3. GOING NATIVE

This chapter was updated in September 2016.

0.     For the numbers killed and injured during the first weeks of October 2015, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Wave of Terror 2015/16,” July 11, 2016; “Palestinians Killed in the OPT and Israel Since 1 October 2015,” Al-Haq, October 19, 2015.

0.     For the T-shirt, see Ian Black, “Wave of Violence Fuels Arab-Jewish Suspicions in Israel’s Heartland,” The Guardian, November 6, 2015. For the attack on the Eritrean asylum seeker, see Raoul Wootliff, “New Video Exposes Severity of Eritrean Man’s ‘Lynching,’” The Times of Israel, October 23, 2015.

0.     On the government taking harsher measures than recommended by the security establishment, see Barak Ravid, “Police Chief Rebuffs Ministers’ Calls to ‘Enforce Israeli Sovereignty in East Jerusalem,’” Haaretz, October 14, 2015; “Police Given Authority to Impose East Jerusalem Closures,” The Times of Israel, October 14, 2015. On the proposal to destroy illegally built homes in Jerusalem, see Barak Ravid, “Police Chief Rebuffs Ministers’ Calls to ‘Enforce Israeli Sovereignty in East Jerusalem,’” Haaretz, October 14, 2015. For estimates on the share of Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem that lack Israeli-issued building permits, ranging from 33 to 39 percent, see “EU HoMs Report on Jerusalem,” European Union Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah, March 18, 2014, accessed June 4, 2016; Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “East Jerusalem 2015: Facts and Figures,” May 12, 2015.

0.     For the interior minister’s call to deport Palestinian attackers from East Jerusalem and revoke some of the rights of their relatives, see Judah Ari Gross, Raoul Wootliff, and Times of Israel staff, “Minister Says Residency of 19 East Jerusalem Terrorists to Be Revoked,” The Times of Israel, October 14, 2015. For the government’s refusal to return some Palestinian bodies, see “Israel Won’t Return Bodies of Dead Palestinian Assailants,” The Jerusalem Post, October 14, 2015.

0.     On the criminalization of Palestinian political activity, see International Crisis Group, “Extreme Makeover? (II): The Withering of Arab Jerusalem,” Middle East Report, no. 135, December 20, 2012, p. 1.

0.     For the article by Jabotinsky, first published in Russian on November 4, 1923, in Rassvyet, with the title O Zheleznoi Stene, see Lenni Brenner, The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir (London: Zed Books, 1984), pp. 146–49. Jabotinsky published it under his birth name, Vladimir.

0.     For more on these exceptions, see Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), pp. 40, 48, 64–71, 76–80, 318–19, 337. Subsequent to them were the Fahd Plan of 1981 and the Fez Initiative of 1982; a January 1982 Syrian offer of peace in return for full Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state under the PLO; Jordanian-Israeli negotiations over the West Bank in the 1980s; the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002; and Syrian-Israeli talks over the Golan in the 1990s, 2000, 2007–2008, and 2010. In February 1971, Egypt also proposed an interim deal, short of a full peace agreement, in which Egypt would open the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and Israel would withdraw its forces from part of Sinai, including the eastern bank of the canal. See Shlaim, pp. 305–12. For the January 1982 offer from Syria, see Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 513. For the Jordanian-Israeli talks, see Shlaim, pp. 457–63. For the talks with Syria in the 1990s and 2000, see Shlaim, pp. 549–56, 573–74, 619–25, 656–68, 660–65. For the 2007–2008 Syria-Israel talks, see Peter Walker, “Syria and Israel Officially Confirm Peace Talks,” The Guardian, May 21, 2008. For the 2010 Syria-Israel talks, see Isabel Kershner, “Secret Israel-Syria Peace Talks Involved Golan Heights Exit,” The New York Times, October 12, 2012.

0.     For the role of Ben Gurion and the first heads of the Mossad, see Yossi Alpher, Periphery: Israel’s Search for Middle East Allies (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), p. xvii.

0.     Despite appearances to the contrary, Alpher insists that some of the alliances were driven by more than just realpolitik. Arguing that ethics and morality were important drivers of aid to the Iraqi Kurdish struggle for independence, Alpher tells of the answer that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin gave to a parliamentary question about the motive for Israel’s support: “Because we’re Jews.” Alpher fails to note that a sense of Jewish morality did not cause Israel to support the quest for independence of the far larger Kurdish populations in Turkey and Iran. For the Rabin quote, see Alpher, Periphery, p. 51.

0.   For some of the achievements of the periphery doctrine that were not directed primarily at Israel’s adversaries, including economic benefits such as Israeli imports of Omani and Iranian oil for export to Europe, as well as the receipt of Iranian funds for the development of Israeli weapons programs, see Alpher, Periphery, pp. 7, 73. For Israel’s marketing of the periphery alliances to the United States, see Alpher, pp. 5, 19. For Egypt’s fears concerning Israel’s periphery alliances and the northward flow of Nile River water, see Alpher, p. 113. For the share of Egyptian troops tied down in Yemen, see Alpher, p. 37, who provides a number of one-third, a figure also cited by Eugene Rogan and Tewfik Aclimandos, “The Yemen War and Egypt’s War Preparedness,” in The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences, Wm. Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim, eds. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 155. For an argument that these figures are inflated, see Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 593–94. For Alpher’s quote on Uganda (“all fruits of”), see Alpher, p. 39.

