The seventeenth century was a defining period in British philosophy. This is the period in which for the first time, British philosophy was definitively put ‘on the map’, producing philosophers of international stature and lasting influence. Its most famous names, Hobbes and Locke, rank alongside such world-class philosophers as Descartes and Spinoza and Leibniz in the modern philosophical canon. Bacon too belongs with this constellation of great thinkers, although his status as a philosopher tends to be obscured by his status as father of modern science. The significance of the British achievement in philosophy is underscored by the fact that the seventeenth century was a period of transformational change which is normally regarded as the dawn of modernity following the breakdown of the Aristotelian synthesis which had dominated intellectual life since the middle ages.1 In this period British philosophers are acknowledged to have contributed significantly to the shape of European philosophy from their own time to the present. Nowadays early modern philosophers are, to quote Donald Rutherford, ‘celebrated for the depth and rigor of their treatments of perennial philosophical questions’, and are acknowledged to have made ‘major contributions in almost every area of philosophy, and in many cases their conclusions continue to serve as starting points for present-day debates’.2
Whatever the reason why we continue to value early modern philosophers today, it is not at all certain that we value them in the same way as their contemporaries, or that the debates of their time necessarily anticipate the concerns of the present. Furthermore, none of them worked in isolation. As Roger Woolhouse reminds us,
Noteworthy individuals, such as Bacon, Hobbes, or Gassendi, are not isolated mountains in a flat desert landscape. They have an influence on an intellectual scene which encompasses a whole host of lesser thinkers, and they act as focuses for movements of thought which find powerful expression in them before passing on, often changed, or with added force.3
To understand where these ‘noteworthy individuals’ sit in relation to that intellectual scene is the task of the historian. It is my aim in the present volume to relocate these ‘mountains’ in the context of their times, and to provide a richer picture of the intellectual landscape from which they emerged.
The history of British seventeenth-century philosophy is not usually treated on its own. It is normally slotted into a broader European narrative about the rise of modern philosophy, which focuses on just a few individuals, who are classified using categories which they themselves would not have recognized (e.g. as ‘empiricists’ or ‘rationalists’, ancients or moderns). The history which I present here attempts a different approach. The basic premise of the present volume is that Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke were not the only philosophers of their time. Nor were they the only ones of enduring influence. I therefore aim to apply a more generous view of context, both by including the ‘also rans’ of philosophy, and giving some attention to the social, political, and cultural conditions in which philosophers practised. My starting point will be what constituted philosophy for the seventeenth century.4 I focus on individuals, rather than particular branches of philosophy or philosophical themes, and I treat seventeenth-century philosophy as an ongoing conversation, as a means of setting philosophers in relation to one another. Like all conversations, some voices will dominate, some will be more persuasive than others, and there will be enormous variations in tone from the polite to polemical, fair-minded, matter-of-fact, loquacious, reticent, intemperate. The conversation model allows voices to be heard which would otherwise be discounted. By this means I provide what might be called a ‘thick description’ of seventeenth-century intellectual culture, setting marginal and ‘major’ thinkers within a more integrated account of seventeenth-century philosophy which attempts to view it in its own terms, taking account of institutions, and the modes of circulation of ideas. I set the philosophy of Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke in relation to the philosophical context within which it was produced, a context made up of figures normally regarded as ‘minor’ players in philosophy (e.g. Herbert of Cherbury, Cudworth, More, Burthogge, Norris, Toland) as well as others who have been completely overlooked (notably female philosophers). Crucially, instead of emphasizing the break between seventeenth-century philosophy and its past, the conversation model makes it possible to trace continuities between the Renaissance and seventeenth century, across the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth century, while at the same time acknowledging the major changes which occurred.
