In contrast to the Allies, there was no unified command on the Axis side. Distrust on both sides was reaching poisonous levels by the early summer of 1943, as the Germans suspected that the Italians were on the verge of departing the war. The Italians were resentful of German domination, especially after Rommel’s heavy-handed style in North Africa, and feared that Germany planned to occupy Italy. Axis command on Sicily was nominally in Italian hands under the Comando Supremo in Rome, but, in practice, the Germans took control.
The Italian supreme commander had been Generale d’armata Ugo Cavalerro, who had enjoyed good relations with the Germans through the desert campaigns. As Mussolini began to have doubts about the Axis alliance, on February 1, 1943, he switched command to Vittorio Ambrosio, who loathed the Germans. Ambrosio strongly opposed further offensive operations in Russia and urged Berlin to adopt a defensive posture. This greatly strained relations between the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht: Armed Forces High Command) and the Comando Supremo. Similar changes in other commands shifted the senior Italian leadership in a decidedly anti-German direction. Mussolini tried to deflect attention from this change by removing his son-in-law, Count Galeazzo Ciano, from leadership of the foreign ministry, because he had been engaged in a variety of intrigues to pull Italy out of the Rome–Berlin alliance and to reach a separate peace with the Allies.
Generale d’armata Alfredo Guzzoni led the Commando Forze Armate della Sicilia in July 1943. The FF.AA. Sicilia headquarters incorporated the army’s 6o Armata plus the other subordinate services. (MHI)
Generale d’armata Mario Roatta was appointed commander of 6a Armata (Sixth Army) on Sicily in February 1943. Roatta had been army chief of staff and he insisted that the dysfunctional command structure on the island be placed under a centralized control. At the time, the army commander did not control the anti-aircraft forces of the Fascist Militia, nor the various paramilitary formations assigned to civilian prefectures. In addition, the navy and air force units on Sicily were under their own commands, and the sizable naval bases on Sicily were under the autonomous command of the Supermarina. On March 28, 1943, a unified command of the various Italian forces was established under Roatta’s new Comando Forze Armate della Sicilia (FF.AA. Sicilia: Armed Forces Command Sicily), which also included subordination of German units on the island. Roatta attempted to strengthen the garrison on Sicily, put the island on a war footing, and amplify the fortification program. Nevertheless, his command proved to be short-lived as, in late May 1943, he issued a proclamation that local Sicilian politicians felt impugned local patriotism.
Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring served as Oberbefehlshaber Süd during the Sicily campaign. He was known as “Smiling Albert” because of his cheerful personality. (Library of Congress)
In his place, Mussolini ordered the 66-year-old Generale d’Armata Alfredo Guzzoni out of retirement to take over the command of 6a Armata. Guzzoni had served as a young officer in the Great War and was governor of Eritrea after the Second Italo-Abyssinian War from 1936 to 1937. He commanded Italian forces in Albania and Greece in 1939–40 and led 4a Armata during the invasion of France in June 1940. In November 1940, Guzzoni was appointed Undersecretary of War and Deputy Chief of the Supreme General Staff before his retirement. Guzzoni had a reputation as a determined and single-minded commander with a strong grasp of strategy. He developed good working relations with the senior German commanders. At least on paper, Guzzoni held command over both Italian and German forces on Sicily. In reality, German tactical commanders often disregarded instructions from Italian sources. In an attempt to improve cooperation, the Wehrmacht established a liaison office with Guzzoni’s headquarters, headed by Generalleutnant Frido von Senger und Etterlin. A Bavarian Catholic who spoke fluent Italian, Senger und Etterlin had a distinguished military career prior to being sent to Sicily in June 1943 after having received personal instructions from Hitler about this delicate position. Senger und Etterlin is better known for his later command at Monte Cassino.
The Regio Marina had its own autonomous naval command structure on Sicily, headed by Ammiraglio di squadra Pietro Barone. Barone’s command was primarily responsible for Sicily’s large naval bases and the smaller ports. These bases were independent of the army and had their own defense. The Italian air force on Sicily was commanded by Generale di divisione aerea Adriano Monti, but his forces withered away in the face of relentless Allied air attacks.
The critical German commander was Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, who served as Oberbefehlshaber Süd (Senior Commander South). In October 1942, Hitler granted Kesselring tactical authority over all German military units in Italy, one of the few times when a theater commander was granted unified command. As a Luftwaffe rather than army officer, Kesselring was an unusual figure in such a senior command post. Nevertheless, his varied career and organizational talents made him an ideal theater commander. Kesselring had begun his military career in the Bavarian artillery, being elevated to the general staff in the winter of 1917. He remained in the Reichswehr until 1933, when he was ordered to become chief administrator of the Air Ministry in civilian mufti. His primary responsibility was the creation of the infrastructure of the new Luftwaffe, and this attracted the favorable attention of the Luftwaffe head, Hermann Göring. By the time war broke out, he had returned to uniform as commander of Luftflotte 1, the tactical close-support bomber and Stuka force that played such a prominent role in the 1939 campaign against Poland and later as commander of Luftflotte 2 during the 1940 campaign against France. Kesselring was appointed to OB-Süd in December 1941 and given the politically challenging task of coordinating the German war effort in North Africa with the Italian armed forces. His political charms led to his nickname of “Smiling Albert.” Kesselring was popular in Berlin as he maintained an optimistic facade in spite of the declining Axis fortunes in the Mediterranean; Hitler was never pleased with naysayers and pessimists. He proved to be an astute and effective operational leader and certainly one of Germany’s most insightful strategic commanders during the war.
