SIXTEEN
Recent Developments in the Chinese Military
The elderly party leaders who gathered together the morning after the military quelled demonstrations at Tiananmen Square and a hundred other cities in China in June 1989 must have been profoundly disconcerted by the events they had witnessed. Immediately dubbed the Eight Immortals, after the Daoist deities of Chinese legend, several of them remembered the demonstrations against the Chinese government in May 1919 that had been instrumental in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Now they, the survivors of the revolutionary era, had become the target of a new generation of rebellious youth.
Moreover, the reaction of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) called into question its adherence to a major tenet of Mao Zedong's creed—that the party must always control the gun; the gun must never control the party. When ordered to deal with the demonstrators, a number of officers and soldiers said openly, in the presence of television cameras, that the people's army should not be used against the people. Some commanders expressed reluctance to use force against the demonstrators, and several retired military icons of the revolutionary era reportedly sent a letter to the leadership opposing the use of the PLA in this manner. Deng Xiaoping must have reflected on the wisdom of his 1982 decision to more clearly differentiate the party, government, and military hierarchies.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE TIANANMEN INCIDENT
Other events external to China would reinforce the conviction that a strong response was needed. Later in 1989, the Romanian army joined demonstrators in overthrowing the Communist government; a democratic republic was proclaimed, and the country's long-serving president, Nicolae Ceauşescu, and his wife were executed. In the Soviet Union, the military did not intervene to save communism. Not only was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union turned out of power, but the nation itself disintegrated. Communism, and those who had ruled in its name, were discredited all over Europe. Although the Chinese leadership doubtless counted itself fortunate to have escaped this annus horribilis, its members were aware that a reprise of the demonstrations might portend a similar fate for them. Deng Xiaoping had been able to cajole hesitant military leaders to obey by virtue of his military experience in the civil war that had confirmed the CCP in power in 1949 and his close connections with the PLA, but it was unlikely that any future leader would be able to do so. Jiang Zemin, whom Deng had designated as his heir apparent, had no military credentials, and the PLA had been successful in blocking an earlier heir apparent, Hu Yaobang, from appointment as head of the party's Central Military Commission (CMC) for similar reasons.
Measures were quickly instituted to obtain loyalty. Those commanders who had hesitated to obey orders were dismissed. Several loyal commanders, including Yang Shangkun, who simultaneously held the position of president of China, and his half brother Yang Baibing were eased out of the military hierarchy to ensure that they would not adversely impact Jiang Zemin's place in the succession. Officers and men were required to take loyalty oaths to reinforce the dictum that this was the party's army. The notion that the military should serve the state rather than the party, which had apparently gained credence in some informal military salons, was declared anathema, and the seminars themselves closed down.
Military training was mandated for college students; at the most demonstration-prone institutions, the course was scheduled to occupy the entire freshman year. After a time, this highly unpopular measure, which students regarded as punitive, was discontinued. A patriotism campaign began. Radio and television featured patriotic music. Films and television programs extolled the heroic deeds that had brought the People's Republic of China (PRC) into existence, with a heavy emphasis on the military's part in the war of liberation. The PLA's literature and art division budgeted $221.3 million—far in excess of the budgets for all 150 films made in China during 1989—to produce a three-part epic, Great Strategic Battles.
The creation of an external enemy was also helpful in achieving post-Tiananmen unity. The United States proved especially useful in this regard. Initially, President George H. W. Bush was reluctant to impose sanctions on the Chinese government, arguing that quiet diplomacy would be more effective and that, in any case, the PRC would evolve peacefully into a democracy as its economic prosperity increased. However, an outraged American public, appalled at what it regarded as egregious violations of human rights, pressured the government to impose sanctions. As formulated by the Bush administration, the sanctions fell particularly heavily on the military. High-level visits, including military visits, were suspended, and military sales to the PRC of all items controlled by the State Department and cited in its Munitions Control List were banned until Beijing amended its human rights record. Congress went further, introducing legislation to suspend military sales, nuclear cooperation, and the export of American-made satellites for launching by Chinese rockets. It also halted the further liberalization of existing export controls, barring U.S. products with potential military applications from going to China. A movement to revoke the PRC's most-favored-nation trade status gained momentum, and its implementation was only narrowly evaded by a technicality.
The Chinese government reacted sharply against American actions undertaken to induce China to modify its behavior. The state-controlled media interpreted Bush's prediction of peaceful evolution, which he had advanced to soothe those who wanted to take harsh actions against the PRC, in the worst possible light. They accused the United States of plotting to undermine socialism and the leadership of the socialist state, substituting capitalist values that were inappropriate to the Chinese context and leaders who would comply with Washington's wishes. The PLA was reminded that it was the protector of the cherished socialist system and its leadership.
