PRESIDENT JOHN F. Kennedy was in his private suite on the second floor of the White House, eating breakfast and still in his pajamas, when Mac Bundy knocked and entered on the morning of October 16. In Bundy’s hands were select images from the film that Steve Heyser had shot on October 14. The national security advisor broke the news to the president that the Soviets had medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba. Kennedy remained calm. Nikita Khrushchev had lied to him, but he was already thinking about what came next.
Looking at the photos Kennedy must have wondered how the photo analysts could be sure. Even though the images had been significantly enlarged, the untrained eye would have difficulty surmising that they depicted a ballistic missile site. Arrows pointed to tiny objects labeled missile trailers, erectors, and tents. Bundy told JFK that Art Lundahl was available to explain in detail exactly what they were looking at.
The president wisely wanted the news limited to as few people as possible and decided to inform only certain members of the National Security Council, along with a core group of advisors and leaders of governmental and military departments. This handpicked working group became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm, and would advise Kennedy throughout the crisis. Its primary members included (in alphabetical order)
Dean Acheson, former secretary of state
George Ball, undersecretary of state
Charles Bohlen, former ambassador to the Soviet Union
McGeorge Bundy, national security advisor
C. Douglas Dillon, secretary of the treasury
Roswell Gilpatric, deputy secretary of defense
Lyndon Johnson, vice president
Robert F. Kennedy, attorney general
John McCone, director of central intelligence
Robert McNamara, secretary of defense
Kenneth O’Donnell, special assistant to the president
David Powers, special assistant to the president
Dean Rusk, secretary of state
Theodore Sorensen, special counsel to the president
General Maxwell Taylor, US Army, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Llewellyn Thompson, ambassador to the Soviet Union
Often in attendance were U. Alexis Johnson, deputy undersecretary of state; Edwin Martin, assistant secretary of state for Latin America; Paul Nitze, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs; and Walter Rostow, State Department policy planner.
Other officials would attend the meetings as needed. Air force chief of staff General Curtis LeMay became a frequent member of ExComm because he controlled all aircraft reconnaissance involvement as well as the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in charge of ballistic missiles.
Ironically, CIA director McCone, who all along thought the Soviets were installing nuclear missiles in Cuba, was not in Washington, DC, when his fears materialized and the president called for an emergency meeting. He was in Seattle with his wife. To notify him without spilling secrets over an unsecured phone line, an assistant called the director and simply said, “That which you always expected has occurred. The President will need all the help he can get. An Agency plane is on the way to pick you up.”1
DESPITE RECEIVING THE bitter news from Bundy at 8:30 a.m., the president decided to keep all his morning appointments and not convene the ExComm group until 11:45 a.m. He wanted the press to see him sticking to his previously distributed schedule so as not to tip them off about the unfolding crisis. In his mind it was imperative that he have time to weigh options without the additional pressure of the media, politicians, and the public clamoring for a decision.
Before the meeting even started, Bobby Kennedy, told about the missiles directly by the president, rushed to Bundy’s office to see the evidence. Lundahl was also there. He knew that as soon as Bundy broke the news to the president, he would need to explain just what the grainy shapes in the photos were. When Lundahl pointed the missiles out to Bobby, the attorney general exploded, saying, “Oh shit! Shit! Shit! Those sons of bitches Russians.”2 Moscow’s assurances that it would place no nuclear missiles outside the Soviet Union had been pure deceit, and the attorney general was furious.
Once Bobby had calmed down and peppered Lundahl with military questions, he asked, “Will those damn things reach Oxford, Mississippi?” He was joking, referring to racist officials at the University of Mississippi (in Oxford) who refused to enroll a black student. This attempt at humor would not be the last by him or the president as they tried to defuse the incredible tension with a joke or wit.
