SIX
Military Writings
Without doubt, China has the longest continuous tradition of military literature of any culture, dating from about 500 B.C.E. right through the present, with only a brief hiatus during the early twentieth century when various Western doctrines temporarily predominated.
Military thought, understood as the conscious study of battlefield events and the forces that shape them, may have had rudimentary precursors in the Neolithic (5500–3000 B.C.E.) when battles were fought with stone and wood, but certainly began to evolve in the Longshan period (3000–2000 B.C.E.) with the development of fortification technology and the incipient stage of bronze weapons. Warring States and later historical writings perceive well-planned campaigns in the rise of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties, while such traditional chronicles as the Commentary of Zuo (Zuozhuan), Discourses of the States (Guoyu), Intrigues of the Warring States (Zhanguoce), Historical Records (Shiji), and Bamboo Annals (Zhushu jinian) attribute complex tactics and coordinated strategy to the clashes of the Spring and Autumn period (722–481 B.C.E.). Although the sophisticated dialogues appearing in these works are late reconstructions, in aggregate they preserve sufficient vestiges of tactical thought to indicate Spring and Autumn military leaders had already formulated a number of combat principles. However, without further archaeological or textual discoveries, it remains unknowable whether a truly systematic body of thought had evolved prior to Sunzi.
Some twenty of the generally acknowledged four to five hundred military writings currently extant—mere remnants of the many that perished over the centuries through neglect, suppression, and war—merit introduction. However, China's military history is not to be found in these theoretical works which, in fact, have an unknown relationship with actual combat, but instead in its many historical writings, especially the annals and biographies found in the expansive Twenty-Five Dynastic Histories. In aggregate, the numerous court discussions and memorials also preserve extensive source materials for the study of military thought and ideas. In addition, Warring States and slightly later philosophical and political writings, including the Book of Lord Shang (Shangjunshu), Guanzi, Xunzi, and Huainanzi, often contain succinct chapters on military affairs. Siege practices are visible mainly in the Mozi, scattered Lüshi chunqiu chapters provide important insights on theory and values, and several paragraphs on the nature and appropriateness of warfare in the Mencius long furnished a basis for moralizing whenever court discussions were held about the feasibility of mounting aggressive campaigns against external, “barbarian” peoples. Finally, a whole host of early writings, such as the Wu-Yue chunqiu, Yanzi chunqiu, and even the Rituals of Zhou (Zhouli) preserve essential accounts, narratives, and martial discussions; the pivotal Daodejing contains focal military chapters and espouses a philosophical perspective that fundamentally influenced traditional military concepts; and a number of forgeries and fabrications, such as the Guiguzi and the Xinshu attributed to Zhuge Liang, also affected military theory.
Although evidence exists that tactical ideas were committed to writing before 500 B.C.E., Sunzi's Art of War (Sunzi bingfa)—often viewed as virtually synonymous with Chinese military thought—marks the known beginning. The turbulent Warring States period (453–221 B.C.E.) saw the composition of numerous political and other books, among which six important martial texts survive: Simafa, Wuzi, Sun Bin bingfa, Taigong liutao, Weiliaozi, and Huangshigong sanlue. Whatever other military works may have been penned in the centuries before Li Quan's Tang-dynasty Taibai yinjing, such as those by Cao Cao and Zhuge Liang, have largely vanished except for remnants and late reconstructions. Finally, Wang Zhen's intriguing early ninth-century meditation on ending warfare (Daodejing lunbing yaoyi) and the incisive Tang Taizong Li Weigong wendui, attributed to the great Tang general Li Jing, conclude the formative period of Chinese military thought. Thereafter, with the exception of the manuals written by the Ming general Qi Jiguang, even the most insightful works tend to be primarily compilations and overview.
The Song philosophical impulse to analytical classification is equally evident in such military writings as the One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies (Baizhan qilue) and the Hundred Terms from Military Tactics (Bingfa baiyan). (The former selects the hundred most important tactical principles found in the classic military writings and illustrates them with appropriate historical battles; the latter offers often ethereal topical discussions.) Imperial concern over the lack of classical military knowledge in the Song dynasty resulted in the famous compendium of miltiary science known as the Essentials of the Military Classics (Wujing zongyao), and subsequently, in 1080, in the Wujing qishu or Seven Military Classics, a collection of seven preexisting martial books settled upon after some dispute: Sunzi bingfa, Simafa, Wuzi, Weiliaozi, Taigong liutao, Huangshigong sanlue, and Tang Taizong Li Weigong wendui. The various extant commentaries, apart from Cao Cao's on Sunzi, were stripped out. Designated as the core texts for the newly founded military academy and required content for military examinations, these seven naturally became disproportionately influential. A few other significant writings appeared in the empire's concluding centuries, including the Caolu jinglue, He boshi luelun, Huqianjing, Beizheng lu, Dengtan bijiu, and the encyclopedic Wubeizhi, but their content was mostly accretional, their knowledge and practices minimally evolutionary.
