Chapter 13
Following the Gerbini raid on July 5, and for the next few days, the pilots of the 14th Fighter Group witnessed firsthand the result of the overwhelming air domination achieved by the Allies in the Mediterranean Theater. With German aerodromes continuing to be almost daily targets for NASAF medium and heavy bomber attacks, the 14th’s three squadrons were up often to provide bomber-escort protection. But these missions differed from many previous raids on German airfields in one important respect: Few enemy fighters were seen, and fewer still engaged. And on some missions, they were missing entirely.
Beginning on July 6, a huge formation of forty-four P-38s consisting of aircraft from all three of the 14th Fighter Group squadrons escorted 36 B-17s back to the Gerbini satellite fields. The 88mm flak was intense, but inaccurate. The 49th squadron, leading the combined formation, and including Lieutenant Kocour, saw just ten enemy aircraft, and they did not engage the bomber formation.
On July 8, another formation of forty-eight P-38s from all squadrons of the 14th escorted 48 B-25s of the 321st Bomb Group to the #6 landing field at Gerbini. Lieutenant Kocour was also assigned to this mission, which saw extensive flak from the time the squadron crossed the Sicilian coastline at Licata until the target was reached and the opposite coast was left behind. But no enemy aircraft.
Returning from the mission, B-25s from the 445th Bomb Squadron took a wrong turn and almost overflew Malta. That navigation error allowed pilot Col. Bailey Cook, to glimpse a portion of the invasion fleet that had been assembling near Tunisia:
We could see the largest collection of boats of all sizes I have ever imagined! Its size is almost unbelievable. . . . Boats line up and scattered around for as far as the eye could see. Just before we got to the Tunisian coast we passed right between two more convoys—big ones—in fact I don’t think I’ve ever seen a herd of cows with as many cows in it as that convoy had boats!1
In an early-morning mission on July 9, the 49th sent up twenty-four P-38s to escort twenty-six B-17s from the 2nd Bomb Group and an equal number from the 301st to the airfield at Biscari. Over the target, the air cover over this large bomber formation was supplemented by a contingent of thirty-six Malta-based Spitfires. Kocour and Knepper were both assigned to the mission, but Knepper’s aircraft apparently failed to start, and Kocour’s developed a mechanical problem, forcing an early return. On this mission, the 49th’s mission history reports: “Not a single E/A [enemy aircraft] was seen. The most unusual observation on this mission was the complete absence of flak, both from the target area and other adjacent areas from the shore inland.” This was a sign that not only had the GAF abandoned the field, but that they no longer considered it worthy of a defense.
A bombing mission begun shortly after this early mission involved B-17s attacking the airfield at Sciacca, under the watchful escort of the 37th and 48th squadrons. On this mission, German aircraft made an attempt at interception, and one was shot down. On a late-afternoon mission that same day, July 9, the 48th and 49th squadrons teamed up to escort B-25s to attack military barracks at Caltanissetta. The 40th’s mission history reports: “Not a single enemy aircraft was seen.” NASAF fighter pilots might well have considered the game fairly won, at least with respect to the enemy fighter opposition. The air plan that had been laid out by Army Air Forces HQ, in combination with an overwhelming numerical advantage, had worked.
On May 13, 1943, the very day that the last German surrendered in Tunisia, the Allied headquarters moved immediately into the final preparations for Operation Husky. By late May, a companion air plan had been finalized that dealt with the general policies to be followed in the application of airpower and with the specific missions of the various components of the NAAF. Issued as “NAAF Air Planning Memorandum No. 2,” and entitled “Procedures for Detailed Planning and Action Necessary to Mount Operation Husky,” the plan identified nine principal goals for the air forces, the first of which was “the destruction or neutralization of the enemy air forces within range of the operation”—i.e., maintain and expand air superiority.
The air plan identified four phases of operation for the Sicilian Campaign, with Phase I consisting of preparatory operations—“softening up.” During the period from mid-May to July 3, targets would be “the main German airdromes in Sicily, Sardinia, and southern Italy, together with submarine bases, communications lines, and industrial plants. Apart from the airdromes, the more important targets would be Naples, Messina, and Palermo.”2 In the latter part of the preliminary phase, from July 3 through 9, “Allied air forces were to step up their offensive against the enemy air force with the objective of rendering it impotent to offer serious opposition to the projected landings. German, rather than Italian-occupied, landing dromes were to be given primary attention.”
The North African Air Force, including all Strategic, Tactical, and Coastal Air Force assets, would carry the lion’s share of the responsibility for supporting air operations. It would provide close air support for the assault forces, launch the paratroop attacks, degrade enemy air forces within range of the invasion area, interdict Axis reinforcements behind the front lines, protect naval operations and the assault convoys, attack naval forces, and protect captured areas in Sicily against air attack.