Although the American military sanctions actually had relatively minor effects—President Bush waived some of these soon after imposing them, and alternative channels of acquisition existed—the Beijing leadership began to look for new sources of weapons procurement. Because the Russian government had little need to purchase new weapons from the well-developed defense industry that existed in the USSR, it possessed a large inventory of high-quality weapons and needed money badly. Thus Russia proved to be an excellent source of weapons. So did the smaller but high-quality Israeli defense industry.
Having an enemy entails preparing to defend oneself should a confrontation arise. For some years, the PLA had been announcing breakthroughs in the development of specific items, such as flight simulators, which were typically described as being world class. Its leadership was therefore taken aback at the technology displayed in the American-led invasion of Iraq during the Gulf War of 1991: the high command emerged from a briefing by the U.S. military attaché with the realization that the PLA had a long way to go before it could challenge the military might of its putative adversary.
Although modernization of the military was a goal of Deng Xiaoping's Four Modernizations and had first been formally mentioned in 1975, defense ranked at the bottom of the list. Deng had been able to convince the military leadership that a strong defense could not be achieved without a firm industrial base to undergird it. The military received its first doubledigit budget increase in 1989. Although this increase was announced before the disturbances began and was therefore not, as some speculated, the PLA's reward for its role in quelling the demonstrations, it proved to be the first in an unbroken string of generous increases. A brief economic recession caused by government actions to reduce the spiking inflation rate, which had given impetus to the demonstrations, had a positive side effect for the PLA: many young people whose alternative was joblessness chose to enlist in the military. By 1992, the economy began to move forward more quickly, facilitating party and government plans to transform the PLA into a politically reliable and militarily capable force. Among the areas impacted were civil-military relations, strategy and doctrine, recruitment and training, budgets, and weaponry.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Although many foreign analysts predicted that the PLA's role in putting down the Tiananmen demonstrations would enable it to play kingmaker in future successions, this did not happen. With the known opposition cleared away by Deng, Jiang Zemin was appointed chair of the CMC and quickly set about creating good relations with the military. Among other things, he paid extensive visits to basic-level units in widely separated parts of the country for heavily scripted and well-publicized conversations with the troops. Not surprisingly, the young men reported that they were happy with their delicious and plentiful rations, had more than enough blankets and warm uniforms, and were pleased to be contributing to the defense of the ancestral land. At the highest levels of the military, Jiang created new billets for three-star generals (the PLA's highest rank), conferring these and other honors in person. He also increased military pay for both recruits and officers, thus enhancing the attractiveness of a military career. In addition, Jiang enforced the retirement ages that Deng had put in place. This enabled him to appoint new people who had been vetted for their presumed loyalty to him.
In July 1998, Jiang had gained enough confidence in his control of the military to order that the PLA divest itself of the business empire it had accrued under Deng's orders. The PLA's industries had underreported profits, diverted attention from the military's raison d'être, and abetted a worrisome increase in the level of corruption. Although the divestiture was less than complete and was accompanied by several forms of subterfuge, the military obeyed the order. Moreover, as the end of Jiang's second fiveyear term as PRC president, party head, and chair of the CMC approached, PLA newspapers praised him to such an extent that it seemed they wished Jiang to stay on. Although he relinquished the other two posts to Hu Jintao, Jiang remained as head of the CMC, thus symbolically separating the party from the gun and creating what the media referred to as two centers of power. After two years, Jiang resigned as CMC chair and was succeeded by Hu, thus ending a situation that many regarded as uncomfortable. Hu Jintao appeared to have no trouble establishing his credentials with military leaders, and there have been no indications of friction between him and the PLA. A recent allegation that the air force staged the test flight of the J-20 stealth plane without informing Hu remains unproved. Some argue that the advance publicity surrounding the test makes his denial of prior knowledge less than credible.
The military presence in the upper echelons of party leadership has been significantly diminished. Two senior officers serve in the party Politburo; there have been no military leaders in the inner sanctum of the Politburo's standing committee since 1997. This has raised concerns that the military might develop autonomous interests that are not necessarily the same as those of party and government leaders. Although this is theoretically possible, there is scant evidence that it has happened thus far.
Richard Bush, a former national intelligence officer for East Asia, believes that the high command will obey direct orders from the civilian leadership; however, because the military is able to shape the way that civilian leadership views national security issues, it can influence whatever orders it is given. Although the Politburo has only two military men among twenty-odd members, the CMC has only two civilians—the party head and his heir apparent as chair and vice-chair—in a military group half that size. The PLA is able to unify its views before presenting them to the civilian leadership. Moreover, unlike in the past, the civilian leadership has no military experience, making it more difficult to refute the military's contentions. Additionally, communications mechanisms between the two hierarchies exist at the operational level. The general office of the party central committee reportedly has strong links to the command and control structure of the military, and linkages also exist between the party's foreign affairs office and the military. Hence, the separation of the party and the military is not as pronounced as it might seem. Bush believes that the PLA has limited autonomy in its own sphere.
