Chapter 10
Chilivani
July 3, 1943
Staging an individual bombing mission during the war was a complex venture; a coordinated attack involving several bomber and fighter groups was immensely more so, from target selection right through to preparation of the aircraft, pilot briefing, coordinated takeoffs and rendezvous, and the mission itself. With careful planning, and with well-trained and professional ground staff and pilots, the missions came off with a very high rate of success.
But as seen in previous chapters, complex operations like bombing raids could go wrong in many different ways. Weather, including ground haze, was a bigger factor than most contemporaries realize. And communications were, by today’s standards, primitive. Radar was not widely available, and the multi-engine aircraft—both bombers and fighters—had hundreds of electrical, hydraulic, and mechanical systems that could go wrong. And then there was always the human element.
Beyond the explicable factors that could complicate or even threaten a mission, there were the unfathomable events that were impossible to anticipate.
Following the extensive NASAF missions on June 30, NAAF’s bomb groups had a rare three-day hiatus until their next missions to the German aerodromes on Sicily and Sardinia. Three days with no missions gave the bomb and fighter groups time to repair damaged aircraft, stockpile munitions, and rest the flight crews for the intense mission schedule that lay ahead—a campaign that all personnel knew was coming, and for which there were strong intimations about the likely location of the Allied landings.
The Allied air forces continued to move men and equipment to advanced bases. Troop-carrier squadrons, flying the workhorse C-47, would be tasked with delivering airborne troops to their drop zones on the island, and having them positioned forward reduced the flight time to the drop points. Dive-bombing units, flying A-36 Apaches, also moved forward, giving these tactical bombers shorter flights to the likely beachheads and more residence time over the battle line. Reconnaissance aircraft also moved to bases closer to Sicily.
The North African Air Force was well positioned, fully provisioned, and poised for the major air operations that would come soon.
The missions scheduled for this date reflected the evolving NASAF bombing strategy of concentrated attacks on a single target or region. On June 28, NASAF had sent multiple missions to airfields in Sardinia. On June 30, five bombing missions had hit the airfields in northwestern Sicily. Later in July, the target would shift to Gerbini. On this day, it was back to Sardinia.
The intent of these attacks was threefold: Axis air forces based in Sardinia could potentially support the German defense of Sicily during the British-American invasion and could contest the hard-won air superiority over Sicily. Catching German fighters on the ground, or forcing them to come up to fight, would lessen the impact they might have on D-Day. And further destruction of ground facilities would reduce the effectiveness of the German air operations, a benefit that could possibly accrue during action after Sicily. And finally, a multi-target mission to Sardinia would keep German HQ uncertain about the location of the coming inevitable invasion: Would it be Sicily? Possibly Sardinia? Mainland Italy? Or even Greece? The uncertainty required Germany to continue to maintain defensive forces in many widely spaced locations, reducing the capabilities of each of these defensive forces.
On another “Big Day,” twenty-two missions would be flown by the nine bomb groups and four fighter groups within NASAF.
The attacks began the night before, when night-bombing Wellingtons attacked the port facility at Olbia on Sardinia, as well as the German base at Trapani—a base located on Sicily but near enough to Sardinia to provide fighter interception. Today’s mission for the NASAF’s B-17s, B-25s, and B-26s targeted five separate airfields on Sardinia; light bombers from NATAF would hit the area around Marsala and the airfields at Sciacca and Trapani; and B-25s from the 9th Air Force would target the airfield at Comiso.
The Axis forces ringed Sardinia with highly effective radar and radio direction finder (RDF) systems as part of their air defenses for the important aerodromes at Chilivani and Millis, and the ports at Cagliari and Olbia. As noted in a contemporaneous German report: “Most penetrations [of Sardinian airspace by the Allied air forces] were detected in good time by the ‘Pula’ station on the southern coast of the island.”1 An effective strike against the installations at Pula and Alghero would increase the chances of catching German and Italian aircraft on the ground when NASAF’s bombers made their attacks later in the day, and so the bombing missions were preceded by fighter strikes against the radar stations at Pula and Alghero.
German radar installations on Sardinia.
