Chapter 11
The Gerbini Mission
July 5, 1943, was a day of heavy action for Allied forces in all theaters and in all branches of service.1 In the Pacific, navy planes and B-24s from the 13th Air Force bombed targets in the Solomon Islands; Marines prepared for an amphibious landing there; and B-25s of the American 5th Air Force hit targets in New Guinea. In the Mediterranean Theater, ground forces were making final preparations for the next assault against Germany, and much of the action fell to the air forces. Wellington night bombers attacked airfields on Sicily and Sardinia, and light and medium bombers hit the large aerodrome at Sciacca and the airfields at Trapani, Comiso, and Biscari. Bombers from the 9th AF, operating in the eastern Mediterranean, made strong attacks against the Messina, Sciacca, and Biscari airfields. Catania was also hit by heavy bombers from the RAF.
As for the fighters, the medium and heavy bombers of NASAF, the target was Gerbini.
About Gerbini
Sicily’s terrain provided limited areas for locating aerodromes. The island has been compared to a “jagged arrow-head with the broken point to the West.”2 Roughly laced with mountains reaching over 3,000 feet, and with only a narrow, low coastal belt, most of the airfields were clustered in three areas: the eastern group between Catania and Gerbini, the southeastern group at Comiso-Biscari-Ponte Olivo, and the western group in the vicinity of Castelvetrano. Of these, the best equipped was in the Catania-Gerbini area.3
Located 14 miles west of Catania, the main aerodrome at Gerbini was an all-weather field with paved runways and taxiways, plus associated hangars, administrative buildings, fuel and ammunition dumps, and personnel housing. The airfield complex encompassed a series of flat agricultural fields that were also used for runways and parking areas. These associated fields came to be referred to as numbered “landing grounds.” Initially numbering nine, these satellite fields were increased to twelve in the days leading to the invasion, with more and more German aircraft seeking relief from the relentless Allied bombing that was targeting aerodromes throughout the island.4
Gerbini main aerodrome, surrounded by level agricultural fields used as Luftwaffe landing grounds during the summer of 1943.
AIR FORCE HISTORICAL RESEARCH AGENCY
Because of the excellent reconnaissance capability within NASAF, air planners knew quite a lot about the facilities at Gerbini, including aircraft shelters and protective earthen revetments, hangars, barracks, fuel dumps, and other key support components.
The commander of Luftwaffe forces on Sicily had a modest opinion of the Gerbini complex: “The complex of airfields was an ideal target for the Fortresses (B-17s) with their carpet-bombing technique. Just now the whole plain around Gerbini was covered with aircraft. Not far from our landing strip were a fighter-bomber group equipped with Focke-Wulfs and one wing each from the 51st and 53rd Fighter Groups, all of them dispersed under sparse cover of the olive trees.”5
Earlier in the year, the AAF mission planners assigned a lower priority to the airfield complex at Gerbini. But Gruppos II and III of the JG 53 fighter “Ace of Spades” wing remained an effective force at Gerbini, as well as a still-robust fighter-bomber wing flying Fw 190s. And Gerbini had become the assembly point for German air assets relocating from other fields to avoid the Allied bombing campaign. Neutralizing Gerbini would reduce the incidence of air attacks by German defenders during the invasion of Sicily.
Allied planners were taking a longer view of Gerbini. Its main aerodrome was suitable for use by heavy bombers and was a short distance from the important port at Messina and other targets in the south of Italy. Securing this base early in the coming invasion would permit a deeper penetration of these bombers into Italy.
The GAF, though far from subdued, had been pushed around during the prior four weeks. While still able to mount effective defensive efforts, and never to be underestimated, the Luftwaffe heads knew they were up against it in the defense of Sicily. Gerbini had risen to the top of the Allied target list, and on this day, every bomber and fighter group in NASAF was assigned a mission there. And while Gerbini came late in the run-up to the invasion of Sicily, when the attacks commenced they were performed with an intensity that had only been matched previously by the campaign against Pantelleria.
