THE BATTLE OF THE CRATER

ALSO KNOWN AS THE BATTLE OF THE MINE PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA
JULY 30, 1864

COMMANDERS

Union Lieut. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant Maj. Gen. George Meade Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside

Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee Gen. G. T. Beauregard Maj. Gen. Bushrod Johnson

PARTICIPANTS

8,500 (Ninth Corps)

4,000 (elements of the Army of Northern Virginia)

CASUALTIES

Union 504 killed 1,881 wounded 1,413 POWs/MIA

Confederate 361 killed 727 wounded 403 POWs/MIA

VICTORY: CONFEDERACY

OVERVIEW

It was a good idea badly executed. The plan was to blow a huge hole in General Lee’s line and charge through it, driving the Confederates out of Petersburg, Virginia. This was during the “siege” of Petersburg, although it wasn’t really a siege. Petersburg and neighboring Richmond weren’t cut off from communication and supplies from the rest of the Confederacy, as a siege normally entails. It was actually trench warfare.

Following his success with the battles of Chattanooga, Grant was promoted to lieutenant general, becoming the second person, after George Washington, to hold this rank—Winfield Scott having held the rank of brevet lieutenant general. With the promotion, Grant replaced Halleck as general in chief, which put him in charge of all the Union’s armies. Halleck became Grant’s chief of staff, managing Washington, while Grant managed the field.

The power of the Confederacy was waning, but it still had a lot of fight left in it. Grant launched a surprise attack on Petersburg, a major cog in the supply line linking Richmond and Lee’s army to the rest of the South. Lee quickly sprang to its defense, and the two armies built fortifications from south of Petersburg up along its eastern side, covering more than twenty-five miles. Complex systems of trenches defended the men from snipers, while bomb shelters, then known as “bomb-proofs,” protected the soldiers from artillery. The Union launched attacks on June 9 and from June 15 to 18, but they failed.

Burnside had control of a southern portion of the Union line just south of Petersburg. One of his men suggested digging a mine across no-man’s land about fifty feet beneath one of the Confederate salients, which are outward projections of fortification that enable defenders to more easily shoot attackers at fortification walls. This particular salient was essentially a fort armed with four artillery guns and about 350 Confederate soldiers. The idea was to load the mine with gunpowder, as Grant did at Vicksburg, and blow it up along with the salient. Then attacking soldiers could charge through the Confederate line into Petersburg.

For the plan to work, Burnside had to get his men across 100 yards of open ground to the explosion crater, and then get them through or around the crater and across another 500 yards to the crest of a hill, where they could look across a valley at Petersburg less than a mile away. Getting his men to the crest as rapidly as possible was the key to the whole operation. Unfortunately, the plan started going wrong for Burnside from the start, and it snowballed from there.

Grant staged a brilliant feint that caused Lee to move all his available troops to Richmond, leaving just enough behind to man Petersburg’s fortifications. The attack was supposed to begin at 3:30 a.m. on July 30,but Burnside had trouble getting his subterranean bomb to detonate. His men finally succeeded at 4:44 a.m. The mine, filled with 320 kegs (8,000 pounds) of powder, blew up, throwing about 100,000 cubic feet of earth, the salient, guns, and men manning the fort a hundred feet into the air. Confederate major general Bushrod Johnson reported 278 of his men killed in the explosion, with another 76 missing. Years later Colonel Fitz William McMaster reported 56 known dead, with 260 missing.

The corps of Burnside and Major-General Edward Ord had to pass down a single covered walkway to get across their own line into noman’s land in front of the huge crater. This walkway bottlenecked their movement, and as they got through, most of the men stopped inside the crater. Soldiers at that time were trained to fight in formation. When out of formation they quickly became confused and had difficulty taking orders. Some made it beyond the crater into a labyrinth of Confederate rifle pits, trenches, and bunkers. By 6 a.m. the Confederates had established heavy cross fire both in front of and behind the crater. Rifle fire swept the top of the crater and mortars rained down into it.

