If prosperity and tranquility were critical keys to the enduring popularity of a government, the St. Laurent Liberals should have been easily re-elected in 1957. The prime minister enjoyed an approval rating of 65 percent, according to a Gallup poll published in July 1956.1 The economy appeared to be robust for much of the period and the Liberal government continued to report a budget surplus. But the King/St. Laurent dynasty had run its course and had not rejuvenated itself. The total dominance of the economic, national unity, and social welfare elements of the issue agenda, which sustained them in power and had enabled them to win elections since 1935, had slipped away. Lester Pearson — who would become Liberal leader after the 1957 election — talked of the malaise that beset the Liberal Party:
We were coming to the end of our career as a Liberal Party in power. We had been the government for over twenty years; people were getting tired of us, which was inevitable and natural. . . . We were vulnerable to any pressure against us; we were more likely to be hurt by our mistakes than if we had made them ten or fifteen years earlier.2
At the same time, the Conservatives were invigorated by the election of a new leader.
In late 1956, the Conservative leader, George Drew, fell seriously ill, and potential successors began to line up. Among them was John Diefenbaker. Described by Historian J.L. Granatstein as a “lonely Westerner and an advocate of increased social welfare,” Diefenbaker’s relations with party leaders from 1942 to 1956 were often cool, and he had little support within his own parliamentary caucus, despite the fact that he had sought the leadership twice before.3
He had, however, acquired a Canada-wide reputation for consistently and publicly defending civil rights and minority groups, and developed a vision of “one Canada” which departed from some of the previous assumptions of the basic nature of Canadian society. According to Diefenbaker, “there should be no German-Canadians, no Jewish — or French-Canadians, only Canadians, pure and simple.”4
Despite the fact that his notion of “unhyphenated” Canadianism ran counter to the historical and constitutional identification of Canada as a nation of two founding peoples — French and English — Diefenbaker never departed from this vision during his entire political career. And, at least initially, his pan-Canadian vision appeared to capture the nation’s imagination.
Library and Archives Canada. Duncan Cameron, photographer.
John Diefenbaker, campaigning in Edmonton, 1965 election.
In a number of important respects, John Diefenbaker was unique in his quest for the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party. Between 1927 and 1993, a majority of its leaders (five of nine) had not been members of Parliament when they were selected, and two-thirds had no national ministerial experience at the time they were chosen by convention. Diefenbaker, on the other hand, was an experienced parliamentarian who had sought the leadership on two previous occasions (1942 and 1948), finishing second to Drew in 1948 (see Chapter 3).
At the convention held on December 12–14, 1956, Diefenbaker threw his hat into the leadership ring once again and was successful on the first ballot (see Table 4.1).
John Diefenbaker was the most controversial of the three leadership candidates. He was not trusted by the Toronto and Montreal financial circles on which the party had traditionally depended for its funding. According to a 1969 interview, outgoing leader George Drew recalled how he reacted to the selection of Diefenbaker as leader: “The party’s finished. It won’t be more than three months before Diefenbaker has lost control. He gets his eye on one thing, and he concentrates on it, and he gets up and makes a speech on it. Then he goes away for two weeks to recover. The party needs people around to pick up the pieces afterwards.”5
Party Leadership Conventions, 1956–1961
Despite these criticisms, there is no question that Diefenbaker had his admirers,6 even among his opponents for the leadership. Donald Fleming considered him a “front-rank” parliamentary debater and Davie Fulton described him in the following way:
He was a brilliant performer in the House of Commons, a terrific debater, a man who attracted a following not only because of his personal qualities but because of his public personality. The way he shone just made him a very attractive man. A man of generous instincts, a man who befriended me, guided me, whose door was always open to somebody seeking advice.7
It remained to be seen whether Diefenbaker’s evangelical style of oratory, combined with the tactics of a criminal lawyer, could counteract the personal popularity of Louis St. Laurent and M.J. Coldwell of the CCF.
The Liberals were actually pleased that Diefenbaker had won the leadership because he was far from popular in Conservative circles in Ontario, practically unknown in the Atlantic provinces, and unacceptable to Quebec Conservatives. Many at the time saw Diefenbaker as being anti-Quebec and, while the reality of this is unclear, he often left the impression that he neither understood nor appreciated the province and its aspirations.8 As a fervent civil libertarian, Diefenbaker had been highly critical of several of Quebec premier Maurice Duplessis’ policies, including the infamous Padlock Law.9
There were also some concerns that Diefenbaker was too old, in poor health, and too difficult to get along with. Given all of these obstacles, how was it that John Diefenbaker was able to end the Liberal dynasty?
First, Diefenbaker assembled one of the savviest campaign teams yet seen in Canadian federal politics. And second, the campaign put together by this group was highly effective in persuading disgruntled Liberals, new voters, and undecided voters to try something new. Once it began, momentum carried the Diefenbaker campaign along, taking full advantage of Liberal vulnerabilities. As will be noted later in this chapter, Diefenbaker has been described as the first “television era” leader. In a sense, the so-called modern era in Canadian party politics began with him.
The Liberals were so confident of victory in 1957 that they went into the election without filling 16 existing vacancies in the Senate. After 22 consecutive years in power, a sense of complacency within the Liberal Party that the Conservatives could never recapture Ottawa again was pervasive. Liberal government was characterized by a managerial style, and the party seemed unable or reluctant to recognize the changing nature of the country’s population base. Where previously Canadians of only French or English extraction had predominated, now other ethnic groups — eastern and southern Europeans, for example — were becoming increasingly important in the electorate. Party organization had also been neglected during the St. Laurent years, and relations with the press were frequently poor, as the governing party saw little need for improvement of its organization or image. Finally, in Parliament itself, there occurred several political disputes and incidents that damaged the Liberals’ democratic credentials.
Much had changed at the provincial level, as well. During the party’s long tenure in Ottawa, there had been a significant swing away from the Liberals at the provincial government level. In 1935, when the Liberals had taken over the federal government, all provincial governments, with the exception of Alberta, were Liberal. Only Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and Manitoba remained under Liberal control by early 1957. This was important because the essential organizational and administrative help that a provincial party in power can lend to its federal allies was no longer available to the Liberals, and federal campaign organizations were virtually non-existent in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.10 The Liberal Party had become organizationally moribund throughout the West, and the Liberals had failed to stay in close touch with their prairie constituents. The overwhelming majorities captured by the Liberals during the King/St. Laurent era did not necessarily reflect a deeply felt partisan commitment. Rather, many voters felt they simply had nowhere else to go or that the Liberals were a safe choice.11
Associated with this pattern was a widely held belief that had been successfully cultivated by the Liberals that they were the only party capable of governing the country.
The Liberals’ fall from power cannot be explained solely by the renaissance of the Progressive Conservatives under their new populist leader, although there is little doubt that Diefenbaker and his advisers ran a strategically successful campaign. Initially, the Conservatives had such limited support in some important regions of the country that the party at first appeared to be heading toward another humiliating defeat. In March 1957, Gallup reported that the Liberals had the support of 48 percent of the electorate compared to 31 percent for the Conservatives — almost exactly the same figures as in the 1953 election (see Figure 4.1).