In just seven days, July 5 through 12, thirty-six bomber missions were launched against Gerbini by NASAF, and more by medium bombers of the 9th AF. On this day, July 5, every bomber and fighter group within NASAF was assigned a mission there.
New Assignment
Unbeknownst to the pilots of the 14th Fighter Group, a brief but important reorganization of air forces was about to take place. It had long been agreed by Allied military planners that during the invasion of Sicily—Operation Husky—the North African Strategic Air Force (NASAF) would be temporarily assigned to the North African Tactical Air Force (NATAF).
In making this change, the planners were granting the authority to NATAF to develop specific tactical missions for execution by NASAF, including specific targets. On paper, NASAF would shift into a tactical mode. In reality, the missions that would be flown by NASAF during the invasion of Sicily differed significantly only for a four-day period, commencing with the invasion. With the invasion secured, the role of the 14th FG in particular shifted back to what might be considered more conventionally “strategic,” although it is now seen that the operations of the 14th during this period would more properly be described as “interdiction.”
During the month of May 1943, when the 14th first “restarted” operations, the missions flown were roughly one-third dive-bombing and strafing and two-thirds bomber escort. The same pattern of missions held true for the month of June.
In the ten days immediately preceding the invasion of Sicily, July 1 through 10, the mix of missions shifted appreciably. No dive-bombing missions were flown by the 49th squadron during this period; they were assigned exclusively to bomber-escort missions. And the converse was true during the four-day period after D-Day: The 49th flew only dive-bombing and strafing missions. Then from July 14 onward, the missions flown by the 49th reverted back to predominantly bomber escort.
The Missions
The 14th Fighter Group was assigned two escort missions on this day.
The first mission of the day was set for takeoff at 0915. Twenty-five P-38s would escort B-17s to the Gerbini complex, attacking specifically landing grounds #1, #4, and #5, located northwest of the main aerodrome. The 49th would contribute twelve aircraft and would be joined by thirteen P-38s from the 48th squadron.6 The mission was expecting heavy resistance from the Luftwaffe units at Gerbini. Just the day before on a bombing mission to Gerbini, the 319th Bomb Group had been met with fifty German and Italian interceptors. In the ensuing battle, sixteen enemy fighters had been shot down, but two B-26s were lost, one of which was piloted by the group commander.
In an effort to keep the Axis forces off guard, NASAF dispatched two squadrons of P-40s from the 325th Fighter Group on early-morning missions against the German radar installations at Marsala and two more squadrons to the Wurzburg radar station at Licata.
German Wurzburg radar site.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Lieutenants Bitter and Homer returned to base twenty minutes after takeoff with an apparent aircraft issue. Lieutenant Grant also returned at 1030, also probably due to an aircraft issue. Spares, Lieutenants Foster and Knott, filled in for this mission, and were joined by Lieutenant Baker from the 48th squadron to complete the twelve-ship formation.
Lieutenant Knepper was again flying number-two position to Lieutenant Bland, with his good friend Herman Kocour flying close behind in the number-four position. Half of the pilots making up this formation were new replacement pilots, with just a handful of combat missions between them.
On this mission, the route took the combined fighter/bomber formation over Lampedusa and Malta before it turned north to the Sicilian coastline. An unusually circuitous course, this route may have been dictated by the other bombing missions that were attacking Gerbini on this date; there simply may have been too many bombers in the queue to permit a direct flight from the rendezvous point to the target.
As the formation overflew the German airfield at Chiaramonte, it became apparent that the missions’ circuitous route, coupled with the additional maneuvering the P-38s were required to perform in order to remain with the lumbering B-17s, had led to a too-high fuel consumption for the fighter escorts. Just 40 miles south of their target, and with fourteen enemy aircraft in sight and preparing for an attack on the bomber formation, the escorting P-38s were forced to return to base.
