0. For the number of settlers (out of 547,000 settlers, 350,010 lived in the West Bank outside Jerusalem at the end of 2013, and 196,890 lived in the area of East Jerusalem at the end of 2012), see B’Tselem, “Statistics on Settlements and Settler Population,” May 11, 2015. For the Netanyahu-led boom in settlement construction during the 2013–2014 talks, see Peace Now, “9 Months of Talks, 9 Months of Settlement Development,” April 29, 2014.

0. For the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, which delimited the international border “with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate,” returned 147 square miles of Israeli-occupied land to Jordan, provided for equal swaps of territory (11.5 square miles) in Wadi Araba, and outlined leasing arrangements in two small boundary areas (totaling 700 acres), see Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (New York: Knopf, 2008), pp. 547–48; Clyde Haberman, “Israel and Jordan Sign a Peace Accord,” The New York Times, October 26, 1994; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty,” October 26, 1994, accessed December 30, 2016, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Israel-Jordan%20Peace%20Treaty.aspx. For Israel’s full withdrawal in Lebanon to the UN-mandated “Blue Line,” which is so close to the 1923 international boundary and 1949 armistice line that, according to the Congressional Research Service, the difference cannot be detected except on very large maps, see Alfred B. Prados, “The Shib‘a Farms Dispute and Its Implications,” Congressional Research Service, August 7, 2001. (According to UN maps, the Shib‘a Farms are in the Israeli-occupied Golan territory of Syria.) See also David Eshel, “The Israel-Lebanon Border Enigma,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Winter 2000–2001, pp. 72–83. For Israel’s 1998 proposal—in a ten-point document, Netanyahu offered Hafez al-Assad full Israeli withdrawal from Syrian lands occupied in 1967—see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, pp. 622–23.

0. For Peres’s quotes (as well as the “greatest achievement” quote in the following paragraph), see Amira Lam, “Peres: I Will Get to See Peace,” Yediot Aharonot, August 2, 2010. In this interview, Peres seems to confuse the Palestinian concessions made in the 1980s and those made in Oslo, referring incorrectly to Oslo as the point at which Palestinians accepted a state on the pre-1967 lines.

0. Shlaim, The Iron Wall, pp. 646–47.

0. . For the 1980 UN Security Council Resolution (465), see “S/RES/465 (1980),” United Nations, March 1, 1980. The resolution demands that Israel dismantle all settlements, including in Jerusalem, and calls on all states not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used in connection with settlements.

0. For the Abba Eban quote (“History teaches us”), see Robert Andrews, Famous Lines: A Columbia Dictionary of Familiar Quotations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 330.

0. For an example of the “absence of personal chemistry” argument, see Alon Ben-Meir, “Why Have Past Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations Failed?,” The Huffington Post, November 18, 2015. For a prominent example of the “lack of trust” argument, see the December 28, 2016, speech by Secretary of State John Kerry: “In the end, I believe the negotiations did not fail because the gaps were too wide, but because the level of trust was too low.” US Department of State, “Secretary of State John Kerry—Remarks on Middle East Peace,” December 28, 2016. For more on mistaken assumptions of would-be peace brokers, see International Crisis Group, “The Emperor Has No Clothes: Palestinians and the End of the Peace Process,” Middle East Report, no. 122, May 7, 2012; Tal Becker, “The End of the ‘Peace Process’?,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2012.

0. For more on the direct talks between Abbas and Netanyahu, see Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), pp. 323–28, as well as chapter 12. The negotiations began on September 2, 2010, in Washington and ended in a final bilateral meeting on September 15, 2010, in Jerusalem, though the formal date the talks concluded is often recorded as September 26, when a ten-month partial halt on some types of settlement construction expired. For the backchannel negotiations, see Nahum Barnea, “Netanyahu’s Secret Peace Offer Concessions to Palestinians Revealed,” Yediot Aharonot, March 6, 2015; Ross, Doomed to Succeed, pp. 385–86.

0. For the growing share of religious infantry officers (from 2.5 percent in 1990 to 31.4 percent in 2007), see “Sharp Rise in Number of Religious IDF Officers,” Haaretz, September 15, 2010. For Israeli profits from occupation, including extraction of Palestinian natural resources, see Human Rights Watch, “Occupation, Inc.: How Settlement Businesses Contribute to Israel’s Violations of Palestinian Rights,” January 19, 2016. For Israeli profits from collecting customs for the PA (according to the World Bank, the fee charged “significantly outstrips costs incurred by [Israel] to handle Palestinian imports”), see The World Bank, “Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee,” April 19, 2016. For an estimate of the amount of aid to the Palestinians that ends up in the Israeli economy (72 percent), see Shir Hever, Aid Watch, “How Much International Aid to Palestinians Ends Up in the Israeli Economy?,” September 2015.