A measure of selection is perforce necessary: it is simply not possible to give comprehensive coverage of all philosophy and philosophers of any period. That would be a project for an encyclopedia, not a history. Within the confines of a single volume it is neither possible nor desirable to give an in-depth account of the philosophical arguments of every philosopher. I have, therefore, structured the main part of the narrative around the dominant philosophical voices of the century. These include the canonical trio, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, but also Herbert of Cherbury, the Cambridge Platonists, and Robert Boyle. The coverage of this history is therefore something of a compromise between inclusiveness and canonicity. To focus on the most famous is justifiable in terms of the importance of their contributions to philosophy, both in the judgement of their contemporaries and in the judgement of later generations. But I have tried to ensure that the attention accorded them does not mean the exclusion of others. The contributions of the lead figures in any chapter are treated to a greater or lesser extent as focal points for debates in which their contemporaries participated, especially the debates which they provoked. In this way they figure as representative of dominant themes and distinctive approaches in their period, rather than as precursors of modern interests. The group of individuals highlighted also provides a broad chronological framework for the volume, across the generations from Bacon and Herbert, through to Locke. Admittedly, the fit between an individual’s main output and the chronology is not perfect, but it helps to preserve a measure of historical and thematic unity for each section.
For the purposes of this history, I take ‘British’ in a geo-historical sense to cover the Stuart kingdoms (England, Scotland, and Ireland) and principality (Wales). The British scope of my account also extends to the diaspora, such as it was, of philosophers of these islands who lived or worked in Europe. I do not take Britishness as an organizing principle for the contents of the volume. Reference to origins is treated as incidental to the philosophical activities of the figures discussed. It will no doubt be noticed that most of the philosophers discussed at any length were of English origin. It is a fact of the historical record that England produced more philosophers of note in the seventeenth century than the rest of the Stuart kingdoms put together. In the eighteenth century, of course, this changes, with the rise to pre-eminence of philosophy in Scotland, a development which is recognized in what has come to be called the Scottish Enlightenment. However, the seventeenth-century hinterland of the Scottish Enlightenment has hitherto remained almost entirely terra incognita. The attention paid to philosophers of Scottish origin in the ensuing chapters will, I hope, go some way towards opening up some of that unexplored territory and show that it is not as bleak or barren as it has sometimes been portrayed.5 There is less to say about philosophy in Wales and Ireland, for the simple reason that there are very few philosophers of Welsh or Irish origin in this period. But these are not overlooked.
British philosophers did not live and work in isolation from the rest of Europe. The origins and interchange of ideas are an important aspect of the history of philosophy, and cannot be confined within national boundaries. I therefore include a chapter on the cross-currents between British and European philosophy and conduits of philosophical ideas between Britain and Europe. In the course of writing, I have been struck by how closely philosophers of this period were aware of the philosophy of their contemporaries or near contemporaries. Cross-referencing to one another is often explicit in their writings. But it is also evident from the themes which they treat and the arguments which they employ. Strikingly, but not surprisingly, the philosophers to whom most frequent reference is made are the canonical names of today: Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke. But also important are non-canonical figures like Gassendi and Grotius. As this cluster of names suggests, philosophical interchange crosses national and confessional boundaries, so did the philosophers themselves. It is also striking that so many philosophers in this period were in dialogue with one another, through letters and travel as well as by means of books. Contrary to the image created by those philosophers who announced their modernity by repudiating philosophies of the past, seventeenth-century philosophers did not work in isolation from one another, and their ties with past philosophy were strong. There are continuities of theme and terminology from medieval philosophy,6 and some of the most distinctive innovations in seventeenth-century philosophy were shaped by the recovery of ancient thought and creative dialogue with the philosophers of antiquity.
As historical markers, centuries make artificial boundaries which do not correspond exactly to the events which they encompass. Few philosophers’ lives fit neatly within the bounds of the seventeenth century. Some of the most distinguished philosophers of the seventeenth century were by birth and intellectual formation Elizabethans (Bacon, Hobbes, and Herbert). Others whose formative years were within the century (Lord Shaftesbury, George Berkeley, Gershom Carmichael), published in the eighteenth century. I have therefore treated the chronological termini of the period as fluid, focusing chiefly on those the major part of whose lives fall within the seventeenth century, but pointing both forwards and backwards to philosophy produced in adjacent centuries.
