86. Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?, p. 40.
87. For text of the quoted 1968 PLO charter and discussion of the revisions made from the 1964 version, see “The Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, July 1–17, 1968,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, accessed October 4, 2016; Asher Susser, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine: The Two-State Imperative (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2012), pp. 26–27; Hussam Mohamad, “PLO Strategy: From Total Liberation to Coexistence,” Palestine-Israel Journal 4, no. 2 (1997). For the PNC quote (“including Muslims, Christians, and Jews”) and Arafat quote (“allow Jews to live in dignity”), see Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?, p. 40. For more on the PLO’s call for a secular democratic state, formally approved at the eighth PNC session, in Cairo, from February 28 to March 5, 1971, see “The PNC: Historical Background,” Journal of Palestine Studies 16, no. 4 (Summer 1987): 151. For a skeptical view of this slogan, see Salim Tamari, “The Dubious Lure of Binationalism,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 85.
88. This was the head of the PLO’s second-largest faction, Saʿiqa, which was under strong Syrian influence. Shafiq al-Hout, My Life in the PLO (London: Pluto Press, 2011), p. 120.
89. For the PLO’s struggle for influence in the West Bank in the 1970s, see Moshe Ma‘oz, Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank: The Changing Role of the Mayors Under Jordan and Israel (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 110–19. For the Kissinger quote (“Arafat will be the spokesman”), see Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 972. For the quotes from the PLO’s weekly publication (“handover of our Palestinian land”) and the head of a PLO faction (“relinquished the Bank and the Strip to the Jordanian regime”), see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 337–38.
90. The ten-point program also moderated the 1968 charter’s insistence that “armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine,” stating instead that the PLO would “employ all means,” of which armed struggle was now “foremost.” See Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol. I: 1976–77, Colin Legum, ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), p. 187. For the Arab League endorsement, see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, pp. 337–39.
91. For text of the Tripartite Communiqué (signed by Arafat while Jordan and Israel were holding talks over dividing the West Bank), see “Arab Documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” Journal of Palestine Studies 4, no. 2 (Winter 1975): 164–165. For the Jordan-Israel talks held when the PLO signed the communiqué, see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 338. For Syria and Egypt’s acceptance of Israel in Resolutions 242 and 338 and their use of Occupied Territories to refer to those conquered in 1967, see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 149; FRUS, VIII, pp. 243–44. Syria stated its willingness to accept Resolution 242 (offering peace and recognition to Israel in exchange for withdrawal) in March 1972, and within a day of the adoption of Resolution 338 both countries had accepted it (Resolution 338 called for immediate implementation of Resolution 242). For Syria’s acceptance of Resolution 338, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Syria Accepts the Cease-Fire—Letter from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria—23 October 1973,” accessed December 28, 2016, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/11%20Syria%20Accepts%20the%20Cease-Fire-%20Letter%20from%20the%20D.aspx. For the Popular Front quote (“drop by drop”), see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 344.
92. For the PLO defeats in Lebanon and the intervention by Syria, which also feared that a Palestinian victory could have led to a partition of the country or invited an Israeli invasion, see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 376–91; Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?, p. 50; Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001 (New York: Vintage, 2001), p. 500. For more on Syria’s calculations, see Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), p. 1040.
93. For Jordan’s revival of the idea of confederation, see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 414–415; Ma‘oz, Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank, p. 147. For the February 1977 meeting at which Egypt told the United States that it favored Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, see FRUS, VIII, p. 338. Arafat’s close aide Hani al-Hasan attacked Sadat’s endorsement of the idea three days later. See Sayigh, p. 415.
94. On PLO dialogue with Israeli doves, see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 414. For more on Abbas, who was among the founders of Fatah and joined the PLO Executive Committee in November 1984, see “The PNC: Historical Background,” Journal of Palestine Studies 16, no. 4 (Summer 1987): 152; Mattar, Encyclopedia of the Palestinians, p. 3. For the quote from the head of Sa‘iqa (“we may accept a truce”), see Sayigh, p. 414. For more on Sa‘iqa, which had been the second-largest PLO faction but suffered massive defections following Syria-PLO clashes in 1976, see Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?, p. 50; Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 79. For Arafat’s message to Egypt’s foreign minister, see FRUS, VIII, pp. 25, 57–66. For the PLO announcement of willingness to attend the new conference, see Sayigh, p. 415.