National Archives
In the first antiradar sweep, the 1st FG sent just six P-38s to strafe the radar station at Alghero, southeast of Chilivani aerodrome. Taking off at 0920, the mission was relatively uneventful but successful. It encountered no enemy aircraft, and minimal flak. The 1st repeated this same fighter sweep later in the day, with seven P-38s again strafing the radar station at Alghero.
A much larger formation of twenty-two P-40s from the 325th FG took off at 0955 to attack the radar and RDF stations at Pula on the southern point of the island. The strafing attack successfully destroyed two radar towers, two homing towers, an RDF station, and defensive gun emplacements, but lost one of their pilots in a midair collision with one of his fellow pilots.2
NASAF assigned the B-17 and B-25 groups to attack the airfields at Chilivani, Monserrato, and Alghero. The B-26s were set to hit the Sardinian airfields at Millis and Capoterra.
As the fighters from the 1st and 325th Fighter Groups were taking off for their antiradar sweeps, other units from widely dispersed airfields in Tunisia and Algeria began to take off and form up, bombers and fighters rendezvousing before making the turn to the island of Sardinia.
At 0915 the 17th Bomb Group sent thirty-two B-26s to attack Millis Aerodrome, with an escort of thirty-six P-38s from the 1st FG.
An hour later, the 319th BG sent a formation of twenty-four B-26s to bomb Capoterra, with an escort of twenty-four P-40s from the 325th FG. At about the same time, the 321st BG sent thirty-six B-25s to bomb Alghero, with an escort of forty-two P-38s from the 82nd FG.
At 1040, thirty-six B-25s from the 310th BG took off on a bombing mission to Millis, with thirty-six P-38s from the 82nd FG escorting.
Medium bomber attacks concluded when twenty-five B-26s from the 320th BG took off on a second mission to Capoterra, with cover provided by thirteen P-38s from the 1st FG, and twenty-four P-40s from the 325th FG.
All of the heavy bomb groups, flying B-17 Flying Fortresses, were assigned targets on Sardinia.
The 2nd and 301st Bomb Groups, flying in a combined mission, and escorted by twenty-three P-38s from the 48th and 49th Fighter Squadrons, targeted the aerodrome at Chilivani. The 97th and 99th Bomb Groups, also flying in a combined mission, targeted the aerodrome at Monserrato, located near Cagliari, with an escort consisting of P-38s from the 37th, 48th, and 49th Fighter Squadrons.3
In the first mission of the day for the 49th Fighter Squadron, the twelve escorting P-38s assigned to cover the mission to Chilivani took off at 1140. The approach to Chilivani was uneventful. The defensive flak over the target was slight, and inaccurate. And it appeared that the early strikes against the radar installations on the island were very effective. On reaching Chilivani, the bombers reported catching thirty-nine enemy aircraft on the ground, a perfect scenario for the carpet-bombing techniques of the two formations of heavy bombers. Perfect except for one new twist that had been added to the mission: On this mission a new bombardment system was being tested by the bomb groups. They planned to overfly the target in waves, with the lead plane of each wave using the C-1 automatic pilot mechanism.
Under normal circumstances, the bombardier would instruct the pilot verbally over the intercom or send instructions via an instrument on the pilot’s instrument panel, with the pilot controlling the attitude, speed, and direction of the bomber. The bombardier would make his drop when the pilot had correctly positioned the aircraft, per the bombardier’s instructions. In order to operate under the autopilot, the bombsight is mated to the autopilot, giving the bombardier direct control over the aircraft during the final minutes of the bomb run. Once the lead ship had made its drop, the other aircraft in the formation would make theirs in synchrony.
On this day’s mission, in the final minutes of the approach to target, the autopilot failed on the lead ship. The bomber’s pilots had to respond quickly, taking back control of the aircraft and attempting to bring the formation into position for the drop. They were only partially successful. Roughly half of the 2nd’s bombs fell on the target, with only a few of the enemy aircraft parked there “possibly damaged.” The bombers of the 301st fared little better, their bombs falling to the north and west dispersal areas of the enemy aerodrome.
Exiting the target area, the bomber formation was intercepted by five Me 109s. Captain Leikness’s four-ship flight engaged the German aircraft, with Leikness shooting down one, and Lieutenant Harper getting a “probable.” The fighters returned safely to base at 1530.