That said, PLA officers have become more outspoken recently. One general, for example, argued in an essay published in the official media just before Premier Wen Jiaobao's 2010 visit to India that the area between the two countries was not peaceful and that China faced “outside threats.” A senior colonel argued in a book titled The China Dream that China's goal should be to replace the United States as the world's top military power. A decade earlier, two senior colonels had argued in Unlimited Warfare that because the PRC had not been consulted when the rules of warfare were devised, it need not be bound by them. The PLA would therefore be justified in using such practices as terrorism and climate alteration, which could result in massive civilian casualties. The decisive factor, according to the authors, should be whatever is needed to achieve victory, not conventional notions of morality. Both books generated considerable interest in foreign countries; PRC government spokespersons replied that the authors' views did not represent official policy. The authors claimed that there was growing support for their views.
The military, however, is not a monolith. Its members do not necessarily agree on priority areas, and not all are in favor of hard-line policies. General Liu Yazhou, for example, has publicly argued that if China does not adopt U.S.-style democracy, it faces a Soviet-style collapse.
Other examples may indicate a disconnect between the military and civilian leaderships. For instance, after a submerged Chinese submarine passed through Japanese waters in 2004, five days passed before Beijing apologized to Tokyo. Western naval experts opined that the most likely explanation was that the PLA Navy (PLAN) had not informed the civilian leadership what it planned to do beforehand. The civilian leadership also initially disclaimed any knowledge of the January 2007 test of an antisatellite weapon after it was publicized in an American military magazine, as well as the aforementioned J-20 test, notwithstanding doubts about the veracity of these statements.
Conversely, civilian leaders have also been more outspoken of late. Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao's heir apparent, lashed out at his hosts during a visit to Mexico in 2009, presumably for supporting the United States and Great Britain in their criticisms of the PRC's human rights record. The following year, Xi angered South Koreans when he described North Korea's invasion as a just war and a great victory in the pursuit of world peace and human progress. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi became enraged at his Japanese counterpart's calls for a reduction in China's nuclear arsenal, nearly walking out of a 2010 meeting between the two. A few months later, Yang termed U.S. Secretary of State Hillary's Clinton's call for freedom of navigation on the South China Sea an attack on China. With reference to the same topic, Yang told a gathering of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, several of which have contested claims with China, that “China is a big country; other countries are small countries, and that is just a fact.”
It is entirely possible that strong statements by the military have received prior approval from the civilian leadership and that the two may, on occasion, be employing a good cop-bad cop strategy. That is, the foreign ministry tells its counterparts in other countries that it cannot compromise on a contentious issue because the PLA would not countenance it. In sum, the balance of evidence seems to indicate that civilian and military leaders are united in believing that the PRC's newly acquired economic and military credentials justify a harder line on foreign policy.
STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
Since the 1991 Gulf War, the PLA's strategy has been premised on preparing to fight local wars under conditions of informatization. Efforts have been focused on creating a PLA capable of winning a war against a highertechnology adversary, unnamed but assumed to be the United States. Military analysts have carefully studied the performance of the U.S. military in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq in an effort to understand American strengths and weaknesses.
The PLA's active defense military doctrine is based on the three principles of nonlinear, noncontact, and asymmetric operations. Nonlinear operations entail launching attacks from multiple platforms in an unpredictable fashion, ranging across the enemy's operational and strategic depth. Noncontact operations involve targeting enemy platforms and weapons systems with precise attacks from sufficiently far away to minimize the opponent's ability to strike back. Asymmetric operations bring the PLA's strengths to bear against the enemy's weaknesses. For example, America's heavy reliance on computer technology is considered to be its Achilles' heel: successful interdiction of its computer network could destroy command and control functions. PLA literature also makes frequent mention of three types of warfare: media, psychological, and legal. In simplest form, these involve efforts to win over public opinion in the target country by convincing its civilians, and perhaps Chinese soldiers and civilians as well, of the justice of the PRC's cause.
The PLAN has been tasked with a three-stage strategy. The first stage is to develop a force that can operate within the first island chain, stretching from Japan down through Taiwan and the Philippines. In the second stage, a regional naval force will operate beyond the first island chain to reach the second island chain, which includes Guam, Indonesia, and Australia. In the third stage, to be attained by midcentury, PLAN will constitute a global naval force.