The Allied Forces Headquarters was led by General Dwight Eisenhower. Ike was a protégé of Gen. George C. Marshall, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Roosevelt’s primary military adviser. In 1942, Eisenhower was appointed as commander for the forthcoming Operation Torch landings in North Africa. This set a precedent of having an American in theater command, while the three subordinates for army, navy, and air force headquarters were all British. Eisenhower displayed exceptional political skills in managing relations between senior British and American commanders in spite of significant differences in strategic viewpoints and different staff cultures. He also proved adept at dealing with senior civilian command authorities and developed a comfortable working relationship with Winston Churchill. Eisenhower often described his role as that of “chairman of the board” rather than warlord. Eisenhower was excessively deferential to senior British commanders in the final stages of the Tunisia campaign and was still attempting to create a workable multinational headquarters when planning began for Operation Husky. Most of the planning for the Sicily campaign was undertaken by British organizations. Eisenhower was dismayed when AFHQ followed the British style of “committee” management with each of the three British services having an equal voice in the decision-making process for Sicily instead of the US style of a unified command. Controversies during the Sicily campaign led Eisenhower to insist on a unified command approach when he took over the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in 1944 for the Normandy invasion.
The senior Allied land commander was Gen. Sir Harold Alexander, commander of 15th Army Group. (NARA)
The senior Allied land force commander was General Sir Harold Alexander. He was a divisional commander in France in 1940 and appointed as a corps commander during the Dunkirk operation; the other corps commander was Bernard Montgomery. He was appointed General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) Burma in February 1942, leading the 14th Army from India. In August 1942, Alexander replaced Claude Auchinleck as the Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Command and concurrently, Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery took command of the Eighth Army under his direction. Alexander’s command became the basis for the new 15th Army Group, which was responsible for the land forces of Operation Husky. Alexander was a popular and respected commander and, like Eisenhower, he fostered cooperation between British and American commands in the difficult early stages of their strategic relationship. However, he failed to impose any sort of operational or strategic vision on his subordinate commanders, and his diffident command style left the door open for more aggressive commanders like Montgomery and Patton to push for their own courses of action during the Sicily campaign.
The two Allied field commanders were Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, commander of the British 8th Army, and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr, commander of the Seventh US Army, seen here on July 26, 1943 at Patton’s headquarters near Palermo. (NARA)
Bernard Law Montgomery took command of the dispirited 8th Army in 1942, leading it on a string of victories starting with the El Alamein. His record of success in North Africa gave him considerable influence in the planning and execution of Operation Husky. Montgomery’s counterpart on the American side was George Patton. He headed the Western Task Force during the Operation Torch landings in French North Africa in November 1942 and his I Armored Corps performed garrison duty in Algeria. After the Kasserine Pass debacle in February 1943, he took command of II Corps in Tunisia, helping to rejuvenate the inexperienced and poorly led US forces in the 1943 spring offensives. He was pulled out of II Corps command shortly before the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign in order to prepare the Seventh US Army for Husky.
The two senior Allied naval commanders were the Royal Navy’s Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham to the right and the US Navy’s Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to the left, seen here aboard the command ship USS Ancon in September 1943. (NARA)
The senior Allied air commanders were the RAF’s Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder (left) and US Army Air Force Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz (right). (NARA)
The senior naval command for Operation Husky was the Royal Navy’s Admiral Andrew Cunningham. He headed the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet in 1943 and was appointed Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces for Operation Husky. He served most of his career in the Mediterranean, starting in the Great War. Cunningham won fame in a series of devastating victories over the Italian fleet, including Taranto in November 1940 and Cape Matapan in March 1941. His intimate knowledge of the heavy price paid in the fight with Turkish coastal defenses in the Dardanelles in 1915 helps to explain the Royal Navy’s lack of enthusiasm in tangling with Italian defenses in the Messina Straits in August 1943.
Major-General G. G. Simonds, commander of 1st Canadian Infantry Division, comes ashore at Bark South beach on July 10, 1943. Simonds later commanded II Canadian Corps in Normandy. (NARA)
The senior air command was Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. He was appointed Air Officer Commander-in-Chief, RAF Middle East Command in June 1941 and commanded the Desert Air Force during the entire North African campaign. As the most experienced Middle East air commander, he led the Allied Air Forces during Operation Husky. He greatly impressed Eisenhower both with his technical knowledge and his astute political skills, and Tedder became Deputy Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) for the European campaign in 1944–45.