Gremlins were also at work on the second Fortress mission of the day. The combined formation of B-17s from the 97th and 99th Bomb Groups with their escorting P-38s made their approach to the aerodrome at Monserrato at 25,000 feet. Lieutenant Kocour was included in this mission, again flying as Lieutenant Bland’s wingman. Due to heavy haze and poor visibility, the bombers were not able to identify the target and did not drop their munitions. All bombers returned to their bases still carrying their bomb loads, with the exception of two bombers who jettisoned their bombs earlier. The escorting P-38s returned to base, still carrying their extra belly tanks. This mission counted as a combat sortie for the pilots, but the squadron reported the results as “Nil.”
On their return, the P-38s of the 14th FG landed at their new airfield—El Bathan—their squadron having begun the move the night before the mission.
Quickening Pace of Pre-Invasion Missions
The pilots had a number of clues that the invasion of Sicily was at hand. The movement to forward bases, the rushed maintenance on all aircraft to ensure their readiness, the stockpiling of bombs and ammunition—all pointed to an action coming soon. And, confirming that secrecy was very difficult to maintain given the enormous buildup, pilots began to talk about the enormous amount of Allied shipping seen at Bizerte Harbor, just south of the coast of Sicily.
With the invasion obviously close at hand, and with the GAF no longer very much in evidence, the pilots of the 49th Fighter Squadron may have wondered what sort of missions they would be flying in the coming days. More strategic bombing escort duty? If so, to what targets? And they may also have wondered to what extent they would be assigned tactical missions. At this time and place in the war, they might be excused if they did not see a distinction between the two.
Strategic or Tactical?
“Strategic engagement”—actions taken to systematically degrade the capacity of a combatant to wage war—had little meaning until the development of national air forces. Militaries had plenty of munitions, but lacked the means of delivering them accurately to targets deep within the opponent’s territory.
The development of increasingly capable aircraft changed all that, and quickly. Within a few short years of the beginning of powered aviation, aircraft were already being used for military applications. While primarily tasked with tactical support of ground troops, and for observation, aircraft were soon adapted to carry bombs. And it soon became clear that bombers could be used in a strategic sense, more or less independent of ground operations.4
Germany undertook a program of strategic bombing in the early months of World War I, commencing with an attack on August 6, 1914, by a German zeppelin on the city of Liege in Belgium. England’s first foray into strategic bombing came in the fall of 1914, targeting the German zeppelin bases in Cologne and Dusseldorf. Within the first month of the war, Germany had formed a special air unit to conduct bombing missions over London, and in early 1915 launched the first extended campaigns of strategic bombing.
Strategic bombing in World War I had no significant impact; the most extensive bombing conducted by the Germans against Britain amounted to no more than 300 tons of munitions dropped. Despite this, the important foundation for strategic bombing had been laid, leading military planners on both sides to understand its potential importance in any future conflict.5
The initial intent of strategic bombing, and in particular, the bombing of cities, was to create terror among the citizenry of the opposing country and to destroy the enemy’s morale. It was soon evident that the use of strategic bombing had a second and potentially more direct effect on the conduct of the war: The targets of strategic airpower came to include the sources of the enemy’s war-making potential—important industries, power plants, oil facilities, and communication centers, such as ports and rail yards—hence developing the parallel intentions of strategic bombing: to degrade a country’s ability to conduct war, and to simultaneously degrade its willingness to conduct war.
In the Mediterranean Theater, a disconnect developed between the doctrine of strategic bombing and the practicalities of military operations in the theater. In Europe, thousands of significant strategic targets fell within the range of Allied bombers. These conditions did not exist in the MTO, where there were relatively few suitable strategic targets. For operational purposes, the Mediterranean Theater was one enormous tactical area. The highest-priority targets identified by air force mission planners—railroad marshalling centers and ports—were arguably strategic, but the primary purpose of bombing missions to these targets was to interrupt the flow of men and materiel to the battlefront—clearly a tactical objective.