0. See Alan M. Milner, Robert Fink, and Rabbi Ephraim Rubinger, reply by Arthur Herzberg, “Begin and the Jews: An Exchange,” The New York Review of Books, April 29, 1982. For the quote from Benvenisti, see Meron Benvenisti, Conflicts and Contradictions (New York: Villard Books, 1986), pp. 11–12.

0. For figures on US military aid to Israel, see chapter 12; Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service, June 10, 2015. For a survey of subjective well-being in which Israel ranked fifth among members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, see “How’s Life? 2015: Measuring Well-Being,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015, accessed October 5, 2016.

0. The number of settlers to be evacuated in a final status agreement depends primarily on two questions: whether Israelis and Palestinians decide that some settlers will remain in their homes and live under Palestinian sovereignty, and what adjustments to the pre-1967 lines are specified in the peace treaty. The 2003 draft permanent status agreement known as the Geneva Accord called for Israel to annex 2.2 percent of the Occupied Territories and provide the Palestinians an equivalent amount of Israeli land. In 2008, Prime Minister Olmert proposed to President Abbas that Israel annex approximately 6 percent of the Occupied Territories and provide slightly less to the Palestinians in exchange. During those same discussions, Abbas proposed that Israel annex 1.9 percent and provide an equal amount in return. Using figures from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, Israeli policy analyst and territorial expert Dan Rothem calculated the number of settlers that would have to be removed in 2015 (the number of settlers increases every year) under several potential territorial agreements: if Israel annexed the roughly 6 percent that Olmert had proposed, 102,220 settlers (18 percent of all Israelis living in the Occupied Territories). If Israel annexed the 1.9 percent Abbas suggested, 239,591 settlers (41 percent of the settler population). If Israel annexed the 2.2 percent outlined in the Israeli-Palestinian Geneva Accord, 182,970 settlers (31 percent). And if Israel annexed 3 percent, 156,100 settlers (27 percent). Dan Rothem, “Border Scenarios Data,” unpublished paper, December 2016.

0. Jews have been a minority in Israel-Palestine since 2012. At the end of April 2012, the Israeli government announced that there were a total of 5,931,000 Jews in Israel and the Occupied Territories. The total number of non-Jews at this time was 5,948,313, including 1,623,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel or residents of East Jerusalem; 2,354,020 Palestinian residents of the West Bank (excluding 295,000 Christian and Muslim residents of Jerusalem counted above); 1,644,293 Palestinian residents of Gaza; and 327,000 immigrants to Israel and their offspring not registered as Jews. (These figures do not include the 217,000 foreign residents of Israel.) Note that the Israeli figures for Christian and Muslim residents of Jerusalem have been subtracted from the total number of West Bank Palestinians counted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Prior to this deduction, the West Bank total was 2,649,020, which included residents of the Jerusalem governorate (an area that includes all of municipal East Jerusalem and territory beyond it). By mid-2016 there were 6,377,000 Jews in Israel-Palestine compared to 6,645,503 non-Jews (of whom 6,271,503 were Arab). Of the non-Jews, there were 1,771,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel and residents of East Jerusalem; 374,000 others (“non-Arab Christians, members of other religions, and persons not classified by religion in the Ministry of Interior”); 2,619,368 Palestinians in the West Bank, excluding 316,000 Arabs in Jerusalem (at the end of 2014); and 1,881,135 Palestinians in Gaza. The 2016 figures do not include 192,000 foreign residents of Israel. For Jewish, Palestinian, and non-Jewish citizens of Israel, see “On the Eve of Israel’s 64th Independence Day,” Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, April 25, 2012; “Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day (2014–2015),” Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, May 31, 2016, both accessed October 14, 2016. For non-Jewish (Muslim, Christian, and other) population of Jerusalem, see “Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day,” Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, May 16, 2012; “68th Independence Day—8.5 Million Residents in the State of Israel,” Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, May 9, 2016, both accessed October 14, 2016. For the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza, see “Estimated Population in the Palestinian Territory Mid-Year by Governorate, 1997–2016,” Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, accessed October 14, 2016.