8. RAGE IN JERUSALEM

This chapter was updated in September 2016.

0.     For the Palestinian share of Jerusalem’s population, see “Selected Data on the Occasion of Jerusalem Day 2014–2015 [Hebrew],” Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, May 31, 2016, which reports that at the end of 2014 there were 850,000 residents of Jerusalem, of whom 316,000 were Palestinian, making up 37.18 percent of the population. (The population had grown to 870,000 by the end of 2015.) For beatings by Jewish nationalist youths, see, for example, Nir Hasson, “In Suspected Jerusalem Lynch, Dozens of Jewish Youths Attack 3 Palestinians,” Haaretz, August 17, 2012; “Young Palestinian ‘Beaten by Jewish Mob’ in Jerusalem Hotel,” Ma’an News Agency, October 18, 2014; “Palestinian Youth Beaten by Israelis Near Jerusalem Old City,” Ma’an News Agency, November 22, 2014.

0.     For the share of Palestinian Jerusalemites who have refused to apply for citizenship, see International Crisis Group, “Extreme Makeover? (II): The Withering of Arab Jerusalem,” Middle East Report, no. 135, December 20, 2012, p. 22: “About 13,000 Palestinians in Jerusalem (roughly 5 percent of the Arab population) are reported to have citizenship, though it seems likely a significant proportion are members of Israel’s Palestinian minority who have moved to Jerusalem for work or family reasons.… While no precise figure is available, a study estimates some 6,000 to 10,000 Israeli-Palestinians immigrated to Jerusalem from other localities in Israel.” The source for the 13,000 Palestinians with citizenship is Laurent Zecchini, “Le passeport qui brule les doigts,” Le Monde, January 12, 2012. The source for the 6,000–10,000 Israeli-Palestinians who immigrated to Jerusalem is Asmahan Masry-Herzalla et al., “Jerusalem as an Internal Migration Destination for Israeli-Palestinian Families,” Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, July 2011. For the steadily dropping approval rates of Palestinian applications for citizenship (from 37 percent in 2013 to 2.8 percent in 2015), see “Sharp Drop in Granting of Citizenship to Jerusalem’s Arabs,” The Jerusalem Post, June 5, 2016. For the 14,416 revocations of residency between 1967 and 2014, see HaMoked—Center for the Defence of the Individual, “Israel Continues Its ‘Quiet Deportation’ Policy: in 2014, the Ministry of Interior Revoked the Residency Status of 107 Palestinians from East Jerusalem,” March 23, 2015. For the boycott by over 99 percent of Palestinians in Jerusalem, see “Municipal Elections: Barkat Takes J’lem, Huldai Carries TA,” Ynet, October 23, 2013; Daoud Kuttab, “Palestinians Again Boycott East Jerusalem Elections,” Al-Monitor, October 24, 2013. For the turnout among Palestinian residents of Jerusalem in 2008 (2 percent), see “Extreme Makeover? (II),” p. 23.

0.     For the population and proportion of the municipal budget in 2014, see n. 1 of this chapter; European Union Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah, “EU HoMs Report on Jerusalem,” March 18, 2014, accessed June 4, 2016. For a slightly higher figure (10.1 percent) for 2013, see Ir Amim, “Jerusalem Municipality Budget Analysis for 2013: Share of Investment in East Jerusalem,” December 2014. For the figures on unequal service provision and the share of Palestinians below the poverty line, see Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “East Jerusalem 2014–By the Numbers,” May 24, 2014. For the number of playgrounds per capita, see Nir Hasson, “Jerusalem Must Plan Playgrounds for Palestinian Neighborhoods, Court Orders,” Haaretz, January 10, 2016. For figures on classrooms, see Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “New Report—Failing East Jerusalem Education System,” September 2, 2013.