As early as January, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a memorandum setting forth bombardment objectives for North Africa. First priority was assigned to “furtherance of operations for the eviction of Axis forces from Africa”; that is, tactical missions in support of ground forces.6
By early 1943, a looser definition of “strategic” had evolved, with AAF planners assigning bomber forces to targets that had little to do with Germany’s war-making capacity and more to do with near-term threats to the army’s ground forces. The mission of the air forces medium and heavy bombers, at least as applied to the Mediterranean Theater, was quickly morphing into something that was arguably neither strategic nor tactical in nature.
A major retrospective prepared by the Office of Air Force History after the war notes:
The organization of the North African Air Forces bespoke a distinction between tactical and strategic operations which in the broader context of the war may prove misleading, however useful it may have been for the Mediterranean theater in 1943. . . . [T]he function of NAAF was almost exclusively tactical in nature; in other words, that its mission was one of cooperation in land and amphibious operations. That cooperation might be direct or indirect; it might be delivered by the relatively short-range planes of Tactical Air Force, or, as in strikes against enemy transportation in Italy, by the longer-range aircraft of Strategic Air Force. But in any case, its purpose was to further the advance of our land and sea forces in accordance with plans for the occupation of specific geographical areas, and thus it differed basically from efforts to strike directly at the enemy’s capacity to wage war.7
During the run-up to Operation Husky, the vast majority of targets selected for NASAF and for the 9th Air Force operating from Egypt were directed at the Axis transportation and air force assets. These targets were selected because their continued operation directly and immediately threatened ground and naval operations in the theater. In that sense, they were operating in a manner that was decidedly more tactical than strategic.
During the period of May–August 1943, the 14th Fighter Group escorted NASAF bombers and conducted their own dive-bombing and strafing missions against the following target mix:8
|
Target |
Percentage of Missions |
|
GAF Aerodromes |
36 |
|
Pantelleria Island |
24 |
|
Antishipping |
11 |
|
Ports and Naval Infrastructure |
11 |
|
Targets of Opportunity |
10 |
|
Bridges, Railroads, Tunnels, Dams |
3 |
|
Search and Rescue |
3 |
|
Factories, Dams |
2 |
The clear focus of these missions was on tactical targets, and of all the missions flown by the 14th during this period, only 5 percent could be considered anything other than tactical. The weight of the air force was brought against targets that could threaten Allied ground forces during the invasion of Sicily.
The targeting of GAF aerodromes was meant to establish Allied air superiority over the battlefront. The reduction of Pantelleria Island was meant to remove the possible threat of German air and naval actions against Allied shipping in the Mediterranean, and most specifically, to the Sicilian invasion force. Targeting shipping and ports was meant to interrupt the supply of munitions and materiel to the Axis forces, and the targeting of bridges, railroads, and tunnels was required in order to hamper the movement of troops and materiel on Sicily prior to and during the invasion. It is also noteworthy that the attacks on these tactical targets were undertaken with close cooperation between NASAF and NATAF. Like the previous joint operations at Kasserine Pass, it was evident that the functional distinction between NATAF and NASAF did not preclude them from conducting effective combined operations.
American air forces bombing in the Mediterranean during this period was strategic in name only, and since strategic forces were being applied in a tactical sense, it is useful to consider the doctrine that governed the Allied tactical air forces at this time in the war. This doctrine, and the associated policies and strategies that would govern the use of the vastly expanded Allied air forces at this time in the war, were anything but clear.
Because of the necessary interplay of these three factors, their shifting nature, and the changes in the world environment in which the air forces operated, American army planners had great difficulty in developing concrete plans. Having been the focus of discussions for nearly twenty years, the development of a sound set of principles governing the use of the air forces continued to be an intractable problem. Even into the early war years, as American airplanes and airmen headed for Europe and North Africa, operating doctrine was still unspecified, even though its critical importance was widely recognized. And at the heart of the uncertain debate were two interrelated missions: tactical and strategic air operations.
In the 1920s and early ’30s, the primary debate went like this: Ground commanders viewed air forces as extensions of artillery and considered their primary purpose to be direct support of ground operations; air commanders concurred that the air assets could fulfill an important role in ground support, but also had a critical strategic mission that should be independent of ground support. Additionally, while the two groups agreed that adequate ground support was a key function of the air forces, there was no agreement as to who should have ultimate control over the air assets that fulfilled that role. Ground commanders believed that the unit on the ground should dictate missions, while air commanders felt equally strongly that the assets should be controlled by the U.S. Army Air Corps.