The collapse of the Liberal dynasty had a variety of causes, ranging from the lack of leadership shown by an aging leader, the absence of a clear successor from within the Liberal caucus, and a series of missteps on policy issues, including immigration, the Trans-Canada Pipeline, the Suez crisis, and farm subsidies that had angered particular constituencies across the country. None of these issues by itself galvanized widespread disillusionment and opposition, but, in a cumulative sense, all worked to plant questions and doubts in the minds of Canadian voters that the Liberals were the only party that could govern the country.
Another important factor was the retirement of several key cabinet ministers shortly after the 1953 election, which left a vacuum of leadership at the top. Included among these ministers were Brooke Claxton (Defence), Douglas Abbott (Finance), and Lionel Chevrier (Transport). All had been long-serving members of Parliament and cabinet ministers in both the King and St. Laurent governments. All were in their mid-50s when other opportunities lured them away from political life. Douglas Abbott received an appointment to the Supreme Court in 1954, Lionel Chevrier was named president of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, and Brooke Claxton went to a prestigious position in the private sector as Canadian vice president of the Metropolitan Insurance Company. According to J.W. Pickersgill, “there was no question that Abbott was the favourite to succeed St. Laurent as the leader of the Liberal Party both in Parliament and in the country.”12
These changes had serious effects on the character and reputation of the St. Laurent cabinet. Historian Robert Bothwell noted that “at a blow, half of the cabinet’s middle generation, men with ten years in the ministry, were wiped out, including the most acceptable choice for the next leader.”13
Prior to the 1957 election, other cabinet changes were made that attempted to address some criticisms about representation and leadership. The Toronto area — at long last — was given its first cabinet representative in the St. Laurent administration, when 33-year-old Paul Hellyer was promoted from his post as parliamentary assistant to associate minister of national defence. But the talent pool was thinner than in the past, since many backbenchers had decided not to spend their lives waiting for a cabinet post. Liberal arrogance, poor recruitment practices, and the absence of new ideas all contributed to the Liberal defeat. Writing in 1953, even C.D. Howe acknowledged that the government and its leader had stayed too long:
I had an understanding with our leader that we would both retire after a year or two in office and give the new leader time to get organized. Unfortunately, our leader changed his mind about retiring, which was a mistake for him and for the party. The plain fact is that the Liberal dynasty had run out of ideas.14
Over and above the malaise within the Liberal Party itself, there were some disquieting signs that the economy, one of the pillars of electoral success in Canada, was weakening. Among these were indications that investment intentions for 1957 would be lower than in previous years, as well as a significant increase in unemployment over the previous year. In June 1954, an estimated 221,000 Canadians were unemployed compared to 115,000 in 1953.15 In addition, the collapse of world prices for wheat resulted in more than a 50 percent drop in the net incomes of prairie farmers between 1953 and 1955. The Liberals were blamed for the plight of prairie farmers in the midst of general prosperity across the country. In the pre-election budget, the finance minister, who was managing a budget surplus, was cautious in handing out benefits. Although a $10 per month increase in old-age pensions had been predicted, only a six-dollar increase was proposed, earning the minister the unfortunate nickname “Six-buck Harris.”
The government’s mastery of the national unity area was affected by its contentious policy on immigration. The Liberals had long followed a British preference and selective system of immigration. Pickersgill — the minister of immigration in the St. Laurent Cabinet — defended this policy by saying that the selective system of immigration was based not upon race or creed, but on a “preference for immigrants we considered most likely to adapt themselves to Canadian society.”16 Between the end of November 1956 and the end of February 1957, an estimated 15,000 Hungarians came to Canada in the wake of the 1956 uprising in that country. The government defended its actions by claiming that this was the only practical and humane position to be taken in the face of the Hungarian tragedy. But the Conservatives raised the possibility that the country’s traditional ethnic balance could be upset. And, behind closed doors, a whispering campaign had begun in which St. Laurent was accused of encouraging Hungarian immigration because the refugees were predominantly Catholic.17 In addition to their weakening hold on the economic and national unity areas generally, the Liberals faced two specific policy crises which contributed to their collapse.
When the idea of a natural gas pipeline from Alberta to Montreal was first advanced in the early 1950s, there was little thought that it would precipitate the most serious parliamentary upheaval since the conscription crisis in 1944. The proposed trans-Canada pipeline was greater in cost and magnitude than the St. Lawrence Seaway and, with the passage of time, some analysts have compared it to the original transcontinental railway in terms of its importance to economic expansion and development. The controversy over the pipeline,18 however, was not primarily about its scope, proposed ownership, and organization, but rather the way that the government spirited the enacting legislation through Parliament. Even a minister in St. Laurent’s cabinet agreed that errors were made in the debate that surrounded the pipeline discussions. According to Pickersgill, “the fundamental mistake of the St. Laurent government in 1956 was to commit itself to the support of the construction of the longest pipeline in the world without a campaign explaining to the public both the difficulties and the advantages of this great national undertaking.”19 Many of the technicalities of the pipeline construction were far too complex for public discussion. What voters did understand, however, was that the government of the day was curtailing debate in the House of Commons in an aggressive and somewhat undemocratic manner. It was the government’s image that was most deeply affected by the pipeline affair.
By means of a merger of existing firms, a new company called TransCanada PipeLines was created; however, the new company was not able to raise enough capital from private sources to build the entire line across Canada. Although the government wanted the pipeline to further Canadian economic development, it also understood that unless Canada moved reasonably quickly to make Canadian natural gas available to states in the Midwest and the Pacific Northwest, pipelines from Texas would be built into the area and this market would be denied to Canadian producers.
The government was conflicted. It wanted an American market to make Canadian pipelines economically viable, with construction entirely within Canada as a secondary objective. But it was caught in a dilemma — to give too much financial aid to a private company with predominantly foreign interests was undesirable and politically inexpedient, but to allow the project to fail for want of financial support was also not in the national interest or that of the government.20 John Diefenbaker engaged the issue when “he invited his listeners to contemplate the government’s ‘touching solicitude’ for American big business and for a company which ‘would take for itself the profitable end of the project and pile the unprofitable on the backs of the Canadian taxpayers.’ Such surrender of our natural resources to the Americans would make Canada ‘a virtual economic 49th state.’ ”21 This nationalistic tone would later become a common theme of the Diefenbaker-led Conservatives, and helped the party in the election neutralize any Liberal credit they might have expected for creating a national pipeline.
By the beginning of May, all hope of private financing was exhausted and the government faced the alternatives of indefinite postponement of the pipeline or financial rescue of the project by the public treasury. The news that cabinet was considering the loan leaked out, and the opposition harassed the government daily with embarrassing questions in Parliament. The decision was finally made and announced by C.D. Howe in Parliament on May 8 that the government had decided to loan up to 90 percent of the cost of constructing the western part of the line in order to make a 1956 start possible. The money was to come from a Crown corporation established for this purpose and was to be repaid by March 31, 1957, or else the government would take over the pipeline. It was this rather complex arrangement that was embodied in the Northern Ontario Pipeline Crown Corporation Bill, the bill over which such acrimonious debate took place. The resolution preceding the presentation of this bill came before the House on May 10, 1956. The Conservatives and CCF had made it clear that they intended to use whatever delaying and obstructionist tactics were available to prevent the construction of the pipeline by TransCanada. The pipeline debate lasted from May 14 to June 5, 1956, when St. Laurent moved for closure.22 Public opinion on both the pipeline and the use of closure was sharply divided, as seen in Table 4.2.