Then the African American soldiers of the Fourth Division went in. While most of the previous attackers were still in the crater, somehow they made it between 300 and 400 yards beyond the crater, but they were sent in too late and met strong resistance, forcing them to retreat. As the men of the Fourth Division were pushed back toward the captured rifle pits, they saw other men fleeing from the Confederate assault, so they kept going until they reached the Union trenches. Colonel H. G. Thomas, who commanded a brigade of African American troops, said, “It is but justice to the line officers to say, that more than two-thirds of them were shot; and to the colored troops, that the white troops were running back just ahead of them.” The resulting stampede of about 2,000 men occurred just before 9 a.m. Seizing the advantage, some of the Confederates moved up to about twenty-five yards from the crater.

About an hour later, on receiving telegrams that their assaults were being repulsed, Grant and Meade called off the attack. It took until noon for most of the men to get back through the bottleneck. This is when the Union suffered most of its losses. Just before noon Burnside sent the evacuation order into the crater. The Confederates launched two more assaults, regaining the crater and their original line at 2 p.m. Because of the bottleneck, only around 8,500 of the 40,000 to 50,000 Union troops lined up for battle even made it across the Union line.

Burnside, a munitions manufacturer before the war, had focused his attention on the mine, disregarding orders for other preparations. Later he insisted that he didn’t want to tip off the Confederates to the pending attack. From Northern newspapers, deserters, and prisoners, the Confederates knew of the mine, but they didn’t know when it was to go off, so Beauregard had additional trenches and works constructed in preparation for the attack.

Burnside was also terrible at reporting to Major-General Meade, often ignoring Meade’s frantic demands for information. When he responded, he did so with minimal information that didn’t reveal much. Grant had to make several visits to the Union trenches to determine how matters were progressing.

Meade, technically in charge of the battle, was about three-quarters of a mile away, where he received telegraphic communications from all along the line. He couldn’t tell what was happening and feared that if he went to the front he’d miss an important communication from another part of the field. He tried to send orders based on the snippets of information he did receive, but these orders just made things worse.

The battle became a major fiasco for the Union and a minor incident for the Confederacy. As a result, the ongoing standoff between the armies of Grant and Lee remained in a stalemate for eight more months.

THE LONG DELAY

Major-General Joshua Chamberlain (See biography, page 174.)

Evil-minded people were trying to make our men believe that Grant and Lincoln were making this long delay in front of Petersburg in order to secure their continuance in office. But this was an outrage upon those noble characters, and an insult to the common sense of every man among us. We knew that the surest way for our high officials to hold their place was by no means to court delay, but to strike a quick, bold blow at the enemy.

Grant’s change of base from the Rappahannock to the James, and his immediate objective from the front of Richmond to its rear by way of Petersburg, called for no adverse criticism. Although technically a change of base, it was not a change in his grand purpose—“to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.” That meant there was to be no retreating. And this might justly be considered a master stroke of grand tactics in the continuous movement to turn Lee’s right, and also cut his communications.

When we understood the purpose of this move we believed it to be good tactics, and we took it up with hope and cheer. Our army was skilfully withdrawn from the front of a watchful and active enemy, and the main body of our army was before Petersburg before Lee knew it had crossed the James.

The first blow was well delivered; but a series of shortcomings, for which it must be said neither the men nor their immediate commanders were responsible, brought all to nought. Successive assaults on the enemy’s lines were made as corps after corps extended leftward; but gallant fighting left little to show but its cost.

By this time it was too late; all Lee’s army were up and entrenched. We encountered a far outnumbering force of veteran troops well entrenched and a cross-fire of twenty guns in earthworks planted with forethought and skill. Desperate valor could accomplish nothing but its own demonstration. Our veterans were hurled back over the stricken field, or left upon it—I, too, proud witness and sharer of their fate. I am not of Virginia blood; she is of mine. So ended the evening of the second day. And the army sat down to that ten months’ symposium, from which twenty thousand men never rose.

