26. For the administration’s failure to cover its flanks, see Quandt, Camp David, p. 126. See also comments by Carter’s press secretary: Jody Powell, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow, 1984), p. 57, cited in Daniel Patrick Strieff, “The President and the Peacemaker: Jimmy Carter and the Domestic Politics of Arab-Israeli Diplomacy, 1977–1980,” Doctoral Thesis Submitted to the Department of International History of the London School of Economics, October 2013, p. 111. For Quandt’s quotes (“time to put their friends on notice” and “otherwise peaceful Saturday”), see Quandt, Camp David, p. 126. For Jody Powell quote, see “Interview with Jody Powell, December 17–18, 1981,” Carter Presidency Project, The Miller Center, 2003, p. 57, accessed September 28, 2016, http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_1981_1217_powell.pdf. For condemnations from American Jewish groups and many more details on the opposition to the communiqué, see Daniel Strieff, Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: The Politics of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), chapter 3; Daniel Patrick Strieff, “The President and the Peacemaker.”
27. For Carter’s UN address (in which he added, to great Israeli satisfaction, “We do not intend to impose a settlement on the nations of the Middle East”), see Jimmy Carter, “United Nations Address Before the General Assembly,” The American Presidency Project (online), October 4, 1977, accessed September 28, 2016, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6744. For Carter’s quote (“rather commit political suicide”), see Martin Tolchin, “Carter Assures Representatives on Israel,” The New York Times, October 7, 1977. Carter had been “increasingly concerned about criticisms of our peace initiatives from within the American Jewish community.” Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 296.
28. For quotes from Dayan and Carter, see “Memorandum of Conversation,” FRUS, VIII, pp. 658–59. In his diary, Carter wrote of the meeting: “I told the group that there was no doubt that, of all the nations with whom we had negotiated on the Middle East, Israel was by far the most obstinate and difficult. This seemed to cause them [the Israelis] genuine concern and they kept coming back to the point, but of course Cy and Zbig and all of us know that it’s absolutely a fact.” Carter, White House Diary, pp. 112–13.
29. For Carter defending himself against the charge of selling out Israel, see Quandt, Camp David, pp. 134–36. For Brzezinski on “blackmail,” see Quandt, Camp David, p. 144, n. 41, citing Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 108. For Dayan and Carter quotes, see “Memorandum of Conversation,” FRUS, VIII, pp. 673–74.
30. For Carter’s quote (“would be a blow to your position”), see FRUS, VIII, p. 674. For the US official’s assessment (“exploited the opportunity brilliantly”), see Quandt, Camp David, p. 138. For Dayan’s quote (“it would be bad”), see FRUS, VIII, p. 676. For Quandt’s quote (“clear priority to domestic political concerns”), see Quandt, Camp David, p. 135.
31. On Sadat’s statement that Carter’s note convinced him of the need to take a bold step, see FRUS, VIII, pp. 741–42. On Sadat having been motivated by despair over Carter’s capitulation, see Quandt, who writes, “It was not the U.S.-Soviet communiqué that disillusioned him; it was Carter’s apparent inability to stand up to Israeli pressure … that seems to have convinced Sadat to strike out on his own.” Quandt, Peace Process, 1993, pp. 267–68. In another book, Quandt writes, “It has often been said that Sadat’s decision to go to Jerusalem was a direct response to the U.S.-Soviet communiqué. Such comments usually come from Israeli sources. But he makes no such statement in his autobiography, and other Egyptians who were involved in the talks at the time have denied it.” Quandt, Camp David, p. 127.
32. For quotes on the “Zionist lobby” from Sadat (who also said: “The inspiration for my initiative itself came from President Carter”), see FRUS, VIII, p. 992. Egypt’s foreign minister later implied that Carter’s confession of impotence, including private admissions to Egypt that further pressuring Israel would be “political suicide,” had been decisive in Sadat’s decision-making. Quandt, Camp David, p. 118. For Sadat’s November 9 announcement (“ends of the earth for peace”), see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 367.
33. On Mordechai Gur’s fear of a ruse, see Shapira, Israel, p. 366; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 367. On Yigael Yadin’s call for a mobilization of reserves, see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 367. On Israeli sharpshooters in case Sadat’s plane was a Trojan horse, see Quandt, Camp David, p. 151. For Golda Meir quote, see Shapira, Israel, p. 367.
34. For quotes from Sadat’s speech, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement to the Knesset by President Sadat—20 November 1977,” accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook3/pages/73%20Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset%20by%20President%20Sadat-20.aspx. For Weizman’s note to Begin (who accepted the note and nodded), see Wright, Thirteen Days, pp. 28–29. For Sadat sweating profusely, see Quandt, Camp David, p. 151.