The first chapters are broadly contextual. Chapter 1 gives some account of perceptions of philosophy in the period, and provides a broad overview of some of the developments which took place within different branches of philosophy across the century. Chapter 2 deals with the educational context, with the teaching of philosophy in the universities, which was the main locus for logic. The third chapter discusses intellectual exchange, giving an account of the cross-currents between British and European philosophers, and between seventeenth-century philosophy and ancient philosophy. Arguably the most enduring philosophical conversation in the seventeenth century was the conversation with Aristotle. Notwithstanding the decline of Aristotelianism which had formed the backbone of all branches of philosophy since the middle ages, Aristotle’s philosophy remained a point of reference for seventeenth-century philosophers, even if it was often a negative one. The intellectual framework into which the thought of Bacon, Herbert, Hobbes, and Locke was received was one dominated by the philosophy of Aristotle, which is discussed in Chapter 4. This is therefore in some sense a contextual chapter. The coverage thereafter is chronological, focusing on the lead figures in each quartile of the period, each of whom is discussed in relation to both the intellectual context which he addressed and the debates generated his philosophy. Chapter 5 deals with two of the earliest innovators, Francis Bacon and Edward Herbert. Chapter 6 focuses on Thomas Hobbes, setting his philosophy in relation to the historical context, and the political debates surrounding it. This is followed by a chapter on mid-seventeenth-century Cambridge, which focuses on the Cambridge Platonists, their followers, and associates, including Richard Cumberland. Chapter 8 on natural philosophy gives special attention to Walter Charleton and Robert Boyle. Chapter 9 discusses Locke, placing his philosophy in its immediate political and intellectual context, and surveying the debates which his philosophy provoked. The concluding chapter draws threads together in a survey of the state of philosophy at the turn of the eighteenth century.
To presume to write a history of seventeenth-century philosophy is an act of temerity in view of the fine work done by eminent scholars of Locke, Hobbes, Bacon, and others. My work would not have been possible without their scholarship. I aim to give a fuller picture of seventeenth-century British philosophy than is customarily offered, both in terms of the numbers of philosophers discussed, and the variety of their contributions. What I offer as a historian is a descriptive account which maps the philosophical terrain of the seventeenth century in such a way as to give the reader both a sense of the richness of the material, and some means of navigating through it. Those who look to past philosophers for insights into modern arguments are likely to be disappointed. Those readers who want more detailed accounts of particular arguments and specialist discussions of individual philosophers are well served by the many recent ‘companions’ and ‘handbooks’ devoted to early modern philosophy, not to mention specialist monographs on individual philosophers and the weighty tomes of the Cambridge History of Philosophy.7 Nevertheless, even such readers will, I hope, discover more about philosophy in seventeenth-century Britain than any standard histories supply. I content myself with the hope that this account of British philosophy in the seventeenth century will serve as a reference point for those who wish to explore it further.
1 The view that modern philosophy originates in the seventeenth century may be traced back to Hegel. But see Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), pp. 1–5, for a revisionist view.
2 Donald Rutherford, Companion to Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 1.
3 Roger Woolhouse, The Empiricists (Oxford: OUP, 1988), p. 67.
4 This is an approach more familiar to historians of Renaissance Philosophy, especially Charles Schmitt and Quentin Skinner, who have attempted to understand the thought of periods they have studied in relation to its own time, and not through the preoccupations of the present day. See Charles Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard Kessler (eds), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a discussion of approaches to the history of philosophy, see Bernard Williams, ‘Descartes and the Historiography of Philosophy’, in The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 257–65, and Sarah Hutton, ‘Intellectual History and the History of Philosophy’, History of European Ideas, 40 (2014): 935–7.
5 Most notoriously by H. R. Trevor-Roper, ‘The Scottish Enlightenment’, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 58 (1967): 1635–58. The seventeenth century is something of a blind spot in the history of Scottish philosophy. See Alexander Broadie, A History of Scottish Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
6 On the continuities between medieval and seventeenth-century metaphysics, see Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes.
7 E.g. Desmond Clarke and Catherine Wilson (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Peter Anstey (ed.), Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Stephen Nadler (ed.), Companion to Early Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).