President Kennedy was agitated when he entered the Oval Office and took his seat behind the Resolute Desk. Made from the wood of the abandoned British ship HMS Resolute and presented as a gift from Queen Victoria to President Rutherford B. Hayes in 1880, the desk had been used by every president since. On its surface sat a vivid reminder of the president’s past—a paperweight made from the coconut shell he had used to help save his men in the Solomon Islands. Carved into it was his message: “NAURO ISL… COMMANDER… NATIVE KNOWS POS’IT… HE CAN PILOT… 11 ALIVE… NEED SMALL BOAT… KENNEDY.” It was a potent reminder and a symbol of young lives saved and young lives lost. JFK was the first sitting president in the modern age to have experienced combat up close—to have smelled burning flesh and seen his crewmates alive one minute and dead the next. He felt no detachment from the horrors of war. The stark memories of seamen Jackson Kirksey and Harold Marney and their families had always weighed heavily on Kennedy’s mind. Now he had the authority as commander in chief to send thousands of men onto the battlefield, to live or die for their country. No president took this responsibility lightly, but only a select few knew what being on the receiving end of such an order felt like. Kennedy, despite his youth and inexperience, understood this responsibility better than most. He had risked his life for his country and witnessed others losing theirs. If American servicemen were to die in this growing conflict, the burden would be his.
When the ExComm meeting convened at 11:45 a.m., Acting Director Carter sat in for McCone, and Arthur Lundahl and another intelligence expert, Sydney Graybeal, also attended to explain the photos. President Kennedy sat at the head of the oblong table underneath a painting of George Washington in the Cabinet Room. He appeared calm, the jitters gone for now. As soon as the discussions were under way, he pressed a button directly under the tabletop. In the basement of the White House, a reel-to-reel tape recorder clicked on and captured almost every word exchanged. Kennedy’s voice is especially clear because the microphones were hidden directly behind the president in a wall.
Lundahl had center stage. He had brought three enlarged black-and-white photographs taken by Steve Heyser during his first flight over Cuba. Using a pointer, he explained what each photo showed, emphasizing the many canvas-covered missile trailers and the missile erector-launchers. The trailers were eighty feet in length, consistent with the size used to haul missiles, and the canvas-covered objects were approximately sixty-seven feet, the exact size of the Soviet MRBM (medium range ballistic missile).
Then the questions began, and the tape recorded exactly who said what, while providing a fascinating glimpse into Kennedy’s decision-making. The most important questions were simple and direct, and asked by the president.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—How do you know those are missiles?
LUNDAHL—By the length, sir.
Having Lundahl and Graybeal at the meeting was essential, because Bobby Kennedy, like the president and most of the others, could not clearly discern the missiles or the launchers. Bobby later said the photos looked like “no more than the clearing of a field for a farm or a basement of a house.”3 Bobby and all the nonmilitary experts simply had to take Lundahl’s word for it.
The president then asked when the missiles would be operational—vital information that would give Kennedy his time frame for removing them, which in turn would dictate the different steps he might take.
Although Lundahl and Graybeal knew the missiles were not yet operational, they did not have a precise answer.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—Is it ready to be fired?
GRAYBEAL—No, sir.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—How long?… We can’t tell that can we, how long before it can be fired?
GRAYBEAL—No, sir. [A later estimate projected that they would be operational in approximately ten to fourteen days, which turned out to be accurate.]
A couple minutes later the conversation shifted to Heyser’s second flight and Rudy Anderson’s first, both conducted on October 15.
LUNDAHL—May I report, sir, that two additional SAC [U-2] missions were executed yesterday. They [the films] were taken to Washington area last night. They’re currently being chemically processed at the Naval Center in Suitland [Maryland] and they’re due to reach us at the NPIC [National Photographic Interpretation Center] around 8 tonight. Both of these missions go from one end of Cuba to the other, one along the north coast and one along the south. So additional data on activities, or these storage sites [referring to potential storage sites for warheads] which we consider critical may be in our grasp if we can find them.
After Lundahl and Graybeal had answered more questions, Rusk and McNamara dominated much of the conversation as the group explored various responses to the missile threat. Options ranged from a quick surgical strike on the missile sites to a full-scale invasion of Cuba during a bombing of the missiles.
Explaining why the Soviets had put missiles in Cuba, Rusk was prescient about Khrushchev’s future bargaining chip.
RUSK—Mr. McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that he knows we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours. Also, we have nuclear weapons nearby in Turkey and places like that.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—How many weapons do we have in Turkey?
TAYLOR—We have Jupiter missiles.
BUNDY—How many?
MCNAMARA—About 15.