Public Opinion on the Trans Canada Pipeline and the Pipeline Debate, 1956
A. Pipeline Funding
Private Canadian Investors |
33 |
Partly government, partly private funding |
13 |
Built, financed, administered by government |
21 |
Other |
1 |
Don’t Know/No Answer/Not heard of pipeline |
33 |
The Gallup Report, March 1956. Question read (those who had heard of pipeline): Which of these ways of financing do you think should be followed: Pipeline built and run by private Canadian investors; Pipeline built partly by the Government and partly by private investors from Canada and the U.S.; Pipeline built, financed and administered by the Government.
B. Use of Closure
Justified |
36 |
Not justified |
38 |
No Opinion / not heard of closure |
27 |
The Gallup Report, July 1956. Question read (those who had heard of use of closure): Do you feel that, just from what you have heard, that the Government was justified, or not justified, in using closure?
When asked, nearly a third of Canadians polled believed that the pipeline should be built and run by Canadian investors. Just over 20 percent thought it should be built, financed, and run by the government. A lower number opted for a mixed option, and a third of the public had never heard of the pipeline issue (see Table 4.2A). While many people knew little about the technical details of pipeline financing, there is no mistaking a general desire that the transmission line be controlled by Canadians. On the issue of closure, Canadians were equally divided between those who felt the use of closure was justified and those who held the opposite view (see Table 4.2B). More time was spent debating issues of procedure than the bill itself. The bill was carried through all stages — resolution, second reading, committee, and third reading — under closure. This had never occurred before in Canadian parliamentary history, and the parliamentary debate was filled with insults coming from both sides of the House.23 The bill went on to the Senate, passed quickly without acrimony in that House, and received Royal Assent on June 7, 1956, the day the option on the steel pipe would have expired.
Parliamentary experts have long debated whether closure was necessary in order to secure passage of the pipeline bill. Given that it had never been introduced before the debates began, it was an unusual choice of procedure. Denis Smith has argued that its use was all about the ego of C.D. Howe, who “was determined to defy the opposition and revenge a parliamentary humiliation of the previous year — all in the service of his national vision.”24 As evident in the polling figures described earlier, there was no public consensus on the pipeline issue. What was clear was that the Conservatives and the CCF had succeeded in transforming the debate from a discussion of the need for a super pipeline project into a battle over parliamentary rights. St. Laurent tried to downplay this ‘spin’ on the pipeline debate when he referred to the debate as having been “nearly as long as the pipeline itself, and quite as full of another kind of natural gas,”25 but damage had clearly been done to the image of the Liberals as competent governmental managers. And seeds of doubt had been planted in many people’s minds by John Diefenbaker that the Liberals really had Canadian interests at heart.
The 10 years when Lester Pearson served as secretary of state for external affairs are often thought of as a “golden decade” for Canadian foreign policy. While Britain, France, Germany, and Japan had been devastated by the Second World War, Canada’s economy was strengthened by the war effort, and it began to emerge as a significant world power. Although King had insisted on maintaining prime ministerial control of foreign policy, St. Laurent had great respect for Pearson and gave him free rein in most areas.
While foreign policy rarely creates serious divisions among Canadians, the Suez crisis in 1956 aroused deeply felt emotions and was politically divisive. The origins of the crisis were confusing and complex. There had been an uneasy truce in the Middle East since 1949 when the state of Israel was created. During the next six years, both Israel and the Arab countries conducted raids and reprisals. The United States, Canada, France, and other NATO countries had supplied Israel with weapons, while the Soviet Union had agreed to supply Egypt with arms. To many observers, there was growing concern that a conflict between Egypt and Israel might escalate into a world war between East and West.26
Egyptian president Nasser sought financial support from the United States and Britain to construct the Aswan Dam, and those negotiations were completed in July 1956. However, just a few days later, the U.S. secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, withdrew American support for the project. This reversal was largely driven by concerns relating to the growth in friendly relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union, as well as Egypt’s recognition of Communist China. On July 26, President Nasser announced that the Egyptian government had nationalized the Suez Canal, thereby threatening British and French financial interests in the canal. The matter went to the United Nations, but Israeli forces moved into Egypt toward the Suez Canal. Britain and France gave Egypt an ultimatum — both the Egyptians and Israelis must cease fire and withdraw from the canal. If they did not, Britain and France would move in and occupy key points in order to keep shipping traffic moving. Egypt rejected this ultimatum.
Britain, France, and the United States then mounted a series of retaliations against Egyptian monetary interests, and the situation escalated. Canadian public opinion was sharply divided about what position should be taken against Egypt, but fewer than a quarter of Canadians surveyed by Gallup in September 1956 were prepared to risk a war (see Table 4.3).
Public Opinion Regarding Action to Be Taken if Egypt Refuses Plan for Control of Suez
Risk war |
23 |
Allow Egypt control |
36 |
Qualified opinion |
13 |
Don’t know / no opinion / |
|
Not heard of Suez dispute |
28 |
The Gallup Report, September 1956. Question read (for those who had heard of Suez dispute): If Egypt refuses all plans for international control of the Suez, do you think we should risk a war over it, or allow Egypt to control the canal?
The prospects for war escalated, however, when, on October 29, the Israelis invaded Egypt and moved toward the canal. Two days later, British and French bombers began attacking certain points in the canal zone, precipitating the greatest international crisis since the Korean War. The Canadian government was conflicted by these actions, in part because of the implied presumption that Canada would automatically support Britain’s action. The prime minister had not been advised of the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt, and Canada had received no prior warning of British intentions. Moreover, given that Britain and France had launched an attack while the Security Council of the United Nations was in the process of examining the dispute, there was grave concern that the legitimacy of the United Nations would be undermined. In his memoirs, Pearson makes it clear that he thought the Anglo-French course of action was not justifiable and that other factors were involved. Pearson also claims that France and England unilaterally decided that the use of force was the only solution and appeared to have little desire to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis:
Throughout the crisis we had tried to persuade the British against the use of force. But the small group who planned the invasion were not to be persuaded, not by the United States, which they felt had badly let them down, and evidently not by Canada. In fact, we were told by a British official that their bitterness towards us was as great as that towards the Americans, because we had negotiated a wheat sale to Egypt in October. This, the British leaders regarded, in their almost irrational isolation, as a “stab in the back.”27
Pearson first raised the idea of an international police force at a cabinet meeting on November 1, and Prime Minister St. Laurent urged him to go to New York. Upon arriving in New York, Pearson discovered that there were 21 speakers on the list ahead of him. The UN was debating an American proposal that called for a ceasefire and a withdrawal of all invading forces. Pearson concluded that the American resolution was inadequate because it did not contain a provision for supervising or enforcing the ceasefire. It was also apparent that Britain and France would not support the proposal. Pearson and some of his colleagues canvassed the views of a number of delegates, and by midnight that day it became clear that a resolution for a UN peacekeeping force would be well supported. Early the next morning, the U.S. resolution was voted on and Pearson, on Canada’s behalf, abstained but asked for the floor in order to explain the abstention, as was allowed by the UN’s rules of procedures. Before retiring that night, Pearson talked with UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, whose support was essential if the idea of a peacekeeping force was to get off the ground. Pearson flew back to Ottawa to brief the prime minister and returned to New York for the November 3 meeting of the General Assembly. That day, Pearson learned that the United States, Egypt, Britain, and France would support the resolution. Pearson rose and introduced the Canadian resolution: “The General Assembly . . . requests, as a matter of priority, the secretary general to submit to it within 48 hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.”28
The resolution was passed 57 to 0 with 19 nations abstaining. This was the diplomatic triumph of Lester Pearson’s career, and on December 11, 1957, Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts during the Suez Crisis.
