Index

• Abel, Gunter, 48–57
• Abstract, 37, 185, 216, 231–232, 236, 243, 249, 258, 264, 278, 283
• Abstract general ideas, 194–195
• Acceptance, passim
• definition of, 19
• Access, epistemic, 2, 23, 56, 79–81, 83, 88–89, 101–102, 118, 137, 153, 158–159, 181, 187–188, 192, 193, 208, 217–218, 231–243, 256–267, 274, 279
• Account, 2, 12–16, 20–24, 28, 34–37, 58–60, 64–68, 71–90, 97–99, 113, 274–275, 299, 311n2
• Adjudication, 64–66, 82–90, 116–117, 121, 148–149, 177–178
• Adler, Jonathan, 18, 22, 68, 74, 95, 141–142, 292
• Aesthetic, Goodman’s symptoms of, 245
• A fortiori arguments, 27–28
• Agency, epistemic, 4, 6, 12–14, 18–19, 22, 34, 39–41, 50–57, 74–75, 83, 91–123, 127, 136, 139, 148, 157, 181, 235, 291–301, 306–307, 313n2, 314n2, 318n3
• Agreement, 71–73, 80, 107, 109, 114, 117–118, 139, 165–166, 228, 270, 288
• interrater, 163, 166, 167
• test-retest, 163, 167
• Alberti, Leon Battista, 153
• Alston, William, 10
• Ambiguity, 270, 280. See also Interpretation
• Ankeny, Rachel, 115
• Anomaly, 14, 31, 35–36, 219
• Approximation, 3, 26, 27, 29–30
• Argument, 44, 52–53, 84–85, 99, 114–115, 173, 177, 181, 182
• banality, 245
• Aristotle, 50–52, 55, 231–233, 238–239, 242, 244, 259, 313n2
• Artifact, epistemic, 135, 225–227
• Assertion, 9, 18, 20, 21, 88–89, 206–207, 296–297
• Assurance, 140–144, 149, 299–300, 308
• Austen, Jane, 237–238, 258–259
• Autonomy, 92–94, 98, 99, 106, 120–121, 217
• Ballet, 208, 211–214, 217–218
• Bealer, George, 208
• Belief, 3, 9–14, 16–22, 34, 40–41, 85. See also Moore’s paradox
• will to, 95–99
• Berkeley, George, 194–195
• Berkeleyan world, 85–87, 92
• Berker, Selim, 10, 97
• Boetti, Alighiero, 185–186, 194–195
• Bokulich, Alisa, 234–235
• BonJour, Laurence, 10, 77, 161
• Boswell, Thomas, 242
• Brewer, Scott, 149
• Brogaard, Berit, 40
• Burge, Tyler, 81
• Calibration, 104, 129, 160, 164–165, 167–168
• Capdevila, Remei, 185–187, 224
• Carelessness, 96, 125, 130, 138–142, 148, 160, 305, 308
• Carr, David, 47
• Carroll, Noel, 242, 245
• Cartwright, Nancy, 25, 102, 153–154, 166, 225, 227, 229
• Cavell, Stanley, 241
• Ceteris paribus claims, 25–26
• Cézanne, Paul, 174–182, 288
• Chang, Hasok, 164–165, 266–267
• Chisholm, Roderick, 87
• Claptrap, 44–45, 83–84, 112
• Coding, 167–168
• Coercion, 117
• Cohen, L. Jonathan, 3, 18–21, 293
• Cohen, Stewart, 292
• Coherence, 14, 45–46, 57–58, 71–79, 83–85, 98, 106–107, 109, 113, 183, 277, 281, 297, 308, 312–313n1
• Collaboration, 128–131, 137–138
• Collusion, 117
• Commitment, epistemic, 2–4, 12–16, 18, 36–37, 44–47, 56–57, 64–121, 184, 233–235, 268, 299, 300–304, 305, 307, 308, 316n1
• epistemic/moral, 123–151
• framing, 273–274, 289
• Community, epistemic, 66, 98, 100, 104–119, 129, 131–150, 165, 166, 169, 178, 184, 230, 305. See also Ends, realm of epistemic
• Concepts, thick and thin, 123–127
• Concessive knowledge, 6, 296–297, 308–309. See also Moore’s paradox
• Confabulation, 73–74
• Confirmation bias, 108–109, 138–139
• Conflict of interest, 136–137
• Confound, 221–222, 229, 232, 257–259, 263, 267
• Consequentialism