SUNZI BINGFA
Despite the Art of War's cryptic nature and short length, as the commonly acknowledged progenitor of China's military writings it constituted a repository of critical ideas and first principles that had to be thoroughly pondered, and inescapably influenced military and nonmilitary thought alike for over two millennia. The source of innumerable sayings and concepts that have entered the Chinese language to shape basic thought processes and expectations, it continues to be actively studied in many contexts and remains the foundation of classically oriented attempts to construct a modern operational doctrine “with Chinese characteristics.” However, apart from having been condemned by the literati over the centuries for its “vicious orientation” and inhumanity, it is also a text much beset by controversy. The identity and even existence of its author, Sunzi or Sun Wu, are much debated, as is his role in transforming Wu into a powerful state capable of conquering mighty Chu and nearby Yue near the end of the sixth century B.C.E. Second, Sunzi's relationship with the Art of War is also questioned, with some views identifying him as the sole author and others denying any connection whatsoever. Third, the book's date is also vehemently disputed. Traditionalists who attribute it to Sunzi himself (as suggested by his Shiji biography) understand it as an insightful meditative distillation of late Spring and Autumn military experience that must have been composed at the end of the sixth century B.C.E. and slightly modified thereafter by his disciples or other editors, accounting for the few obvious anachronisms. Others consider it a late-fifth-century product that reflects the expanding scope of warfare, or even attribute it to the early fourth century and perceive a strongly accretional nature. While showing slight variations and much about the text's evolution, the bamboo-slip editions recovered by archaeologists in recent years have not substantially contributed to resolving these debates.
The brief, enigmatic Art of War often seems to take the form of notes, perhaps because of the inherent constraints imposed by using bamboo slips as the recording medium. Although each of its thirteen chapters is marked by a distinct thematic emphasis, the views, concepts, and principles remain consistent throughout. Nevertheless, the last two chapters on incendiary warfare and spies (for which the book was excoriated in both China and the West) may have been appended by later hands. Even though much of the book actually consists of concrete pronouncements applicable to operational situations and explications of specific tactical principles, at least half presents a core vision of national strategy, warfare objectives, and conceptual material that became fundamental to Chinese military thought. Briefly summarized, because warfare is dangerous and expensive, Sunzi advocated achieving victory without fighting wherever possible. However, when unavoidable, and only if based on thorough intelligence, military actions should be taken to achieve predetermined objectives expeditiously. This should be accomplished by manipulating and destabilizing the enemy, thereby creating circumstances in which overwhelming strategic power can effect a decisive victory through the utilization of unorthodox methods and exploitation of environmental advantages.
Because military campaigns entail the fate of the people and warfare is therefore deemed the greatest affair of government, martial study and preparation cannot be neglected. Moreover, the state must be united and fully in harmony with the ruler's intent for success to be achieved. However, unlike the later military classics, the Art of War is little concerned with the people's welfare, being focused instead on developing the overwhelming strategic power that, when applied in concrete situations, can be imagized as a torrent roaring down a mountain from a burst dam, carrying everything before it. However, mere might alone is inadequate; it is the creation of strategic advantage that forges victory. This is achieved through maneuvering one's own army while simultaneously manipulating the enemy through lures, deceit, forced marches, subversion, and other means that will weaken them and make them susceptible to a concentrated, unexpected attack. The enemy's spirit should equally be targeted, because the dispirited are easily defeated.
Implementing these measures requires thorough knowledge of the enemy, generally obtained through scouts and spies. Thereafter, councils can calculate the feasibility of achieving state objectives through warfare, determine the requisite operational strategy, and plot concrete tactical efforts. Hostile forces should never be engaged if the victory is not certain, but once committed, actions should be decisive yet taken with an eye to preserving the enemy as well as oneself. Foolish and wasteful assaults, such as upon fortified positions (generally misunderstood as applying simply to cities), should be eschewed in favor of making the enemy vulnerable, spreading his defenses, and attacking his vacuities and gaps. The commander should be formless and unfathomable, utilize secrecy and deception to fullest advantage, vary his tactics, and employ the unorthodox (qi) and orthodox (zheng). The commander should also be cognizant of the topography and consciously take advantage of the various configurations of terrain, especially the “fatal terrain” that can be employed to elicit the utmost effort from one's troops.