Airpower expert Mark Stokes describes the PRC's aerospace strategy as an integral component of firepower warfare involving the coordinated use of PLA Air Force (PLAAF) strike aviation assets, Second Artillery (Missile) Corps, conventional theater missiles, and information warfare. Although the military leadership seems to be developing a range of options for all levels of warfare, Stokes believes that the PLA is disposed toward a denial strategy that emphasizes operational paralysis in order to compel an adversary to comply with Beijing's orders.
The PLA's successful antisatellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 revealed its developing capabilities in space warfare. The test followed several years of discussion by PLA officers in defense journals and books of the need to have the ability to deny the use of space to others. While the authors differ somewhat in their suggestions, the need for secrecy is a common theme. The program should be “internally tense while [appearing] outwardly relaxed.” Having an orbiting network of concealed space weapons that can launch surprise attacks against U.S. assets fits in well with both the psychological component of the three-warfares doctrine and the need to practice asymmetric warfare.
China's inventory of space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communications satellites is being expanded. These share functions with the country's commercial space program, allowing military uses to be downplayed. A navigation satellite was launched in 2009, and a full network of satellites is scheduled to provide global positioning for military and civilian users in the 2015–2020 time frame. Also launched in 2009 was the Yaogan, the sixth in China's series of reconnaissance satellites sent into orbit since 2006. The development of the Long March V rocket, now delayed until 2014 owing to technical problems, will more than double the size of China's current low earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit payloads. A newly constructed launch facility on Hainan will support these rockets. In addition to its ASAT program, the PLA is known to have at least one ground-based laser program.
With regard to nuclear weapons, China is believed to have at least 200 warheads, including 20 liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States, numerous other missiles with shorter ranges, and nuclear-armed submarines. The PRC has pledged a no-first-use policy, but from time to time, high-ranking figures have phrased this policy in ways that suggest the existence of unspecified caveats. It is not known, for example, whether demonstration strikes, high-altitude bursts, or strikes on what Beijing considers its own territory are included in the no-first-use policy. Recently, attention has focused on China's proliferation activities, principally with regard to Iran and North Korea.
Training programs are designed to emphasize three strikes (sometimes translated as three attacks) and three defenses. The three strike targets are stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and gunship helicopters. The three actions to defend against are precision strikes, electronic jamming, and reconnaissance and surveillance.
The PRC seems to be moving away from Deng Xiaoping's advice of the early 1990s to “observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capabilities, and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.” A growing point of view is that, while Deng's advice may have been excellent when China was still weak, recent developments, including its rapidly expanding economy and military power, call for a more assertive strategy to secure China's core interests. In 2010, the South China Sea was added to the list of China's core interests, which have traditionally been focused on territories such as Tibet and Taiwan. A more assertive strategy also seems appropriate in light of the financial woes of the Western world and the perception that the United States, mired not only in financial difficulties but also in expensive, protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, has entered a stage of rapid decline.
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING
Aware that more technologically sophisticated military weapons will require better-educated and better-trained personnel to operate them, the PLA has made efforts to recruit university graduates, particularly those with science and engineering backgrounds, into the officer corps. Military academies also concentrate on producing technologically knowledgeable personnel, adapting their curricula to put more stress on science and technology.
In a national defense student program begun in 2001, the military offers training to those willing to join after graduation; in return, the students' tuition is paid, and they receive a modest monthly living allowance. University graduation is followed by a year of formal training in a military academy. In the first year the program was offered, there were few takers, but when one-third of university graduates from the PRC's newly expanded university system were unable to find jobs, incoming freshmen found the military option increasingly attractive.
Another priority is the noncommissioned officer corps. New recruits are now required to have at least high school diplomas, and the size of the corps is being expanded to constitute 40 percent of the army. The military as a whole now enjoys improved pay and benefits, as well as better creature comforts in the form of new barracks and karaoke clubs.
Consonant with PLA's more outward-oriented stance, the navy and air force have in recent years received priority over the traditionally favored ground force. Though the ground force, at 64 percent of the total, is still by far the largest of the services, this is a drop from 73 percent in 1998. The navy now constitutes 14 percent of the total, up from 10 percent in 1998, and the air force has increased to 23 percent from 17 percent. These changes have been accompanied by proportional increases in budgetary allocations and weapons acquisitions. The ground force maintains an important role in protecting the country's long land borders and in ensuring domestic stability as the Chinese population becomes more outspoken and increasingly prone to demonstrations and protests. In theory, keeping the domestic peace is the role of the People's Armed Police (PAP), but the PAP has sometimes been judged unable to carry out its mandate effectively. According to credible reports, many of the personnel used to quell disturbances in Xinjiang in 2009 were PLA members who had been ordered to put on PAP uniforms because it would look less repressive to the foreign media.