• epistemic, 10, 97
• moral, 198
• Consistency, 71, 83–84, 98, 106, 109, 113, 179, 247
• Constraint, 6, 30, 77, 92, 96, 109, 113–114, 118, 129, 230, 236
• Context, 19–21, 28, 100, 118, 145, 187–189, 193–194, 226, 236, 238, 244, 247, 250–251, 261, 269–270, 292
• Control, 5, 10, 27, 84–85, 91–92, 96–97, 144, 162, 165, 168, 196, 222–229, 237, 244
• Conviction, 19–20, 22, 34, 65, 67, 77, 97–98
• Correction, 26, 53–54, 167, 261
• Counterexample, 206–207
• Credibility, 3, 70–77, 112, 137, 197
• tampering, 117–118, 197
• Cunningham, Merce, 206, 208–213, 217–218
• Curve smoothing, 14, 23–24
• Dance, 205–220, 275
• Davenport, Edward, 241
• David, Marian, 9
• Davidson, Donald, 299–300
• Davies, David, 242–245
• Defamiliarization, 209
• Deliberation, 4, 91, 94, 99–121, 165–166, 240
• Delusion, 74–75
• Denial, being in, 215. See also Self-deception
• Denotation, 89, 152, 206, 251–257, 260–261, 263, 279, 282, 287, 318n2
• Density, symbolic, 208, 245, 282, 285
• Dependency, 40–43, 57
• DeRose, Keith, 292
• Dewey, John, 114, 181
• Dickie, George, 316n3
• Difference maker, 25, 28, 58–59, 143, 225
• Disagreement, 107, 108, 110, 114–117, 169, 171–182, 285
• Discipline, 4–6, 13–14, 16, 33, 41, 113, 123, 127–128, 135–137, 140, 141, 149–150, 159, 245, 273–290
• Discursiveness, 275–279
• Disposition, 19, 37, 46–48, 51–52, 56, 93
• Dogmatism, 6, 87, 103, 292–298
• Dougherty, Thomas, 296–297, 309
• Douglas, Heather, 159–160, 166
• Doyle, Yannick, 267–268
• Dretske, Fred, 294
• Dutch book, 106–107
• Education, 4, 59, 147–149, 239–240, 305–306
• Emotion, 47, 92, 173, 197, 207, 213, 215–216, 240
• Endorsement, reflective, 4–6, 37, 45, 56, 62, 66–67, 83–84, 88–94, 98–99, 102–113, 118–121, 129, 135, 141–150, 229–230, 273–274, 289, 313n3
• Ends, epistemic, 3, 10–11, 14–15, 19, 46, 56–57, 65, 80, 96–97, 99, 103–104, 106, 123, 129, 132, 140, 147, 152, 205, 250, 308
• Ends, realm of epistemic, 4–6, 105–121, 132, 135–136, 140, 145, 160, 173
• Episode, historical, 273–281, 285–287
• Equilibrium, reflective, 4, 63–69, 86–90, 91, 98, 102–104, 121
• Error, 291–306
• possibility of, 6–7, 52–53, 108, 115, 133–135, 138–139, 306–309
• Ethics, Kantian, 92, 105–106, 196–198, 239–240
• Evidence, 6, 12–13, 34–36, 63–66, 72–73, 83–84, 92–93, 95–103, 113–120, 130–132, 136–144, 169, 191, 199–200, 223–229, 232–233, 239–244, 277–278, 291–298, 306–308, 315n9
• Evidentialism, 93, 292
• Exemplification, 5–6, 26, 142, 153, 168, 176, 179, 183–203, 222, 247
• in dance, 208–220
• in ethics, 196–199
• in fictions, 237–247
• in history, 286–287
• instantiation requirement, 185, 211, 213, 224, 226, 231, 257–258
• in laboratory experiments, 222–228, 244
• in mathematics, 199–203
• in models, 249, 253, 257–272, 278
• in thought experiments, 231–233
• in visual arts, 256–257, 259, 280–285
• Experiment. See also Thought experiment
• laboratory, 5, 10–11, 15, 20, 84–86, 129, 133–134, 138, 140, 143–144, 158, 165, 192–193, 222–229, 303–305
• natural, 227–228
• Expertise, 41, 102, 114–117, 120, 129–130, 140, 169, 194, 291
• Explanation, 27, 41–44, 71, 75–76, 225, 275–276