THE WUZI
The Wuzi, the second of the ancient military classics, has traditionally been attributed to Wu Qi, the great general who enjoyed inordinate battlefield success against Qin in the first century of the Warring States period before perishing in Chu while serving as a high official (because he instituted severe governmental reforms inimical to entrenched aristocratic interests). Even if the book's core originated with Wu Qi, it has suffered both extensive losses and serious accretions (including references to cavalry forces), and may not have attained final form until the early Han. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the Art of War it has always been considered one of the twin foundations of Chinese military science even by nonmilitary officials and therefore essential to martial contemplation.
Wu Qi believed that governments must implement benevolent policies; otherwise, they will be unable to nurture the military forces crucial to the state's survival. Harmony must be fostered if the people are to sustain martial efforts, but organization and training make victory possible. Commanders must be properly qualified, the troops selected, rewards and punishments properly established, and constraint and measure imposed in all aspects. Thereafter, tactical opportunities must either be discovered through active probing or created. Enemy commanders must be manipulated and all flaws in the character of their troops exploited. Numerous tactical measures are also discussed, providing many insights into the era's military practices. However, although the book's focus is more concrete than the Art of War, the Wuzi, throughout its few extant chapters, still stresses the larger issues that significantly affect the state.
THE SIMAFA
Traditionally associated with the legendary Sima Rangju, a fabled commander of the turn of the fifth century B.C.E., the Minister of War's Methods was probably compiled in the fourth or early third century B.C.E. from various materials, including some recounting relatively idealized early Zhou practices that may date from the Western Zhou period. Whether the extant five chapters comprise mere remnants from the 155 reportedly included in early Han dynasty versions cannot be verified, but what remains, although limited in scope, is cogent and consistent. Moreover, the Simafa has traditionally been accorded great respect, certain concepts and key sentences frequently being quoted in court discussions and later military manuals. Particularly important is the dictum, “Even though a state may be vast, those who love warfare will inevitably perish. Even though calm may prevail under Heaven, those who forget warfare will certainly be endangered.”
In emphasizing fundamental issues of government and organization rather than operational principles and tactics, the Simafa's thrust differs fundamentally from the other classic military writings. Although many of the tactical resolutions it proposes for varying situations are common to other late Warring States works such as the Taigong liutao, the Simafa is defined by its ruminations on the nature of warfare and the surprising conclusion that war is necessary because only through killing can power be created and order brought to the world. However, violence is only appropriate in limited circumstances, when justified by virtue and righteousness. (Since the people's welfare is paramount, rescuing them from suffering and repression stands chief among them.) Effective training must precede any military campaign; when in the field, constraint and measure should be imposed. The examples of antiquity should be studied for crucial lessons, including different approaches to conflict.
Two aspects command attention: the clear distinction that must be made between the civil and the martial (or civic and warrior realms), and the nature and role of qi (spirit or the will to fight). The Simafa points out that they are intertwined because the spirit and attitude appropriate to a warrior, focused on action and death, are disjunctive with those found in court, where sedate movement and deferential discussion prevail. Thus, the attitudes of the latter cannot be imposed on the former; otherwise, the army will be doomed because practicing inappropriate ritualized forms of behavior (the li) quickly subverts and erodes warrior values. Moreover, since qi ensures victory, the army's qi must be studied and manipulated, exploited when required but constrained when less urgent. Rewards and punishments provide the means, oaths and harangues the final impetus for achieving this.
SUN BIN BINGFA
Reputedly a lineal descendant of the great Sunzi, Sun Bin's historicity is attested by a highly dramatic biography in the Shiji and numerous references in late Warring States writings. A brilliant strategist who was maimed through the machinations of his enemies, he still managed to direct Qi's forces in vanquishing Wei twice in the mid-fourth century B.C.E. at the famous battles of Guiling and then Maling, where crossbows were employed en masse for the first time. His book was well known into the Han, but somehow disappeared thereafter until it was rediscovered in a Han dynasty tomb in 1972 and laboriously reconstructed from hundreds of fragmented bamboo strips. Unfortunately, the resulting work consists of two distinct parts: fifteen chapters in expanded dialogue format with Sun Bin explicitly identified as the speaker, followed by fifteen integrated, purely expository essays on particular topics (presumably by later hands). The book was probably compiled by Sun Bin's disciples within decades of his death. Although numerous textual and interpretive problems plague the enigmatic passages, both halves of this book preserve extremely valuable material for studying middle Warring States thought.