In the months since the first landings in North Africa, and most particularly in the few weeks since the Germans had been forced from Tunisia, the Allied forces had assembled a tremendous air capability. As the combined invasion convoys steamed toward Sicily on the night of July 9–10, the Allied air forces numbered approximately 4,900 operational aircraft of all types, divided among 146 American and some 113 British squadrons. American air assets made up most of the bomber and air-transport aircraft, and about one-third of the fighter contingent. The RAF provided the majority of the single- and twin-engine fighters and coastal aircraft, and the entire night bomber force.3
The missions flown by NASAF in the final days leading up to Husky well reflect the targets identified by the air plan, and the paucity of enemy opposition attests to the effectiveness with which the plan had been carried out. NAAF gave instructions that all groups and squadrons were to be brought up to and maintained at full strength, that all equipment be overhauled and made serviceable, that new groups and squadrons were to be fully trained, and that sufficient stocks of bombs, small-arms ammunition, gasoline, etc., were to be established in the vicinity of the operations bases to cover the period from D minus 7 (July 3) to D plus 14 (July 24).
One squadron clerk noted in his July 2 mission report: “The planes have been getting special attention the past two days. The guns on all the planes have been tested. Everyone has the feeling that they will get quite a workout very soon.”4
Importantly, the army realized that the disembarkation of ground troops on D-Day could not be accomplished rapidly enough to ensure the security of the beachhead. In order to isolate the battlefield for the invading forces, it would be necessary to interdict the enemy’s movements from the interior toward the assault area. Because of the island’s terrain, enemy movements would be by road, largely from the Axis concentration area around Gela. That interdiction was in the eyes of North African Air Force (NAAF) planners, best accomplished by NASAF fighter-bombers. Accordingly, two groups of P-38s from NASAF—the 1st and the 14th—were transferred to reinforce two groups of A-36 light bombers of NATAF. The three P-38 groups were assigned to the eastern region of Sicily, and the A-36 groups were tasked with the western and central areas. Both were to launch combat missions every 30 minutes throughout the day beginning at first light, and were ordered to attack all enemy troop movements.
This heightened air activity did little to confirm to the Axis leadership that Sicily was next. By the end of June 1943, there was little consensus among German military authorities as to the most likely site of the next Allied attack. Greece was the option most favored by Hitler. And the Allies appeared to be showing interest in a landing at Sardinia. In a famous Allied deception—“Operation Mincemeat”—faked invasion documents were attached to a British corpse which was “discovered” after being intentionally placed ashore on a Spanish coast. This subterfuge led Hitler to order the diversion of German reinforcements to Sardinia and Corsica.
But the only target that made any sense given the preceding efforts in North Africa was Sicily. As Churchill allegedly remarked: “Anyone but a bloody fool would know it was Sicily.”
The Operation Husky Plan
Decided at the Casablanca conference late in January 1943 by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), the invasion of Sicily was designed to “intensify pressure on Italy, divert German forces from the Eastern Front, and cement the Allied hold on the Mediterranean.” General Eisenhower was designated supreme commander, and General Alexander, his deputy, was placed in command of ground operations.5
The final plan for the invasion of Sicily—Operation Husky—had been approved by the CCS in mid-May 1943 and was to be a combined land, sea, and air operation concentrating British and American troops on the southern and southeastern coastline. The plan called for eight simultaneous seaborne assaults to be made along approximately 100 miles of coastline. The British Eighth Army under the command of General Montgomery was to land on the southeastern coast. The American troops were divided into three assault forces, with landings planned for the Bay of Gela.6
Nearly a half-million American, British, and Canadian ground troops would be used in the offensive, and nobody expected an easy victory. Sicily, a mountainous, rugged country, offered every advantage to the defender, thought to number about 350,000 troops easily reinforced from Italy across the narrow Strait of Messina. The Allied invasion of Sicily was to be the greatest amphibious operation yet attempted, and was to remain the greatest in World War II in terms of initial assault. There were to be more than 3,200 vessels in the vast armada, of which 1,700 were required to carry American men and cargo. In the first week alone, the United States would need to land over 132,000 men, 25,000 vehicles, and over 500 tanks.7
Allied air planners adopted a very conservative approach, insisting that no question remain of air superiority on D-Day. “During the assault period the primary aim of the air forces was to insure that the enemy did not interfere with ground or naval operations from the air. Until mastery of the air was achieved, the bomber effort was to be concentrated for the achievement of this end.”8 Arguably, “mastery of the air” had been well secured by D-Day, and bomber forces could have been released from missions targeting the GAF, instead focusing on interdiction missions targeting Axis ground forces in the vicinity of the invasion beaches. In fact, NAAF had been so successful in neutralizing air opposition prior to the commencement of the land battle that after D-Day, the scale of attacks on airfields was reduced to just 21 percent of the total bomber effort.
The bomber forces were not especially nimble and could not be easily re-tasked. A twelve-hour notification was required before attacks by medium and heavy bombers could be executed. Nonetheless, anticipating that air mastery would be soon secured, the air plan had included a list of known pivotal defense positions and other easily definable targets in the assault areas, in case the bombers could be released to conduct missions in the immediate vicinity of the land operations. Each target was assigned a code number, and target maps were prepared and distributed by NAAF.
The air plan also anticipated that the light-bomber force within the North African Tactical Air Force (NATAF) would be called upon for close air support missions during the invasion. Specifically, “light bombers were to furnish close cooperation with the land forces . . . when enemy air had ceased to be a factor in the operations, enemy ground forces were to be attacked by offensive sweeps.”9
The German and Italian air forces opposing them were estimated to have between 1,500 and 1,600 aircraft based in Sicily, Sardinia, Italy, and southern France. Eliminating noncombat aircraft and assuming that the serviceability of Axis aircraft was not above 50 percent, Allied air forces outnumbered their Axis adversaries by at least four to one.
