Any reader of the “Pentagon Papers” should be warned that although they were commissioned on June 17, 1967, by the Secretary of Defense as “the history of United States involvement in Vietnam from World War II [Sept 2,1945] to the present” [1968], they are unreliable, inaccurate and marred by serious omissions. They are a contrived history, at best, even though they were written by a selected Task Force under Pentagon leadership.
Special Operations is a name given in most cases, but not always, to any clandestine, covert, undercover, or secret operations by the government or by someone, U.S. citizen or a foreign national . . . even in special cases a stateless professional, or U.S. or foreign activity or organization. It is usually secret and highly classified. It is to be differentiated from Secret intelligence and in a very parochial sense from Secret or Special Intelligence Operations.
This is a gross and crafty misnomer [Pentagon Papers], since all too few of those papers actually were bona fide military papers. They may have been written under Pentagon headings; they may have been signed by “military” officers or “military department civilians,” but for the most part they were not actually military papers. They represent the papers of a small group of civilians, some of whom worked in the Pentagon, and their military [real and cover] counterparts.
The Pentagon Papers’ account and the subsequent NBC-TV presentation of the assassination of the Ngo brothers are both excellent representations of what happened during those grim days in Washington and Saigon. The only problem is that neither one is a complete and accurate account of what really took place, especially in Washington.
McNamara used to make the distinction that the war against North Vietnam was “sophisticated.” Whereas the war in the South was “unsophisticated.” The feeling was that there was an element of design and control over the war in the North which was not possible in the South. Walt Rostow had his own term for this. He liked to say that the war in the North was a sort of game of tit-for-tat. His idea was that if they hit us, we’d hit back. This type of game is all the more “sophisticated” when we hit clandestinely; they strike back overtly and then we strike back, claming they hit first!
See clarification on pages 115 and 401.
In Special Operations, black flights deliver black cargo into denied or unwitting areas. “Black” in this sense is usually synonymous with clandestine. A black cargo would not go through customs, USA or foreign. A black cargo, might be a defector from the communist world being flown to a safe house in the USA or other host country. If the black flight crossed the ocean, it would be known as a “deep water” flight. Clandestine shipments are made by all modes of transportation, including submarines and PT boats.
DCI—Director of Central intelligence; DDCI is his Deputy. below these men are three other Deputy Directors:
DD/I—Deputy Director of Intelligence (responsible for the real and overt intelligence activity of the Agency.)
DD/P—Deputy Director of Plans (responsible for the clandestine activity of the Agency. By far the largest and most complex portion of the Agency in the Special Operations part of the business.)
DD/S—Deputy Director of Support (responsible for the logistics support. This is the most effective part of the Agency and makes the others look good.)
(DD/A—Deputy Director of Administration—no longer a part of the Agency.) Note: To an Agency man DD/P can be used as an adjective, as in: “I’m going to Europe with some of the DD/S guys on that new DD/P project.”
The same applies with Divisions, Directorates, and Sections. The CIA is very loose about these things. For example: You can say something was done by Special Operations without ever having to say that it was a special operations division (there is no special operations division in the Agency).
If a military chief of staff did disagree so deeply with a plan briefed to him by the CIA that he decided to discuss his views with others, it is more than likely the CIA would charge him with a security violation or withdraw his clearance, or both. The Agency would attack him on security grounds, not on substantive grounds or on the merits of the case.
To add to this confusion, Mr. Thomas Gates was Secretary of Defense and Mr. James Douglas his deputy until January 20, 1961 (Kennedy’s inauguration, and then Mr. Robert McNamara and Mr. Roswell Gilpatric followed them. Mr. Douglas told the author on January 19 at 4:30 p.m. that there had been no transition briefing between them.
A hypothetical name in this instance. Such code names are given in great numbers to all operations and even to various phases or segments of classified operations.
Sanche de Gramont, The Secret War, New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, p. 29.
Note that from the beginning the Agency was considered a coordination center, and that it was not empowered to be a collection agency. The original plan was that the agency simply coordinate all of the intelligence that was readily available from other government departments. As the agency grew during the following twenty-five years, it expanded its role bit by bit from this first limited charter, and it did so by its own zeal and initiative, not by law or direction.