Aviation commanders also wrestled with defining strategic targets. In the 1920s, these targets were largely military in nature. By the mid-1930s, the target list had expanded to include surface vessels, submarines, and power plants. And by the early 1940s, the list had further expanded to include oil and electric power industries. The debate continued for decades, with field manuals issued irregularly that attempted to codify the accepted policies, strategies, and doctrines.
In 1935 the army issued FM 31-35, “Employment of the Air Forces of the Army,” which remained in effect when the European war erupted in 1939. That manual defined the general mission of airpower as comprising “the air operations required for carrying out the Army mission.” Although the document recognized the separate tactical and strategic missions for airpower, it treated much more carefully air activities “in immediate support of the ground forces.” At least for a time, ground commanders had won the debate. The field manual noted: “When war broke out, strategic bombing as a highly significant aspect of airpower had barely achieved recognition in official doctrine, and no realistic body of principles governing the use of this weapon had yet been worked out.”9
The AAF doctrine was put to the test during the invasion of North Africa, and in the early days of the Tunisian Campaign that followed. The heavy combat losses incurred over the winter of 1942–1943 demonstrated clearly that FM 31-35 had gotten it wrong.10
The glaring unsuitability of the American doctrine was especially evident when compared to the brilliant successes of the British air forces in the eastern desert during the same period. There, the air arm operated independently from, but in close cooperation with, the British Eighth Army ground forces. RAF air marshal Sir Arthur Coningham had developed and perfected three important principles: establishing air superiority as first priority, centralizing the command of air operations and making it co-equal with that of ground operations, and employing innovative tactics when supporting ground operations.
Questions related to tactical use of the air forces were complicated further in the reorganization that led to NAAF and NATAF, because the resulting amalgam included both British and American air units. Eisenhower’s preferences were soon made clear when he named General Coningham as commander of the tactical forces—NATAF. Issues that related to the American doctrine contained in FM 31-35 were essentially, and practically, swept aside. The new operating principles were laid out in a pamphlet, authored by Coningham but issued by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, stating in part:
The greatest asset of airpower is its flexibility. . . . So long as this is realized, then the whole weight of the available airpower can be used in selected areas in turn. This concentrated use of the air striking force is a battle-winning factor of the first importance. It follows that control of the available airpower must be centralized and command must be exercised through Air Force channels.
Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources into small packets placed under command of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces.11
In a presentation to Eisenhower and other Allied senior officers on February 16, 1943, the day before he took command of the tactical air operation, Air Vice Marshal Coningham commented: “The Army has one battle to fight—the land battle. The Air [Force] has two. It has first of all to beat the enemy air, so that it may go into the land battle against the enemy land forces with the maximum possible hitting power.” He declared: “An air force on the offense automatically protect[s] the ground forces.”12
Two days later, wasting no time in implementing the same principles that had been so effective for the RAF and the British Eighth Army, he issued a general operational directive prioritizing the objectives for NATAF: attaining air superiority, air interdiction of enemy assets behind the battle line, and air support of ground troops.13
Attaining Air Superiority
By the late spring of 1943, NAAF was beginning to make significant progress in achieving superiority in the air. German and Italian aircraft were destroyed in the air when they attempted to intercept Allied bombing missions, and they were caught on the ground by medium and heavy bombers, and in dive-bombing missions by fighter aircraft. Of equal importance, the Axis aerodromes were targeted massively and repeatedly in order to deprive the Axis of its support facilities. The enemy was forced to transfer their planes from the Mediterranean islands, and from the Italian mainland, to remoter locations from which they could not so readily interfere with Allied ground efforts.14
This target selection was not undertaken piecemeal; actual target selection for missions prior to and during Operation Husky had been completed by the Intelligence Section of the 12th Air Force in February of 1943. The top ten targets on the S-2’s First Priority List were aerodromes (seven), rail centers (one), and ports (two). Overall, aerodromes accounted for 61 percent of the First Priority targets. The first-, second-, and third-priority targets included forty-six individual aerodromes or landing ground, which were reflected repeatedly in the missions assigned to the 14th Fighter Group.15
As will be seen, the objective of attaining air superiority was largely met by the end of June 1943, although even as late as D-Day on the day of the invasion of Sicily, the GAF was able to launch over one hundred sorties against invading ground forces.