Enemy airfields were the primary targets for both the Tactical and Strategic Air Forces during the run-up to Husky. The raids of June 30 against Palermo, Sciacca, Bo Rizzo, and Trapani had devastated the airfields, causing GAF and Italian aircraft to relocate to more easterly airfields and the remaining bomber forces to leave Sicily altogether for safer bases in Italy.
During the first week of July, the shorter-range aircraft of NATAF targeted the western and central portion of the island, with NASAF’s longer-range aircraft targeting the east, most particularly the airfields at Gerbini and Catania. The Sciacca landing grounds—located close to the planned landing beaches—were attacked nine times from July 3 through 9. Milo/Trapani was hit four times, and additional missions were flown against Bo Rizzo and Castelvetrano on Sicily, and Villacidro and Pabillonis on Sardinia.
The bombing blitz by NAAF yielded precisely the intended effect: Many of the Sicilian aerodromes were rendered unserviceable. Gerbini’s main aerodrome, and seven of its satellite landing grounds, were reported as unusable, as were the large aerodromes at Comiso and Bocca di Falco. Castelvetrano appeared to have been abandoned by D-Day.
The intense bombing campaign also caused the Luftwaffe to defend its bases, with a resulting spike in the number of enemy aircraft destroyed in air combat. In the week before the invasion, 139 enemy fighters were destroyed in the air. Combined with the heavy losses of aircraft that were caught on the ground, the destruction of German aircraft dealt the Luftwaffe a blow from which it never fully recovered, and which was to have great significance to Germany’s defensive capabilities later in the war.
By D-Day, July 10, 1943, the Allied air forces had clearly achieved air superiority over Sicily, perhaps attaining air supremacy.
Air Reconnaissance of the Battle Area
Leading up to D-Day, Allied planners were well supported by aerial intelligence gathered by the Northwest African Photo Reconnaissance Wing. NWAPR units, flying camera-equipped P-38 aircraft, flew 130 pre-D-Day missions, starting in late March. Almost 200,000 aerial photographs were obtained, with 100 percent coverage of the island of Sicily. By D-Day, 1,400 photo mosaics had been produced. As the invasion neared, army ground force planners required more detailed images of landing beaches, cities, airfields, drop zones, and objectives for the airborne troops. A detailed 1:5,000 relief model of the beaches was prepared.10
Some areas of Sicily were overflown and photographed at ten-day intervals, others, at five-day intervals. Enemy airfields and naval forces received careful attention in the period leading up to D-Day: The twenty-six major Axis airfields were photographed twice daily, as were the Sicilian ports and the Strait of Messina—the likely points where Axis reinforcements would enter Sicily.
As D-Day approached, photo intelligence provided details on troop dispositions and strength, locations of artillery, and secondary defensive positions. By D-Day, the Allied planners were completely informed of the disposition of enemy troops, and the likely routes that would be used to reinforce Axis defensive positions along the invasion beaches. Intelligence analysts were able to estimate how quickly German units could reinforce the beaches, based on their transport capabilities and the available roads.
Disposition of Axis forces immediately prior to Allied invasion, July 9, 1943.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
The disposition of Axis forces immediately prior to D-Day is shown in the following map. The intense bombing campaign had convinced the Italian commander of forces on Sicily that it would be the invasion site, and he guessed correctly that the invasion would come ashore on the southern beaches. The Italian Livorno and Napoli divisions were positioned on either flank of Germany’s Hermann Göring Division, which had moved into position from southern Italy just three weeks earlier. The intense counterattacks that developed against American troops on D-Day came from the well-equipped and battle-tested Livorno and Göring divisions. The Napoli division was directed against the British landing farther to the east.11
Aerial reconnaissance—both photographic and visual—on D-Day was also carefully planned. The 111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron flew twenty-seven missions on D-Day, providing dawn-to-dusk coverage for the most critical day of the operation. Particular emphasis was placed on the road networks leading from the inland regions to the beachhead, and on roads and junctions between major towns. Landing beaches and the areas immediately proximal were photographed. Upland regions—the locations of German reinforcements—and coastal roads were covered repeatedly.
German and Italian forces that would likely reinforce their coastal defenses on D-Day were known to be based in the Enna-Caltanissetta region, and it was well known that the reinforcing forces would have to use two main roads leading to the invasion beaches: the southern roads from Canicatti and Piazza Armerina. It was also known that reinforcing and/or retreating forces were likely to use the Vizzini-Caltagirone road, and the road leading to the invasion beaches from Ragusa.
Communications among the various army units, photo reconnaissance units, and NASAF and NATAF command centers were occasionally difficult. Following the actual landings, requests for new overflights could be processed within two hours, and for urgent taskings, the attacking air units could be airborne within three hours of the request. But processing and disseminating the results of these urgent overflights reduced the overall value of tactical recon missions on the day of the invasion. Rather more success was had by AAF tactical units in conducting preplanned assaults on targets that had been identified during the planning phase of Operation Husky.
As H-Hour approached, Allied commands were at least adequately informed of the precise location and strengths of all opposing forces. Interdiction missions had been preplanned, and the combined British-American air forces were poised for the attack.
D-Day on Sicily
On the bright, sunny afternoon of July 8, the ships and landing craft of the Allied landing forces swarmed out of the harbor and into the dark blue of the Mediterranean, headed for the Tunisian Channel and the Sicilian coastline. To war correspondent Ernie Pyle, aboard an Allied ship, the armada standing on the horizon was a sight he would never forget. It “resembled a distant city. It covered half the skyline, and the dull-colored camouflage ships stood indistinctly against the curve of the dark water, like a solid formation of uncountable structures blending together. Even to be part of it was frightening.”12 Described by AAF reconnaissance pilots, the sea was “black with ships,” including more than three thousand cruisers, destroyers, cargo vessels, landing barges for tanks and infantry, and huge passenger ships that in peacetime had been luxury liners.
Visualization of the invasion armada during Operation Husky.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
The Lewiston Morning Tribune, Allan Knepper’s hometown newspaper, included a report on July 12 that described the scene. As reported by reconnaissance pilot Lt. Col. Frank L. Dunn, “the whole thing spread out before me as I came in yesterday afternoon about six miles up in the air. Our ships were the greatest collection of naval strength I have ever seen. And there seemed to be thousands of landing craft with the noses firmly planted on the beach. . . . There was considerable smoke on the southern coast and the roads leading to it. Warships were firing at the shore . . . Looking over the entire island I must have seen hundreds of fires with one chain stretching from east to west, right across the middle. They appeared to be airports, but it was impossible to tell definitely.”13
2nd Lt. Marion Legendre was also on scene: “There were many medium-size ships in the first group and behind them large landing craft. Destroyers and cruisers were grouped all around on the outside for protection. It was an amazing sight—just like a cluster of islands in the sea.”14
Even the troopship USS Chateau Thierry was on hand—the vessel that had recently brought pilots Kocour, Knepper, and hundreds of other air force officers and enlisted replacements to North Africa. Stationed just outside the main assault armada, it began landing troops late in the day and into the night. She remained off Sicily for two days, firing to aid in turning back German air attacks and taking on board Italian and German captives for transport to POW camps already waiting in North Africa.
The invasion began in the early hours of July 10, 1943. As recorded by the Mission Diary of the 49th Fighter Squadron:15
The invasion of Sicily began at 0800 hrs. on this date. The event was very much looked forward to by all of us, and the time was most opportune, as the moon and weather were very favorable. The American troops made landings from Licata to Religione Pointe. U.S. airborne troops were dropped behind Licata, some by gliders, others by parachute, their mission to consolidate the port, cut communications, and occupy adjoining territory. Other units were landed along the beaches to the eastward and are advancing in a north and easterly direction, to make contact with British forces landing on the eastern side of the island, which will move inland and northward. British forces [Canadian] will make their landing from Religione Pointe, around the S.E. tip of the Island, to Cape San Panagia north of Syracuse. British airborne troops will be landed back of Syracuse, their mission to occupy the port, cut communications, and occupy adjacent territory.
All of our fighters and bomber strength was sent as support. And as soon as the progress of the ground forces permits, airfields shall be used by the Air Forces.
Apart from targets in the immediate vicinity of the landings, the great majority of AAF targets on D-Day were contained within a corridor extending 50 miles by 70 miles within the eastern part of Sicily. It was within this corridor that German defensive units were already positioned, and where reinforcements would transit on their way to the battle line. And it was to this sector that most of the missions for the 14th Fighter Group would be flown, with particular emphasis on “targets of opportunity”—that is, truck convoys, troop columns, tanks, artillery pieces, antiaircraft guns, trucks, and staff cars.
All fighter groups and squadrons within NASAF were flying on this day. NASAF Bomb Groups were assigned a range of interdiction missions: The B-17 “heavies” of the 2nd, 99th, and 301st Bomb Groups delivered an attack in three waves against the Gerbini aerodrome and its satellites, rendering the fields unserviceable. The B-17s of the 97th Bomb Group also flew an early mission against the German headquarters at Caltanissetta. B-25s were in action against the aerodromes at Sciacca and Trapani. In the Sciacca mission, the escorting P-40s of the 325th FG had their hands full, encountering intense and accurate flak, of both light and heavy caliber, during the mission. And the Luftwaffe was up, sending a large formation of Me 109s against the attacking bombers. Three of the attacking aircraft were shot down.
Enemy aircraft also gave battle in the late-afternoon mission at Trapani, losing three aircraft. Antiaircraft fire was also reportedly very intense and accurate. In a final mission of the day, B-25s of the 321st BG also flew an interdiction mission against the barracks at Palazzolo Town, hoping to keep reinforcements from reaching the battle lines to the south. B-26s flew an early mission against Caltagirone, the headquarters of the Hermann Göring Division, and the assembly point for many of the Axis forces in the eastern region of Sicily. And, importantly, the B-26s of the 320th BG were assigned a late-afternoon interdiction mission to Vizzini. Off at 1439, and making their drop at 1640, the mission reported poor results in an operation that could have had a telling effect on the Axis counterattack that came on D-Day +1. The bombs of the first squadron dropped east of the target, and the second squadron could not identify the target and did not drop. Among all the bombing missions of that day, this mission was surely an opportunity lost.
