[670] This volume contains a selection of articles and pamphlets on analytical psychology written at intervals during the past fourteen years.2 These years have seen the development of a new discipline and, as is usual in such a case, have involved many changes of viewpoint, conception, and formulation.
[671] It is not my intention to present the fundamental concepts of analytical psychology in this book. The volume does, however, throw some light on a certain line of development which is especially characteristic of the Zurich school of psychoanalysis.
[672] As is well known, the merit of discovering the new analytical method of general psychology belongs to Professor Freud of Vienna. His original views have had to undergo many important modifications, some of them owing to the work done at Zurich, in spite of the fact that he himself is far from agreeing with the standpoint of this school.
[673] I cannot here explain the fundamental differences between the two schools but would mention only the following: The Viennese School adopts an exclusively sexualistic standpoint while that of the Zurich School is symbolistic. The Viennese School interprets the psychological symbol semiotically, as a sign or token of certain primitive psychosexual processes. Its method is analytical and causal. The Zurich School recognizes the scientific possibility of such a conception but denies its exclusive validity, for it does not interpret the psychological symbol semiotically only but also symbolistically, that is, it attributes a positive value to the symbol.
[674] The value of the symbol does not depend merely on historical causes; its chief importance lies in the fact that it has a meaning for the actual present and for the future, in their psychological aspects. For the Zurich School the symbol is not merely a sign of something repressed and concealed, but is at the same time an attempt to comprehend and to point the way to the further psychological development of the individual. Thus we add a prospective meaning to the retrospective value of the symbol.
[675] The method of the Zurich School, therefore, is not only analytical and causal but synthetic and prospective, in recognition of the fact that the human mind is characterized by fines (aims) as well as by causae. This deserves particular emphasis, because there are two types of psychology, the one following the principle of hedonism, the other the power principle. The philosophical counterpart of the former type is scientific materialism and of the latter the philosophy of Nietzsche. The principle of the Freudian theory is hedonism, while the theory of Adler (one of Freud’s earliest personal pupils) is founded on the power principle.
[676] The Zurich School, recognizing the existence of these two types (also remarked by the late Professor William James), considers that the views of Freud and Adler are one-sided and valid only within the limits of their corresponding type. Both principles exist in every individual though not in equal proportions.
[677] Thus, it is obvious that every psychological symbol has two aspects and should be interpreted in accordance with both principles. Freud and Adler interpret in the analytical and causal way, reducing to the infantile and primitive. Thus with Freud the conception of the “aim” is the fulfilment of the wish, while with Adler it is the usurpation of power. In their practical analytical work both authors take the standpoint which brings to light only infantile and grossly egoistic aims.
[678] The Zurich School is convinced that within the limits of a diseased mental attitude the psychology is such as Freud and Adler describe. It is, indeed, just on account of such an impossible and childish psychology that the individual is in a state of inner dissociation and hence neurotic. The Zurich School, therefore, in agreement with them so far, also reduces the psychological symbol (the fantasy-products of the patient) to his fundamental infantile hedonism or infantile desire for power. Freud and Adler content themselves with the result of mere reduction, which accords with their scientific biologism and naturalism.
[679] But here a very important question arises. Can man obey the fundamental and primitive impulses of his nature without gravely injuring himself or his fellow beings? He cannot assert either his sexual desire or his desire for power unlimitedly in the face of limits which are very restrictive. The Zurich School has in view the end-result of analysis, and it regards the fundamental thoughts and impulses of the unconscious as symbols, indicative of a definite line of future development. We must admit, however, that there is no scientific justification for such a procedure, because our present-day science is based wholly on causality. But causality is only one principle, and psychology cannot be exhausted by causal methods only, because the mind lives by aims as well. Besides this controversial philosophical argument we have another of much greater value in favour of our hypothesis, namely that of vital necessity. It is impossible to live according to the promptings of infantile hedonism or according to a childish desire for power. If these are to be given a place they must be taken symbolically. Out of the symbolic application of infantile trends there evolves an attitude which may be termed philosophic or religious, and these terms characterize sufficiently well the lines of the individual’s further development. The individual is not just a fixed and unchangeable complex of psychological facts; he is also an extremely variable entity. By an exclusive reduction to causes the primitive trends of a personality are reinforced; this is helpful only when these primitive tendencies are balanced by a recognition of their symbolic value. Analysis and reduction lead to causal truth; this by itself does not help us to live but only induces resignation and hopelessness. On the other hand, the recognition of the intrinsic value of a symbol leads to constructive truth and helps us to live; it inspires hopefulness and furthers the possibility of future development.