35. For the Arab reaction to Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem—including flag burning, a diplomatic and economic boycott by the PLO and four Arab states, a day of national mourning declared by Syria, and Iraq’s cancelation of celebrations of the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha—see Sabri Jiryis, “The Arab World at the Crossroads: An Analysis of the Arab Opposition to the Sadat Initiative,” Journal of Palestine Studies 7 (1977–1978): 26–61; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 371.
36. On US expectations of Begin (Carter insisted that during an upcoming regional tour he would not stop in Israel unless Begin made a proposal that went beyond a mere Egyptian-Israeli bilateral agreement), see the following endnote, as well as Quandt, Camp David, p. 155. On the public opinion poll of Americans, see FRUS, VIII, p. 845. On Vance’s delivery of a personal, written appeal from Carter, see FRUS, VIII, p. 813.
37. For quotes from the meeting at which Begin informed Vance of a plan for Palestinian “home rule,” see FRUS, VIII, pp. 814–15. During a discussion six days later, Carter opened by telling Begin that the ball was now in his court: “President Sadat’s action was dramatic and far-reaching. It was almost the ultimate concession that he could make, a guarantee of real peace. He will even agree to withdraw most of his troops from Sinai. The world is now awaiting your response.” FRUS, VIII, p. 862.
38. On prior approval for Begin’s plan by the security cabinet, see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 372. FRUS, VIII, p. 870. For Begin’s quotes (“including perhaps sovereignty” and “He can take credit”), see FRUS, VIII, p. 881.
39. For the text of Begin’s plan for “Home Rule for Palestinian Arabs, Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District,” see FRUS, VIII, pp. 871–72. Points 14, 15, and 16 state: “14. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, without distinction of citizenship, or if stateless, will be granted free choice (option) of either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. 15. A resident of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who requests Israeli citizenship will be granted such citizenship in accordance with the citizenship law of the State. 16. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who, in accordance with the right of free option, choose Israeli citizenship, will be entitled to vote for, and be elected to, the Knesset in accordance with the election law.” Point 19 states: “Residents of Israel will be entitled to acquire land and settle in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Arabs, residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be entitled to acquire land and settle in Israel.” The plan approved by the Knesset later that month was modified to remove the provision for unrestricted land purchase for all Arabs, making land purchase in Israel available only to those Arabs who had chosen Israeli citizenship. Compare Point 19 of the original plan to Point 20 of the plan approved by the Knesset. For the Knesset-approved plan and Begin’s quotes (“fairness,” “Rhodesia,” and “anti-racialism”), see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin Presenting Israel’s Peace Plan—28 December 1977,” accessed September 29, 2016, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook3/Pages/103%20Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Beg.aspx.
40. FRUS, VIII, p. 671.
41. For text of the Framework for Peace, see “The Camp David Accords: The Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (online), accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtm/. For the Framework serving as the basis of Oslo, see Dennis Ross, who writes: “Yitzhak Rabin would insist in the secret Oslo talks that the essential elements from the CDA [Camp David Agreement] framework provide the basis for the Declaration of Principles that would be signed at the Clinton White House in September 1993.” Ross, Doomed to Succeed, p. 168. For the invitation letter to the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, which reproduced the main points of the 1978 Camp David Framework, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Letter of Invitation to Madrid Peace Conference, October 30, 1991,” accessed October 7, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/madridletterofinvitation.aspx; see also Yossi Beilin, The Path to Geneva: The Quest for a Permanent Solution, 1996–2003, (New York: RDV Books/Akashic Books, 2004), pp. 47–48.
42. For the texts of the two agreements, see “The Camp David Accords,” cited above, and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993,” accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declarationofprinciples.aspx. For Security Council Resolution 242, see “S/RES/242 (1967),” United Nations, November 22, 1967.
43. On Sadat and Carter colluding on a plan to force an agreement on Begin, see FRUS, VIII, pp. 984–87. Quandt writes that “the idea arose of trying to work out with Sadat a means for resuming the negotiating process that would put pressure on Begin.… Sadat should put forward an Egyptian plan for the West Bank and Gaza.… Carter would have an understanding in advance with Sadat that at a mutually agreed moment an American compromise proposal would be put forward—and Sadat would accept it. Then the full burden of American influence could be turned on Begin, without Carter being vulnerable to the charge of applying one-sided pressure on Israel.” Quandt, Camp David, pp. 173, 175–77. For Carter’s statement to Begin on Israel as “the main obstacle to peace,” see FRUS, VIII, p. 1079. For Dayan’s quote (“fury in his cold blue eyes”) and Begin’s admission that the meeting was one of the most difficult moments of his life, see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 378. For Carter’s quote to a group of Senate leaders, see Ross, Doomed to Succeed, pp. 385–86. For Israel’s failed effort to block arms sales to the Saudis, see Quandt, Camp David, pp. 195–96, 200, 210. For Sharon’s quote (“sowing the seeds for war”), see Quandt, Camp David, p. 202.
