PART IV. CONFRONTATION

Rubin, Revolution Until Victory?, p. 21.

7. NOT POPULAR ENOUGH

0.     For the nonviolence that predominated during the first several decades of Zionist immigration, see Wendy Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 27–39. See also Ben Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring: Life and Death in Palestine (New York: Penguin Press, 2016), p. 193, who writes: “In his official report to the British Parliament on the 1929 ‘disturbances,’ Sir Walter Shaw acknowledged that ‘there had been no recorded attacks of Jews by Arabs’ in the previous eight decades and ‘representatives of all parties’ had concurred ‘that before the [First World] War the Jews and Arabs lived side by side if not in amity, at least with tolerance.’ The aggravating factor, Shaw was forced to admit, was the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which promised British support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, such that ‘the Arabs have come to see in the Jewish immigrant not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future.’”

0.     For the 93 percent of Palestine’s land outside Jewish hands, see chapter 1, section iii, n. 81. For the land owned by Jews having been sold mostly by absentee landlords, many of them non-Palestinian, see Hillel Cohen, Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), p. 4; see also Rashid Khalidi’s response to Kenneth W. Stein, “Letters,” Journal of Palestine Studies 17, no. 4 (Summer 1988): 254–56.

0.     For the number of Palestinian combatants in 1948 (including local militias, the Army of the Holy War, and the Arab Salvation Army), see Cohen, Army of Shadows, p. 3. On Palestinian combatants in 1956, see Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 60–65; and Martin Van Creveld, Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), p. 146, who writes that the Palestinian units under Egyptian command in Gaza “had not been issued with heavy weapons by their Egyptian masters and had never been intended for anything more than purely holding operations.” See also Yagil Henkin, The 1956 Suez War and the New World Order in the Middle East: Exodus in Reverse (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), p. 170, who writes: “In a war, the [Palestinian] 8th Division would be not much more than cannon fodder.… the Egyptian defense plan for Sinai, dated August 1956, made no mention whatsoever of the Gaza strip.” On Palestinian fighting in 1967 and 1973, see Hillel Frisch, The Palestinian Military: Between Militias and Armies (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 54–58, 63–64; Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, pp. 169–73, 329–33.

0.     For the number of Jews killed per year by Palestinian violence, according to Israeli government statistics, see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Terrorism Deaths in Israel—1920–1999,” January 1, 2000, accessed October 20, 2016. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000,” accessed June 16, 2016. According to the above, Palestinian violence and terrorism killed 2,500 Jews from 1920 to 2000 and 1,364 Israelis from 2000 to the end of June 2016, for a total of 3,863 in a period of 96.5 years (40 per year). (The figures above contain the following adjustments to the Israel Foreign Ministry totals: included are 66 soldiers declared dead or missing in the 2014 Gaza war and 8 Jewish soldiers killed [4 from friendly fire] in the 2008–2009 Gaza war, both of which had been excluded from the Israeli Foreign Ministry total; excluded are at least 9 Arabs and 18 foreign nationals killed by Palestinian violence between 2000 and June 2016. Note that both the Foreign Ministry total and the adjusted figures above include some Israelis killed by non-Palestinian militants, such as the July 2012 Hezbollah attack in Bulgaria that killed 5 Israelis and a local bus driver; the July 2002 attack at the Los Angeles airport by an Egyptian national; and attacks from Sinai that Israel claims were orchestrated in Gaza.) The fewer than 4,000 Jews killed by Palestinian violence between 1920 and the end of June 2016 is some thirteen times fewer than the number of French combatants, settlers, and allies killed by Algerian nationalists in less than eight years of fighting, and it is nineteen times less than the number of French forces killed by Vietnamese nationalists in an equally short period. For the approximately 75,000 French soldiers killed in the First Indochina War, see Edward Berenson, Vincent Duclert, Christophe Prochasson, eds., The French Republic: History, Values, Debates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 259; Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 (New York: New York Review Books Classics, 2006), p. 538. For the more than 50,000 French forces, settlers, and allies killed in the Algerian War, see Horne, p. 67.

0.     For British repression of the Arab Revolt, see Gudrun Krämer, A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel, trans. Graham Harman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 274. For the number killed during the Arab Revolt, see chapter 2, n. 7.