The Outline of Military Training and Evaluation that became standard in the PLA in 2008 emphasizes realistic training conditions, training in complex electromagnetic and joint environments, integrating new and high technologies into the force structure, and amphibious warfare. Training exercises have become more sophisticated and are concentrated on achieving true jointness. In the past, different service arms typically converged in the same area but carried out their activities essentially separately. Service in a joint assignment is increasingly seen as a desideratum for those who aspire to be promoted to senior-level positions. The PLA recently established the Jinan Theater Joint Leadership Organization—the first of its kind—to integrate at the campaign level all services, including the Second Artillery Corps, the provincial leadership, and leading personnel from other organizations.
A National Defense Mobilization Law passed in 2010 gives the state the legal right to requisition civilian facilities and property. The new law, formalizing what would occur anyway, was presented in terms of its continuity with the Maoist People's War and its emphasis on close militarycivilian cooperation. In the post-Mao era, however, local governments have tended to resent the burden of supporting military units by supplying food, fuel, and financial contributions, thus necessitating a law that more clearly defines their obligations and responsibilities.
Also in 2010, PLAN ships carried out exercises in the Mediterranean that were described as unprecedented. The flotilla then visited the capital of Burma and cruised up the Irrawaddy River. A second group crossed the Coral Sea on a Pacific tour, visiting Tonga and Vanuatu.
Several exercises have been held in the South China Sea, presumably to signal to other countries Beijing's determination to enforce its claim that this area constitutes one of the PRC's core interests. In another 2010 exercise, all three of the navy's fleets took part in a joint exercise that simulated the invasion of an island in the South China Sea controlled by another nation. Amphibious assault ships and tanks were used to land troops while countering electromagnetic interference and missiles fired by other troops posing as the enemy. To make the semiotics perfectly clear, the exercise was attended by almost 275 invited military attachés from seventy-five countries.
This kind of military theater generally has the desired effect and can be considered an operationalization of the three types of warfare—media, psychological, and legal. Domestic sources generally announce when such exercises will be held and explain why they constitute breakthroughs for the military. The stories are then picked up by foreign media, which, according to Western military experts, tend to amplify the exercises' actual military significance. Another important motivation appears to be the desire to impress the Chinese public with the PLA's increasing prowess and to take pride in its rapidly advancing capabilities.
The military has also diversified its training to include military operations other than war, including antiterrorism, emergency response, disaster relief, and international humanitarian operations. As of 2010, the PRC had seconded more than 2,100 personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Although this was only one-fifth the number contributed by Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, it represents a significant change of attitude. In the past, China rejected peacekeeping missions as unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. In 2010, China and the United Nations conducted a peacekeeping training class at the Ministry of National Defense in Beijing. Nineteen mid- to high-ranking PLA officers took part, and an accompanying press release declared that the information imparted would enable the PLA to further contribute to world peace.
As for antipiracy operations, a three-ship naval task force has been deployed on rotation in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia since the end of 2008, marking the first time in its sixty-year history that the Chinese navy has conducted such operations. Military units also play an important part in domestic disaster relief operations following earthquakes and floods, and they have helped to quell ethnic unrest when the PAP was deemed inadequate to the task. Antiterrorism exercises have been conducted, sometimes in coordination with other members of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, including Russia and several Central Asian states. These allow the PRC to cultivate an image of a responsible global actor while simultaneously accustoming its military to long-distance and long-endurance deployments. This experience enhances the PLA's ability to protect China's interests beyond national borders and to protect its access to the sea-lanes over which China's commercial and energy imports and exports must move. There may be other potentially useful benefits: sources at the Indian defense ministry have complained that when its antipiracy vessels passed near those of China, the Chinese ships appeared to be probing the sonar capacities of the Indian naval vessels.
BUDGETS
Announced Chinese military spending has increased nearly twenty-five-fold, from 21.53 billion yuan in 1988 to 519.1 billion yuan in 2010. Even as other countries drastically cut back their military spending due to the end of the Cold War, the PRC's defense budget increased by double digits each year until 2010—the one exception, a 9.6 percent increase announced for 2003, actually reached 11.72 percent by the end of the year. It is possible that the planned 7.5 percent increase for 2010 ended in double-digit figures as well. In any case, defense was one of the more generously treated sectors in the 2010 budget, which was intended to wean the country off a generous stimulus package enacted the year before to ease the impact of the global financial crisis. The PLA was promised that its budgetary allocations would increase as the economy recovered, which it has done.