In accord with the earlier agreement struck with NATAF, NASAF fighter-bombers were assigned fighter sweep missions to the southeastern region of Sicily.16 For the 14th Fighter Group, seven missions were scheduled for July 10, each involving a formation of twelve P-38 aircraft. All three fighter squadrons contributed to these missions. Similarly, all three squadrons of the 1st Fighter Group, also flying P-38s, flew a total of eight missions on this day, all dive-bombing “targets of opportunity” missions to the same areas as the 14th aircraft would fly.
The 82nd Fighter Group flew three large missions on this day, sending not less than twenty-four aircraft on each mission, which included a bomber escort and two large fighter sweeps. By the end of this day, NASAF’s P-38s would fly 829 sorties.
Opposing the Allied onslaught on this day were the remnants of the Luftwaffe on Sicily, including the greatly weakened but still dangerous JG 53 and JG 77.
The squadrons of JG 53 had exacted a steep toll against Allied air forces in the run-up to D-Day, accounting for 186 downed Allied aircraft since May. It was led by pilots who had achieved impressive results since early actions in 1939, including Ofw. Herbert Rollwage with 47 kills, Oblt. Hans Roehrig with 73, Ofw. Gunther Seeger with 37, Oflt. Fritz Dinger with 64, and Hptm. Friedrich-Karl Muller with 118.
JG 77 was equally menacing, having accounted for 132 downed Allied aircraft over the same brief period. It was led by airmen with equally impressive combat experience, including Hptm. Siegfried Freytag with 98 kills, Oflt. Heinz-Edgar Berres with 50, Maj. Johannes Steinhoff with 160, and Maj. Kurt Ubben with 108.
By the end of this day, pilots of JG 53 and JG 77 would shoot down 16 Allied aircraft.
For pilots Knepper and Kocour—both assigned to today’s mission—there was an emerging awareness that for fighter pilots at this time and place, a “normal” combat mission could only be loosely defined. They had each, by this time, flown a half-dozen missions, and their experiences already spanned a broad spectrum. Two of their fellow pilots were lost on their first mission, and their squadron operations officer was shot down on their second. The next couple of missions had been milk runs, with no enemy aircraft encountered and minimal flak. The missions to Chilivani and Monserrato were at best ineffective, and on the escort mission to Gerbini, the fighters had had to turn back just before reaching the target, leaving the bombers to fend for themselves. While NASAF was operating at a very high level of success overall, at times the squadrons felt snake-bit. Today’s mission did not involve bomber escorts, but rather dive-bombing and strafing—a new sort of mission, to critical targets, on the most important day of the war so far.
The first mission of the day for the 14th Fighter Group was given to the 37th Fighter Squadron. Taking off at 0530, a flight of twelve P-38s were assigned to dive-bomb targets of opportunity in the region north of Ragusa. By the time the 37th was airborne, the Allied paratroop attack had begun, American and British troops were already coming ashore, and the German and Italian defenders on Sicily had already moved into action. Within hours of becoming aware of the invasion, the commander of Italian defensive forces had ordered his Livorno division and two independent units to counterattack the landing force at Gela from the northwest. The Hermann Göring panzer division, though somewhat delayed while its commander awaited approval from headquarters, was moving by dawn in the direction of the landing forces at Gela and Scoglitti, with a planned attack from the east. Within a 30-mile coastal band ranging from Agrigento to the southeastern tip of Sicily, all Axis units were alert, and many were moving along the few Sicilian roads toward the landing beaches.
Allied assault on Axis-held Sicily, July 10, 1943. Showing location of German and Italian reinforcements and their lines of communication to the assault beaches.
By 0700, the 37th squadron had overflown the massive Allied flotilla, crossed the Sicilian coastline, and sighted the enemy forces. It made an effective dive-bombing attack on a line of trucks moving south near Santo Pietro. Upon return to base, the pilots reported seeing twenty vehicles on the road going south near Cap di San Pietro and about fifty vehicles, including tanks, trucks, and motorcycles moving south toward Comiso aerodrome below Vizzini. The Luftwaffe made no effort to intercept the 37th; four enemy aircraft were seen, but they did not approach. And despite the medium and heavy flak guns that defended the target, no aircraft were lost. By 0830 the formation was making their landing back at El Bathan.
This large armored column moving south from the area of Vizzini—probably the Hermann Göring panzer division—was to be targeted repeatedly by the Allied fighter-bombers in many subsequent missions on July 10.
The 48th Fighter Squadron had the second mission of the day—dive-bombing targets of opportunity in the region extending from Licata northeast toward Mazzarino. Taking off at 0645, the formation flew from their base at El Bathan to a point just east of Licata, then made a turn to the northeast to the road junction 5 miles south of Mazzarino. Targeting this was critical to the Allies because it ran roughly parallel to the coastline, where the major invasion beaches were located, and would be expected to be used heavily by the Axis defenders. At that road junction, the formation was jumped by two Me 109s. After driving off these interceptors, the formation wheeled back around toward Licata, and at 0800 found and engaged a concentration of guns. Heavy flak was encountered, though there was little movement on the roads. The flight made their return to base at 0905.
The 48th had flown in the vicinity of the Italian Livorno division, which was at that time moving in a southeasterly direction in order to position itself for a counterattack on the Allied forces at the Gela beachhead.