This international achievement might be thought to have bolstered the appeal of the Liberal government, but there was some political controversy back home. Conservatives generally supported the British position, but many Liberals viewed the British attack as an act of aggression contrary to the United Nations Charter. The emotions of many Canadians were aroused by the Conservatives’ open appeal to their traditional British loyalties. There was also dissension within the Liberal Party itself as several ministers were concerned about such an open disagreement with the United Kingdom at a time of severe international tensions.29
The three major political events described here all took place in 1956 within a tightly compressed period of time, as the St. Laurent government was nearing the end of its second mandate. The acrimonious pipeline debate was concluded in June, and the Suez crisis came to a resolution in November. The next month, John Diefenbaker was chosen as the new leader of the Progressive Conservative Party. As the new year, 1957, dawned, attention quickly began to turn to the probability of a spring election — an election for which the Liberal Party would prove to be woefully unprepared. At the age of 76, still a popular and respected figure, St. Laurent would be fighting his third election as prime minister. Few could foresee that the weak and fragmented opposition parties posed any real threat to the Liberal dynasty. Peter C. Newman colourfully describes the prevailing psychology on the eve of the 1957 election campaign:
The coterie of Liberal armchair strategists, gently rumbling in the palmy reaches of Ottawa’s Rideau Club, smugly reminded each other of the hoary epithet that the Conservative Party’s problems were, as always, insurmountable, its policies insufferable, and its prospects invisible. After twenty-two fat years, they could not know how wrong they were.30
There were three key figures in the 1957 Conservative campaign team. Diefenbaker’s chief policy adviser during the election campaign was Merril W. Menzies, an economist who had done his doctoral dissertation on Canadian wheat policy. Prior to joining the campaign, he had undertaken an intensive study of national economic policies and problems for the Conservative Party as a researcher. For all intents and purposes, Menzies became Diefenbaker’s idea man, creating the phrases and slogans that the party leader needed in order to convey his passionate vision to the country. By casting Diefenbaker as a new nation-builder, Menzies tried to inspire comparisons to John A. Macdonald.
Also on the campaign team were Allister Grosart and Dalton Camp, two of the most competent public relations experts in Canada. Grosart, who assumed the post of campaign manager and national director just prior to the election call, was, according to both admirers and detractors, brilliant and manipulative. As a political image maker, he was clearly a man ahead of his time, inviting comparisons to later practitioners of the craft, like Keith Davey and Allan Gregg. In Renegade in Power, Peter C. Newman notes that “the expression ‘Grosart tactics’ became either a sneer or a compliment, depending on the political persuasion of the speaker.”31 Camp, a Toronto advertising executive, directed the campaign in the Atlantic provinces, and would go on to become a stalwart of many subsequent Conservative campaigns.
Although Grosart evoked mixed reactions both from within his own party and from outside, he had absolute authority in the operation of the party machine. One of Grosart’s key roles was to advise Diefenbaker on his approach to television. Television was used extensively in the 1957 election for the first time in Canada. Realizing that the new medium was going to be important in the campaign, the Liberals engaged a television expert, converted a garage attached to headquarters into a studio, and set up a closed-circuit television workshop. The premises were used to give “illustrated” talks on the new medium, to which Liberal members of Parliament were invited.32 Despite having this facility, only one Liberal minister availed himself of the opportunity to perfect his television technique.
Because the Liberals were largely banking on St. Laurent’s popularity in their campaign, it was critical that he adapt to the new medium of communication. This proved to be a major problem, according to Pickersgill:
Right from the start I realized the Liberal campaign was unexciting. This was the first federal election with television coverage, and St. Laurent did not like the medium. I watched his opening broadcast on television at a friend’s house. He delivered an indifferent text without animation and when the broadcast ended my friend said it had been a poor show and reflected how far out of touch with the people the government was.33
Other observers came to the same conclusion about the prime minister’s television appearances as being the weakest aspect of his campaign. Although he had quickly adapted to radio on first entering public life, St. Laurent took an immediate dislike to television. He considered paraphernalia such as teleprompters and makeup as theatrical devices designed to deceive the public. On the three occasions that he made television broadcasts during the 1957 campaign, he read the text with scarcely a glance at the camera, and he looked older than usual.34 While Diefenbaker’s television manner was rather restless, exhibiting numerous personal mannerisms, it did not seem to detract from the effectiveness of his speeches. There is little question that he appeared more relaxed than the prime minister, and that his television broadcasts seemed as convincing to his viewers as his personal appearances were at meetings. M.J. Coldwell’s biographer, Walter Stewart, agrees that Diefenbaker’s 1957 campaign style was effective, and that television played a key role:
This was Canada’s first television election, and the camera loved Diefenbaker, with his broad gestures, rumbling voice and flawless timing. It was not a Conservative campaign but a Diefenbaker jubilee, and very few minutes of the free-time broadcasts allotted to the party were meted out to lesser lights; it was Diefenbaker who led the charge, from start to finish.35
The indifference of both the press and the public to the lacklustre Liberal campaign was countered by a growing interest in the Diefenbaker campaign. At long last, there was something exciting to write about, and many of them pictured the Progressive Conservative leader as David fighting Goliath against great odds. Worried about the situation, the Liberal campaign team began to turn to more negative strategies. But Liberal attacks on the new Conservative leader quickly backfired. As political scientist John Meisel observed, it would probably have been more effective “to have spoken well of Mr. Diefenbaker, but to have portrayed him as the prisoner of the Old Tory party.”36
Another factor that contributed to the Conservative victory in 1957 was the poor health of the CCF leader, M.J. Coldwell. He had suffered a heart attack in February of 1957 and was not his usual self on the campaign hustings. Potential CCF voters may have considered that the party was even less likely to form a government with an ailing leader, and handed their votes to Diefenbaker — a harbinger of the type of “strategic voting” seen in more recent Canadian federal elections. In a plurality electoral system such as Canada’s and with a multi-party system, many voters feel compelled to vote “strategically” — not necessarily for their first choice of candidate but for one who appears more competitive.
Conservative strategists believed that the key to success in 1957 was to attract disaffected Liberals, new voters, and undecided voters. The Conservatives calculated that their base of popular support was around 30 percent, sometimes even a little lower. In order to gain the necessary parliamentary representation to form a government, they had to appeal to the “uncommitted” voter and to individuals unhappy with their own parties. In order to attract these voters, it was deemed necessary to develop a distinction between Diefenbaker and his party in the minds of voters. Grosart decided to sell his movement not as the Conservative Party (which Canadians had been rejecting with regularity since 1935) but as a dynamic new political force under the leadership of a vital and fresh personality. Everything in the 1957 campaign was directed toward promoting this image, including its main slogan, “It’s time for a Diefenbaker Government,” which was frequently (but mistakenly) attributed to Dalton Camp.
According to Camp:
I knew it was right. It was positive. It echoed what we took to be the greatest common denominator of the campaign — the belief that the Liberals had been in office too long, that it was time for a change. But “time for a change” begged a question — change to what? The answer ought not to be “change to the Conservatives,” which invoked partisan loyalties and repelled Liberal sentiments. Better a soft answer: change to a Diefenbaker Government. Diefenbaker was obviously a better word than Conservative: it had no history; it was non-Wasp, more acceptable to Liberals.37
The party strategists believed that there were many people who wanted to vote against the Liberals, who liked Diefenbaker, but who would have preferred to overlook the fact that they were voting Conservative. By emphasizing the “Diefenbaker Party,” it became possible for many to vote Conservative without feeling that they were doing so.