0.     For the absence of new Palestinian neighborhoods, see Middle East Task Force, “Occupation Realities,” American Friends Service Committee, Winter 2004. For restrictive zoning and permit allocation (between 2010 and 2015, only 7.5 percent of building permits in Jerusalem were given to Palestinian neighborhoods, where nearly 40 percent of the population lives), see Nir Hasson, “Only 7% of Jerusalem Building Permits Go to Palestinian Neighborhoods,” Haaretz, December 7, 2015. For land allocation in Jerusalem, see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “The Palestinian Economy in East Jerusalem: Enduring Annexation, Isolation and Disintegration,” 2013. For the share of Palestinian homes in Jerusalem built without permits and at risk of demolition, see the estimate of 33 percent in European Union Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah, “EU HoMs Report on Jerusalem,” March 18, 2014, accessed June 4, 2016; and the estimate of 39 percent in Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “East Jerusalem 2015: Facts and Figures,” May 12, 2015. See also chapter 3.

0.     For the demolition of homes of Palestinian attackers but not Jewish ones, see Akiva Eldar, “Why Isn’t IDF Razing Homes of Jewish Terrorists,” Al-Monitor, January 7, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/demolition-palestinian-terrorists-jewish-undeground.html. For the eviction of Palestinians but not Jews from homes abandoned in 1948, see Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “East Jerusalem 2015: Facts and Figures,” May 12, 2015, p. 9.

0.     For the rationale for the route of the wall in Jerusalem, see Ir Amim, “The Separation Barrier,” accessed June 4, 2016; “Extreme Makeover? (I): Israel’s Policies of Land and Faith in East Jerusalem,” pp. 11–12. For the 3 percent of the wall that follows the pre-1967 line, see “EU HoMs Report on Jerusalem,” p. 6. For the one-quarter to one-third of Palestinian residents on the West Bank side of the barrier, see Association for Civil Rights in Israel, “East Jerusalem 2015—Facts and Figures,” May 12, 2015, p. 1; in 2014, the same organization estimated that the number of Palestinians in Jerusalem neighborhoods on the West Bank side of the barrier was more than 120,000, which is more than one-third of the city’s Palestinian population: “different surveys estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 residents live in the Shuafat Refugee Camp, and [a] similar number in Kfar Akab. Both are located within Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries, but on the east side of the Separation Barrier.” “East Jerusalem 2014—By the Numbers,” n. 20, http://www.acri.org.il/en/2014/05/24/ej-numbers-14/. For the Palestinian communities entirely encircled by the wall, such as the 15,000 people in the Bir Nabala enclave, see UN OCHA, “The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities: East Jerusalem,” June 2007, pp. 4, 14.

0.     For Israel’s neglect of the areas on the West Bank side of the barrier, where residents do not receive the most basic services yet still pay Jerusalem municipal taxes, see UN OCHA, “The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier,” June 2007, pp. 8–49; “East Jerusalem 2014—By the Numbers,” http://www.acri.org.il/en/2014/05/24/ej-numbers-14/.

0.     For the operation of the Israeli security forces in East Jerusalem and the behavior of paramilitary units—known in Hebrew by the acronym Magav (Mishmar HaGvul), the Israeli Border Police is a gendarmerie that operates primarily in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and on Israel’s borders, and it is one of the forces in which Israelis may do their compulsory military service—see Ruth Eglash, “Heavy-handed or heroes? Israel border police are on the front line,” The Washington Post, April 24, 2016.

0.     For the slogans chanted by Jewish demonstrators—including “a Jew is a brother, an Arab is a bastard,” “we want war,” and “Kahane was right”—and the attacks on Palestinian workers and passersby, see Nir Hasson, “Extreme Rightists Attack Palestinians in Jerusalem as Teens Laid to Rest,” Haaretz, July 1, 2014; Isabel Kershner, “Arab Boy’s Death Escalates Clash over Abductions,” The New York Times, July 2, 2014. For the murder of Abu Khdeir, see Peter Beaumont, “Palestinian Boy Mohammed Abu Khdeir Was Burned Alive, Says Official,” The Guardian, July 5, 2014.

0.   “Damage to Light Rail by Arab Rioters Could Take ‘Months’ to Fix,” Israel National News, July 3, 2014.