While some of this largesse can be accounted for by inflation, increases also occurred in years when the inflation rate was small and even when the economy had slipped into deflation. Military budgets have slightly exceeded the increases in the PRC's annual economic growth and are not believed to be so large as to place an undue burden on the economy as a whole.
Published defense budgets may not accurately reflect true military spending, which is estimated at two to three times the announced figure. Research and development for nuclear programs are not part of it, and payments for foreign weapons purchases come from the budget of the State Council; local areas are responsible for at least part of the costs of billeting troops. Finally, even accurate figures would not tell us how wisely the monies are spent. Procurement wastes are believed to be substantial. And, as in other sectors of the PRC's economy, corruption is a serious problem.
WEAPONS
Funding for research and development in science and technology has greatly increased. In 2006, the State Council announced a National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology 2006-2020, with the goal of transforming China into an innovation-oriented society by its end date. All the program's key elements have military applications, including nanotechnology research; information technology; technology for the creation of new materials and for deep-sea operations; laser and aerospace technologies; radar; counterspace capabilities; secure command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); high-resolution satellites; and manned spaceflight. Important advances in weaponry have been made through a combination of innovative research, purchases from foreign countries, reverse engineering, and espionage.
The U.S. Defense Department's annual report on the military strength of the PRC notes that China has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. It is developing and testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, creating additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading selected missile systems, and devising methods to counter opponents' ballistic missile defenses. Missiles are becoming more accurate, more deadly, and more difficult to detect and evade. Of particular recent concern to foreign countries are the following:
• Aircraft carrier research and development program. China purchased the former Soviet carrier Varyag from Ukraine in 1998, towing it to a shipyard at Dalian and experimenting with improvements. The Soviet-era carrier is expected to be used for training purposes, and several indigenously produced carriers are scheduled to enter service in the 2015–2020 time frame. Negotiations with Moscow over purchasing Su-33 carrier-borne fighter planes were delayed by Russian concerns that the PRC would reverse-engineer the two planes it wanted to buy. The deployment of aircraft carrier battle groups would greatly expand the PRC's strategic reach.
• Submarines. China has introduced four new classes of domestically designed and built submarines and now operates the largest submarine force among Asian countries. The second-generation Type 093/ Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine and Type 094/Jinclass nuclear-powered missile submarine have already entered service. Older Type 033/Romeo-class and Type 035/Ming-class diesel-electric submarines, which were based on 1950s-era Soviet technology, are gradually being replaced by the newer indigenous Type 039/Song class and Russian-built Kilo class. The even newer Yuan class has also entered batch production.
• Antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). China has now attained initial operating capability for an ASBM, a military milestone that most analysts regard as a game-changer for the military balance in Asia. Designated the DF-21 D, it is the world's first weapons system capable of targeting a moving carrier strike group from long-range, land-based mobile launchers. This has important implications for the anti-access area denial strategy; it will enable the PRC to consolidate its claims to the South China Sea by preventing the United States from defending its Pacific allies.
• Stealth aircraft. The PLAAF's fifth-generation fighter program achieved another breakthrough with the January 2011 test flight of the Chengdu J-20. Similar in design to America's F-22 Raptor and Russia's Sukhoi T-50 fighters, the plane has the potential to compete with the F-35, the most advanced fighter in the inventory of the U.S. Air Force. The J-20's relatively large size indicates that it will have a long range and the ability to accommodate heavy weapon loads. Its ground clearance is higher than that of the F-22, which will facilitate loading larger weapons, including air-to-surface munitions. Newly developed air-to-ground weapons are required to be compatible with the J-20.
• Cyberattacks. The PRC has the world's largest number of Internet users. Researchers based in Canada traced to China an electronic spying operation that penetrated computer networks in 103 countries. Among the sites entered were those of defense and foreign ministries, news media, private companies, political campaigns, and nongovernmental organizations. In some cases, information was exfiltrated; in others, the websites were defaced and data were destroyed or altered. Although a distinction is sometimes made between cyberespionage and cyberwarfare, the skills involved in intelligence gathering are the same as those involved in taking offensive action in wartime: the difference is what the keyboard operator does with, or to, the information after he or she has penetrated the network. American analysts were further disconcerted when a paper appeared in a Chinese scholarly journal detailing how a cascade-based attack could take down the U.S. power grid. Net attacks cannot be definitively linked to the Chinese government, and even assuming these attacks are perpetrated by “patriotic hackers,” we do not know whether the hackers are being cued by the Chinese government. Nonetheless, cyberattacks fit in with the asymmetric warfare that is part of the PRC's military strategy. A worst-case scenario envisions a kind of technological Pearl Harbor in which U.S. command systems would be paralyzed and its major combat platforms destroyed by a sudden strike. Those who advance such a possibility point out that it is consonant with the traditional Chinese emphasis on strategic deception and surprise, as well as with current discussions of the topic in the PRC's military journals.