• Fabrication of findings, 131–135, 145
• Factivity, 3, 31, 33–34, 37–40, 45, 57–62, 296–297
• Fallibilism, 6–7, 103, 134
• Fallibility, 89, 128, 141, 224–225, 291–310
• Falsehood, felicitous, 1–5, 23–32, 58, 85, 88–89, 97, 121, 126, 141, 171, 277, 311n5
• fictions as, 235–247
• infelicitous, 4, 125, 131–132
• models as, 257–271
• thought experiments as, 229–335
• Falsification, 131–135, 145
• Feature, 1–2, 5–6, 154–155, 158, 180–204
• Feldman, Richard, 96
• Feynman, Richard, 275–276, 278, 284
• Fickleness, 138–139
• Fiction, 5, 75–77, 206, 213, 222, 235–247, 250–251, 258–259
• Fine, Arthur, 159–160, 166
• Firth, Roderick, 10, 97
• Folkman, Judah, 20
• Forgery, 135
• Free and equal, 4, 114–121, 123, 137
• Fricker, Elizabeth, 81
• Fricker, Miranda, 117–118
• Frigg, Roman, 252
• Fruitfulness, 10–11, 20, 30, 114–115, 306
• Fry, Roger, 174–182, 285, 316n4
• Fumerton, Richard, 12
• Galileo, 231–233, 258, 275–276, 278
• Gambler’s fallacy, 106–107
• Gendler, Tamar, 233
• Gettier, Edmund, 40
• Giere, Ronald, 261–262
• Ginsborg, Hannah, 54–56
• Goldman, Alvin, 9, 10, 80. See also Veritism
• Goodman, Nelson, 23, 89–90, 175–176, 184, 191, 206, 208, 226, 245, 251–252, 256, 266, 282–287
• Goya, Francisco, 283–284
• Grasp, 33, 38–39, 41–43, 46, 57–59
• Greco, John, 37, 40
• Greenberg, Clement, 174–182, 285, 316n4
• Grice, Paul, 25–26, 189, 269, 309
• Grimm, Stephen, 37, 40–41, 275–276
• Gullibility, 125, 139
• Habermas, Jürgen, 119
• Hacking, Ian, 104, 166, 225
• Hardwig, John, 130–131
• Hempel, Carl, 274, 284
• Herodotus, 38–39, 43
• Heteronomy, 92–94, 97, 99, 313n3
• Hetherington, Stephen, 12, 56
• Hills, Alison, 41
• History, 38–40, 43–44, 135–136, 273–289
• Holism, 1, 3–5, 12–16, 31, 35, 43–46, 63–81, 83, 102, 106, 302
• Hughes, R. I. G., 6, 252–256, 262, 269
• Hume, David, 81, 173–175, 215
• Humility, epistemic, 111, 292, 297–299, 308
• Hyperintensionality, 207–208
• Idealization, 2, 14–15, 27–28, 31, 35, 61–62
• Imagination, 229–235
• Impartiality, 5, 110–111, 113, 162, 166–168, 175
• Imperative, epistemic, 105–106, 110, 112, 120–121, 137
• Impersonality, 162–166, 168
• Impute, 249, 253, 258, 259–260, 262, 265–268, 271
• Individualism, epistemic, 107
• Infallibility, 291–294
• Injustice, epistemic, 117–118
• Integrity, epistemic, 127–141, 144–150, 159–160
• Interdependence, epistemic, 103–108, 120, 129–131, 135, 144, 217, 220
• Internalize, 49–56, 109, 148
• Interpretation, 109–110, 114, 130, 134, 155–173, 185–194, 218–228, 234–235, 245–247, 252–253, 265, 270, 284–285
• Irresponsibility, epistemic, 6, 14, 78, 80, 135–136, 139
• James, William, 10–13, 95, 97–98, 115–116, 198
• Jullien, Caroline, 317n5
• Kant, Immanuel, 4, 50, 91–94, 105–109, 111, 146, 173, 197–198, 229, 239
• Keller, Evelyn Fox, 118
• Kepler, Johannes, 30–31, 60, 67, 89, 265, 269
• Khalifa, Kareem, 275–276
• Kipling, Rudyard, 243–244, 247
• Kitcher, Philip, 110, 116, 169, 314n9
• Klein, Peter, 12
• Know how, 9, 46–57
• Knowledge, propositional, 6–7, 9–14, 17–18, 33–37, 39–41, 57–58, 199–200, 291–298
• Korsgaard, Christine, 99–100, 172