Sun Bin's Art of War (or Military Methods, to distinguish it in English from Sunzi bingfa) may be said to generally take Sunzi's assertions on the nature and importance of warfare, as well as many of of his other concepts, as fundamental preliminary to focusing on concrete issues, especially tactical and operational questions. Even though the subject matter ranges widely, Military Methods emphasizes manipulating the enemy and then ruthlessly exploiting the resulting weakness. Following thorough evaluation and planning, Sunzi's crucial techniques of being deceptive, luring the enemy onto difficult terrain, destabilizing their formations, and thwarting their plans are to be employed. Furthermore, while stressing swiftness, Sun Bin advocates dividing both one's own and the enemy's forces, the former to facilitate maneuver, the latter to create gaps and vacuities. Flaws and weaknesses in enemy commanders should be targeted and enemy troops emotionally coerced. Contrary to Sunzi's blanket admonition, cities may be attacked when dictated by potential profits and the likelihood of an easy conquest.
Even when not specifically discussed, Sunzi's concept of strategic power (shi) underlines most of Sun Bin's methods and pronouncements. Since the various configurations of terrain previously identified by Sunzi facilitate the creation of temporary strategic advantage, the topography must be constantly surveyed. The unorthodox provides the general method for engaging a dissimilar enemy, deploying into selected formations the concrete means for wresting victory in varying circumstances. Formations, terrain characteristics, and recurring tactical situations are discussed in some detail throughout the book. Only an astute, experienced commander of exemplary character can actualize these advantages, only well trained and organized troops can implement them. Finally, the soldiers' fervor must be controlled through a remarkable series of stages that constitute a true martial psychology so that their spirit reaches its zenith just when entering battle.
THE WEILIAOZI
Some historians believe the Weiliaozi originated in Wei Liao's conversations with King Hui of Liang, others attribute its beginnings to his discussions with the first Qin emperor while the latter was still young. Since the text was clearly composed somewhere between the late fourth and the middle third centuries B.C.E. and tomb text versions show it existed before the Han—contrary to claims of Tang dynasty fabrication—it is clearly a middle to late Warring States book. Moreover, because its two halves dramatically differ in focus and orientation, it must have been cobbled together from two distinct sources rather than being an integral work from a single author that then underwent the usual modifications and accretions.
The first half is a strongly theoretical work that integrates benevolent policies with strict discipline and draconian law enforcement. In seeking to unite civil government with martial spirit, it stresses conceptual and organizational issues to the almost complete exclusion of tactics. Because material welfare is the foundation of the state's survival and the means to military procurement, a vibrant agricultural and commercial economy must be fostered. Furthermore, a strong, contented populace will furnish the loyal, enthusiastic military forces necessary, particularly when they are properly controlled through strict disciplinary measures. The Weiliaozi continues the Simafa's insights into qi and its manipulation, emphasizing the need to nurture the warrior spirit while depriving the enemy of their will.
The Weiliaozi also attaches great importance to organization and unity in both civil and military administrations. Its entire second half, which may preserve actual Qin regulations, advocates imposing strong measures to control the troops and always punishing battlefield failures and camp infractions severely, frequently with death. This will forge a stalwart, responsive army capable of maneuvering and executing unorthodox tactics and of readily exploiting emerging weaknesses. This sort of force will not just overwhelm the enemy, but also overawe them with its unity, spirit, commitment, and death-defying dedication. Much in the spirit of Sunzi, the Weiliaozi's well-known opening paragraphs debunk the era's beliefs in auspicious days and portents, stressing that man alone is responsible for battlefield success or failure.
TAIGONG LIUTAO
The longest of the Seven Military Classics, the Six Secret Teachings (from the character tao, which has the basic meaning of “bowcase” and thus suggests a container that could conceal things) is a comprehensive work that ranges widely over all aspects of grand strategy, military conceptualization, tactics, organization, and theoretical fundamentals. Traditionally attributed to the sagacious Taigong (also known as Lü Shang), who served as an advisor and military commander to the Zhou kings when they vanquished Shang, it is clearly a heterogeneous work compiled in the Warring States period either shortly after Sun Bin's Military Methods or at the start of the third century B.C.E. Apart from preserving innumerable concrete tactics for particular situations and unique descriptions of military equipment, several chapters advocate total warfare, including the use of subversive methods to corrupt and undermine the enemy, causing it to be much condemned by later Confucians. Its sixty chapters are grouped into six tao—the Civil, Martial, Dragon, Tiger, Leopard, and Canine—each of which generally pursues a single theme. For example, the Civil primarily focuses upon government, general strategy, administrative matters, and state building.