0.   For Israel’s policy of “dilution” at the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary—imposing age and gender restrictions on Muslim access during visits by Jewish activists, including those calling for building a Third Temple in place of the Dome of the Rock—see International Crisis Group, “The Status of the Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade,” Middle East Report, no. 159, June 30, 2015. For the growing number of Jewish visitors to the site (from 5,658 in 2009 to 10,906 in 2014), see “Jewish Visits to Temple Mount Increase by 92% Since 2009,” The Jerusalem Post, January 27, 2015. For advocacy of prayer at the site or the construction of a Jewish temple, see statements by numerous Knesset members and by ministers of the Netanyahu governments formed in 2009, 2013, and 2015: by Minister of Housing and Construction Uri Ariel (2013–2015); by Deputy Religious Affairs Minister and Deputy Defense Minister Eli Ben-Dahan (2013–2015); by Deputy Defense Minister Danny Danon (2013–2014); and by Deputy Minister of Transport, National Infrastructure, and Road Safety Tzipi Hotovely (2013–2015), see International Crisis Group, “The Status of the Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade,” Middle East Report, no. 159, June 30, 2015, p. 10; “Far-Right Israel Minister Makes Brief Visit to Al Aqsa,” AFP, March 16, 2014; “Likud’s Hotovely Gets Death Threats After Temple Mount Visit,” The Times of Israel, November 26, 2014; “MK Ben Dahan Vows to Enable Temple Mount Prayer,” Israel National News, July 16, 2013; “Minister Calls for Third Temple to Be Built,” The Times of Israel, July 5, 2013; “‘We’re Not Embarrassed to Say It: We Want to Rebuild the Temple,’” Israel National News, August 14, 2016. For the deputy defense minister’s financial support of an institution that advocates building a Third Temple where the Dome of the Rock now stands, see “Israeli Deputy Minister, Netanyahu Donor Gave to Temple Mount Groups,” JTA, December 9, 2015. For the newly established Knesset Temple Mount Lobby, whose launch event was attended by three cabinet ministers, the speaker of parliament, and three lawmakers, see Nir Hasson, “Israeli Ministers Join Call to Permit Jewish Prayer at Temple Mount,” Haaretz, November 8, 2016.

0.   For Barkat’s statement, see “Mayor Reveals Jerusalem Went from 200 to 5,000 Monthly Attacks,” Israel National News, October 27, 2014. For the more than 1,000 detained, see “2 Palestinians to Be Detained Without Trial for 6 Months,” Ma’an News Agency, November 28, 2014; “PLO: Israel Has Detained 1266 Palestinian Children in 2014,” Al-Akhbar, December 30, 2014. For the 240 arrests in Jerusalem for security-related offences in the 2000 to 2008 period, see Daniel Seidemann and Lara Friedman, “Jerusalem 2014: No New Stable Status Quo, No Return to Status Quo Ante,” Terrestrial Jerusalem, August 22, 2014. In the period between October 2015 and October 2016, when violence in Jerusalem resurged, Israel detained nearly 1 percent of the city’s Palestinian population—2,355 Palestinians, 866 of them children—according to the Committee of Prisoners’ Families: “Israel Detained 2,355 Palestinians in Jerusalem in the Last Year,” Middle East Monitor, October 3, 2016.

0.   For the deployment of special forces officers and extra border police units, the large-scale raids, the new checkpoints and barricades, the call for Israelis with firearms to join a volunteer security force, the demolition of homes of Palestinian attackers and the arrest of their relatives, the use of “skunk” water, the threats to fine parents, the proposed twenty-year prison sentences for throwing stones, and the fines for spitting out shells of sunflower seeds, see “Mayor Barkat Releases New Jerusalem Security Plans,” The Times of Israel, November 21, 2014; Peter Beaumont, “Jerusalem on the Edge as Tensions over Holy Site Threaten to Boil Over,” The Guardian, November 11, 2014; “Netanyahu Promises to Crack Down on Jerusalem Riots,” The Times of Israel, October 26, 2014; “Israel Eases Gun Control Rules After Jerusalem Terror Attack,” The Jerusalem Post, November 20, 2014; “Israel Begins Demolishing Homes over Attacks,” Al Jazeera, November 20, 2014; “IDF Arrests Family Members of Suspects Behind Monday’s Terrorist Attacks,” The Jerusalem Post, November 11, 2014; John Reed, “Israeli Use of Skunk Water Fuels Anger in East Jerusalem,” Financial Times, November 21, 2014; “Children Throwing Stones? Parents to Pay the Price,” i24 News, October 27, 2014; Kate Shuttleworth, “Palestinian Stone Throwers Could Face 20 Years in Jail,” The Guardian, November 4, 2014; “East Jerusalem 2015: Facts and Figures,” p. 16.