Diefenbaker was also the beneficiary of several well-oiled provincial Conservative election machines. In the Maritimes, provincial politics were dominated by the Conservatives, and even in Newfoundland, where a federal Liberal victory was taken for granted, Premier Smallwood was at best lukewarm about the federal government. Even in Quebec, which had long proven to be such a political wasteland for the Conservatives that they had elected only 21 members in the entire period since 1935, there was hope. This time the provincial Union Nationale government concentrated its opposition on several Liberal members who had campaigned actively against the Duplessis government in 1956.
Liberal organizers underestimated one significant factor, the feeling of animosity harboured by the Union Nationale leader against the only man capable of challenging his power. The by-elections of 1955 had demonstrated that his organization could counteract St. Laurent’s personal influence without his even appearing in public; he decided to teach the prime minister a lesson by knocking out a few of the Liberal candidates.38
However, the most important provincial ally Diefenbaker had was Ontario’s Conservative premier, Leslie Frost. While he had been only moderately supportive of Diefenbaker’s predecessor, George Drew (who was a former Ontario premier), Frost supported Diefenbaker at election rallies all over the province in 1957, including the inaugural rally at Massey Hall in Toronto. This gave the Conservative campaign an aura of political legitimacy in Ontario. Although a number of Diefenbaker’s ideas appealed to Frost, it was his promise for a more equitable division of tax revenues between the two levels of government that convinced him to throw his support and electoral machine squarely behind the new Conservative leader.39
While the PC campaign was gaining ground, the Liberal one was falling apart, despite spending an unprecedented four million dollars — nearly three times as much as the Conservatives. Rather than appealing to voters directly, St. Laurent appeared more than ever to be the chairman of an executive committee, exercising only a general supervision over his colleagues’ activities. The Liberal campaign created the general impression that it was a competent but unspectacular government and that administrative considerations took priority over political ones. Increasingly the crowds were small at Liberal events. As the campaign progressed, St. Laurent abandoned more and more his prepared texts, and chatted amiably with his audiences. His speeches became largely anecdotal, interspersed with comments on newspaper articles or the benefits of Canadian democracy. The leader’s dull performance and an unsympathetic media reinforced the perception that the party had become stale and bankrupt of ideas.
In contrast, Diefenbaker’s meetings were increasingly well attended and his appeal was almost entirely an emotional one, focusing on Canadian nationalism and his love for the country. His campaign deftly mixed humour and righteous indignation with carefully calculated appeals to self-interest. One of the most significant aspects of the Diefenbaker campaign was that he spoke to constituencies outside of the traditional Conservative enclaves. He made direct campaign appeals to ethnic minorities, and farm and low-income groups that had never been Conservative supporters. In outlining the legislative program that a Diefenbaker government would pursue, he offered intrinsic benefits to these segments of society, such as increased old-age pensions, expanded welfare benefits, and subsidized wheat sales. Diefenbaker’s campaign stressed a social program that was more welfare-oriented than that put forward by the Liberals, a marked departure from past Conservative campaigns. In doing this, he attempted to distance the party from its traditional image as a party that represented mainly the financial interests of St. James and Bay streets, and to better position his party around a winning configuration of issues, particularly those in the national unity and social welfare areas.
Federal Vote Intention, 1953–1959
The Gallup Report, selected dates
Most Important Problem Facing Canada, 1954
|
Percent (multiple responses)* |
Economic Issues |
|
Unemployment |
33 |
Cost of Living |
4 |
Markets |
7 |
Labour |
4 |
Need of Industry |
1 |
Social Issues |
|
War |
10 |
Population |
5 |
Communism |
5 |
Housing |
3 |
Youth |
2 |
Government |
2 |
Other Issues |
|
St. Lawrence Seaway |
2 |
Personal faults |
1 |
Traffic |
1 |
Miscellaneous other |
4 |
* The Gallup Report, July 1954.
Results of the 1957 and 1958 Federal Election, by Province
Figure 4.1 displays responses to the standard Gallup vote intention question over an extended period following the August 1953 federal election. The Gallup data for the period show that support for the PC Party rose sharply in May 1957, and was generally on an uptrend. At this same time, there was also a sharp increase in the undecided category to more than 20 percent of all voters. The Liberals nevertheless remained in the lead in all of the pre-election polling. In the post-mortems that followed the 1957 election, Gallup claimed that one of the reasons that it underestimated the number of Conservative votes was a pronounced last-minute increase in Conservative support, suggesting a strong late-campaign effect.40 Of course, it was also true that the Liberals won a narrow plurality of the popular vote, while the Conservatives won the larger number of seats. The PCs increased their support in all parts of the country. They did particularly well in Ontario and Atlantic Canada, somewhat less well in the West due to the strength of the CCF and Social Credit, and relatively poorly in Quebec, where they managed to capture only 8 of the 75 seats. Overall, there was an increase in the Conservative vote in every province, ranging from a high of +18.4 percent in British Columbia to a low of +1.7 percent in Quebec.
The election result shocked everyone, including the people closest to Diefenbaker. Dalton Camp speaks of this surprise in the following statement: “None of us ever thought of the possibility of minority government — a Diefenbaker minority government.”41 The Liberals not only lost the election, but a number of cabinet ministers; nine in total went down to defeat, including Howe, Harris, and Hellyer. The political forecasters had all been wrong. John Diefenbaker, who at times seemed alone in believing that he could win, had been right, with 112 Conservatives elected, 105 Liberals, and 48 from among the third parties. Many people believed that the explanation for the Conservative victory was the leader himself. His populist, anti-elitist rhetoric and his “One Nation” campaign theme resonated with many voters in English Canada. Others, however, credited Gordon Churchill’s strategy of concentrating the party’s focus and campaign spending on Ontario, Atlantic Canada, and the West, and not expending scarce resources on Quebec, where few electoral returns could be expected.
After the election, much credit for the Conservative victory was given to Ontario premier Leslie Frost, although Conservative support increased proportionately more in other provinces and regions than in Ontario. But in Ontario, the 8 percent increase in the Conservatives’ share of the vote yielded a dramatic increase in the number of seats — from 33 to 61. Turnout was also a factor. When turnout in the 1957 election is compared with that in 1953, it becomes apparent that the Prairies experienced the greatest resurgence in political interest. The turnout in this region increased by more than 10 percentage points. History would show that the resurgence of the Conservatives in the West was not just a short-lived shift, but one that would remain for the rest of the century and into the twenty-first. There was also a substantial increase in the support of farmers, as well as a significant shift away from the Conservatives’ image as a British party to a multi-ethnic party. Diefenbaker’s key legacy would be that he established a new and broader electoral base for the Conservative Party. Prior to the 1957 election, the party had won only 14 percent of Prairie seats in the five previous elections.42 Not only did the Prairies become the new electoral base of the Conservative Party, it would become an electoral wasteland for the federal Liberals. But this development needed to await 1958 for its full flowering — in 1957 the Social Credit Party outpolled the PCs in Alberta, and the CCF did so in Saskatchewan (see Table 4.5).