FOREIGN COUNTRIES' REACTIONS
Since the PRC has no external enemy and many pressing internal needs to address, other countries have expressed concern with the speed and scope of its military development. In response to pleas for greater transparency, the government has published defense white papers approximately every two years for the past decade. In general, these papers stress that the PRC's overriding goal is peaceful development and that it is expanding its military power strictly for defensive purposes. The white papers have not allayed concerns about the lack of transparency.
Countries such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia view the United States as the guarantor of regional stability, and they all have some sort of defense arrangement with the United States. Yet China has surpassed America economically, becoming the major trading partner of almost all the nations in the region. Hence, they face what Australian defense analyst Michael Evans calls economic-strategic dissonance. Their economic prosperity has become dependent on good relations with China and the continued growth of the Chinese economy, but their sovereign rights are dependent on the United States' continued willingness and ability to balance the PRC strategically. As a consequence, they do not want China to become too weak, lest that adversely affect their economic prosperity; however, they do not want it to become too strong, either, lest their economies and their international maneuvering space be swallowed by the growing power of the Chinese juggernaut. With the possible exception of India and Japan, the option of self-reliance is unrealistic; hence, these countries attempt to balance off the United States and the PRC.
No country's military power can be judged in isolation from the power of potential military opponents. Worried neighbor countries have made efforts at self-help, presumably to raise the costs of aggression to Beijing, and at forming alliances with one another. To avoid angering Beijing, these efforts are often justified as steps aimed against terrorists and pirates. Weapons purchases have increased in many of these countries, and to a significant degree in several of them. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), overall regional military spending grew by 50 percent between 2000 and 2008. It has risen even more sharply since then. SIPRI cites concern over disputed areas in the South China Sea as a major driving force.
India, whose territorial concerns involve disputed areas along the two countries' land borders, as well as China's naval activities in the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean, has been attempting to upgrade both its economic ties with China and the military assets it would need to oppose China should a confrontation arise. The number of main-force combat units in the Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims but India administers, has been doubled, and four squadrons of Su-30 attack aircraft purchased from Russia are being sent to areas within striking distance of the border. Six nearby airfields are being upgraded to increase troop mobility.
Some Indian defense analysts speculate that increased Chinese pressure on disputed land areas is designed to divert New Delhi's attention from Beijing's real intent, which is to expand its naval presence. India is strengthening its fleet, including basing an aircraft carrier in the Bay of Bengal. The Indian navy now regularly exercises and trains with American and Southeast Asian navies. The first test of the country's 5,000-kilometerrange Agni-V nuclear-capable missile was scheduled for 2011.
In addition to India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, and even Burma, to which the PRC has been exceptionally generous, have all bought Russian arms, even though they are priced higher than Chinese copies of the same weapons. This prompted a BBC analyst to remark that Asian states seem prepared to pay more for weapons not supplied by a neighbor that is increasingly seen as a threat to regional stability.
Japan, whose newly installed Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) campaigned on a platform of getting America to move its bases in Okinawa to the U.S. territory of Guam, found itself seriously embarrassed when the PRC stepped up its pressure in the East China Sea after a Chinese fishing boat rammed Japanese Coast Guard vessels, perhaps intentionally. Beijing then announced that PLAN ships would patrol the area, whose nearby islands have been held and administered by Japan. The DPJ has backed away from its campaign promise and is reinforcing the country's ground force presence on the disputed islands.
The net effect of the PRC's actions has been to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, with joint naval exercises carried out to signal the determination to protect Japan's claims. Significantly, South Korea sent observers to the exercises, despite the long-standing animosity between the ROK and Japan. Seoul was resentful because the Beijing government had done nothing to support it when North Korea first torpedoed an ROK naval vessel and then shelled one of its islands, causing loss of life and property. When a Chinese fishing boat capsized after ramming a South Korean Coast Guard vessel, Beijing demanded compensation.
Strategic partnership and maritime security cooperation agreements between previous Japanese governments and Australia and India remain in place and have been reinforced with high-level visits.
WEAKNESSES
Military analysts have pointed out that there is a significant difference between the technical parameters of a weapon or a weapons system and its actual performance in battle. With regard to the ASBM, attaining initial operating capability does not necessarily mean success: the weapon has yet to be tested over water. It is difficult to target an aircraft carrier even when stationary, and relying on the ASBM's onboard sensors to acquire a target may not be sufficient. Employing another scout platform, such as a helicopter or a small submarine, to illuminate the target with a laser could increase the ASBM's accuracy, but it is unlikely that the scout could enter the carrier battle group's visual range without being detected. If the carrier is moving, the difficulty of the task is compounded, particularly if the carrier takes evasive maneuvers such as zigzags.