As for Grant, he was like Thor, the hammerer; striking blow after blow, intent on his purpose to beat his way through, somewhat reckless of the cost. Yet he was the first one of our commanders who dared to pursue his policy of delay without apology or fear of overruling. He made it a condition of his acceptancy of the chief command that he should not be interfered with from Washington. That gave him more freedom and “discretion” than any of his predecessors. He had somehow, with all his modesty, the rare faculty of controlling his superiors as well as his subordinates. He outfaced Stanton, captivated the President, and even compelled acquiescence or silence from that dread source of paralyzing power—the Congressional Committee on the conduct of the war.

The Government and the country had to exercise patience—with us no doubt, and even with General Grant.

TRENCH WARFARE

The Civil War transformed warfare in many ways. With many new innovations and rapid improvements in weaponry, commanders had a difficult time adjusting tactics to keep up. For much of the war, officers maintained control over their men by marching them around in formation. When they lost formation, the officers tended to lose control until they were able to re-form. Often soldiers didn’t know what the objective was. They were trained to obey commands. When their officer was wounded or killed, they usually didn’t know what to do, leading to many inglorious, disorderly retreats.

When attacking, they used the old Napoleonic tactic of charging in a tight group, the idea being that if you bunch enough men together and they run really fast, enough of the attackers will reach the enemy to stick them with bayonets or for attacking cavalry to kill the defenders with sabers. This strategy worked when the defenders were armed with muzzle-loading, smooth-bore muskets, but as firearms and ammunition improved, soldiers loaded and fired faster, and their guns shot farther and more accurately, doing more damage. Early in the war a formation could march toward a defensive position and not sustain many casualties until the last hundred yards. Then they increased their march to quick time for their bayonet charge, receiving two or three volleys from the defenders before engaging in hand-to-hand combat. Oddly, they didn’t charge at double-quick time.

Just by adding rifling to muskets and cannon, defenders could fire up to eighteen effective volleys starting at a distance of 1,000 yards. Charging while exposed into weapons such as these resulted in particularly bloody repulses, such as Marye’s Heights, Cold Harbor, and Pickett’s Charge. The introduction of repeating rifles and machine guns made these charges even worse. Since it was difficult to get close enough to use sabers and bayonets, these began to fade from use, and hand-to-hand combat became relatively rare. Of around 250,000 wounded treated at Union hospitals, only 922 suffered from saber or bayonet wounds. Still, it took many senseless slaughters before the generals realized they had to change their tactics—but even then they didn’t know what to do.

When frontal assaults no longer worked, two armies suddenly found themselves facing each other in a stalemate. Snipers picked off anyone in an exposed position, so they began digging foxholes, rifle pits, and trenches to protect themselves. Thus trench warfare was born.

Lee, an engineer, put such emphasis on digging in and creating extensive systems of fortifications as defensive positions early in the war that he soon became known derisively as the “King of Spades,” but it helped him succeed. Sandbags and gabions—large baskets filled with rocks or dirt—created or reinforced walls. Bomb shelters provided further protection with a thick roof of logs and dirt. Networks of trenches usually ran for miles.

Prior to trench warfare, using available protective cover or crawling along the ground was considered cowardly and dishonorable. Suddenly maintaining cover and the use of camouflage became a requirement. Trench periscopes allowed men to spy over trenches without exposure.

Different weapons were used to strike at hidden opponents. Trench mortars lobbed shells high into the air so they could drop down into trenches. Hand grenades flew across no-man’s land into opposing trenches. Snipers constantly scanned the opposing line for anything exposed.

Defenses were needed in case the enemy suddenly launched a surprise attack by going over the top, so defenders placed a variety of obstacles in front of their trenches. A fraise resembled a knocked-over picket fence, with a row of sharpened stakes tied or wired together and angled to point toward the enemy. A cheval-de-frise, primarily a barrier against cavalry, consisted of a central log through which stakes alternated at right angles so, endwise, they formed a row of X’s. The abatis, sometimes called a fraise or cheval-de-frise, was a barricade of cut-down trees laid in front of a trench with sharpened branches pointed toward the enemy.