0.   For the Palestinian teenager abducted, beaten, and left alive, as well as a similar incident several weeks earlier, see “Unidentified Assailants Kidnap Jerusalem Teen,” Ma’an News Agency, November 5, 2014; “Witnesses: Settlers Try to Kidnap 11-Year-Old Jerusalem Boy,” Ma’an News Agency, September 24, 2014. For Palestinians in the West Bank who were run over, see, for example, “Israeli Settler Runs Over Hebron Child with Car,” International Middle East Media Center, September 11, 2014; “Ten-Year-Old Injured in Settler’s Deliberate Hit and Run,” Wafa—Palestinian News & Info Agency, September 25, 2014; “Palestinian Girl Dies in Hit-and-Run by Jewish Driver,” The Times of Israel, October 19, 2014; “Jewish Settler Runs Over 7-Year-Old Palestinian Child Near Hebron,” Ma’an News Agency, December 28, 2014; “Jewish Settler Runs Over Palestinian Child Walking to School in Tuqu,” Ma’an News Agency, December 31, 2014. For the shooting of the supporter of Jewish prayer in the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount, see “Temple Mount Activist Shot, Seriously Hurt Outside Jerusalem’s Begin Center,” The Times of Israel, October 29, 2014. For the attack at the West Jerusalem synagogue (the fourth rabbi, Haim Rothman, was critically injured and died of his wounds eleven months later, on October 24, 2015), see Jodi Rudoren and Isabel Kershner, “Israel Shaken by 5 Deaths in Synagogue Assault,” The New York Times, November 18, 2014. For the 13 people killed by Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank between September 16, 2014, and November 18, 2014 (including those who were attacked during this period but died of their injuries later), compared to the 6 Israelis killed in 2013 and none in 2012 (excluding those killed by exchanges of hostilities with militants in Gaza), see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000,” accessed June 4, 2016.

0.   For Israeli claims that Abbas incited the violence, see “Netanyahu Blames Abbas Incitement for Jerusalem Attack,” The Times of Israel, October 22, 2014; “Abbas Is Inciting Jihad, Has Joined Ranks with IS, Liberman says,” The Times of Israel, October 18, 2014; “Netanyahu Lashes Abbas for Inciting Violence Among Arabs,” The Times of Israel, November 9, 2014; “Palestinian Driver Rams Jerusalem Station Killing Baby,” Reuters, October 22, 2014. For senior Israeli security officials contradicting the claim by politicians that Abbas was responsible, see, for example, the statement by Shin Bet chief Yoram Cohen in Attila Somfalvi, “Shin Bet Chief: Abbas Is Not Inciting to Terror,” Ynet, November 18, 2014.

0.   For Rabin’s opposition to dividing Jerusalem (“If they told us that peace is the price of giving up on a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, my reply would be, ‘Let’s do without peace’”), see Dore Gold, The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2009), p. 177; and Rabin’s October 5, 1995, Knesset speech (“First and foremost, united Jerusalem, which will include both Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev—as the capital of Israel, under Israeli sovereignty”). Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PM Rabin in Knesset- Ratification of Interim Agreement,” accessed June 4, 2016. For Rabin’s decision to bypass the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians in the Madrid-Washington talks and negotiate directly with senior PLO leaders based in Tunis, see chapter 1, section iii, n. 122. The PLO had deliberately encouraged local leaders to take harder line positions in the Madrid-Washington talks to persuade Israel to negotiate directly with it in Oslo. Nevertheless, beneath the tactical ploy there appeared to be substantive differences between Husseini and Arafat on negotiating Jerusalem. For a discussion of these differences (albeit one that neglects the coordination between the PLO and the Palestinian representatives at the Madrid-Washington talks), see Gold, pp. 162–63.