Amphibious invasion on any significant scale is considered one of the most complicated and difficult of military maneuvers. The attacker must build up rapidly, establish air and sea superiority, and ensure uninterrupted support for those who land. If the area being invaded is heavily populated, the troops must be prepared to contend with urban warfare and guerrilla tactics by the defenders. Currently, the PLA is considered capable of sealifting only one infantry division.
There have also been ongoing deficiencies in China's overall systems design and integration capabilities. Many of its most advanced systems rely to varying degrees on foreign designs that have been modified or reverseengineered. Computer-based data fusion and coordination of the PRC's different bureaucracies also present problems.
According to the U.S. Defense Department, China's ability to communicate with deployed submarines is limited, and the PLAN has no experience in managing a ballistic missile submarine fleet that performs strategic patrols with live nuclear warheads mated to missiles. Land-based missiles may face similar, if less serious, command and control problems in wartime.
CONCLUSIONS
Technical problems can be overcome. China has many well-trained scientists, and the country is investing heavily in technological innovation. The PLA has made impressive progress in a short time, and it will likely continue to do so. However, as the PLA becomes increasingly technologically proficient, it will develop the same Achilles' heel that Chinese analysts have detected in the U.S. military: dependence on technology that an opponent can interdict. Finally, the military as a whole is untested in battle.
The argument that China's military still trails behind that of the United States, though true, does not consider two important points. First, the PLA is catching up quickly, even as U.S. research and development lag and Washington is preoccupied in the Middle East. Second, U.S. military assets are, and must continue to be, distributed globally, whereas China need act only regionally to assert its claims to disputed territories. Washington also has to contend with far longer supply lines. In addition, America's ability to deploy assets and maintain them will be hampered by political factors involving its use of foreign bases.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
Several publications in Chinese are basic for keeping up with the rapidly changing People's Liberation Army. These include Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army News), published by the PLA's General Political Department, and monthly or quarterly journals such as Xiandai Bingqi (Modern Weaponry), Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Xiandai Junshi (Conmilit), Xiandai Jianchuan (Modern Ships), and Guofang (National Defense). Translations from these occasionally appear in Open Source, a website restricted to government users and government contractors; a less informative version is available by commercial subscription.
The U.S. Department of Defense's annual report on military and security developments in China is available from the department's website (www.defense.gov). Also available are relevant hearings before the congressionally established U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission, as well as the commission's annual report to Congress (www.uscc.gov).
Western defense periodicals such as Defense Week and Aviation Week and Space Technology, both published in Washington, D.C., and Jane's Defence Weekly, published in London, regularly report on developments in China's weapons technology. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, also in London, publishes assessments of Chinese capabilities in its annual reviews Strategic Survey and The Military Balance.
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) sponsors an annual invitation only conference on the PLA. The papers presented to the conference are published in book form and are available to the public in hard copy or are downloadable from the U.S. Army War College's website (www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil). Recent titles include Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, Other People's Wars: PLA Lessons from Foreign Conflicts (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), and Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2010). The respective service arms of the U.S. military sponsor research on the PLA that appears in the publications of the Counterproliferation Center of the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base; in the Air Force's Maxwell Papers; and in the publications of the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, the China Maritime Studies Institute of the U.S. Naval War College (www.usnwc.edu), and the U.S. Navy's Center for Naval Analyses (www.cna.org).
The RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, California (www.rand.org), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute of Sweden (www.sipri.org) regularly report on Chinese military developments, as does the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, located in Washington, D.C. (www.heritage.org). China Security, published by the World Security Institute in Washington, D.C., presents China's perspective on military issues. Several websites devoted to the Chinese military exist, including www.sinodefense.com, www.chinamilitary.net, and the Toronto-based www.kanwa.com. Kanwa is a subscription-only service.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
While states are generally reluctant to divulge information about their defense, the People's Republic of China is unusually secretive. Although sources are far more diversified and available than they were twenty years ago, research on the military continues to be limited by a lack of transparency in the data released. The more sensitive the area, the scarcer the information and the greater the foreign interest in it. Examples of such topics are research and development on missile programs, the process by which high-level promotions and transfers are decided, and the precise process by which the PLA makes its corporate voice known to civilian policy makers.
Research topics that can be addressed, however imperfectly, from open sources include recruitment and demobilization, strategy, training, comparisons of published defense budgets over time, weapons acquisition, and the PLA's exchange programs with foreign militaries.