Fortifications generally consisted of one or more rows of abatis or similar barriers along with rifle pits for skirmishers and pickets connected by trenches. Behind this usually lay a two- to sixfoot-deep ditch. Behind that, four to eight feet from ground level, rose a rampart or embankment of dirt faced with a wall of logs or stone, topped with logs or sandbags, with gaps for firing through. On the back of the rampart, if it was higher than four feet, was a step on which men could stand when firing over the parapet. Behind all this ran a covered walkway to protect soldiers passing to the rear. Batteries and forts often looked down on the trenches. And all of this was repeated by the enemy along their line.

Such fortifications were difficult to overcome. Unless they could be breached or flanked, the confrontation essentially became a siege or near siege—a battle of attrition in which each side slowly ground away at the other until one finally gave out.

PLAN OF ATTACK

General Ulysses S. Grant (See biography, page 54.)

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine from about the centre of his front under the Confederate works confronting him. He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had submitted the scheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men occupied. His position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. The position of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. In the bottom of this ravine the work commenced.

The position was unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy’s line at that point was re-entering [recessed], so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point.

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that Lee was coming out to make an attack upon us—the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. I concluded to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that Lee had had.

I had other objects in view, however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry Petersburg if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many of Lee’s troops away from the south side of the James River as possible. Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock’s corps and Sheridan’s cavalry to the north side.

The plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and destroy as much as they could of the Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. We were successful in drawing the enemy’s troops to the north side of the James as I expected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minute orders on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged.

Meade’s instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were all that I can see now was necessary. The only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy’s works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under their lines. Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge them.

On the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James River with their troops. Under cover of night they started to recross the bridge at Deep Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the mine.

[General Gouverneur] Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside’s corps, while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under Meade, was to form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in. All were to clear off the parapets and the abatis in their front so as to leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside’s corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by Ord’s and Warren’s corps.

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making ready was concerned. Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they could. The four divisions of his corps were commanded by Generals [Robert] Potter, [Orlando] Willcox, [James] Ledlie and [Edward] Ferrero. The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to make the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took Ledlie’s division—a worse selection than the first could have been.¹⁹ In fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division commanders Burnside had who were equal to the occasion.

The crater presented an obstacle of fearful magnitude. I suppose it was a hole of about 200 feet in length, by perhaps 50 or 60 feet in width, and nearly 30 feet in depth. The sides of it were composed of jagged masses of clay projecting from loose sand. It was an obstacle which it was perfectly impossible for any military organization to pass over intact, even if not exposed to fire.

—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHARLES LORING, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL OF BURNSIDE’S CORPS, TESTIFYING BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

Having occasion to be down in the gallery the greater part of the time, I was in it at about 5 a.m. the 30th instant, when I was startled by the sound of a very heavy explosion and thrown from my feet by the shock, the ground or rather gallery heaved and waved as if from an earthquake. After recovering from our surprise I took the three men out, who were at work in the mine, and on reaching the outside saw that the works had been utterly destroyed for a distance of 100 or 150 yards as near as I could judge.

—SERGEANT A. H. SMYTH, WORKING IN ONE OF THE CONFEDERATE MINE SHAFTS TRYING TO LOCATE THE UNION’S MINE

A MOST UNFORTUNATE OPERATION

Major-General George Meade (See biography, page 92.)

As soon as the mine was sprung, the 1st division 9th corps, Brigadier-General Ledlie commanding, mixed forward and occupied the crater without opposition. No advance, however, was made from the crater to the ridge, some 400 yards beyond; Brigadier-General Ledlie giving as a reason for not pushing forward, that the enemy could occupy the crater in his rear, he seeming to forget that the rest of his corps and all the 18th corps were waiting to occupy the crater and follow him.