0.   For the deportation of Palestinian legislators from Jerusalem and Shin Bet monitoring of political subversion, see Daoud Kuttab, “Israeli Court to Rule on Minister’s Deportation Case,” Al-Monitor, May 11, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/Israel-interior-minister-jerusalem-palestinian-residents.html; “Extreme Makeover? (II),” p. 1.

0.   For the assault on a former religious affairs minister and close associate of Abbas, see “Abbas Adviser Forced to Flee Temple Mount,” The Jerusalem Post, June 29, 2014; chapter 9, n. 10. For the PA Minister of Jerusalem Affairs, Adnan al-Husseini, who was expelled from the Abu Khdeir family home, see Asmaa al-Ghoul, “Palestinian Press Losing Media War in Current Crisis,” Al-Monitor, July 8, 2014.

0.   For details of the 2011 agreement and quotes from Hamas officials confirming that Mish‘al agreed with Abbas to a strategy of popular resistance, see International Crisis Group, “Light at the End of Their Tunnels? Hamas & the Arab Uprisings,” Middle East Report, no. 129, August 14, 2012, pp. 18–25, 33. For Mish‘al’s May 2011 speech in which he stated that Hamas was willing to suspend attacks on Israel (“We have given peace, from Madrid to now, twenty years. I say: We are ready to agree as Palestinians, in the arms of the Arabs and with their support, to give an additional chance for agreement on how to manage it”), see the following video, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6z FDivGgCs. For Hamas’s previous agreement to a strategy of popular resistance in the so-called Prisoners’ Document (Wathiqat al-Asra) of 2006, officially known as the National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners, see “Text of Agreement Reached by Palestinian Factions,” The New York Times, June 28, 2006. For leaked minutes of an August 21, 2014, Doha meeting between Abbas and Mish‘al in which both confirm that they had agreed to a program of nonviolence and in which Mish‘al complains that Abbas had obstructed nonviolent protests, see “Palestinian Authority President Abbas to Qatari Emir Tamim: Meshaal Is Lying,” Al-Akhbar, September 5, 2014. See also “Abbas and Mashaal Agree on Peaceful Intifada,” The Jerusalem Post, February 23, 2013. For complaints of PA obstruction by leaders of nonviolent protests against Israel, see, for example, “Jamal Juma’: PA ‘Killing Popular Resistance,’” Stop the Wall, August 10, 2011. For more on PA efforts to quell Palestinian protests, see Ahmad Azem, “West Bank Uprisings Dampened by PA,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2014; “Abbas Tells PA Forces to Urgently Quell West Bank Protests,” The Times of Israel, October 5, 2015; “PA at Odds with Palestinians as West Bank Protests Escalate,” Ma’an News Agency, October 9, 2015; “Caught Between Protesters and Israel, Palestinian Security Forces Shift Tactics,” The New York Times, October 25, 2015. For Abbas’s refusal to endorse a nonviolent boycott of Israel, see “Abbas: Don’t Boycott Israel,” The Times of Israel, December 13, 2013.

0.   For the Israeli-Jordanian understandings and Israel’s breach of them, see International Crisis Group, “How to Preserve the Fragile Calm at Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade,” Middle East Briefing, no. 48, April 7, 2016, pp. 1–3, 4–6.

0.   For more on the uncoordinated attacks prior to the outbreak of the First Intifada, see Lisa Hajjar, Mouin Rabbani, and Joel Beinin, “Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict for Beginners,” and Salim Tamari, “What the Uprising Means,” both in Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, eds., Intifada, pp. 110, 132; Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement, p. 101. For the local elections in 1976—when legitimate Palestinian representatives were toppled and deported, and more compliant, unelected figures were put in their place—see Ma‘oz, Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank (London: Frank Cass, 1984), pp. 133–161.