but a few dozen mathematicians of his time. The system did not make prediction easier; it simply happened to be nearer the truth, and if you were attuned to the aesthetic of mathematics, you might feel that. But in the other part of his book, Copernicus made a profound tactical mistake. He tried to ignore mathematics altogether and to find some ground on which uninstructed common sense might operate. In a word, he tried to meet the arguments that might be brought against him by an appeal to common sense. In so doing, he only made it easier for the average non-astronomical, non-mathematical reader to counter him at every point. For in the days of naked-eye observation, the Ptolemaic universe was the common-sense one.

Here is an example: ‘It is the vault of heaven that contains all things, and why should motion not be attributed rather to the contained than the container, to the located than the locator? The latter view was certainly that of Heraclides and Ecphantus the Pythagorean, and Hicetas of Syracuse according to Cicero.’

This gave infinite scope to those who would play at quotations. In short, his attempt to appeal to common sense was an abject failure, because no man who could not feel the aesthetic of mathematics in his bones could possibly avoid the conclusion that Copernicus was a theorist with straw in his hair.

So when the book came out, in 1543, it gathered to itself a series of uninformed criticisms which are difficult to parallel because, in a way, the event was unparalleled.

Thus a political thinker of the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin, said: ‘No one in his senses, or imbued with the slightest knowledge of physics, will ever think that the earth, heavy and unwieldy from its own weight and mass, staggers up and down around its own center and that of the sun; for at the slightest jar of the earth, we would see cities and fortresses, towns and mountains, thrown down.’

Now this is very sensible, granted the kind of universe Bodin, and indeed Copernicus, inhabited. All Bodin needed was a lifetime’s study of mathematics.

Martin Luther, who was used to laying down the law, dealt with Copernicus summarily in terms of Holy Writ: ‘This fool wishes to reverse the entire science of astronomy; but sacred Scripture tells us that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still and not the earth.’

That is a clincher. The mind reels to think of the laborious history of other discoveries and other reassessments one would have to unravel for Martin Luther before he could have been brought to doubt the evidence of Holy Writ and his own senses.

Copernicus got nowhere once he stepped outside the world of mathematical demonstration. Only six years after Copernicus died, Melanchthon summed up the average man’s reaction: ‘Now it is a want of honesty and decency to assert such notions publicly, and the example is pernicious. It is part of a good mind to accept the truth as revealed by God and to acquiesce in it.’

The truth was that man’s universe was about to turn inside out and explode. No man could introduce such an idea and be believed. Copernicus, in his appeal to common sense — it was really an appeal to intuition — had attempted the impossible.

The history of his idea is revealing. Again it was a matter of teamwork. His system never worked exactly. Tycho Brahe who came after him was an anti-Copernican, but he knew the value of accurate observations and spent his life compiling them. Then he produced a cosmology of his own, with the earth still at the center. Kepler, his successor, returned to the ideas of Copernicus, and at last, with Brahe’s accurate observations, made them work. He got rid of the last hangover from the ancient system, the idea that movement in a circle is perfect and therefore the one movement admissible in the heavens. He went from the circle to the ellipse, and in his work we find a model of the solar system which, with minor alterations has been accepted ever since.

What was Copernicus, then? In him, the ancient and the modern meet. He inherited the work of three thousand years, and he pointed the way toward Newton and Einstein. He was, as it were, a man who lived beside a great river and built the first bridge across it.

One’s mind goes back to the massive Latin book. It was forced out of him; he had no desire to publish it. His work was done in the study, in a private wrestling with problems he never thought would see the light of a larger day. It was not till the seventeenth century — when the unbelievable happened, and any man could train a telescope on the heavens and see spread before him the evidence which proved Copernicus right — that his own Church forbade his theories to be taught.

One remembers the lily. Was it not after all Pythagorean? Was it not a symbol that truth is beauty, knowledge and God? For knowledge displays no dichotomy at last, but is one. The intuition of Copernicus was the intuition common to all great poets and all great scientists; the need to simplify and deepen, until what seems diverse is seen to lie in the hollow of one hand.

They brought Copernicus his book on his deathbed. He never read it, and so he never knew that his pupil, Osiander, had prefaced it with words of his own, explaining that these considerations were theories only and not meant to overthrow the real universe established by God. Not that Copernicus would have minded much; and as he drifted away, it may well have been a sentence from his own writings that stayed with him, a sentence drawing all his work together:

‘In the middle of all sits the Sun, enthroned. In this most beautiful temple, could we place this luminary in any better position from which he can illuminate the whole at once? He is rightly called the Lamp, the Mind, the Ruler of the Universe. Hermes Trismegistus names him the Visible God, Sophocles’ Electra calls him the All-seeing. So the Sun sits as on a royal throne ruling his children, the planets which circle round him.’