The earth around us trembled and heaved so violently that I was lifted to my feet. Then the earth along the enemy’s lines opened, and fire and smoke shot upward seventy-five or one hundred feet. The air was filled with earth, cannon, caissons, sand-bags and living men, and with everything else within the exploded fort. I gave the command ‘Forward,’ but at the outset a serious difficulty had to be surmounted. Our own works, which were very high at this point, had not been prepared for scaling. But scale them in some way we must, and ladders were improvised by the men placing their bayonets between the logs in the works and holding the other end at their hip or on shoulders, thus forming steps over which men climbed. Our colors were the first to be planted on the ruined fort. Nearly all who were within it were killed or buried alive. We succeeded in taking out many—some whose feet would be waving above their burial-place; others, having an arm, hand, or head only, uncovered; others, alive but terribly shaken.

—BREVET MAJOR CHARLES HOUGHTON

Brigadier-Generals Potter and Wilcox, commanding 2d and 3d divisions, 9th corps, advanced simultaneously with Ledlie, and endeavored to occupy parts of the enemy’s line on Ledlie’s right and left, so as to cover those flanks, respectively, but on reaching the enemy’s line Ledlie’s men were found occupying the vacated parts, both to the right and left of the crater, in consequence of which the men of the several divisions got mixed up, and a scene of disorder and confusion commenced, which seems to have continued to the end of the operations.

In the mean time, the enemy rallying from the confusion incident to the explosion, began forming his infantry in a ravine to the right, and planting his artillery both on the right and left of the crater. Seeing this, Potter was enabled to get his men out of the crater and enemy’s line, and had formed them for an attack on the right, when he received an order to attack the crest of the ridge. Notwithstanding he had to change front in the presence of the enemy, he succeeded not only in doing so, but, as he reports, advancing to within a few yards of the crest, which he would have taken if he had been supported.

This was after 7 a.m., more than two hours after Ledlie had occupied the crater, and yet he had made no advance. He, however, states that he was forming to advance when the 4th division, (colored troops,) General Ferrero commanding, came rushing into the crater, and threw his men into confusion. The 4th division passed beyond the crater, and made an assault, when they encountered a heavy fire of artillery and infantry, which threw them into inextricable confusion, and they retired in disorder through the troops in the crater, and back into our lines. In the mean time, in ignorance of what was occurring, I sent orders to Major-General Ord, commanding 18th corps, who was expected to follow the 9th, to advance at once on the right of the 9th, and independently of the latter. To this General Ord replied, the only debouches were choked up with the 9th corps, which had not all advanced at this time.

He, however, pushed on a brigade of Turner’s division over the 9th corps parapets, and directed it to charge the enemy’s line on the right, where it was still occupied. While it was about executing this order, the disorganized 4th division (colored) of the 9th corps came rushing back and carrying everything with them, including Turner’s brigade.

By this time—between 8 and 9 a.m.—the enemy, seeing the hesitation and confusion on our part, having planted batteries on both flanks in ravines where our artillery could not reach them, opened a heavy fire, not only on the ground in front of the crater, but between it and our lines, their mortars at the same time throwing shells into the dense mass of our men in the crater and adjacent works.

In addition to this artillery fire, the enemy massed his infantry and assaulted the position. Although the assault was repulsed and some heroic fighting was done, particularly on the part of Potter’s division and some regiments of the 18th corps, yet the exhaustion incident to the crowding of the men and the intense heat of the weather, added to the destructive artillery fire of the enemy, produced its effect, and report was brought to me that our men were retiring into our old lines. Being satisfied the moment for success had passed, and that any further attempt would only result in useless sacrifice of life, with the concurrence of the lieutenant general commanding, who was present, I directed the suspension of further offensive movements, and the withdrawal of the troops in the crater when it could be done with security, retaining the position till night if necessary. It appears that when this order reached the crater, 12.20, the greater portion of those that had been in were out; the balance remained for an hour and a half repulsing an attack of the enemy, but on the enemy threatening a second attack, retreating in disorder, losing many prisoners. This terminated this most unfortunate and not very creditable operation.