The conversation about the US missiles in Turkey called attention to a sensitive issue for Khrushchev, who later said the Americans “would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointed at you.”4
The ExComm meeting of October 16 focused primarily on the various pros and cons of US responses in order to glean the Soviet Union’s ultimate objective. One issue not seriously examined or debated was why the United States deemed it so important to remove the Soviet missiles in Cuba. After all, the Soviets had plenty of intercontinental missiles in the Soviet Union capable of reaching the United States. As advisor Ted Sorensen wrote in a summary of the first ExComm meeting, “It is generally agreed that these missiles, even when fully operational, do not significantly alter the balance of power—i.e. they do not significantly increase the potential mega-tonnage capable of being unleashed on the American soil.”5 The real danger they posed was political. Kennedy had publicly stated he would not allow missiles in Cuba, and now he was being tested. All eyes were on him to stand up to the Soviets. Bundy later hit the nail on the head, saying, “Our public would simply not tolerate them [nuclear missiles] being so close to us.” And the president later told Bobby essentially the same thing, saying that if he hadn’t gotten those missiles out, “I would have been impeached.”6
A little later in the ExComm meeting President Kennedy asked General Taylor, “How effective can the takeout [bombing all the missile sites] be?”7 Taylor responded, “It will never be 100%, Mr. President.” The president had great respect for General Taylor and had just recently appointed him as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Kansas City–born general had seen combat as commander of the 82nd Airborne Division Artillery in Italy during World War II and later became the first Allied general to parachute into Normandy, France, on D-day. Both Kennedy and Taylor had served valiantly in World War II, and now both men were working tirelessly to prevent World War III. Taylor’s frank assessment heightened Kennedy’s need for the U-2s to uncover more information, particularly key clues as to how many days remained until the missiles would be operational and equipped with warheads.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—You’ve got two problems. One is how much time we’ve got on these particular missiles before they are ready to go. Do we have two weeks?
[…]
BUNDY—We’ve authorized, Mr. President, we have a decision for additional intelligence reconnaissance.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—We’ll go ahead with this maxim, whatever is needed from these flights.
The president gave the go-ahead for unrestricted U-2 overflights and potential low-level reconnaissance flights at a later date. For the low-level flights, ExComm later decided that the navy’s VFP-62 reconnaissance organization had the best aircraft and photo equipment. The jets used for these missions—flying just five hundred feet off the ground and traveling between 550 and 600 knots—differed quite a bit from the soaring U-2s. But preparation for these flights would take time, and the first low-level reconnaissance did not begin until October 23.
The majority of the men sitting in the Cabinet Room espoused quick and forceful action during that first meeting, even Bobby Kennedy: “Better to get it over with [war] and take our losses.”
At that point, there was no doubt in President Kennedy’s mind that the missiles had to go. The question was how. Kennedy went on record, saying, “We’re certainly going to do [option] one [the surgical strike]. We’re going to take out those missiles.”
JFK had learned much from the Bay of Pigs disaster, for which much of the fault lay with him. He had not asked enough questions or pressed the generals to submit various alternatives, and he had relied too much on the decision-making of others. Then, in the final days—when he should have followed his gut instinct that the endeavor had a high degree of failure—he watered down the invasion by reducing American aircraft involvement and demanding an alternate landing site. Now, on October 16, he faced a far bigger decision and was determined that no one—no matter how expert—would unduly influence or pressure him. He would be deliberate in his planning; for now he had established the objective that the missiles must go and would keep all options for accomplishing that goal on the table. In this first meeting he was leaning toward, but he would not commit to, a military solution. Lundahl had said the missiles were not yet operational, so the president knew he had a little time, and he put the burden on Lundahl and the U-2 pilots to find out just how much by ascertaining the missiles’ readiness for launch equipped with nuclear warheads.
While the morning meeting did not yield a final decision to bomb the missiles and invade the island, ExComm ordered preparations in anticipation of such decisions. Arrangements would begin for deploying troops, moving tactical aircraft to advance positions in Florida, and organizing naval vessels to head toward Cuba.