95. For Qaddumi’s statement regarding a national authority in the West Bank and Gaza alone, see al-Hout, My Life in the PLO, p. 117; Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 417. For the PLO’s message to the White House, see section i of this chapter; FRUS, VIII, pp. 335–36. For Qaddumi’s statement on abandoning the armed struggle and accepting a modified version of Resolution 242, see Sayigh, p. 421.
96. For the number of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians killed during the invasion, see the Lebanese police report cited by Rashid Khalidi, Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking During the 1982 War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 200. For Palestinian estimates of the number of PLO fighters killed (560 “fulltime” personnel and approximately an equal number of militiamen), see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 540. For much higher numbers of dead PLO combatants claimed by Israel (IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan: 2,000; Amir Drori, the commander of the Israeli invasion: 3,000), see Eric Pace, “Israeli General Says Mission Is to Smash P.L.O. in Beirut,” The New York Times, June 15, 1982; “Casualties of Mideast Wars,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1991. For the number of PLO personnel evacuated (8,500 by sea to Tunisia and another 2,500 by land to Syria, Iraq, and Yemen), see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 425. In addition, several thousand Syrian soldiers were evacuated, making a total of 14,398 PLO personnel and PLA and Syrian soldiers who left by sea or land. Sayigh, p. 537. For US written assurances to the PLO, see Quandt, Peace Process, p. 344.
97. For estimates of the number killed, which range from 700 to 2,750, see Sayigh Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 539; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 428. For Sharon’s quote (“clean out”), see Schiff and Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, p. 285. For details of the IDF role in the massacre, see Linda A. Malone, “The Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the Sabra-Shatilla Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under International Law for Massacres of Civilian Populations,” Utah Law Review, no. 2 (1985): 373–433; Seth Anziska, “A Preventable Massacre,” The New York Times, September 16, 2012; and especially Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 539. Sayigh writes: “The IDF transported several hundred [Phalange] militiamen to Shatila … and provided wireless communications, ammunition, food rations, and night-time illumination for the next 48 hours while the Lebanese Forces conducted a systematic slaughter of every living thing, human or animal, they met.… hundreds of prisoners were herded into the nearby sports stadium, where, in the presence of Israeli officers, Maronite gunmen led young men away for execution. Sharon, Eitan, Drori, and military intelligence chief Yehoshua Saguy all knew what was happening by the evening of 17 September, according to their own subsequent testimony, but the massacre was allowed to continue for twelve more hours.… the IDF also provided bulldozers which the Lebanese Forces hurriedly used to dig mass graves.”
98. For the PLO’s sense that the Lebanon War had demonstrated the futility of seeking to liberate Palestine from neighboring bases, see al-Hout, My Life in the PLO, p. 229. For Abu Iyad’s quip (“betray the PLO”), see Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?, p. 58. For the 70,000 Palestinians flying out of Beirut in 1983, see al-Hout, p. 219. For the drop in crude oil prices (from 1981 to 1986, the inflation-adjusted price of imported crude oil was reduced to less than one-third of its original value, from $98.12 to $30.55 per barrel), see “Short-Term Energy Outlook, Real Prices Viewer,” US Energy Information Administration, accessed October 7, 2016, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/realprices/.
99. For Arafat’s March 1983 agreement to negotiate on the basis of the Reagan Plan (as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation) and the PLO’s opposition to Arafat’s concession, see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 557–58. In April 1983, Arafat gave his verbal support to the plan, though the PLO did not approve it. David B. Ottaway, The King’s Messenger: Prince Bandar bin Sultan and America’s Tangled Relationship with Saudi Arabia (New York: Walker & Company, 2008), p. 76. For the PLO statement on “some positive elements” to the Reagan Plan, see Sayigh, p. 538. For the secret PLO-US discussions in the months leading up to the Reagan Plan, see Bernard Gwertzman, “Reagan Administration Held 9-Month Talks with P.L.O.,” The New York Times, February 19, 1984.
100. For the Fez plan, see “Text of Final Declaration at Arab League Meeting,” Associated Press, September 10, 1982; Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 551–53. For the PLO’s conditional willingness to state that it would live in peace with Israel in 1977, see section i of this chapter and n. 95 of this section. For the Fahd Plan that Arafat had quietly helped formulate, see Sayigh, pp. 511–12. The Fahd plan was published two weeks after Israel and the PLO agreed to a cease-fire that ended what was known as the “artillery war.” The PLO had fired rockets from south Lebanon and Israeli aircraft had destroyed the PLO headquarters, killing 150 civilians. Sayigh, p. 506. Arafat came under withering PLO criticism for the Saudi Plan that he had discreetly helped create, especially for article 7, which called for “all states in the region” to live in peace, implying recognition of Israel.