THE ORDER TO WITHDRAW

Major-General Ambrose Burnside (See biography, page 122.)

Between half past nine and ten o’clock I received two despatches from General Meade with reference to withdrawal. I was very much concerned in reference to the matter, because, although we had met with some reverses, I could not help feeling myself that we could hold the position which we occupied, if we could not gain more ground. In fact I was under the impression at the time that we were gaining ground in the direction of the enemy’s rifle pits to the right and left, and I felt that if troops were put in on our left flank, that then we would have been enabled to establish ourselves on the enemy’s line, which, of course, would have made our position secure. However, that is simply a matter of opinion, upon which the commanding general had to decide.

I also felt that if we could gain no more ground, we could run out lines at an angle to the crater, and establish a salient upon the enemy’s lines, which would be of material advantage to us in future operations, particularly in making him vacate that part of the line which is now opposite my front, and in fact, as I had not given up all hopes of carrying the crest even, if a positive and decided effort were made by all the troops.

But feeling disinclined to withdraw the troops, I got on my horse and rode over to General Meade’s headquarters, which were at my permanent headquarters. He and General Grant were there together. General Ord and I entered the tent, and General Meade questioned General Ord as to the practicability of his troops being withdrawn. I made the remark that none of General Ord’s troops were in the enemy’s line, and he would have no trouble in withdrawing; that none but the troops of the ninth corps were in the line, and I thought that my opinion on that subject would probably be a proper one to be received, and I stated that I did not think that we had fought long enough that day that I felt that the crest could still be carried if a decided effort were made to carry it. To that I received the reply that the order was final, or something to that effect.

This order, I consider, materially affected the result of our withdrawal, inasmuch as the enemy’s forces upon our right and left were entirely unoccupied, and thereby had an opportunity of concentrating upon us during the withdrawal. It could hardly have been expected that the withdrawal could have been made without disaster after all offensive operations had ceased on the right and left, and the supporting force withdrawn from the rear. My only hope was that the force in the crater would be able to hold the position until a covered way could be dug from our advanced line out to the crater, a distance of a little over a hundred yards. This covered way had been commenced both in the crater, and on our advanced line, and I instructed General Ferrero to push it forward as rapidly as possible, with such of his troops as had been driven back and collected in the advanced line.

The communication between the advanced line and the crater was almost entirely cut off; and although the distance was so short, only about a hundred yards, it was next to an impossibility for messengers to reach the crater, much less to send in ammunition and water. The men had become very much exhausted with the heat and labors of the day.

The sun was pouring its fiercest heat down upon us and our suffering wounded. No air was stirring within the crater. It was a sickening sight: men were dead and dying all around us; blood was streaming down the sides of the crater to the bottom, where it gathered in pools for a time before being absorbed by the hard red clay.

—BREVET MAJOR CHARLES HOUGHTON

“THE SADDEST AFFAIR I HAVE WITNESSED”

General Ulysses S. Grant (See biography, page 54.)

City Point, Va., August 1, 1864

Major-General Halleck, Washington, D.C.

The loss in the disaster of Saturday last foots up about 3,500, of whom 450 men were killed and 2,000 wounded. It was the saddest affair I have witnessed in the war. Such opportunity for carrying fortifications I have never seen and do not expect again to have. The enemy with a line of works five miles long had been reduced by our previous movements to the north side of James River to a force of only three divisions. This line was undermined and blown up, carrying a battery and most of a regiment with it. The enemy were taken completely by surprise and did not recover from it for more than an hour.