The B-17s roared forward unescorted to the target at Gerbini and made their drop at 1125. In fact, the turnaround came too late for four of the P-38s. Lieutenants Bland, Knepper, Kocour, and Foster had to stop at the Allied base at El Djem to refuel, arriving back to their base at El Bathan at 1630. The turnaround over Chiaramonte was unavoidable—continuing on would have meant that all twenty-four of the escorting P-38s would have had to ditch in the Mediterranean on the way back to base. Still, it would be understandable if the pilots sharply regretted having to leave the bombers unprotected.
On this mission, Kocour earned his first air medal—five combat missions. The occasion probably went unnoticed by the young second lieutenant, and even if he had realized the milestone, he probably would have paid it little attention. With fifty combat missions needed to complete a combat tour, he had forty-five more to go before he could return home. Had he mentioned anything to the more experienced pilots, they would surely have hooted at him.
Close on the heels of the first attack, a formation of B-25 Mitchell medium bombers from the 321st Bomb Group, with P-38 escorts from the 82nd Fighter Group, was scheduled to attack landing ground #1 at Gerbini. But due to poor visibility and haze, #1 was overflown by one of the bomb squadrons, and bombs were dropped instead on the main Gerbini aerodrome.
The strange day continued for the 14th Fighter Group. In the second mission of the day, the 37th squadron escorted B-17s from the 2nd Bomb Group to attack Gerbini landing ground #6, 10 miles southeast of the main aerodrome. As the formation neared the target in a heavy haze, the P-38 escorts spotted a group of single-engine fighters approaching, seeming to parallel the bomber formation. The aircraft causing them such concern were in fact friendly Spitfires based at Malta that were also assigned as fighter escorts for the mission—a fact no one had mentioned during the 37th’s preflight briefing.
The Intelligence officer for the 37th, Capt. John McCarthy, would later note: “Several Spitfires approached bombers near Sicily in menacing fashion and P-38s dropped tanks and were just about ready to shoot when they recognized planes as Spits. Pilots claim Spits made them very uneasy, as groups of several Spit planes would be off to one side, and impossible to tell whether or not they were enemy aircraft. At times some of the Spits flew altogether too close to the formation and were lucky they were not shot.”7
Following standard practice, the P-38s had dropped their external fuel tanks in preparation for what they believed to be an imminent attack on the bomber formation by German Me 109s. Moments later they discovered that the single-engine aircraft were in fact friendlies. Too late, the P-38s had jettisoned their fuel supply, leaving them with scant fuel to continue as an effective escort for the mission. But the flyers’ luck held: “All in all, the resistance offered by the enemy was quite weak, as the fighters were scarce and the slight to moderate flak was only fairly accurate.”8
The mission continued, with the B-17s making their drop of 20-pound fragmentation bombs at 1435. The target was well covered, and fires were observed in the area for 40 miles. At the time the bombers made their drop, the 37th reported much smoke and several fires in the Gerbini satellite field areas—all remnants of bombing missions already completed by the Allies earlier in the day.
Other NASAF missions reported similarly light opposition by the Luftwaffe. The 1st Fighter Group, escorting B-26s on two separate missions to Gerbini, reported no enemy aircraft opposition on either mission.9
The Luftwaffe, with limited resources, were picking their fights carefully, and it was against one of these Gerbini missions that the Luftwaffe chose to make a stand. The 99th Bomb Group, flying B-17s and scheduled to make their drop just after the 49th’s first mission of the day, was confronted by an estimated one hundred enemy aircraft which made “persistent aggressive and determined attacks from all angles, singly and in groups, in a furious attempt to break up the bomber formation.”10 Returning the fire with devastating effect, the 99th successfully penetrated the enemy defenses and covered the target area completely, destroying twenty aircraft on the ground, plus hangars, fuel supplies, and ammunition dumps.