• Kripke, Saul, 6–7, 54–55, 208, 296–297
• Kuhn, Thomas, 168, 314n4
• Kvanvig, Jonathan, 3, 37, 39, 41, 57–58, 59–61, 281
• Labor, division of cognitive, 111–114, 127, 129–131
• Lehrer, Keith, 10, 76, 312n2
• Leite, Adam, 294–295
• Lewis, C. I., 69
• Lewis, David, 87–88, 243, 294
• Likening, 256–257, 263–266
• Lin, Maya, 279–283, 285, 289
• Lipton, Peter, 40, 44, 70, 275–276, 284
• Locke, John, 194
• Logical space, 155
• Longino, Helen, 114, 119
• Lopes, Dominic, 156
• Luck, epistemic, 16, 40–41, 87, 109, 294–295, 298
• Lying, 125, 135, 196–199
• Magnitude, 5, 144, 162–164, 266–267
• Match, 168, 188–189, 228
• Mathematics, 40–42, 54–55, 199–202, 253, 274. See also Proof
• Maxwell, James Clerk, 265
• Maxwell’s demon, 233–234, 244, 246
• McClintock, Barbara, 118, 121
• McGowan, Mary Kate, 117
• Measurement, 5, 24, 142, 153, 157–159, 162–165, 175, 266–267
• Mill, John Stuart, 119
• Miller–Urey experiment, 225–226
• Mind–body problem, 215–216
• Misconduct, scholarly, 127–128, 131–139
• Model, 1–6, 14–15, 23–31, 62, 88, 152–153, 155–157, 180–182, 251–271
• fit of, 175, 260–261, 266
• Modern dance, 208, 211–216
• Monte Carlo method, 105
• Monument, 279–281, 283
• Moore, G. E., 200
• Moore’s paradox, 207, 296–297, 308
• Morrison, Margaret, 30
• Mutual support, 3, 12, 36, 45, 66, 69–71, 84, 98–99, 110
• Nagel, Thomas, 5, 151–152
• Narrative, 226–228, 233–247, 277–281
• Nersessian, Nancy, 225–226, 265
• Newton, Isaac, 60–61, 89, 264
• Noncommitment, 154, 156
• Normativity, epistemic, 2, 31–32, 48, 50–54, 91–95, 99–121
• Objectivity, 2, 5, 99, 151–169, 171, 181–182
• Obligation, 123, 128, 132–141, 144, 149
• Occlusion, 154, 156–157, 180, 191
• Omission, epistemically culpable, 135–136a
• Open-mindedness, 110, 173, 297
• Other minds, problem of, 241
• Pascal, Blaise, 96
• Pattern, 24, 165, 184, 207, 216, 220, 222, 236, 237, 239–240, 242–243, 258, 263
• Peer review, 113, 114–115, 142–145, 167
• Perception, 68, 76–82, 92–94, 98, 108, 161, 256–257, 266
• Perfectionism, moral, 198
• Perspective, 97, 104, 114, 117–119, 153–159, 180–181, 206–207, 240, 246–247, 270–271, 308
• Plagiarism, 131, 133–135, 145
• Plato, 45, 183–184, 192, 236
• Popper, Karl, 301–303
• Porter, Theodore, 162–163
• Portrait, 6, 255–257
• Postmodern dance, 208–212, 214–217, 220
• Practice, 48–56, 106–107, 118–121, 129–135, 140–141, 153, 181–182, 202, 214, 250
• Prediction, 112–113
• p-representation, 251–252, 254–256, 278
• Pretending, 20–21, 214
• Pritchard, Duncan, 11, 16, 40–41, 295, 318n3
• Privilege, epistemic, 76–80, 88, 89, 183, 241, 285
• Professing, 9, 20–21, 46, 106, 111
• Proof, 42, 104–105, 109, 194–195, 199–203, 274
• Proxy, 163–165
• Publication, scientific, 137–138, 140–141, 149
• Quine, W. V., 2–3, 13, 64, 82–83, 302–303
• Rainer, Yvonne, 205–206, 209–211, 213, 216, 217
• Rawls, John, 27–28, 29. See also Equilibrium, reflective
• Reasons, 12, 44, 64–65, 69, 72–73, 80–81, 99–105, 171–182
• accessible, 100
• available, 100
• Reliabilism, 4, 92, 292
• Reliability, 12, 16, 18, 35–36, 41, 48, 79–81, 92–93, 99–101, 160–162, 292, 298