0.     For the estimate of 326 Palestinians killed during the first year of the intifada, see B’Tselem, “Fatalities in the First Intifada,” accessed June 18, 2016, http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables. For an estimate of 390 Palestinians killed (including a list of names), see Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin eds., Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, p. 317. For the IDF statement that “we have no record that soldiers have been killed as a result of rock-throwing,” see Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring, pp. 44–45, who adds: “In the many demonstrations I went to in Nabi Saleh—I lost count, but it was probably around twenty—I only once saw a soldier hit with a stone.” For stone throwing by undercover Israeli security forces, see Chaim Levinson, “‘Undercover Israeli Combatants Threw Stones at IDF Soldiers in West Bank,’” Haaretz, May 7, 2012; Ishaan Tharoor, “Watch: Israeli Undercover Cops Brutally Beat Palestinian Protesters,” The Washington Post, October 8, 2015. Video of the undercover agents throwing stones prior to the arrests can be found in Sheren Khalel, “Video: Israeli Undercover Police Help Palestinians Throw Stones Before Drawing Guns on Them,” Middle East Eye, October 7, 2015.

0.     For figures on Palestinians killed in the first days of the intifada, see Menachem Klein, The Jerusalem Problem: The Struggle for Permanent Status, trans. Haim Watzman (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), pp. 97–99. For the killing of 12 Palestinian citizens of Israel (as well as a resident of Gaza who was present), see Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, “The October 2000 Killings,” September 17, 2015.

0.     For Jayyous as the largest olive-producing region of Qalqilya and details on the wells, irrigated land, and olive trees closed off by the barrier, see UN OCHA, “The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities,” March 2005; Sharif Omar, “Israel’s Wall Hems in Livelihoods—and Dreams,” USA Today, August 17, 2003.

0.     For the ICJ advisory opinion, see “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” International Court of Justice, July 9, 2004. For changes in the barrier from 2003 to 2009, including its rerouting around Budrus in 2005, see UN OCHA, “Five Years After the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion: A Summary of the Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier,” July 2009; Ray Dolphin, The West Bank Wall: Unmaking Palestine (London: Pluto Press, 2006), pp. 190–91. For the previous route of the barrier, encircling Budrus and eight nearby villages, see Mark Sorkin, “Letter from Budrus: Palestinians Are Organizing a Grassroots, Nonviolent Resistance to Israel’s Separation Barrier,” The Nation, June 14, 2004; “Budrus Discussion Guide,” Just Vision, 2011. For more on Budrus, see the documentary directed by Julia Bacha, Budrus, Just Vision Films, 2010; and interviews with Ayed Morrar and Abd al-Nasser Morrar: Jody McIntyre, “Interview: Budrus ‘Built a Model of Civil Resistance,’” The Electronic Intifada, November 4, 2010; Ida Audeh, “A Village Mobilized: Lessons from Budrus,” The Electronic Intifada, June 13, 2007.

0.   For the court decision on the single home near Jerusalem, see Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring, pp. 86–87. For the quote from the president (often translated as chief justice) of the Supreme Court (“We were not convinced”), see Mohammed Daraghmeh, “Court: Israel Must Re-Route Barrier,” Associated Press, September 4, 2007.

0.   For the protests in Kafr Qaddum, see B’Tselem “Background on the Protests in Kafr Qadum,” December 4, 2013. For more on restrictions in Area C, Israeli approval of only 5.6 percent of applications for building permits between 2000 and 2012, the inability of Palestinians to build in more than 99 percent of Area C, and Israel’s demolition of nearly three thousand Palestinian structures, see B’Tselem, “Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C,” June 2013, pp. 15, 19–20. See also UN OCHA, “Humanitarian Factsheet on Area C of the West Bank,” July 2011 (updated through December 2011).

0.   For the more than 120 physical obstacles deployed by the Israeli military in Hebron, the shuttering of 512 businesses, the closure of 1,100 other businesses due to restricted access, and the abandonment of over 1,000 Palestinian homes in restricted areas, see UN OCHA, “The Humanitarian Impact of Israeli Settlements in Hebron City,” November 2013. For the closure of Shuhada Street, see “Ghost Town: Israel’s Separation Policy and Forced Eviction of Palestinians from the Center of Hebron,” B’Tselem, 2007, pp. 22–36, https://www.btselem.org/download/200705_hebron_eng.pdf. For the Goldstein massacre, see Chris Hedges with Joel Greenberg, “West Bank Massacre; Before Killing, Final Prayer and Final Taunt,” The New York Times, February 28, 1994.