The crater and several hundred yards of the enemy’s line to the right and left of it and a short detached line in front of the crater were occupied by our troops without opposition. Immediately in front of this and not 150 yards off [in reality, 500 yards], with clear ground intervening, was the crest of the ridge leading into town, and which, if carried, the enemy would have made no resistance, but would have continued a flight already commenced. It was three hours from the time our troops first occupied their works before the enemy took possession of this crest. I am constrained to believe that had instructions been promptly obeyed that Petersburg would have been carried with all the artillery and a large number of prisoners without a loss of 300 men. It was in getting back to our lines that the loss was sustained. The enemy attempted to charge and retake the line captured from them and were repulsed with heavy loss by our artillery; their loss in killed must be greater than ours, whilst our loss in wounded and captured is four times that of the enemy.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General

Addenda

City Point, August 2, 1864—9.30 p.m.

Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff:

I have the honor to request that the President may direct a court of inquiry, to assemble without delay at such place as the presiding officer may appoint, to examine into and report upon the facts and circumstances attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemy’s position in front of Petersburg on the morning of July 30, 1864, and also to report whether, in their judgment, any officer or officers are censurable for the failure of the troops to carry into successful execution the orders issued for the occasion, and I would suggest the following detail: Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock, Brig. Gen. E. B. Ayres, Brig. Gen. N. A. Miles, Volunteer service: Col. E. Schriver, inspector-general and recorder.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine. When it did explode it was very successful. Instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions, commenced playing. Ledlie’s division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they started. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as I expected they would do.

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that our men were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation.

It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was nine o’clock before Lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander [Burnside] and the incompetency of the division commander [Brigadier-General Ledlie] who was sent to lead the assault.

I am satisfied that if the troops had been properly commanded, and been led in accordance with General Meade’s order, we would have captured Petersburg with all the artillery and a good portion of its support, without the loss of 500 men. There was a full half hour, I think, when there was no fire against our men, and they could have marched past the enemy’s intrenchments just as they could in the open country.

But that opportunity was lost in consequence of the division commanders not going with their men, but allowing them to go into the enemy’s intrenchments and spread themselves there, without going on further, thus giving the enemy time to collect and organize against them.

I blame myself a little for one thing. General Meade made his orders most perfectly. I do not think that now, knowing all the facts, I could improve upon his order. But I was informed of this fact: that General Burnside, who was fully alive to the importance of this thing, trusted to the pulling of straws which division should lead. It happened to fall on what I thought was the worst commander in his corps. I knew that fact before the mine was exploded, but did nothing in regard to it. That is the only thing I blame myself for. I knew the man was the one that I considered the poorest division commander that General Burnside had—I mean General Ledlie.

If they had marched through to the crest of that ridge they would then have taken everything in rear. I do not think there would have been any opposition at all to our troops had that been done. I think we would have cut off entirely those of the enemy to our right, while those on the left would have tried to make their escape across the Appomattox.

General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in front, and I believe if he had done so it would have been a success. Still I agreed with General Meade in his objection to that plan. General Meade said that if we put the colored troops in front, (we had only that one division,) and it should prove a failure, it would then be said, and very properly, that we were shoving those people ahead to get killed because we did not care anything about them. But that could not be said if we put white troops in front. That is the only point General Meade changed after he had given his orders to General Burnside. It was then that General Burnside left his three division commanders to toss coppers or draw straws which should and which should not go in front.

THE COURT OF INQUIRY

Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock (See biography, page 116.)

After losing the battle, Meade and Burnside blamed each other for the failure. The generals recommended by Grant conducted the court of inquiry ordered by President Lincoln, with Hancock presiding. After collecting testimony, reports, and dispatches from Grant on down, the court determined the following:

The causes of failure are:

1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement being mainly by flank instead of extended front. General Meade’s order indicated that columns of assault should be employed to take Cemetery hill, and that proper passages should be prepared for those columns It is the opinion of the court that there were no proper columns of assault. The troops should have been formed in the open ground in front of the point of attack parallel to the line of the enemy’s works. The evidence shows that one or more columns might have passed over at, and to the left of the crater without any previous preparation of the ground.
2. The halting of the troops in the crater instead of going forward to the crest, when there was no fire of any consequence from the enemy.
3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working parties, and of materials and tools for their use, in the 9th corps.
4. That some parts of the assaulting columns were not properly led.
5. The want of a competent common head at the scene of the assault, to direct affairs as occurrences should demand.²⁰

Had not failure ensued from the above causes and the crest been gained, the success might have been jeoparded by the failure to have prepared in season proper and adequate debouches through the 9th corps’ lines for troops, and especially for field artillery, as ordered by Major-General Meade.