The basic vision is common to most of the military writings: Establish benevolent yet strict government that espouses virtue, emphasizes the people's welfare, and nurtures the state's prosperity. The ruler, who should be constrained and impartial, must manifest an image of righteousness in order to inculcate the proper values and build a competent, devoted bureaucracy. Thereafter, should the state need to engage in warfare against a pernicious enemy, every means should be employed—but without treating the common people as the enemy. Victory can only be secured with qualified generals who impose severe discipline through a strictly organized military hierarchy. Training is paramount, for then the army will be able to exploit advantages of terrain, weaknesses in the enemy, and flaws in commanders.
The final three tao, some thirty chapters, focus on the actual practice of warfare, not only discussing equipment, logistics, and the nature of the army's component forces (chariots, infantry, and cavalry), but also explicating dozens of tactical situations (such as mountain and marsh warfare) rarely seen in other works. Swiftness and deception are always essential, certainty and aggressiveness requisite. Chaos in the enemy's ranks must be fostered and then exploited; environmental factors, such as steep hills and rainy conditions, must be turned to advantage; traps and ambushes should be established; the initiative should be seized; and the enemy should be continuously evaluated and probed, constantly manipulated and exhausted both physically and psychologically. Suitable operational forces must be chosen from among the infantry, chariots, and cavalry, and difficult terrain thereby overcome.
HUANGSHIGONG SANLUE
Despite its storied association with Zhang Liang, one of the chief strategists in the rise of the Han dynasty, the Three Strategies of the Duke of Yellow Rock was probably composed late in the Former Han dynasty by integrating highly disparate Warring States material within a new, heavily Daoist perspective known as Huang-lao. The last of the classic military writings, the book is organized into three sections, entitled Superior Strategy, Middle Strategy, and Inferior Strategy, presumably reflecting the theory that civilization had inexorably declined since legendary antiquity, thereby requiring stronger, more aggressive measures for each increasingly disordered stage. However, a closer examination reveals that the strategies should be appropriately employed in accord with differing circumstances rather than simply in a particular era of turmoil.
Four threads of thought pervade this somewhat ethereal but intriguing work: Confucian concepts of virtue and benevolent government; the activist measures of Legalism intended to strengthen the state and restore civic order; Daoist values of harmony, noncontentiousness, yielding, and esteeming life; and the intrusive realism of military combat, mandating strict command and control measures. Warfare, which should only be conducted to mitigate suffering and extirpate evil rather than to profit the state, depends upon the people's willing allegiance and participation. The soldiers must be strongly motivated rather than merely willing to defend the state. Rewards and punishments provide the means of coercion, swiftness in execution the method for precluding disorder and disaffection. The general must be an exemplary figure: loved yet awesome, capable yet receptive, unquestioned in authority and free of doubt. Finally, in accord with the Dao, military actions require restraint yet decisiveness. Because simple strength, bluntness, and directness are not always advisable, appropriate techniques from among the hard and soft, weak and strong, should be selected, even admixed, to achieve the predetermined objectives.
TANG TAIZONG LI WEIGONG WENDUI
The Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Duke Li of Wei purportedly records an actual dialogue between the Tang dynasty's second emperor and his most prominent general, Li Jing, also honored as Duke Li of Wei. However, doubts that such sophisticated dialogues could be genuine, particularly as some of the language and concepts apparently date to the Song, have prompted numerous questions about its authenticity. Most likely the book was compiled by an experienced strategist in the late Tang or early Northern Song period, possibly from notes or a core work containing the views of these two dynamic historical figures. It briefly enjoyed great credence when included in the Seven Military Classics, but subsequently encountered much condemnation.
Irrespective of its provenance and its greater stress on conceptions and reasoning rather than tactics, the book's three lengthy chapters contain important material on Tang and possibly Song military theory and practices. The discussants tackle several key issues from earlier military writings, evaluate historical battles, and unravel Li Jing's intentions in mounting victorious battlefield actions in the dynasty's early days. (Li Jing was not only instrumental in helping consolidate the dynasty's power, but from 618 on also expanded the Tang domain in pacification campaigns in the south and later against the Türks. Continuing as Tang Taizong's confidant after the latter usurped power in 626, he remained prominent until his own death in 649.) The dialogues explicate the nature and employment of the orthodox and unorthodox; previous military writings; organization and training; selecting and using men appropriately; the vacuous and substantial; the employment of battlefield formations; methods for conquering and using barbarians; command and control; the cavalry's functions; rewards and punishments; being deceptive and manifesting changes; strength and weakness, including how to manipulate the army's qi; appointing generals; the basis and means for waging warfare; and warfare's necessity and appropriateness. Although many of their conclusions merely expound principles and ideas first conceptualized by Sunzi, the dialogues show a wide appreciation of the entire body of classic military writings.