The third mission of the day was off at 0845 to dive-bomb targets of opportunity in the vicinity of Canicatti and Porto Embedocle—farther to the east from the mission that preceded it. Lieutenants Knepper and Deru were assigned to this mission as “spares,” and when Lieutenant Bitter was forced to return home with a mechanical issue, Lieutenant Deru took his position as wingman to Captain Hageny. Lieutenant Bitter returned to base at 0905. Lieutenant Knepper, flying as an additional spare, but not needed for the mission, returned to base at 1115.
For this mission, Knepper again flew aircraft #45. This had been a well-maintained and reliable aircraft for the 49th. It was the favored mount of Bob Riley, who flew it on ten missions from May 8 through June 18, when Knepper took over as primary pilot. From restart to July 10, it had been flown by six other pilots, including Bland, completing twenty-three missions without an early return. The aircraft had been flawless.
The mission had difficulty locating a good target. Crossing Sicily near Licata, the formation flew north 40 miles before turning east to a point just south of Mount Etna. Still not finding a target, the squadron retraced their way back to Canicatti, where they began a dive-bombing attack at 1015 on railroad yards there, destroying three locomotives and several freight cars. So few good targets were found that one P-38 did not drop its bomb. The squadron’s flight plan had taken it circumferentially around the enemy concentrations at Caltanissetta and Enna, but at a distance and altitude that apparently prevented it from seeing ground targets.
Turning toward the coast and still searching for strafing targets, the formation was jumped by six German Me 109s from what was left of JG 53—the “Ace of Spades” wing just south of Campobello. The German fighters concentrated on the four-plane flight led by Lieutenant Leikness. Leikness and his wingman, Lieutenant Ellis, turned into the attacking aircraft, as did Lieutenant Manlove, leading the second element with his wingman, Lieutenant Booth. In the ensuing dogfight, Manlove and Leikness each shot down two Me 109s. Lieutenant Booth was last seen as he turned with Manlove to engage the German aircraft. He is presumed to have been shot down in the melee that followed, his sixteenth combat mission.
Still full of fight, the remaining eleven planes strafed an antiaircraft position at Porto Embedocle as they returned to base.
Although both the second and third missions flown by the 14th Fighter Group achieved good results, neither mission found and engaged the main column of Italian forces moving south toward the beachhead at Gela during the morning of D-Day. This, despite the fact that the first mission of the day for the 1st Fighter Group had observed and reported a column of seventy-five trucks moving in the direction of the battle line at 0725. This formation, most likely the Italian Livorno Division, was one of the Axis’s primary defensive forces on Sicily. Engaging them effectively early on D-Day could have had a big effect on operations that day, and in the ensuing month of the Battle of Sicily. Clearly, had this intelligence been made available to the 14th, and providing that the commander of the 14th had had the authority to make targeting changes, the two morning missions of the 14th need not have been “targets of opportunity” sweeps, but targeted attacks.
The fourth mission was given to the 37th FS, who took off at 1045 on a dive-bombing mission to the region north and west of Comiso, to just south of Gerbini. Thirteen P-38s were armed with 500-pound bombs—the standard issue for the day—and they flew right into the lion’s den. The squadron found good targets in the Comiso region. Five trucks were destroyed, and the road junction just north of Comiso was blocked. The radar station near Grammichele was bombed and strafed by a four-plane flight of the squadron. A bivouac area and truck park west of Comiso was strafed, destroying one JU 87 aircraft on the ground. Other buildings and motor cars, and one command car, were also strafed in a very full mission. The mission reported moderate flak from trucks and tanks, accurate at times, and flak was reported around the aerodrome at Comiso.
Turning back to base, the squadron reported seeing fifty or more vehicles, including several German medium tanks, parked in trees along the roadway just west of Comiso aerodrome. An additional twenty vehicles, including several tanks, were parked at the road junction just north of Comiso. What the 37th’s pilots spotted appears to have been one of the attacking formations of the Hermann Göring panzer division—quite likely the same tanks and trucks spotted by the 37th squadron at 0700 that morning on the first mission of the day. By noon of D-Day, the Intelligence officers of the 14th Fighter Group would have developed a fairly clear idea of the direction in which German ground forces were moving.
In fact, the earlier intelligence estimates related to the likely movement of German assets was proven to be precisely correct. By noon the German Hermann Göring Division had launched a two-pronged counterattack from its position near Caltagirone, had been repulsed, had moved rearward, and was making preparations for a second counterattack that afternoon.
American amphibious assault, D-Day, Invasion of Sicily, July 10, 1943.
U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, SICILY AND THE SURRENDER OF ITALY, PART II, OPERATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS, CHAPTER VI, THE ASSAULT.
Just prior to their return of the 37th FS, the 48th FS took off on the fifth mission of the day for the 14th FG. Off at 1250, the squadron was again targeting any Axis asset in the southeastern portion of Sicily. Just over an hour into their mission, the formation spotted a convoy of twenty to thirty trucks heading in a southerly direction between Caltagirone and Grammichele, obviously bound for the battlefront. The P-38s commenced their dive from 2,500 feet, with results that must have been disappointing to the squadron. Nine near misses. One truck was seen to explode, and one bomb caused part of the roadbed to cave away. The mission reported light machine-gun fire from the truck convoy, but no enemy aircraft were seen. A train, station house, and other buildings just east of Canicatti were also strafed and left ablaze.