• Repleteness, 245–246, 282, 287–289
• Replicability, 10, 86, 147, 218, 228
• Representation, 3, 5–6, 14–16, 22, 23–32, 37, 85, 131, 151–159, 201, 206, 247, 249–256
• mode of, 195
• Representation as, 252–256, 258, 259–262, 264–271
• Resemblance. See Similarity
• Respect, 113, 119–121, 146, 274
• Responsibility, epistemic, 2, 4–6, 14, 53, 91–94, 98–105, 110, 112, 116, 119–121, 123, 125–126, 127, 134–135, 137–141, 143–144, 172, 293–295, 297–298, 313n2
• Riggs, Wayne, 115–117
• Risk, epistemic, 6, 10, 99, 101, 116, 117, 132, 133, 137, 147, 169
• Roman numerals, 202–203
• Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 236
• Rowling, J. K., 112–113
• Rule following, 48–57, 96
• Russell, Bertrand, 251
• Ryle, Gilbert, 46–48, 51, 56
• Rysiew, Patrick, 296–297, 309
• Sarkar, Sahotra, 42
• Scanlon, T. M., 100–101, 110
• Schwartz, Robert, 256–257
• Second nature, 49–53, 148
• Self-correcting, 4, 66, 86, 103, 111, 119, 132, 134, 163, 291
• Self-deception, 22, 73–75, 240–241
• Sellars, Wilfrid, 29–30, 31, 56, 61–62, 89
• Shah, Nishi, 96
• Sigman, Jill, 210, 218
• Silencing, 117–118
• Similarity, 249, 254–255, 261–262
• Simpson’s paradox, 102, 154
• Skepticism, 6, 17, 54, 76, 88, 89–90, 291–293. See also Berkeleyan world
• Sklar, Lawrence, 25
• Snow, John, 195–196, 207, 227–228
• Socratic insight, 219–220, 305
• Sosa, Ernest, 11, 313
• Stability, 85, 103, 130, 139, 164, 190, 192, 291
• Stadler, Ingrid, 177
• Strevens, Michael, 25, 28, 40, 41–43, 58–59, 197, 202
• Stroud, Barry, 295
• Stylized facts, 26–27
• Suárez, Mauricio, 254
• Suppression of results, 131–136
• Szabo, Zoltan, 21
• Teller, Paul, 270–271
• Tenability, 1, 2, 13–16, 23, 44, 64–76, 78–91, 97–99, 114, 119, 176, 183, 221, 276
• Testimony, 6, 19, 41, 70–71, 73, 80–83, 112, 117–118, 277, 299
• Thought experiment, 1–2, 5, 14–15, 121, 221–222, 229–235, 244–247, 251, 278
• Thucydides, 277
• T-monism, 11
• Trade-offs, 85, 87, 115–117, 314n9
• Treanor, Nicholas, 11, 13
• Trustworthiness, 4–5, 34, 69, 73, 78–81, 83, 99, 103, 118, 120, 123–149, 157, 159–161, 197, 227–229, 288
• Truth, 1–4, 9–18, 88–89, 124–127
• conduciveness, 1–4, 9–10, 86–87, 92–93, 97
• Truthfulness, 124–127
• Tufte, Edward, 196, 207, 262
• Typify, 188–190, 192, 245
• Understanding, passim
• objectual, 33, 39, 44–46, 57–58, 63
• propositional, 33, 39–41
• Univocality, 245–246, 270, 284. See also Interpretation
• Van Fraassen, Bas, 152–159, 169, 206–207, 270–271
• Veritism, 1, 3, 9–17, 24–31, 93, 106, 115–116, 312n10
• Virtue, 4, 50–57, 63–64, 110–111, 124–126, 238–239, 245, 250, 313n2
• Vogel, Jonathan, 294
• Voluntarism, 95–99
• Walden, Kenneth, 302
• Warrant, 76–77, 141–144
• Weatherson, Brian, 92
• Wedgwood, Ralph, 17–18
• Weisberg, Michael, 258
• West, Rebecca, 250
• White, Morton, 276–277
• Will, 22–23, 95–99, 188, 222
• Williams, Bernard, 22, 95–98, 123–127, 146, 151–152, 266, 277, 283, 314n2, 314n3
• Williamson, Timothy, 18
• Wills, Gary, 277, 286
• Wilson, Mark, 82–83
• Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 49, 54, 207
• Zimba, Jason, 202
• Zinn, Howard, 286