TAIBAI YINJING (TAIBAI YINFU)
Nothing is known about this book's author, Li Quan, except that he apparently held provincial-level military posts and was probably active for at least twenty years (roughly from 745 to 765). Thus, he must have experienced the devastating warfare that engulfed China during An Lushan's rebellion (755–763) and witnessed the subsequent erosion of Tang power. He was an astute yet thorough student of military affairs and the classic martial texts, but only the Taibai yinjing and his commentary on Sunzi's Art of War (in the Shijiazhu edition) survive intact. However, the Tongdian and other later texts adopt many chapters in their entirety, and numerous short paragraphs from his lost works are also preserved in such compilations as the Taiping yulan.
According to the author's prefatory remarks, dated 759, the title refers to the planet Venus (Taibai), which governs military affairs, and the moon (Yin), which is associated with attacking and slaying. The book was conceived as a subtle work discussing the ethereal and unorthodox aspects of military art rather than simplistic open-field tactics. A lengthy hundred chapters in all, its ten categorical sections of varying length constitute a veritable repository of Tang military theory and practice. Although opening with a contemplation of Heaven and Earth, it immediately emphasizes the role and necessity of human effort, without which any advantage of environment will be squandered. Still, more than any previous work, the Taibai yinjing is pervaded by the concepts of yin and yang and thus emphasizes the formless and the hidden, though not because Li Quan was enamored of mystical doctrine. Rather, he employs a unique vocabulary to advance a new means of conceptualizing warfare, one that emphasizes being unfathomable so as to effect unexpected victory with minimal effort and expense, in consonance with Sunzi's thought.
Although tactics are surprisingly absent, the book is similar to the Taigong liutao in comprehensiveness, with many chapters focusing upon important concepts and poignant sayings from the classic military writings, especially the Art of War, Wuzi, and Liutao. However, the defining theme throughout the disparate chapters is the need for flexibility, for employing unorthodox methods to wrest spatial and temporal advantages that will allow strategic power (shi) to overwhelm the enemy. The foundation for victorious military campaigns is a sound, virtuous national leadership that harmonizes the people and unites them in the state's enterprises. In conjunction with this, an efficient military organization with superlative command and control techniques, proven methods for motivating men, and thorough knowledge of all aspects of military science must be nurtured. Accordingly, there are extensive discussions of formations and deployments, planning, preparation (including logistics and camp measures), weapons and equipment (such as for fording rivers, and for incendiary and aquatic warfare), medical and veterinary issues, rewards and punishments, the commander's qualifications, military organization, and creating elite forces.
Even though some of them have a pastiche character, the chapters are internally consistent and reasonably well integrated. However, there is a major disjuncture between the first part of the book, comprising roughly 60 percent of the material, and the final four sections, which subsume chapters on sacrifices to such legendary martial figures as Chi You, numerous methods for prognostication, calendrical indications for auspicious days, and even techniques for physiognomizing men and horses. Insofar as the classic military writings prior to the Taibai yinjing largely embraced Sunzi's stress on human agency, this marks an astonishing shift. Whether these contents were amassed by Li Quan himself or simply cobbled on by later hands because of the ethereal orientation pervading the earlier chapters is unknown, but they certainly initiated a trend toward including vast amounts of such speculative material in subsequent works. Although so overwhelmingly detailed as to suggest that these methods could never have been contemplated, much less consulted, in real military contexts, these chapters provide a remarkable source for studying the principles underlying divinatory systems. Their very extensiveness also indicates that prognostication played a much greater role than previously imagined, perhaps explaining its vehement condemnation in the Weiliaozi.