During the running air battle with enemy fighters, the gunners on the B-17s shot down thirty-eight fighters, with eleven more probables. In total, the bombers alone accounted for the destruction of seventy Axis aircraft on this single mission and rendered the Gerbini airfield unusable. For this effort, the group was awarded a rare Unit Citation by the North African Air Force (NAAF).11
From the GAF Side
Oberstlt. Steinhoff recorded the events of the day in his memoirs:12 Starting this day at Trapani, on the northwestern tip of Sicily, he took off at first light with twenty or so Me 109s from JG 77 to fly the 135 miles to Gerbini, joining JG 53 as part of the GAF’s efforts to shore up the eastern sector on the island. Temporarily combining assets from JG 53 and 77 would give Steinhoff a total force of some thirty-eight fighters. Shortly after his arrival at Gerbini, he was advised that the German airfield at Comiso, 50 miles to the south, had been attacked by NATAF’s medium bombers. Refueling immediately, his wing was ordered to “cockpit readiness,” awaiting the German direction finders’ report on any new approaching Allied aircraft.
Shortly thereafter: “Odysseus One, Comiso bombed—pantechnicons flying north, very high.13 Watch out for Spitfire escort.” The planes Steinhoff refers to were probably the B-17s from the 99th Bomber Group, mentioned above. B-17s were fearsome engines of war; their bombardment could utterly destroy an aerodrome and everything on it, and their armaments made it nearly impossible to shoot them down. All aircraft from the GAF headquarters squadron and both fighter wings scrambled to engage the approaching Allied bombing mission. The German interceptors were spotted by the bomber escorts, and the Spitfires immediately attacked. A wild melee soon developed, with the Allied fighters giving more than they received.
On this mission, while attacking the escorting Spitfires, Steinhoff was shot down, crash-landing just south of Mount Etna.14 But by 1400 he had been collected by his squadron and was back in the air, flying a small “Storch” recovery aircraft, headed back to the Gerbini complex. “We were probably about 30 miles from Gerbini. The plain with its fields of yellow stubble extended to the horizon. Conditions were hazy and the air shimmered in the heat.”15 His flying companion in the Storch shouted, “They’re attacking Gerbini!” Steinhoff had run into the 2nd Bomb Group and its escorts of P-38s from the 37th squadron, and Spitfires from Malta. The bombers made their drop on Gerbini at 1435.
Strike photograph taken June 13 during a bombing raid by B-24s of the 9th Air Force on the landing ground complex at Gerbini. Included here to illustrate the surroundings and bomb patterns, note the Axis aircraft in the lower right corner, taxiing into the fields to avoid bomb damage.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
Strike photograph taken June 9 during a bombing raid by 9th Air Force B-24s on the landing ground complex at Gerbini, included here to illustrate the smoke patterns arising from damage to GAF planes on the ground.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
The missions of this date were just the beginning—there was no lessening of the tremendous effort the North African Air Force expended against Axis airfields. On the next day, NASAF forces and bombers from the 9th Air Force hit Gerbini again, while NATAF bombers hit the airfields at Biscari, Sciacca, Trapani, and Comiso. NACAF continued sea patrols and convoy protection.
Four groups of B-17s, five groups of mediums of the North African Air Force, and five groups of B-24s of the 9th Air Force operated almost continuously—a seemingly endless stream of bombers and fighter escorts, largely unencumbered with Axis air force interceptors.
By D-Day, July 10, the main aerodrome at Gerbini had been rendered unserviceable, along with satellites 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12. Comiso and Bocca di Falco were also destroyed, and Castelvetrano was abandoned.
The effects of this Allied bombing blitz on the German air defenders were devastating. Col. T. Christ, chief of the German Air Staff, stated: “All the aerodromes, operational airfields, and landing grounds in Sicily were so destroyed in continuous attacks by massed forces that it was only possible to get this or that airfield in running order for a short time by mobilizing all available forces, including those of the German and Italian armies.” The German and Italian antiaircraft batteries shot down many aircraft, but they were unable to halt the massive air attacks.16
In his memoir, German general Adolf Galland reports: “Our pilots were exhausted to a terrifying degree. From North Africa and Malta the American and British air fleets took us in a pincer movement and the grip became tighter every day. The Luftwaffe was burning up in the southern theater of the war.”17