0.   For the Israeli government statistics obtained by Peace Now, see Peace Now, “GUILTY! Construction of Settlements upon Private Land—Official Data,” March 2007, pp. 1, 6, 12, accessed June 19, 2016, http://peacenow.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Breaking_The_Law_formal-data_March07Eng.pdf. For the history of Nabi Saleh and Halamish, the imposition of a closed military zone, the marches toward the spring used by settlers, and the occasion on which villagers finally reached it, see Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring, pp. 13–15, 27–30, 75–76.

0.   For the marches on Nakba day, see Ethan Bronner, “Israeli Troops Fire as Marchers Breach Borders,” The New York Times, May 15, 2011; Harriet Sherwood, “Thirteen Killed as Israeli Troops Open Fire on Nakba Day Border Protests,” The Guardian, May 15, 2011; “Egyptians Rally at Rafah for Palestinian Rights,” Ma’an News Agency, May 15, 2011. Several reports state that tens of thousands assembled in Lebanon at the border with Israel. See Nicholas Blanford, “A Third Intifadah? Deadly Nakba Protests Spark Fears of Israel-Lebanon Border Escalation,” Time, May 15, 2011. For Israeli officials commenting on the growth of BDS at this time, see Ben Caspit, “Did Israel’s Reaction to BDS Drive Movement’s Growth?,” Al-Monitor, April 27, 2016.

0.   For the Palestinian Freedom Riders, see Joel Greenberg, “Palestinian ‘Freedom Riders’ Arrested on Bus to Jerusalem,” The Washington Post, November 15, 2011; Hugh Naylor, “Police Arrest Palestinians on Bus to Jerusalem,” The National, November 16, 2011. For the protesters blocking a road exclusively for Israeli cars and a related demonstration, see Elior Levy, “Palestinians Protest Against Settlement Goods,” Ynet, October 24, 2012.

0.   For the US veto, see “United States Vetoes Security Council Resolution on Israeli Settlements,” UN News Centre, February 18, 2011. For Palestine joining UNESCO, see Steven Erlanger and Scott Sayare, “Unesco Accepts Palestinians as Full Members,” The New York Times, October 31, 2011. For the PLO’s unsuccessful application for Palestine to be admitted to the UN as a full member state, see “UN Security Council Panel Fails to Agree on Palestinian Statehood Bid,” Haaretz, November 11, 2011. For Palestine’s admission to the UN as a nonmember observer state, see “General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine ‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations,” United Nations, November 29, 2012. For Abbas’s signature of instruments of accession to treaty bodies in April 2014, see Human Rights Watch, “U.S.: Stop Blocking Palestinian Rights: Support Commitment to Abide by International Law,” April 5, 2014. For Abbas’s December 31, 2014, signature of the Rome Statute, Palestine’s deposit of the instrument of accession on January 2, 2015, and the Rome Statute entering into force on April 1, 2015, see “Preliminary Examination—Palestine,” International Criminal Court, accessed June 20, 2016.

0.   For the Israeli army’s support of settlements and restrictions that forbid soldiers from preventing settler attacks, see Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring, pp. 201–2; Breaking the Silence, Our Harsh Logic: Israeli Soldiers’ Testimonies from the Occupied Territories, 2000–2010 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012). For the evacuation of Bab al-Shams, see Irene Nasser, “In Bab Al-Shams, Palestinians Create New Facts on the Ground,” +972, January 25, 2013; “Security Forces Evacuate E1 Outpost,” Ynet, January 13, 2013. For the four other protest villages—“Bab al-Karameh” in Beit Iksa, northwest of Jerusalem; “al-Asra,” northwest of Jenin; “al-Manatir” in Burin, south of Nablus; and “Canaan,” near al-Tuwani, south of Hebron—see “Activists Construct New Protest Village in South Hebron,” Ma’an News Agency, February 9, 2013; Linah Alsaafin, “Israeli Military Cracks Down on Palestinian Tent Villages,” Al-Monitor, February 14, 2013.

0.   For labor statistics, see chapter 1, section iii, n. 126. See also Leila Farsakh, “Palestinian Employment in Israel: 1996–1997,” MAS—Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, August 1998.