Interdiction
Interdiction missions are air attacks that destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s assets before they can be used in battle. Coningham recognized early on in the eastern desert that effective interdiction can have a profound effect on ground operations. Friendly ground forces advance much more quickly if the enemy is denied food, ammunition, or reinforcements.
Air interdiction missions, sometimes referred to as “deep air support,” do not directly support ground operations and do not require close communication or coordination with ground units. Interdiction missions typically attack ground targets that are not in close proximity to friendly ground forces, and may be performed hundreds of miles from the battlefront. The early AAF missions against Sicilian ports would certainly qualify as interdiction, since they were intended to impede the flow of troops and materiel from mainland Italy to Sicily prior to the Allied invasion.
Further, the intense bombing campaign against German and Italian airfields in the days prior to the invasion was clearly interdiction. At that time, the battle line had not yet been established, but the destruction of these airfields was intended to reduce the capacity of Axis forces, so as to prevent air attacks during the invasion. U.S. Air Force historians later noted: “[T]he function of airpower . . . was to interfere constantly with Axis supply lines—to isolate the theater of war. The great contribution of the strategic air force in Africa was its vigorous participation in this campaign to deny supplies and reinforcements to the enemy. The only real distinction made between tactical targets and the targets assigned to strategic bombers was one of range.”16
On D-Day of Operation Husky, air interdiction would “isolate the battlefield” with direct attacks on enemy units and ancillary targets, like railroad lines, bridges, truck convoys, and roads. Bombers could be used for interdiction strikes, because they could operate from altitude. In more purely tactical operations—that is, in providing close air support to ground troops—their slower speed, larger silhouettes, and less-responsive flight characteristics made them ready targets for ground gunners and enemy aircraft.
Close Air Support
Close air support missions—air actions against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces—require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. And as was learned during Husky, integration with naval bombardment forces was also required. They are the most difficult to control and execute, and carry the greatest risk to the pilot.17
Combat results using light bombers in close air support missions were mixed. Even in the successful German offensives in 1939 and 1940, it became clear that the ground-support aircraft, the feared Stuka dive-bomber, was vulnerable to the higher speed and guns of fighters, and to general ground fire. And the first American encounters with German forces in North Africa revealed the flaws in low-level bombardment tactics against the highly effective German light antiaircraft artillery. Despite these realities, providing close air support was essential to the combined air-ground effort.
Missions very close to the battle line were particularly challenging for the pilots, because they increased the risk of Allied losses by friendly fire—a true nightmare for AAF pilots. An effective control system had been developed by the British in the deserts of North Africa, and was later used in Europe. The Americans developed their own system for command and control of close air support aircraft used during Husky—a system that was ineffective in the early days of the invasion. Military historian B. Michael Bechthold notes: “Most support seems to have been directed at predetermined targets at a reasonable distance from the ground troops, and real ‘close air’ support for attacks was provided by the rather more precise creeping barrages from artillery developed in the Great War.”18
The distinctions between tactical and strategic evaporated in the week leading up to the invasion of Sicily, when NASAF was temporarily put under the administrative control of NATAF. The transfer of strategic forces to tactical control was later confirmed in FM 100-20: “When the action is vital and decisive, the strategic air force may be joined with the tactical air force and assigned tactical air force objectives. Although nowhere directly stated, the clear intention of the directive was that strategic aircraft, when participating in a tactical program, should pass under the control of the joint air-ground headquarters—that is, of the tactical air force.”19
The importance of the extreme versatility of the P-38 Lightning now became apparent: As the invasion of Sicily approached, NASAF fighter pilots flew bomber-escort missions to attack Axis aerodromes, interdiction missions against radar installations, ports, and rail centers, and during the invasion itself, missions that could only be described as close air support.