1. For the Eisenhower and Ford examples, see section ii of this chapter. For the Carter examples, see section i. Freilich, Zion’s Dilemmas, pp. 82–83; Quandt, Camp David, pp. 246–47. For the James Baker example, see Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 503.

  2. For some advocates of a boycott of settlements, the not so hidden purpose of the ban is to shield Israel from the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, as the first sentence of a 2016 open letter signed by numerous liberal Zionists makes clear: “We, the undersigned, oppose an economic, political, or cultural boycott of Israel itself as defined by its June 4, 1967, borders.” See Todd Gitlin, Peter Beinart, Peter Brooks, Michael Walzer, and Edward Witten, et al., “For an Economic Boycott and Political Nonrecognition of the Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories,” The New York Review of Books, October 13, 2016. For a rebuttal by advocates of BDS, see Angela Y. Davis, Chandler Davis, Richard A. Falk, Rashid Khalidi, and Alice Rothchild, et al., “On the Boycott of Israeli Settlements,” The New York Review of Books, November 10, 2016.

  3. US interests in an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement declined substantially when the Soviet Union collapsed, after which there was no longer the same risk that an Arab-Israeli war could lead to some degree of great power confrontation, as occurred in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. Quandt, Camp David, p. 334.

  4. Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. 320.