0.   For the 3 percent fee and Israel’s profits from it, see chapter 1, section iv, n. 137.

0.   For the 165 islands, see B’Tselem, “Acting the Landlord: Israel’s Policy in Area C,” June 2013, pp. 5, 12. For the control by Jewish settlements and local and regional councils of 42.8 percent of the West Bank in 2009, see B’Tselem, “By Hook and by Crook: Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank,” July 2010, p. 11. For the 90 percent of the West Bank’s Palestinian population that resides in Areas A and B, see B’Tselem, “Impact of Construction and Planning Policy on Communities in Areas A and B,” October 23, 2013.

0.   For Israel’s Military Order 101 and other regulations, see Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring, pp. 19, 160.

0.   For the share of Palestinian men who have been imprisoned, see “Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israeli Prisons,” Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, January 2014. For Tamimi having spent three years in prison, see Ehrenreich, p. 12; “Military Court Rejects Motion to Release Bassem Tamimi,” Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, October 12, 2011. For the charges against Tamimi and his conviction, see “Military Court Rejects Motion to Release Bassem Tamimi,” Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, October 12, 2011; “Palestinian Activist, Bassem Tamimi, Convicted; Prosecution Criticized by Court,” Popular Struggle Committee, May 20, 2012; Ehrenreich, pp. 19–20. For the 99.74 percent of tried Palestinians who were convicted (of 9,542 cases in 2010, 25 resulted in full acquittal, while 4 percent resulted in conviction with the acquittal of some charges), see Chaim Levinson, “Nearly 100% of All Military Court Cases in West Bank End in Conviction, Haaretz Learns,” Haaretz, November 29, 2011.

0.   For the 1.4 percent of complaints against soldiers resulting in indictment, see Yesh Din—Volunteers for Human Rights, “Israel’s Compliance with the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights,” September 8, 2014. For the three hundred inquiries concerning Shin Bet torture (the Justice Ministry has not revealed how many complaints it received that did not result in inquiries in the first place), see Yotam Berger, “Department Fails to Investigate Complaints About Shin Bet Torture,” Haaretz, December 7, 2016. According to the Israeli human rights lawyer Irit Ballas, of the hundreds of complaints of torture at the hands of the Shin Bet between mid-2002 and 2012, there was “not even one found worthy of a criminal investigation.” See Irit Ballas “Regimes of Impunity,” in “On Torture,” Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, June 2012, p. 42, cited in Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring, p. 158.

0.   For divisions in Nabi Saleh, see Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring, pp. 66–67, 122–25. For the 155 injured, 70 arrested, and damage done to homes, see Ehrenreich, p. 15. For the two protesters killed—Mustafa Tamimi in 2011, and Rushdi Tamimi in 2012—see Phoebe Greenwood, “Israeli Soldiers Clash with Mourners at Funeral of Palestinian Protester,” The Guardian, December 11, 2011; “Palestinian Dies of Wounds in Nabi Saleh Protest,” Ma’an News Agency, November 19, 2012.

0.   For the PLO Central Council’s vote, see Peter Beaumont, “PLO Leadership Votes to Suspend Security Cooperation with Israel,” The Guardian, March 5, 2016. For Abbas’s threat, see Emily L. Hauser, “Abbas Threatens to Dismantle PA—Again,” The Daily Beast, December 28, 2012. For Abbas’s first two quotes (“sacred” and “we will not give it up”), see Elhanan Miller, “Abbas Vows to Uphold ‘Sacred’ Security Coordination with Israel,” The Times of Israel, May 28, 2014; Linah Alsaafin, “Abbas Vows No Collapse of Palestinian Authority,” Middle East Eye, January 6, 2016. For Abbas’s third quote (“Our people will continue”), see Stephen Foley, “Abbas Tells the World: It Is Time for Palestinian People to Gain Their Freedom,” The Independent, September 24, 2011. For examples of suppression by PA security forces—stopping protests from marching on settlements and checkpoints, discouraging leaders of village protests from demonstrating in Area A, infiltrating protests to direct them away from Israelis, threatening a leader of demonstrations in Hebron, and breaking up numerous popular protests, including ones that called for unity (March 2011) or that opposed US-led negotiations (July 2013)—see Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring, pp. 73, 128, 178, 220, 335–36.

0.   Ehrenreich, The Way to the Spring pp. 335–36.