Although the Liberals polled more votes than the Conservatives nationwide, nearly half their voting strength was in Quebec; 62 of the 105 Liberal members came from that province. The three-quarters of a million votes which they polled in Ontario were not used to best effect because of three- and four-cornered contests in single-member constituencies that took place in that province. When the traditional sources of Liberal support were diminished, as they were in 1957, the seeds of the drastic reversal of a year later were sown.43
Shortly after his election victory, Diefenbaker attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London. He was greeted with great fanfare — from a main headline in the Daily Mail that described him as “the new Strong Man of the Commonwealth” to Winston Churchill’s statement that the 1957 Canadian election was “the most important event since the end of the war.”44 For 37 of his first 60 days in office, Diefenbaker traversed the country to acquaint the people with the new government. From officiating at the Calgary Stampede to addressing the Canadian Bar Association to receiving an honorary doctorate at Dartmouth College, he maintained a high public profile and a pace of vigorous activity.
Canadians also appeared to be impressed with the new Conservative cabinet that quickly dealt with implementing programs that had been promised in the election. Pay increases were approved for some federal employees, special assistance was given to the doom-ridden collieries at Springhill, Nova Scotia, and $150 million was allocated through the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation for loans on low-cost homes. A grain-selling mission to the United Kingdom and continental Europe was dispatched. All of these measures were accomplished between July 11 and September 16.
Over the summer and into the autumn, the Gallup poll showed growing Conservative support across the country (see Figure 4.1). When Parliament was finally convened in October, Diefenbaker escorted Queen Elizabeth II to the inaugural ceremonies. This was the first time that the British monarch had ever been present for the opening of a Canadian Parliament and the visuals of the opening ceremonies gave the image of a prime minister in charge. In comparison to the Liberals, with St. Laurent remaining as the interim leader, the Tory performance looked impressive. They mounted a long and detailed legislative agenda. Old-age pensions were raised, western farmers were given cash payments for their crops, married women were included in the Unemployment Insurance Act, and improvements were made to old-age assistance, blind persons, disabled persons, and war veterans programs. In short, there appeared to be a little something for everyone. By the time the House adjourned for the Christmas recess, there was a widespread belief among Canadians that the Diefenbaker-led Conservatives had delivered what they had promised. Alvin Hamilton made the following statement of the 1957 government:
I think, objectively, if you put a measuring scale of brand new legislation brought in and took all of the governments of Canada since 1867, there is only one period that would challenge the 1957 government and that would be the period from 1932 to 1935 under Bennett. There was a tremendous rush of brand new legislation then.45
The Liberals were nevertheless convinced that a leadership convention would restore their political fortunes. With his newly minted Nobel Prize in the background, there was little doubt that Lester Pearson would be chosen as leader. Even so, little was done to create a lively media event, and the convention was generally perceived as a dull affair. Pearson may have been the party’s best hope, but his political experience was lacking.
On January 20, 1958, the newly elected Liberal leader was mulling over the wording of a supply motion that, if supported by all the opposition parties, could have led to the defeat of the government in the House. Pearson knew that the Liberals, as well as the other opposition parties, were tired, demoralized, and debt-ridden. However, at the urging of Pickersgill, St. Laurent, and Howe, Pearson agreed to put forward a motion that, in effect, would ask the Diefenbaker administration to resign and allow the Liberals to resume office. In support of his motion, Pearson stated, “I would be prepared, if called upon, to form a government to tackle immediately the formidable problem of ending the Tory pause and getting this country back on the Liberal highway of progress from which we have been temporarily diverted.”46
What the motion was proposing was that a defeated and discredited party that was clearly slipping further in popularity wanted to be brought back to power without an election. As Denis Smith so aptly states, “Was there a more perfect demonstration of Liberal arrogance?”47 In hindsight, Pearson himself describes this event by saying, “I have never regretted anything in my political career so much as my proposal that day. . . . I had made a spectacle of myself by coolly inviting the government to turn over their seals of office to those of us who had, a few months before, been rejected by the electorate.”48
Library and Archives Canada. Bill Cadzow, photographer.
Lester B. Pearson speaking at 1968 Liberal convention, Ottawa.
Reacting immediately, Diefenbaker accused the Liberals of concealing facts and numbers that showed that the economy was slipping. He produced a document called The Canadian Economic Outlook,49 which had predicted higher levels of unemployment several months prior to the election. For almost two hours, Diefenbaker attacked the Liberals, whose only defence was that Diefenbaker was quoting from a confidential document offering advice to a previous government. Sensing his opportunity, Diefenbaker became convinced that he should go to the polls again shortly, particularly after a huge turnout at a Conservative event in Winnipeg one week later. Among the attendees was Mrs. Isabella Mary Gainsford, the granddaughter of Sir John A. Macdonald, who later told a friend, “He’s got the punch.”50 On Saturday February 1, Diefenbaker recommended to Governor General Vincent Massey that Parliament be dissolved and a general election be called.
Building on the style and rhetoric that had been so successful in the 1957 contest, Diefenbaker opened his second campaign with references to his “Vision”:
This is the vision, One Canada. One Canada, where Canadians will have preserved to them the control of their own economic and political destiny. Sir John A. Macdonald saw Canada from East to West: he opened the West. I see a new Canada — a Canada of the North. . . . This is the vision!51
Canadians, realize your opportunities! This is the message I give you, my fellow Canadians. Not one of defeatism. Jobs! Jobs for hundreds of thousands of Canadians. A new Vision! A new hope! A new soul for Canada! We’re going to call a national convention on conservation to map a national conservation policy to extend the principles of farm rehabilitation to all Canada, to maintain a continuing study of soils and land use, and a possible second Trans-Canada Highway route.52
There was little question that the “vision” struck a chord with many Canadians. It combined an expansion of economic opportunity with nationalism, reinforcing the party’s appeal on those two key issue areas. When polled in 1956, nearly 45 percent of the public had expressed a preference to have the Liberal Party in power in the event that hard times were to come again. In the heat of the 1958 election campaign, only 25 percent responded in the same way, suggesting that nearly one-third of the electorate had experienced a change in opinion.53 Diefenbaker’s popularity was on the rise, with a majority of those sampled by Gallup indicating approval of his performance within three months of his assumption of the office of prime minister (see Figure 4.2). Lester Pearson, in contrast, had yet to establish himself as an effective alternative to the charismatic Conservative leader. Heading into the election, Gallup found that Diefenbaker enjoyed a margin of nearly two to one over Pearson as “the best man for the job” (see Figure 4.3). Economic issues also worked in favour of the Conservatives. By 1958, the rising level of unemployment had become the dominant issue facing the country (see Figure 4.4).54 Diefenbaker’s vision of a new powerhouse North full of job opportunities took advantage of that concern.