0.   For the allure of using Israeli influence in Washington, see Alpher, Periphery, pp. 63–73, 136. For the Alpher quote (“could manipulate U.S. policy in their favor”), see Ronen Bergman, “The Officer Who Saw Behind the Top-Secret Curtain,” Yediot Aharonot, June 21, 2015. Alpher also writes of the issue at several points in his book (pp. 63, 379, 73), including an anecdote involving a Turkish official who told the CIA that Israel was an essential component of efforts to combat recognition of the Armenian genocide: “The reason we are so friendly to Israel,” said the Turkish official, “is that … AIPAC … is the solution to the Armenian problem.” Alpher, p. 17.

0.   For the lack of help from periphery allies in 1967 and the antagonistic behavior of Morocco and Iran in 1973, see Alpher, Periphery, pp. 139, 71. For the Kurdish failure to open a front against Iraq, and pressure on the Kurds by Iran and the United States, see Alpher, pp. 55, 66, 71, 88, 139. For Iran’s support of the Arab oil embargo, see Alpher, p. 15. For the United States’ lack of enthusiasm for Israel’s periphery alliances and the failure of the periphery doctrine to “aggrandize [Israel’s] political stock in Washington,” see Alpher, pp. 139–40.

0.   For the Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq, Israel’s hope of bringing to power a friendly Lebanese regime that would expel the Palestinians to Jordan, and the lesson of the Lebanese failure for Israel, see Alpher, Periphery, pp. 58–59, 47, 96, xxi, 73.

0.   For the Arafat quote (“handful of Sinai sand”), see Lawrence Wright, Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David (New York: Knopf, 2014), p. 287.

0.   For the quotes from Kamel (“a separate peace”) and Sadat (“bluster and empty slogans”), see Wright, Thirteen Days, p. 243.

0.   For more on the 1982 Arab plan, which was a slightly modified version of Saudi Arabia’s “Fahd Plan” of 1981, see chapter 1. For Shamir’s quote (“declaration of war”) and the Foreign Ministry statement (“danger to Israel’s existence”), see “Israel Rejects Arab Summit Plan as ‘Declaration of War on Israel’ and Terms It Worse Than Fahd Plan,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 13, 1982.

0.   For the Arabic-speaking countries with diplomatic representation in Israel, see Alpher, Periphery, p. 95; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel Among the Nations: Middle East & North Africa,” accessed August 21, 2016, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Nations/Pages/Israel%20Among%20The%20Nations-%20Middle%20East%20-%20North%20Afri.aspx. For Peres’s quote, see Alpher, Periphery, p. 98.

0.   For more on the suppression and defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood, see chapter 9; Carlotta Gall, “Islamist Party in Tunisia Concedes to Secularists,” The New York Times, October 27, 2014. For the Yadlin quote (“third-order threats”), see Amos Yadlin, “Undermining Assad,” in “Israel’s Northern Border and the Chaos in Syria: A Symposium,” Jewish Review of Books, Summer 2015. On Hamas seeking a long-term cease-fire, see “Abu Marzouk: No Truce Before Israel Lifts Siege on Gaza,” The Palestinian Information Center, September 6, 2015.