44. For the texts of the two agreements, see “The Camp David Accords,” cited above, and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993,” accessed September 29, 2016. For Security Council Resolution 242, see “S/RES/242 (1967),” United Nations, November 22, 1967. On Carter’s threat to Begin of American censure and warning to Sadat of the end of US-Egyptian relations, see Quandt, Camp David, pp. 246–47. On the eleventh day of the summit, Carter asked his aides to draft a “failure speech” blaming Begin for the collapse of the negotiations. On the same day, Carter warned Sadat against leaving the talks: “‘It will mean first of all an end to the relationship between the United States and Egypt. There is no way we can ever explain this to our people. It would mean an end to this peacekeeping effort, in which I have put so much investment. It would probably mean the end of my Presidency because this whole effort will be discredited. And last but not least, it will mean the end of something that is very precious to me: my friendship with you.’ … Sadat appeared to be shaken by the force of Carter’s argument.” At the time Carter made this threat, Egypt was receiving over $900 million per year in US assistance, a figure that would rise considerably after the peace agreement. According to the Congressional Research Service, “In the late 1970s, U.S. aid to Egypt was substantial when compared to both the size of the Egyptian economy and the government’s budget.” Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, February 25, 2016, pp. 18–19, 24.
45. Charles D. Freilich, Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), pp. 82–83. Although Carter threatened Begin with the end of US aid, his threats against Sadat—the end of US-Egyptian relations—were more severe, and the final framework agreements reflect the greater pressure placed on Sadat: they took Begin’s earlier concessions from his December 1977 autonomy plan and coupled them with an Egyptian-Israeli agreement on Sinai. Quandt writes of Sadat: “Instead of cornering Begin with his strategy of brinkmanship, in which Carter was to be assigned the crucial role as co-conspirator, Sadat found himself the target of relentless pressures for concessions.” And of Carter, Quandt writes: “once again, faced with the choice of pressuring Begin or Sadat for concessions, he turned to Sadat.” Quandt, Camp David, pp. 226, 266, 174.
46. On Begin’s December 1977 autonomy plan as the basis of the Camp David agreement, see Quandt, Camp David, p. 218. Quandt describes an American strategy paper prepared in advance of the Camp David summit: “The key idea was to refashion Begin’s autonomy plan into a proposal for an interim regime for the West Bank and Gaza that would offer the Palestinians a serious measure of self government.” He writes that the Americans entered Camp David thinking that Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai would be easy to resolve and that the greatest difficulty, toward which “almost all the American effort was aimed,” was the Palestinian issue. Quandt, Camp David, p. 223.
47. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 337.
48. For the Ben Gurion quote, the Soviet letter, and Eisenhower’s ultimatum, see Shlaim, Iron Wall, pp. 191–92.
49. Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East (New York: Schocken, 2007), p. 209.
50. On Israel’s two withdrawals in 1974, see Avi Kober, Israel’s Wars of Attrition: Attrition Challenges to Democratic States (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 81: “In order to pressure Israel to withdraw its forces from the heart of their country, the Egyptians adopted coercive diplomacy, accompanying negotiations with Israel on a disengagement agreement with continuous barrages on Israeli troops on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Violence ended only after the signing of the disengagement agreement on 18 January 1974. In the Golan Heights, an eighty-day war of attrition accompanied the U.S.-mediated talks between Syria and Israel. The war peaked between 12 March 1974 and the signing of the disengagement agreement in May 1974.” Shlaim writes of the first Sinai agreement: “Israel made greater concessions in return for a military disengagement with Egypt in 1974 than those it had refused to make in return for an interim agreement in the first half of 1971.” Still heavier US pressure forced Israel’s reluctant acceptance of a second Sinai withdrawal, in September 1975, during one of the most difficult periods in US-Israel relations. The crisis began when President Gerald Ford blamed Israeli intransigence for the collapse of talks over a second Sinai withdrawal in March 1975. Ford sent a harsh letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin concerning his “deep disappointment over the position taken by Israel.” It stated that “vital interests of the United States” had been at stake, that Israel’s rejection of a “reasonable” proposal would “have far-reaching effects in the area and on our relations,” and that the United States would now begin a period of “reassessment” of its regional policies, “including our relations with Israel.” In the middle of the reassessment, during which the United States refused to sign any new arms deals with Israel, Ford offered Rabin two ways out: an Arab-Israeli conference for a comprehensive peace agreement based on Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 lines, which Rabin wanted to avoid; or a second withdrawal from Sinai. Rabin agreed to another Sinai withdrawal, and the reassessment came to an end. For more on the first and second Sinai withdrawal agreements, see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, pp. 327, 340–46. For the quote from Israel’s prime minister (“worst periods”), see Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 261. For the United States suspending consideration of economic assistance, see Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), p. 548.