[680] The functional importance of the symbol is clearly shown in the history of civilization. For thousands of years the religious symbol proved a most efficacious device in the moral education of mankind. Only a prejudiced mind could deny such an obvious fact. Concrete values cannot take the place of the symbol; only new and more effective symbols can be substituted for those that are antiquated and outworn and have lost their efficacy through the progress of intellectual analysis and understanding. The further development of the individual can be brought about only by means of symbols which represent something far in advance of himself and whose intellectual meanings cannot yet be grasped entirely. The individual unconscious produces such symbols, and they are of the greatest possible value in the moral development of the personality.
[681] Man almost invariably has philosophic and religious views concerning the meaning of the world and of his own life. There are some who are proud to have none. But these are exceptions outside the common path of mankind; they lack an important function which has proved itself to be indispensable to the human psyche.
[682] In such cases we find in the unconscious, instead of modern symbolism, an antiquated, archaic view of the world and of life. If a necessary psychological function is not represented in the sphere of consciousness it exists in the unconscious in the form of an archaic or embryonic prototype.
[683] This brief résumé may show the reader what he may expect not to find in this collection of papers. The essays are stations on the way toward the more general views developed above.
Küsnacht / Zurich, January 1916
[684] In agreement with my honoured collaborator, Dr. C. E. Long, I have made certain additions to the second edition of this book. It should especially be noted that a new chapter on “The Conception of the Unconscious”3 has been added. This is a lecture I gave early in 1916 to the Zurich Society for Analytical Psychology. It provides a general survey of a most important problem in practical analysis, namely the relation of the ego to the psychological non-ego. Chapter XIV, “The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes,”4 has been fundamentally revised, and I have taken the opportunity to incorporate an article5 that describes the results of more recent researches.
[685] In accordance with my usual method of working, my description is as generalized as possible. My habit in daily practice is to confine myself for some time to studying the human material. I then abstract as general a formula as possible from the data collected, obtaining from it a point of view and applying it in my practical work until it has been either confirmed, modified, or else abandoned. If it is confirmed, I publish it as a general viewpoint without giving the empirical material. I introduce the material amassed in the course of my practice only in the form of example or illustration. I therefore beg the reader not to consider the views I present as mere fabrications of my brain. They are, as a matter of fact, the results of extensive experience and ripe reflection.
[686] These additions will enable the reader of the second edition to familiarize himself with the recent views of the Zurich School.