The court further cited the failures of five officers, primarily Burnside, saying:

I.   Major-General A. E. Burnside, United States volunteers, he having failed to obey the orders of the commanding general:

1. In not giving such formation to his assaulting column as to insure a reasonable prospect of success;
2. In not preparing his parapets and abatis for the passage of the columns of assault;
3. In not employing engineer officers who reported to him to lead the assaulting columns with working parties, and not causing to be provided proper materials necessary for crowning the crest when the assaulting columns should arrive there;
4. In neglecting to execute Major-General Meade’s orders, respecting the prompt advance of General Ledlie’s troops from the crater to the crest; or, in default of accomplishing that, not causing those troops to fall back and give place to other troops more willing and equal to the task, instead of delaying until the opportunity passed away, thus affording time for the enemy to recover from his surprise, concentrate his fire, and bring his troops to operate against the Union troops assembled uselessly in the crater.

   Notwithstanding the failure to comply with orders, and to apply proper military principles, ascribed to General Burnside, the court is satisfied he believed that the measures taken by him would insure success.

Congress’s Committee on the Conduct of the War investigated further, taking statements from and questioning many of the same witnesses, along with a few more. The committee included transcripts of Hancock’s court in its record and placed all blame on Meade.

Your committee cannot, from all the testimony, avoid the conclusion that the first and great cause of disaster was the change made on the afternoon preceding the attack, in the arrangement of General Burnside to place the division of colored troops in the advance. The reasons assigned by General Burnside for not taking one of his divisions of white troops for that purpose are fully justified by the result of the attack. Their previous arduous labors, and peculiar position, exposed continually to the enemy’s fire, had, as it were, trained them in the habit of seeking shelter; and, true to that training, they sought shelter the first opportunity that presented itself after leaving our lines. And it is but reasonable to suppose that the immediate commander of a corps is better acquainted with the condition and efficiency of particular divisions of his corps than a general further removed from them.

The conduct of the colored troops, when they were put into action, would seem to fully justify the confidence that General Burnside reposed in them. And General Grant himself, in his testimony, expresses his belief that if they had been placed in the advance, as General Burnside desired, the assault would have been successful, although at the time the colored troops were ordered in the white troops already in were in confusion, and had failed in the assault upon the crest beyond the crater, and the fire of the enemy had become exceedingly destructive. The colored troops advanced in good order, passed through the enemy’s lines and beyond our disorganized troops there, and, stopping but a short time to reform, made the charge as directed. But the fire of the enemy was too strong, and some others of our troops hurrying back through their lines, they were thrown into confusion and forced to retire.

Your committee desire to say that, in the statement of facts and conclusions which they present in their report, they wish to be distinctly understood as in no degree censuring the conduct of the troops engaged in this assault.

In conclusion they, your committee, must say that, in their opinion, the cause of the disastrous result of the assault of the 30th of July last is mainly attributable to the fact that the plans and suggestions of the general who had devoted his attention for so long a time to the subject, who had carried out to a successful completion the project of mining the enemy’s works, and who had carefully selected and drilled his troops for the purpose of securing whatever advantages might be attainable from the explosion of the mine, should have been so entirely disregarded by a general who had evinced no faith in the successful prosecution of that work, had aided it by no countenance or open approval, and had assumed the entire direction and control only when it was completed, and the time had come for reaping any advantages that might be derived from it.

Burnside was charged with not following orders and was relieved of duties. Meade never called him back up.

General Edward Ferrero (seated on the left) with his staff and a sentry at Petersburg in August 1864. Ferrero was the commander of a division of African-American soldiers.