Again, mission intelligence would have further refined the position of the German forces, making additional interdiction missions much more likely to achieve success. The German forces had been engaged several times already, and the fighter-bombers of the 14th and 1st FGs seemed poised for a knockout punch.
The sixth mission left El Bathan about thirty minutes before the return of the 48th FS’s mission. Assigned to the 49th FS, the objective of the mission was to search for targets of opportunity in the area from Licata to Gerbini. Off at 1450, this was the second mission of the day for Lieutenants Bitter and Knepper. In the earlier mission, Bitter had a mechanical issue with his aircraft and returned to base. On this flight, he had mounted a different aircraft. Knepper flew the same aircraft as he had in the earlier mission. Lieutenants Ogle and Foster were assigned to the mission as “spares.” Lieutenant Richard’s aircraft developed a mechanical issue just ten minutes after takeoff. Lieutenant Foster took his position as wingman to Captain Decker. Lieutenant Ogle, the remaining spare, was not needed for the mission and returned to base before the formation made their attack.
With Foster in position, the formation included ten of the squadron’s most experienced pilots, each having already logged more than half of their 50-mission combat tour. The two replacement pilots—Kocour and Knepper—had each completed a handful of combat missions, and their competence in combat was growing with each mission.
Unaccountably, during the preflight briefing for this mission the squadron was apparently not apprised of the intelligence received earlier in the day from their sister squadron at El Bathan, the 37th. Returning from two prior missions that day, the 37th had reported large concentrations of German armor, vehicles, and troops in the Vizzini-Caltagirone corridor. In the last mission of the day, the 37th—taking off shortly after Decker’s flight departed—was sent on a final dive-bombing mission, targeting those same concentrations at Vizzini for the third time that day. Had Captain Decker known of the location of this concentration of forces, his flight course and mission would have taken a much different direction and probably had a much different outcome.
What was said during the mission briefing is not recorded. It is certainly possible that Decker was sent as far as Catania in order to intercept reinforcing troops potentially moving south from Catania or Messina; a second Italian reserve division was known to be in the area south of Catania, and it was not known whether this force would be sent against the American landing forces at Gela, or against the British forces near Syracuse. It is also known that roughly one-third of the Hermann Göring Division was located in the vicinity of Catania, and it is plausible that Decker’s mission was to seek out and attack that concentration.
The formation flew “on the deck” as it crossed the Mediterranean toward the coastline of Sicily. As it neared the Sicilian coastline at Gela, it increased altitude and continued on a generally northeastern course over Ponte Olivo, to and beyond the landing complex at Gerbini, and continuing to the port city of Catania. Not finding targets at any point on their outbound leg, Decker wheeled the formation back around and continued their visual search for targets on a southwestern track, intending to fly over Vizzini and Comiso before returning to base.
The inbound route for the squadron took them slightly to the west of the region in which the Hermann Göring Division was staging its decisive counterattack against the American forces landing at Gela on D-Day—the same German forces that had been reported twice that day in post-flight briefings by the 37th squadron.
As recounted by Lt. William Gregory, flight leader for the Blue flight, “We flew over the coastline of Sicily at altitude. And there were all these ships lined up for what seemed like 50 miles. When we flew over these ships on the way in, we were about 10,000 feet, maybe 7,500. We had been briefed that they [the U.S. Navy] might shoot at us, but they shouldn’t, since we were P-38s, and they probably would have identified us. But they sure did. Fortunately no one got hit, and we didn’t lose anyone from that. That is why we were so high when we went in. We went all the way to Mount Etna inland, then we turned around 180 degrees and were coming back. It seemed like there was no war on for most of that mission. Of course, our own ships shot at us, be we did not receive any ground fire going over from the Germans.”17
The formation had flown across most of the southeastern part of Sicily without having encountered any enemy aircraft, without receiving any enemy ground fire, and without spotting any suitable targets for their 500-pound bombs.
About the time that Captain Decker had turned his formation back around, headed southwest in the direction of the beachhead at Gela, the seventh and final mission for the 14th Fighter Group was taking off from its base at El Bathan. That mission, assigned to the 37th FS, was the third mission they would fly on this date. The 37th flew off in search of targets in the region between Gerbini and Comiso aerodromes. The aircraft were on a roughly parallel and opposite path to the 49th FS formation, led by Decker, and were also flying directly over one of the main battlefronts of the invasion. The 37th found good targets just west of Scordia, and made their drop later in the afternoon, destroying munition dumps, warehouses, a railroad station house, railroad tracks, and nearby buildings. The mission reported seeing heavy German tanks and quite a lot of truck traffic along the roads in the vicinity of Vizzini.
As Decker’s squadron continued in the direction of the beachhead at Gela, he “jumped down” low as they continued to search for a target of opportunity. Their course took them in the direction of Vizzini—the exact location where the Hermann Göring Division had just retreated following their mauling by the U.S. Army and Navy at the Gela beachhead. The formation was jumped by two Me 109s as it neared the vicinity of Vizzini. One fired at “Charley”—the last P-38 in the formation—but the German fighters were driven off when the formation turned into them. At this point in the mission, the aircraft were still in formation, flying at 3,000 feet altitude, and spanning a distance of roughly a quarter-mile from the far left to the far right of the formation.