[687] As regards the criticism encountered by the first edition of this work, I was pleased to find my writings were received with much more open-mindedness among English critics than was the case in Germany, where they are met with the silence born of contempt. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Agnes Savill for an exceptionally understanding criticism in the Medical Press. My thanks are also due to Dr. T. W. Mitchell for an exhaustive review in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research.6 This critic takes exception to my heresy respecting causality. He considers that I am entering upon a perilous, because unscientific, course when I question the sole validity of the causal viewpoint in psychology. I sympathize with him, but in my opinion the nature of the human mind compels us to take the finalistic view. It cannot be disputed that, psychologically speaking, we are living and working day by day according to the principle of directed aim or purpose as well as that of causality. A psychological theory must necessarily adapt itself to this fact. What is plainly directed towards a goal cannot be given an exclusively causalistic explanation, otherwise we should be led to the conclusion expressed in Moleschott’s famous dictum: “Man ist was er isst” (Man is what he eats). We must always bear in mind that causality is a point of view. It affirms the inevitable and immutable relation of a series of events: a-b-c-z. Since this relation is fixed, and according to the causal point of view must necessarily be so, looked at logically the order may also be reversed. Finality is also a point of view, and it is empirically justified by the existence of series of events in which the causal connection is indeed evident but the meaning of which only becomes intelligible in terms of end-products (final effects). Ordinary life furnishes the best instances of this. The causal explanation must be mechanistic if we are not to postulate a metaphysical entity as first cause. For instance, if we adopt Freud’s sexual theory and assign primary importance psychologically to the function of the genital glands, the brain is seen as an appendage of the genital glands. If we approach the Viennese concept of sexuality, with all its vague omnipotence, in a strictly scientific manner and reduce it to its physiological basis, we shall arrive at the first cause, according to which psychic life is for the most, or the most important part, tension and relaxation of the genital glands. If we assume for the moment that this mechanistic explanation is “true,” it would be the sort of truth which is exceptionally tiresome and rigidly limited in scope. A similar statement would be that the genital glands cannot function without adequate nourishment, the inference being that sexuality is a subsidiary function of nutrition. The truth of this forms an important chapter in the biology of the lower forms of life.
[688] But if we wish to work in a really psychological way we shall want to know the meaning of psychological phenomena. After learning what kinds of steel the various parts of a locomotive are made of, and what iron-works and mines they come from, we do not really know anything about the locomotive’s function, that is to say its meaning. But “function” as conceived by modern science is by no means exclusively a causal concept; it is especially a final or “teleological” one. For it is impossible to consider the psyche from the causal standpoint only; we are obliged to consider it also from the final point of view. As Dr. Mitchell remarks, it is impossible to think of causal determination as having at the same time a finalistic reference. That would be an obvious contradiction. But the theory of cognition does not need to remain on a pre-Kantian level. It is well known that Kant showed very clearly that the mechanistic and the teleological viewpoints are not constituent (objective) principles—as it were, qualities of the object—but that they are purely regulative (subjective) principles of thought, and, as such, not mutually inconsistent. I can, for example, easily conceive the following thesis and antithesis:
Thesis: Everything came into existence according to mechanistic laws.
Antithesis: Some things did not come into existence according to mechanistic laws only.
Kant says to this: Reason cannot prove either of these principles because a priori the purely empirical laws of nature cannot give us a determinative principle regarding the potentiality of events.
[689] As a matter of fact, modern physics has necessarily been converted from the idea of pure mechanism to the finalistic concept of the conservation of energy, because the mechanistic explanation recognizes only reversible processes whereas the actual truth is that the processes of nature are irreversible. This fact led to the concept of an energy that tends towards relief of tension and hence towards a definitive final state.
[690] Obviously, I consider both these points of view necessary, the causal as well as the final, but would at the same time stress that since Kant’s time we have come to realize that the two viewpoints are not antagonistic if they are regarded as regulative principles of thought and not as constituent principles of the process of nature itself.
[691] In speaking of the reviews of this book I must mention some that seem to me wide of the mark. I was once again struck by the fact that certain critics cannot distinguish between the theoretical explanation given by the author and the fantastic ideas produced by the patient. One of my critics is guilty of this confusion when discussing “On the Significance of Number Dreams.” The associations to the quotation from the Bible in this paper are, as every attentive reader will perceive, not arbitrary explanations of my own but a cryptomnesic conglomeration emanating not from my brain at all but from that of the patient. Surely it is not difficult to see that this conglomeration of numbers corresponds exactly to the unconscious psychological function from which the whole mysticism of numbers originated, Pythagorean, cabalistic, and so forth, back to very early times.
[692] I am grateful to my serious reviewers, and should like here to express my thanks also to Mrs. Harold F. McCormick for her generous help in the production of this book.
June 1917