0.   For the steps taken by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states toward increasingly public cooperation with Israel, see Herb Keinon, “Top Diplomat: Israel Has Contacts with Almost Every Arab State,” The Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2016; “Netanyahu: Some Arab Countries See Israel as an Ally,” Israel National News, February 15, 2016; Barak Ravid, “Ya’alon: Israelis Secret Meeting with Officials from Gulf States,” Haaretz, February 14, 2016; Barak Ravid, “Former Saudi General Visits Israel, Meets with Foreign Ministry Director-General,” Haaretz, July 22, 2016; Chemi Shalev, “Saudi Prince al-Faisal Tells Haaretz: Desire for Peace Exists Both in Gaza and Ramallah,” Haaretz, November 12, 2015; J. J. Goldberg, “Top Israeli, Saudi Ex-Spy Chiefs in Rare Dialogue,” The Forward, May 26, 2014; Eric Cortellessa, “In Rare Joint Appearance, Saudi Prince, Ex-Netanyahu Adviser Spar over Peace,” The Times of Israel, May 6, 2016; Elliott Abrams, “Reading The Jerusalem Post in Riyadh,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 8, 2016. For the Israeli diplomatic office in Abu Dhabi and the joint aerial combat exercise with the UAE and Pakistan, see “Israel to Open Representative Office in Abu Dhabi, First in UAE,” Reuters, November 27, 2015; Judah Ari Gross, “Israeli Pilots Return Home After Flying Alongside Pakistan, UAE in U.S. Drill,” The Times of Israel, September 1, 2016. For Sudan’s announcement of possible normalization with Israel, as well as Israel’s lobbying of the United States and EU member states to improve ties with Sudan, see Sue Surkes, “Sudan Said Willing to Consider Normalizing Ties with Israel,” The Times of Israel, January 21, 2016; Barak Ravid, “Israel Urges U.S., Europe to Bolster Ties with Sudan,” Haaretz, September 7, 2016. For Peres’s address to Arab and Muslim foreign ministers, see Spencer Ho, “Peres Addressed 29 Arab and Muslim Foreign Ministers,” The Times of Israel, December 2, 2013. For the softening of the Arab League’s peace offer, see “In Sea Change, Arab League Backs Land Swaps in Peace Talks,” The Times of Israel, April 30, 2013; “Arab States ‘Willing to Change Peace Initiative, Waiting to Hear from PM,’” The Times of Israel, May 20, 2016. For attempts to help Israel and its Arab allies work together toward Israeli-Palestinian peace, see William Booth and Ruth Eglash, “What Is Egypt’s Sissi up to? Maybe an Israel-Palestinian Peace Dẹal,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2016; “Arab States ‘Willing to Change Peace Initiative, Waiting to Hear from PM,’” The Times of Israel, May 20, 2016. For more on Israeli exports to Arab states such as Tunisia, Morocco, the UAE, and Qatar, see Tani Goldstein, “‘Arabs Dying to Do Business With Israel,’” Ynet, April 3, 2011.

0.   For the Menachem Begin quip, see “Menachem Begin,” New World Encyclopedia, accessed August 20, 2016, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Menachem_Begin; Eran Etzion, “Israel on the Outer in Syria’s Civil War,” Middle East Institute, July 19, 2016. For the old idea of a Druze buffer state in southern Syria, see Alpher, Periphery, pp. 43–44. On the hope of Israel’s right wing that the international community will reverse its opposition to Israeli annexation of the Golan, see Isabel Kershner, “Israel Will Never Give Golan Heights to Syria, Netanyahu Vows,” The New York Times, April 17, 2016.

0.   For the 2016 Turkish-Israeli reconciliation, see Cengiz Çandar, “Erdogan Displays Survival Instinct in Israel Reconciliation,” Al-Monitor, June 27, 2016. For Turkey-Israel trade during the period of downgraded ties, see Ora Coren, “Israeli Trade with Turkey on Track to Reach Record,” Haaretz, July 4, 2014. For EU trade with Israel, see “European Union, Trade in Goods with Israel,” European Commission, June 21, 2016, accessed August 21, 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113402.pdf. For Israel as one of the world’s top arms exporters (ranked ten in the world from 2010 to 2015), see “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed October 18, 2016, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php. For Israel’s approval of contracts to sell natural gas to Egypt and Jordan, see “Government Approves First Gas Export Contract from Israel to Egypt,” Natural Gas World, December 24, 2015; Sharon Udasin, “Israel to Supply Gas to Jordan in $10 Billion Deal,” The Jerusalem Post, September 26, 2016. For Israel’s energy exports prior to the natural gas deals (e.g., crude oil, electricity, and refined petroleum products), see “Israel,” CIA World Factbook, accessed August 20, 2016, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html. For Israel’s strengthening ties with India and China, see Dan Blumenthal, “Is China a Friend of Israel?,” Mosaic Magazine, November 16, 2015; Tanvi Madan, “Why India and Israel Are Bringing Their Relationship out from ‘Under the Carpet,’” Brookings Institution, February 11, 2016; “India Successfully Testfires Indo-Israeli Barak-8 Missile,” Xinhua, December 30, 2015. For Israel’s efforts to join the African Union as an observer and growing ties with African states, see Ken Karuri, “Guinea, Israel Restore Diplomatic Ties after 49 Years of Severed Relations,” Africa News, July 20, 2016; “Kenya Set to Help Restore Israeli Ties with Africa,” Jewish News Service, July 5, 2016; “Ethiopia Backs Israeli Bid for AU Observer Status,” Al Jazeera, July 7, 2016. For Israel’s permanent office at NATO headquarters and its election as chair of a UN permanent committee, see Julian E. Barnes and Emre Parker, “Israel to Open Office at NATO Headquarters,” The Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2016; “Israel Elected to Head Permanent U.N. Committee for First Time,” Reuters, June 13, 2016.

0.   Barak Ravid, “Mossad Chief: Palestinian Conflict Top Threat to Israel’s Security, Not Iran,” Haaretz, July 5, 2014; Barak Ravid, “Mossad Chief: Nuclear Iran Not Necessarily Existential Threat to Israel,” Haaretz, December 29, 2011.

0.   For more details, see chapter 12; “Fact Sheet: Memorandum of Understanding Reached with Israel,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 14, 2016.