The Liberals had few areas they could count on, despite their dynastic status. Even support in Quebec was no longer assured, since the party was no longer led by a “native son” but by an English Canadian. Pearson was not only a unilingual Anglophone but also favoured a team approach to campaigning and was relatively shy about making grand leadership statements like those of his opponent. In addition, amidst concerns about American encroachment in the vital area of culture, Quebec nationalists were attracted to some of Diefenbaker’s comments during the campaign about the dangers of American economic domination. Among French Canadians, particularly those in the lower economic and occupational strata, and even among trade union members, the Conservatives appealed convincingly for the first time in a generation.55
While Premier Duplessis had played a modest role for the Conservatives in the 1957 Quebec campaign, he was much more influential in 1958, particularly in constituencies along the south shore of the St. Lawrence River. Duplessis may have been retaliating for some actions of the federal Liberals in favouring his opponents in the previous provincial election, but in any case he saw the opportunity of sending a message to Ottawa about who really ran Quebec. According to Pierre Sévigny, who was to join the Diefenbaker Cabinet, Duplessis said, in 1958, “we are going to go all out for the Conservatives,” committing the powerful provincial Union Nationale machine to the federal campaign.56
There were other factors at work in the 1958 election. The number of voters increased by nearly 700,000 over 1957, reflecting both natural population and immigration increases and higher overall turnout (79 percent versus 74 percent in 1957). The media interest in both the election and the Diefenbaker persona, along with the strong campaign waged by the Conservatives emphasizing the need for a majority government, captured the voters’ attention. A steady flow of campaign contributions brought the Conservative campaign fund to $2.5 million — double the amount they had raised in 1957. Grosart was able to distribute $6,000 to each constituency in the country.57
Approval Ratings for Prime Minister Diefenbaker, 1957 and 1958
The Gallup Report, September 1957; June 1958 The question asked was: “Do you approve or disapprove of the job that John Diefenbaker is doing as Prime Minister of Canada?” “No opinion” and “Don’t know” responses are included in calculation but not displayed in graph.
Best Man for Prime Minister – Diefenbaker or Pearson? March 1958
The Gallup Report, March 1958 The question asked was: “Regardless of your own political feelings, which do you think would make the best prime minister for Canada – Lester B. Pearson or John Diefenbaker?” “Other” mentions, “No opinion” and “Both the same” responses are included in calculation but not displayed in graph.
Most Important Problem Facing Canada, March 1958
The Gallup Report, March 1958 The question asked was: “In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing Canada today?” “No opinion” and “Don’t know” responses are included in calculation but not displayed in graph.
The Conservatives won the 1958 election in a landslide, their 208 out of the 265 seats in the Commons wiping out Liberal representation completely in four of the 10 provinces (see Table 4.5). Several former Liberal cabinet ministers went down to defeat, and the Social Credit Party was completely wiped out. The Social Credit provincial administrations in Alberta and British Columbia had been rocked by mismanagement charges and scandals, which contributed to significant discontent among Social Credit supporters. Their dislike for the Liberals was far more intense than it was for the Conservatives, and Diefenbaker’s evangelical style was in keeping with what Socred supporters had been used to in their previous leaders. While the popular vote for the CCF declined by only 1 percent, their seat numbers plummeted from 25 to just 8. However, the most astonishing result was the Tory sweep in Quebec, something that had not happened since the days of John A. Macdonald. Also significant were the Ontario results. The Conservatives polled 56 percent of the vote to the Liberals’ 33 percent, taking 67 of Ontario’s 85 seats. Metropolitan and urban areas within Ontario supported the Diefenbaker-led Conservatives in both the 1957 and 1958 campaigns and in the process shattered the infrastructure of the Liberal Party.
The 1957 and 1958 elections marked the beginning of an emerging Canadian intellectual tradition in voting behaviour and election analysis. John Meisel’s Ph.D. dissertation at the University of London, “The Canadian General Election of 1957,” was a full-scale study of the 1957 election. Prior to 1957, Meisel had written an influential piece titled “Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behaviour” in The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.58 Meisel and other Canadian academics at that time were influenced by the rapid development of British and American studies of voting behaviour and elections. These studies were not restricted to voting alone, and were also aimed at examining the importance of issues, the tactics and strategies employed by parties, the structure of campaigns, and the role of the media. David Butler (under whom Meisel studied at the University of London) wrote The British General Election of 1955, one of the many volumes on British elections which became known as the Nuffield Studies. In the United States, Berelson et al., Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (1954), and Campbell et al., The Voter Decides (1954) and The American Voter (1960), likewise generated a powerful influence on the development of election studies in Canada. Other Canadian academics who joined this fledging tradition included Dennis H. Wrong, whose article, “Parties and Voting in Canada,” appeared in Political Science Quarterly in 1958. Frank H. Underhill’s classic work, In Search of Canadian Liberalism, was published in 1960, in part a response to the sea change in Canadian federal politics that had just taken place.
The technology of survey research was also evolving rapidly, providing scholars with new types of evidence on which to base their analyses of political events. The Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (the Canadian Gallup affiliate) had been surveying Canadians since 1942, but typically included only a few questions of interest to academics studying Canadian voting behaviour. Peter Regenstreif was an early researcher who used the Gallup data to study elections. In his book The Diefenbaker Interlude (1965) he employed Gallup data, together with some of his own polling conducted for the Toronto Star, to compare voting intentions prior to the 1962 and 1963 elections with the actual vote. Gallup data was the primary source for tracking public opinion until the first National Election Study was conducted by Meisel and his colleagues in 1965. These developments combined to increase the depth of our understanding of electoral behaviour in subsequent elections.
Looking back at the King/St. Laurent Liberal dynasty, the customary electoral pattern had been for the Liberals to win overwhelmingly in two regions of the country and to hold their own elsewhere. This template had allowed them to consistently put together majority governments, even though the components of that majority were not always the same, and the Liberals’ share of the total vote rarely approached 50 percent. However, the 1958 Diefenbaker sweep had a different cast to it, as the Conservatives were able to poll very close to a majority of the vote in every region of the country, while winning 54 percent of the vote in the country as a whole. The Liberals, in contrast, had been reduced to a regional rump of 49 seats — heavily concentrated in Ontario and Quebec.59 The regionally skewed Liberal caucus led John Meisel to raise the question, “Was something akin to the breakup of the Roosevelt coalition in the United States affecting the party once led by Mr. King and more recently by Mr. St. Laurent?”60 Set alongside the re-election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1956, such speculation regarding the potential longer-term consequences of the Diefenbaker phenomenon appeared perfectly reasonable in the context of the times.
At long last, it seemed that federal politics in Canada had become nationalized and was no longer going to be characterized by regional differences and localisms. Observers began to sense the birth of a new era in Canadian federal politics in which elections would be based on pan-Canadian issues and campaigns rather than on appeals to specific groups or regions. Others pointed to the overwhelming Conservative victory of 1958 as a return to a two-party system in Canada, given that the CCF and Social Credit had fared so poorly. Certainly, the reduction of the influence of the minor parties in national politics held the potential to effect fundamental and lasting changes in Canadian politics. Ever since the sudden rise of the Progressives in 1921, “third” parties, based largely in the West, had played a pivotal role in federal politics. But with Diefenbaker’s repositioning of the Conservatives around a strong western base, it appeared that parties such as Social Credit or the CCF might never regain their hold on western voters. In 1958, Canadians of every stripe had a host of reasons for voting Conservative. But, if the seeds of a new Conservative dynasty appeared to be present, events would soon show that it was not to be.
First, it became quickly evident that the Conservative landslide was not based on a lasting appeal on the three dimensions of economy, national unity, and social welfare. In particular, Diefenbaker’s reluctance to move away from his “One Nation” concept led to a rapid erosion in his newly won support in Quebec. Moreover, while there were many Canadians who voted Conservative for the first time in 1958, their vote was cast primarily, as the party strategists had hoped, for Diefenbaker himself rather than for his party. The ties binding them to the party were weaker than ever and, as disillusionment with “the Chief” began to set in over the next few years, these voters were easily shaken loose. The sources of that disillusionment, and its consequences for the politics of the next decade, will be explored in Chapter 5.