Lt. William “Greg” Gregory recalls: “And that is where, near the coastline, the Germans had this heavy concentration—in this kind of valley, as I recall. There were a lot of trees in that area—could have been an olive grove. We didn’t see all of this going in.” The squadron had overflown a hidden column of twenty German tanks and twenty-five trucks northwest of Vizzini along the Vizzini-Buccheri road. The German concentration took the squadron completely by surprise. It was not an ambush—the Germans had no way of knowing the 49th’s squadron was approaching. But they were certainly on high alert, having just been beaten back at the Gela beachhead, and were ready to throw up a wall of antiaircraft fire. Flying in close formation, at a low altitude, the P-38s were huge targets for the experienced German gunners.
Lt. Harold Harper, flying on Lieutenant Gregory’s right side, remembers: “We flew over a grove of trees when all of a sudden the situation ‘lit up.’ We had encountered a GAF AA battery.”18 The P-38s immediately dove, strafing as they neared the vehicles, the pilots hurrying to release their bombs.
Greg: “There was no signal from the flight leader. It was not a typical dive-bombing run. It was more of a strafing run, but we dropped our bombs as we were approaching. A few trucks, tanks, and other vehicles were spotted, and they were attacked successfully.” Greg glanced to his right, and saw that his good friend Wallace Bland and his formation were also in a dive, strafing as they went.
Harper: “Decker was leading at around 2,500 to 3,000 feet, looking for something to shoot at. I don’t think we ever did see anything. We dropped our bombs on the trees when the fire came up. They saw us before we saw them. I never did see them. They were in thick trees. We dropped and kept going. Decker did not swing around to make another pass at the ground targets. As soon as the ground fire started coming up, the squadron dropped [its bombs]. I got hit right away. The AA fire was not [just] ground fire; it was 30/40mm cannon fire—the four-barrel AA guns. Everybody got hit, and when you get hit, you better drop your bomb and get the hell out of there. We were not in attack mode; we were still looking, and still in our formation. The GAF AA knew what was going on, on the rest of the island, and were on alert.”
The German gunners found the entire squadron. According to official reports, six aircraft were damaged by flak, and two pilots—Lt. Harold Harper and Lt. Herman Kocour—had one engine shot out and had to nurse their aircraft back to base on the remaining engine.
Harper: “Yes, they just opened up. So you can see how many guns they [must have] had, to hit that many aircraft. So at this point, [everyone was shot up]. There was no thought of completing the mission. It was a matter of getting back to base if possible. My wingman [Lieutenant Boatman] was still with me when I got hit, and was still in element formation. I called Decker and told him that I was hit and was going down. I dove down and my engine started to get hot, so I feathered it up.” Diving down got him out of the way of the AA fire—he was right on the deck. “If you are right on the deck, and someone is shooting at you, anything that is between you as you are going past him, he has got to swing that gun around [like a tree], and it would give a bit of cover.”
Adding to the swirling action, B-26s from the 320th Bomb Group were on their final approach in a bombing mission to nearby Vizzini, targeting troop and armor concentrations that had been reported there. Harper’s plane was hit in front of the cockpit, and one engine was shot out. “It’s a wonder that on this mission that was all shot up, a bullet didn’t hit me,” says Harper. “It hit right in front of the cockpit, and missed the nosewheel; how it did that, I don’t know. It flew back on the right engine and knocked it out, and shrapnel stopped on the aluminum skin on the left engine. That’s pretty close.”
Harper had to limp back to the base at El Bathan, and while passing back over the invasion fleet, the U.S. Navy shot at him again. “I was thinking about bailing out,” Harper recalls. “When we got over the water, I got up to about 2,500 feet. I thought if I had to bail out, I would have time to get things together. Mostly guys who parachuted would go out over the wing, and go under the tail booms.”
Flying on Harper’s left, Greg remembers: “I saw Bland get hit. He was pretty low, when I saw him.”
According to Lieutenant Lovera, flying just behind Bland: “I saw Lieutenant Bland’s plane going down and the left engine was smoking. He called over the radio that the airplane was out of control, and about that time the left engine caught fire and the plane peeled off and did a wing-over to the left and blew up. As the plane started over, I saw an object go past the tail assembly, but I did not see a parachute open.”
Lieutenant Evans, also flying just behind Bland, reported: “I saw Lieutenant Bland’s left engine smoking and tried to call him on the radio and tell him about it, but he didn’t reply. Then he called and said he was going to bail out. His plane turned over and started down. I saw him bail out, but his parachute didn’t open, and I saw him hit the ground.”19
Harper’s understanding—unconfirmed, but based on what he heard at the debriefing—was that Lieutenant Bland’s parachute had gotten wrapped around the tail boom of his aircraft. Bland was killed on his twenty-sixth combat mission; he’d just turned twenty-four years of age.
Knepper’s good friend Herman Kocour, flying as Bland’s wingman, was also hit by ground fire. Knepper, Lieutenant Evan’s wingman, was also pouring cannon fire into the German armored column when he was hit by flak. His plane peeled up, made a half-roll, and crashed straight into the ground.20