ENCYCLOPEDIAS
The Tang dynasty also produced the first encyclopedia to include a significant military section, the famous Comprehensive Canons (Tongdian) largely compiled in the last decades of the eighth century by Du You, a scholar also known for his commentary on the Art of War. (Much military knowledge and thought is preserved in the various commentaries appended to the classic martial writings by such scholars and military men as Shi Zhimei, whose voluminous late-twelfth-century jottings on the Seven Military Classics, the first comprehensive commentary to the entire corpus, became known as “lectures”) The Tongdian consists of nine major sections focusing on government affairs, including one devoted to military matters that basically selects, parses up, and distributes important passages from the classic martial and historical writings under various military topics, all insightfully interspersed with Du's narrative. Thereafter, the well-known Taiping yulan and its companion Taiping guangji, both compiled under imperial sponsorship by Li Fang and others late in the tenth century, encompass selected military materials under such broad topics as “chariots” and “boats,” thereby fortuitously preserving otherwise lost passages as well as illuminating textual variants and errors. Finally, the still extant portions of the enormous Yongle Encyclopedia (Yongle dadian), compiled in the first decade of the fifteenth century, contain several volumes of military writings, as does the massive Gujin tushu jicheng (“imperially approved synthesis of books and illustrations past and present”) compiled in the early eighteenth century.
Although several other lesser-known encyclopedias also preserve materials of interest, two other compendia are devoted exclusively to military issues and affairs, the Essentials of the Military Classics (Wujing zongyao) and the Wubeizhi. The former was undertaken by imperial directive in 1040 when Emperor Renzong was persuaded his military officials lacked an understanding of China's classical military writings. Essentially a cut-and-paste job, it arranges passages from the classics (without identifying their origins, as was common) in every imaginable topical category. It also includes several chapters on divination and prognostication, and appends two important anonymous works of the Song period, the Xingjun xuzhi and the Baizhan qifa. A so-called continuation of the work known as the Xu wujing zongyao and written in the late Ming dynasty focuses largely on formations and deployments.
China's second military encyclopedia, the Wubeizhi, is roughly three times the size of the Wujing zongyao. Compiled single-handedly by Mao Yuanyi in the second decade of the seventeenth century, it essentially drew upon all the writings extant at the end of the Ming. The material is arrayed in five comprehensive sections that focus on military writings; the evaluation of historical battles; deployments, training, control, and weapons use; operational matters for field campaigns; and finally prognostication, a section that also includes substantial chapters on riverine and open-water warfare as well as border peoples and affairs. Many early books and obscure materials, such as the Taibai yinjing, are preserved complete, accounting for the encyclopedia's great length.
JIXIAO XINSHU AND LIANBING SHIJI
The last great Chinese military writer was Qi Jiguang (1528–1588), who composed these two lengthy but exemplary military manuals devoted to training and the practical aspects of warfare in the Ming dynasty. Although born into a hereditary military family established six generations earlier by Qi Xiang, a noted general who had helped establish the Ming dynasty, he cultivated both civil and martial skills before entering active military service in Beijing when only seventeen. Quickly rising in rank and responsibility, he first served for several years as a northern defense commander, during which time his strict discipline and troop organization wrested important victories and deterred Mongol aggression. In addition, he passed the local military exam, thereby earning a minor place in palace discussions, and wrote his first appraisal of the contemporary military situation, complete with recommendations for repulsing the enemy.
While only twenty-four, he was posted to Zhejiang and entrusted with defeating the so-called Japanese pirates who had been entrenched for some two centuries in the coastal area (thanks to the collusion of local officals and powerful families) and preyed upon local shipping, towns, and merchants. In several battles in which he participated—including one in which he personally shot the enemy commander to turn the tide—the marauders were severely defeated. Over the years, as he became responsible for increasingly greater areas, the pirates were invariably vanquished and expelled further from the coast. After pacifying the region, he was appointed area commander for northern Hebei at the age of forty and assumed responsibility for defending the area along the Great Wall. Here he showed his ingenuity in constructing numerous watchtowers and perfecting his training methods, successfully deterring enemy aggression for a decade and a half. Ironically, the resulting lack of armed clashes, dramatically in contrast to his aggessive record in the south, led to accusations of laxity and dereliction that eventually led to his retirement and death just before his sixtieth birthday.
Qi Jiguang's fame rests less upon his impressive field achievements at a time when the Ming military was increasingly weak and hollow than upon the two books he penned to instruct soldiers in their craft. Although many of the chapters are devoted to describing essential field practices, military organization, and the proper employment of weapons (often illustrated for the first time) and always emphasize the substantial over the formal and flowery, the underlying views may be traced back to Sunzi and Wuzi. Qi believed that soldiers should be physically qualified, well trained, and tightly organized under a strict system of discipline wherein the individual squads would employ mixed weapons to engage in the critical task of slaying the enemy. (Cannon were also to be integrated into the army as a whole rather than deployed with individual units.) All forces should be capable of both offensive and defensive warfare, able to create opportunities and exploit them, identify configurations of terrain and utilize them. The people constitute the foundation, because without a stable, engaged populace, armies will lack the fervor for battle. In addition, their courage must be fostered and respect for their role sustained. Their material welfare must be sufficient and their weapons superior; only then will the army be able to bring overwhelming power to bear, just as Sunzi advocated. The component forces of chariots, cavalry, and infantry all have their appropriate roles, and are therefore mixed in the ideal combat battalion. Moreover, no doubt because of his long service in the coastal areas, Qi's books, in contrast with previous works, include considerable material on naval forces and their training. Much of the text and most of the illustrations (although often poorly redrawn, as with the spear tips dropped off, turning them into staffs) were incorporated in the Wubeizhi, and his books were much studied in the late Ming and Qing dynasties.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING
For an overview on dates and authorship, see Robin D. S. Yates, “New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts: Notes on Their Nature and Evolution, and the Development of Military Specialization in Warring States China,” T'oung Pao 74 (1988): 549–603, as well as the individual introductions and notes to the translations in Ralph D. Sawyer, Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993) and Sun Pin Military Methods (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).
Among the numerous Chinese military texts, only those found in the Seven Military Classics and a few others have been translated into English. Sunzi's Art of War has seen many versions over the past two centuries, but the most useful are those of Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), and Roger Ames (New York: Ballantine, 1993), with the first two emphasizing military history. With the exception of the Wuzi (included as an appendix in Griffith's Art of War), the only readily available English translations for the other Seven Military Classics are Sawyer's. Sun Bin bingfa may be found in two translations: D. C. Lau and Roger Ames, Sun Pin: Art of Warfare (New York: Ballantine, 1996), and Sawyer, Sun Pin Military Methods. Other translations of Chinese military writings include One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies: Battle and Tactics of Chinese Warfare [Baizhan qilue] (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) and Wang Zhen, The Tao of Peace [Daodejing lunbing yaoyi] (Boston: Shambhala, 1999), both translated by Ralph D. Sawyer; Harro von Senger, The Book of Stratagems, trans. Myron B. Gubitz (New York: Viking, 1991); several comic book editions of the classics; and various English-language versions of Sunzi published in the People's Republic of China that, irrespective of the writer's insights, tend to be useless for scholarly purposes.
Although vernacular (modern) Chinese versions of the various military classics, especially Sunzi's Art of War, proliferate, apart from the series published by the People's Liberation Army Press (Jiefangjun chubanshe) in Beijing over the last two decades—and, to a lesser extent, that published by the Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuguan) in Taiwan—few are of any scholarly value, often eliding difficult passages or dropping them altogether. Even the PLA editions suffer in inexplicably converting all the characters of the ancient texts into simplified modern forms. Conversely, many of the ancient texts are being republished in readily accessible formats by both PRC and Taiwan presses, including the PLA's fifty-volume Collection of Chinese Military Books (Zhongguo bingshu jicheng). A number of modern Japanese scholarly editions also append useful commentaries as well as contemporary translations. Unfortunately, with the exception of Sunzi's Art of War and Sun Bin's Military Methods, most of the so-called tomb texts—lost texts recovered from ancient tombs over the past three decades—still await transcription, modern annotation, and publication.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Notwithstanding the existence of these historical texts, the fundamental questions regarding the nature and function of military thought in traditional China remain unanswered. Although military officials were often commissioned from among the pool of experienced generals or, from the Song dynasty on, successful examination candidates, normally they were civil officials constrained by a distinctly different mindset and temporarily entrusted with military responsibilities. Moreover, particularly in the earlier periods, many commanders were directly appointed from the ruler's own clan or were relatives of his consorts. However, individual schools or family traditions of military thought clearly existed, and military texts were prized, even circulating to a great extent despite the natural inclination to secrecy, the inconvenience of bulky bamboo-slip versions prior to the introduction of paper in the Han dynasty, and official proscription in some periods. Whether commanders studied their concepts and applied their tactics (especially prior to the establishment of imperial examinations), simply struggled in ignorance, or operated from knowledge variously acquired remains to be determined. Furthermore, many of the authors remain obscure: Were they experienced military men or simply perceptive thinkers drawn to military subjects because of their importance to the social order and the state's survival? The evolution of these books and their relationship to the wider intellectual world are not only murky, but also greatly complicated by the existence of numerous discrete viewpoints and minor traditions within the greater flux.