KENNEDY KEPT TO his announced schedule that afternoon. Fortunately for him, UN ambassador Adlai Stevenson happened to be in Washington, and after a public ceremony, the president invited him into his family quarters. There he informed Stevenson about the missile presence in Cuba and outlined the preparations under way to possibly remove them by air strikes. Stevenson cautioned that before taking any military action, they needed to examine all potential peaceful solutions thoroughly. Buying into Khrushchev’s comparison of US missile bases in Turkey and Greece with Russian military involvement in Cuba, the UN ambassador the next day presented Kennedy with a handwritten note that asked, “If we attack Cuba, an ally of the U.S.S.R., isn’t an attack on NATO bases equally justified?” Later Kennedy shared the note with Ted Sorensen. “Tell me what side he’s on,” the president said regarding Stevenson.8
While the president and the UN ambassador huddled, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did the same at the Pentagon. They discussed preparations for air strikes but also readiness for nuclear war, should it come to that. The group decided to advise the president not to use low-level reconnaissance flights quite yet, so as not to tip off the Soviets that they had discovered the missiles.
Later, at 6:30 p.m., ExComm met again. The president got back to the question that had nagged him earlier regarding how much time he had until the missiles were operational and “ready to fire.” The answer: two weeks.
The president now had his maximum time frame to remove the missiles, and it didn’t give him much breathing room. However, the information allowed him just enough daylight to reconsider a possible planned air strike on Sunday.
Kennedy and Rusk turned the conversation to the flights that Rudy Anderson and Steve Heyser had conducted the previous day.
RUSK—The total readout on the flights yesterday will be ready tonight, you think?
CARTER—It should be finished pretty well by midnight.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—Now wasn’t that supposed to cover the whole island? Was it?
CARTER—Yes, sir. In two throws [flight paths].
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—Except for…
CARTER—But part of the central and in fact much of the central and eastern [part of Cuba] was cloud covered. The western half was in real good shape.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—I see. Now what have we got laying on for tomorrow?
CARTER—There are seven, six or seven…
The discussion then returned to the various responses, such as a limited, surgical strike on the missiles, a broader air attack on both the missiles and all Cuban and Soviet aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, and a full air attack followed by an invasion with a quarter million soldiers and marines. The president called these courses one, two, and three; yet, alarmingly, no one clearly labeled them as such, and there was confusion among ExComm members.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—It seems we’re going to have the general, number two we would call it, course number two, which would be a general strike and that you ought to be in a position to do that, then, if you decide you’d like to do number one we have the option.
BUNDY—I agree.
ROBERT KENNEDY—Does that encompass an invasion?
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—No, I’d say that’s the third course.
Then the president, finally, clearly defined the three options. In future exchanges during this meeting he was cognizant that he must be especially clear that these were options and he had not yet decided on one. And he also made clear that while he would like options one and two ready for launch on the weekend, he had not yet given the go-ahead. Obviously afraid that the generals believed one of these options would eventually be exercised, McNamara said, “I don’t believe we have considered the consequences of any of these actions satisfactorily.… I don’t know what kind of world we will live in after we have struck Cuba.”
Taylor quickly pushed aside McNamara’s sobering inquiry and informed the president of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s opinion of a limited military strike.
TAYLOR—Mr. President, I should say that the Chiefs and the commanders feel so strongly about the dangers inherent in the limited strike that they would prefer taking no military action rather than to take that limited first strike. They feel that it’s opening up the United States to attacks which they can’t prevent, if we don’t take advantage of surprise.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY—Yeah, but I think the only thing is, the chances of it becoming a much broader struggle are increased as you step up the [attacks].
The meeting ended shortly after this exchange, with President Kennedy keeping all his options open. He encouraged the State Department to give more thought to their consequences as well as when to notify allies and whether to warn Khrushchev.
While the objective of removing the missiles was set in stone and the methods for doing so remained fluid, Kennedy was clearly leaning toward either a limited or a more general air strike. But before he committed he wanted more information about what was happening on all of Cuban soil. Missiles had been located in the San Cristobal area, but were there more in other locations? And the judgment that the missiles would be ready to fire in two weeks was just an estimate. The president needed to know their precise state of readiness. Only the pilots who strapped themselves into a temperamental aircraft that cruised on the edge of outer space could get him this information within the next few days.