1. Compared with 17 percent who disapproved of St. Laurent’s performance, and 3 percent who expressed a “qualified” view. The balance of those sampled had no opinion. Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Report, July 1956.
2. Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).
3. J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957–1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation. The Canadian Centenary Series. Ramsay Cook, ed., Vol. 19 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1986), 16.
4. Diefenbaker as quoted in Granatstein, Canada 1957–1967, 16.
5. Denis Smith, Rogue Tory (Toronto: Macfarlane Waiter & Ross, 1995), 214.
6. One of those admirers was Brian Mulroney who cut his political teeth under Diefenbaker. See Brian Mulroney, Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007), especially Chapter 4, 39–53.
7. Peter Stursberg, Diefenbaker: Leadership Gained 1956–62 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 26.
8. Patrick Kyba, and Wendy Green-Finlay. “John Diefenbaker as Prime Minister: The Record Re-Examined,” in D.C. Story and R. Bruce Shephard, eds., The Diefenbaker Legacy: Canadian Politics, Law and Society Since 1957 (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1998), 62.
9. This law allowed the Quebec government to shut down buildings that were being used for peaceful opposition purposes of any kind that were deemed to be communistic in nature.
10. Peter C.Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963), 47.
11. Peter Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 24.
12. J.W Pickersgill, My Years with Louis St. Laurent — A Political Memoir (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 216.
13. Robert Bothwell, C.D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1979).
14. Howe to Irvin Studer, May 23, 1958. Howe Papers, NAC.
15. Statistics Canada, Historical Labour Force Statistics (Ottawa, 1974).
16. Pickersgill, op. cit., 238.
17. Pickersgill, op. cit., 244. In fact, the statistical section of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration identified that a substantial number of Hungarian refugees were Jewish but were reluctant to declare their religion to immigration officials.
18. The pipeline debate was contentious for a number of reasons. While there was general support for the project itself, the policy, the pipeline’s ownership, and the role of the federal government all became contested by the various interests involved. The transport and sale of gas beyond the boundaries of a province was under federal jurisdiction and the pipeline carrying the gas out of Alberta could be built only by a company incorporated by Parliament. There was also opposition (primarily by the CCF) to a company with American interests being involved in the project and the preference was for a public company or Crown corporation. The CCF and other Canada-first supporters also opposed any sale of gas to the United States. Gas producers in the province of Alberta and the province itself supported the export of Alberta gas to the American Midwest, which would be more profitable than transporting it to Ontario and Quebec. See William Kilbourn, Pipeline (Toronto: Clark Irwin, 1970).
19. Pickersgill, op. cit., 273.
20. Hugh Thorburn, “Parliament and Policy-Making: The Case of the Trans-Canada Gas Pipeline,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 23 (1957), 521.
21. Bothwell, op. cit., 305.
22. The closure rule had been adopted by the House of Commons in 1913 on the initiative of the Borden government to end a long and exhausting filibuster by the Liberal opposition led by Laurier. Closure then was denounced by the Liberals as a denial of freedom to debate and the tool of a tyrannical government. Although closure had been used on rare occasions since 1913, it was invariably applied by a Conservative government. The last time closure had been invoked was by the Bennett government in 1932. See Pickersgill, op. cit., 276.
23. Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 1956, Vol. 5, 4,463–75.
24. Smith, Rogue Tory, 201.
25. Newman, Renegade in Power, 54.
26. Bruce Thordarson, Lester Pearson: Diplomat and Politician (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1974.), 85.
27. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 2, 242.
28. Thordarson, Lester Pearson: Diplomat and Politician, 89.
29. Dale C Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), 465.
30. Newman, Renegade in Power, 48.
31. Newman, Renegade in Power, 159.
32. John Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 70.
33. Pickersgill, My Years with Louis St. Laurent, 323–24.
34. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian, 512.
35. Walter Stewart, The Life and Times of M.J. Coldwell (Toronto: Stoddart, 2000), 197–98.
36. Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957, 186.
37. In his book, Camp states that it was his colleague at Locke Johnson Advertising Agency, Hank Loriaux, who came up with the slogan “It’s time for a Diefenbaker government.” Dalton Camp, Gentlemen, Players and Politicians (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1970), 279.
38. Thomson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian, 510.
39. E. Bryden, “Money and Politics: Relations Between Ontario and Ottawa in the Diefenbaker Years,” in D.D. Story and R. Bruce Shepard, eds., The Diefenbaker Legacy, 124–25.
40. Wilfrid Sanders, “How Polls Like That Happen,” Canadian Commentator. Vol. 1, No. 6 (June 1957), 14–15.
41. Camp, Gentlemen, Players and Politicians, 339.
42. David Stewart, “Factions, Reviews and Reformers: Diefenbaker’s Legacy to the Progressive Conservative Party,” in D.C. Story and R. Bruce Shepard, eds., The Diefenbaker Legacy, 88.
43. Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude, 32.
44. Newman, Renegade in Power, 60–61.
45. Alvin Hamilton, as quoted in Peter Stursburg. Diefenbaker: Leadership Gained 1956–62 (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 78
46. Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 1957–58, Vol. 6, 3,520.
47. Smith, Rogue Tory, 275.
48. Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 3 (1957–1968), 31, 33.
49. According to Denis Smith, this report was given to Diefenbaker by Patrick Nicholson. It was prepared in February and March 1957 as one of an annual series of confidential documents for ministers on the economic outlook. Nicholson had obtained it through some direct inquiries after Paul Martin had casually told him the previous summer that the Liberal government “had been warned of trouble ahead.”
50. Newman, Renegade in Power, 68.
51. Diefenbaker, quoted in Smith, Rogue Tory, 280.
52. Diefenbaker, quoted in Newman, Renegade in Power, 70
53. Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude, 111.
54. Unemployment rose from an average of about 4.5 percent in 1957 to over 7 percent in 1958. Statistics Canada, Historical Labour Force Statistics (Ottawa, 1974).
55. Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude, 24.
56. Pierre Sevigny, as quoted in Peter Stursberg. Diefenbaker: Leadership Gained, 1956–62, 57.
57. Smith, Rogue Tory, 281.
58. John. Meisel “Religious Affiliation and Electoral Behaviour: A Case Study,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 22 (1956), 481–96.
59. Although the party also won five of Newfoundlands’s seven seats, polling 54.4 percent of the vote in that province. Newfoundland, along with the Northwest Territories, were the only areas of the country that resisted the Diefenbaker sweep in 1958.
60. Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957, 252.
Bothwell, Robert. C.D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1979).
Fleming, Donald. So Very Near: The Political Memoirs of the Honourable Donald M. Fleming. Volume One — The Rising Years (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1985).
Granatstein, J.L. Canada 1957–1967. The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation. The Canadian Centenary Series, Vol. 19 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart 1986).
Meisel, John. The Canadian General Election of 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1962).
Newman, Peter C. Renegade in Power (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963).
Pearson, Lester B. Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Vol. 2, 1948–1957, edited by John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973).
Pickersgill, J.W. My Years with Louis St. Laurent — A Political Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
Regenstreif, Peter. The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965).
Smith, Denis. Rogue Tory (Toronto: MacFarlane Walter & Ross, 1995).
Thomson, Dale C. Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967).