One of the most frequently used unclassified code names for the CIA; in general conversation by employees and those familiar with their intimate jargon. Note how the White House/Watergate Affair Group called themselves “the Plumbers,” showing their CIA lineage.
Harry Howe Ransom teaches political science at Vanderbilt University and is one of the Foremost authors on the subject of the Intelligence Community. He has taught at Harvard, Princeton, Vassar, and Michigan State University. He is author of Central Intelligence and National Security.
Composite quote from the National Security Act of 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947.
Extracted from a typical USNWR question and answer review, July 18, 1966, Adm. Raborn, interviewee.
Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Real CIA, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968.
The Pentagon Papers (New York Times ed.) 1971.
At that time, General Taylor was Special Military Advisor to President Kennedy—that was the overt title. He was the CIA clandestine operations man closer to Allen Dulles than to anyone in the Pentagon. He was in the office later held by McGeorge Bundy and currently by Henry Kissinger, who by the way has long been a key spokesman for the Council of Foreign Relations.
The helicopters had been obtained from the USMC but there were no Marines in the organization flying them, or on the ground. The New York Times report of The Pentagon Papers, Nov. 8, 1961, p. 148.
The New York Times report of The Pentagon Papers, Nov. 8, 1961, p. 148.
Ibid. p.148.
Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
The Real CIA, New York: The Macmillan Co.,1968.
It should be recalled that General Donovan of OSS fame had been the Ambassador to Thailand and that he was followed by the former Ambassador to Greece, John Puerifoy. Both men were, of course, CIA-type operators, and it was their expertise that accounts for so much of the relationship that has existed in Thailand during the past twenty years.
Deciphering performed by computers from material picked up by global listening posts.
The Agency makes a specialty of covering its people with code names as they travel around the world. Thus the message traffic will he gibberish to most people when a list of names of the Agency’s key men appear. Many years ago, “Red” White and another executive from Mr. Dulles’ office made an extended trip through the Pacific. They were given code names just before they left. Some genius in the cover department gave “Red” White the code name “Ballew.” As he traveled from station to station it was “Red, White, and Ballew,” like the flag.
A cover cutout is some device or process that has been set up to circumvent or otherwise bypass normal procedure so that the connection with the CIA cannot be discovered in the normal course of business.
The Human Use of Human Beings, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954.
Headed by the same James McCord later to gain notoriety in the 1972 “Watergate” affair.
Industrial components are marked with special numbers, codes and other identifying inscriptions. A thorough intelligence system classifies these things and can gain considerable information from such data. (More later.)
Captain Kong Le of the Royal Laotian army had been given special training by the U.S. Army, which included familiarization with CIA supporting activities. Later he broke away from his U.S. friends and led a revolt against the government.
When the CIA was housed in World War II temporary buildings in the Foggy Bottom and Reflecting Pool part of Washington, the Pentagon was “across the river” from the CIA. Thus, it had a special meaning to both organizations.
It may be worthwhile to note that both memoranda were very well written, exceeding by far the usual bureaucratic language of such papers in style and clarity. The writer—Sorenson?—was certainly more than one of the run-of-the-mill memo writers. Since the Pentagon Papers seem not to have contained these memoranda, it may be some time before we can learn who wrote these excellent and extremely significant papers for the President.
To be expanded.
Among the most noteworthy are the several papers produced by the staff of the Presidential Task Group on High Level Human Resources for Economic Development, mentioned earlier; and a thoughtful study by Mr. James Howe of ICA.
ICA has recently initiated a week long Communications Seminar for selected trainees following completion of their course of instruction. The emphasis is on professional conduct at home and the communication of ideas.
This thought, and certain others, reflect ideas advanced by the “Study on MAP in the Underdeveloped Areas” prepared for the Committee by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, by Dr. George Liska; and by Dr. Buy Pauker.
Electronic Teaching Laboratories; English courses in local educational systems; bi-national centers; text books; and refresher training facilities in this country, utilized by trainees upon arrival.
Technical assistance is, of course, available for provision of instructors, U.S. university contracts, etc.
Much of what follows has been taken from a Confidential memorandum prepared by Colonel E. G. Lansdale, Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense.