The secretary wants to see you at five thirty,” my assistant, Evelyn Polidoro, called into my office at 4 P.M. One of the many odd things about election transitions is the seamless way the career Foreign Service reacts to the fact that the title of “Secretary” after January 20 now refers to an entirely different person. Evelyn was referring to Secretary Hillary Clinton, who had begun her duties days before. I didn’t think much of the request to see me, assuming as I did that Secretary Clinton wanted to talk with me yet again about North Korea and what it would take to get the denuclearization talks restarted.
Since camping out in a first-floor State Department office with her incoming staff in December, Secretary Clinton had been interested in my views about the talks and whether they could be restarted after collapsing in the fall of 2008 over the North Korean refusal to agree to an adequate verification regime. She was most interested in exploring the idea that the North Koreans had essentially broken off the talks in anticipation of working with a new administration in Washington, which, if true, suggested a willingness on their part to get them moving again without too much loss of time.
Theories abounded on this point, though I was of the view that the North Korean resistance to go further in the fall of 2008 had more to do with an internal decision that we could surmise had been complicated by Kim Jong Il’s stroke and his incapacitation that summer. I couldn’t rule out, however, that fresh faces in Washington could help the situation. Many North Korean watchers had viewed with dismay, during the 2001 presidential transition, incoming President Bush’s unwillingness to pursue the Clinton administration’s “Agreed Framework” in which the U.S. side held direct talks with the North Koreans on a set of agreements whose essence was to provide North Korea with two light water reactors in return for dismantling their existing nuclear program. The incoming Bush administration officials were especially concerned about mounting evidence that the North Koreans had continued to engage in clandestine purchases of equipment for a uranium program. The result was that the talks went into hiatus while the nuclear program accelerated.
This time, that danger still existed, but it was the North Koreans who had stopped the talks, not us. Moreover, it was not clear what we could do to continue them, since the issues had come down to the essential one of agreeing on a verification regime. Without an agreement on, for example, allowing inspectors the right to inspect a site previously not on the declaration, we could not begin to verify the North Korean nuclear declaration, a document we already knew to be incomplete in its absence of any references to a uranium enrichment program, past or present. The disagreement was a serious one: we were not prepared to accept a verification regime limited to known plutonium sites, and insisted on the right to inspect undeclared sites, especially ones that we might in the future develop information about. The North Koreans had dug in their heels in a way that even for them was unusually stubborn. It invited different theories within the analytical community as to whether they were waiting for a new administration or for Kim Jong Il’s health status to be clarified.
The nuclear talks had consumed me as nothing I had ever been involved with, but with the North Korean nuclear reactor shut down and no longer producing the spent fuel rods for plutonium, and with the U.S.–South Korean relationship now in good shape, unlike before the Six Party Talks, when many South Koreans believed the impediment to progress was the bellicose United States rather than the truculent North Koreans, I felt the negotiations were at a good moment to pause; it was a propitious time to pass it on to a new administration that had shown a strong interest in continuing them and avoiding the kinds of problems with the South Koreans that had occurred in the first term of the Bush administration when it hit the pause button. So much of what one does in government is to pass on problems to the next generation with the understanding that they should be passed on in better shape than when one found them. I felt we had come to such a moment with North Korea.
I was also, after some thirty-two years, ready to move on from the Foreign Service to take a lecturing and writing position at Yale University. I had had three ambassadorships, in Macedonia, Poland, and South Korea, had been special envoy to Kosovo, a member of Ambassador Holbrooke’s team in ending the Bosnian War, and was finishing up as assistant secretary of state for East Asia, which had come with another hat as chief of the North Korean negotiations.
My involvement in the North Korean negotiations had the life cycle of a typical Washington story. The press, looking for signs of a new approach to diplomacy at the start of the second Bush term, settled on the talks as the poster child. At first, I was heralded in press profiles, and in one New York Times editorial had received the death sentence when it suggested to Secretary Rice that in dealing with Iran she should ask: “What would Chris Hill have done?” (I skipped the senior staff meeting that day.) Later, as talks stalled, they became known as “failed talks.”
At about 5 P.M., I reviewed the latest information about the Six Party Talks, checking to see if there was anything new in the intelligence that day that would have prompted the secretary to call for me. At 5:25 P.M. I went up to her office suite and was waved in by her assistant Claire. Clinton met me at the door of her outer office and motioned me to one of the two wing chairs that sat on either side of the large fireplace. I noticed that some furniture rearranging had taken place in the past couple of days.
But before I could think about whether it was good feng shui for the room or not, I was a little startled to see that in three hard-backed chairs sat incoming Deputy Secretary Jim Steinberg, Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills, and a worried-looking undersecretary for political affairs and the most senior career Foreign Service officer, Bill Burns. I thought: North Korea policy is getting upgraded.
Secretary Clinton opened the discussion by saying some very nice things about my service, especially my handling of the North Korean negotiations. I sat back in my wing chair thinking how pleasant can this be, a last scene in a feel-good movie, as if I were a sort of Foreign Service Bilbo Baggins at the conclusion of my adventures. I glanced over at Bill Burns, who continued to have a troubled look on his face. I thought perhaps he had eaten one of the specials in the State Department cafeteria that day.
And then the secretary said, “And, so I would like to ask just one more thing of you.”
(Oh dear, I thought, another memo on our next steps with the “Norks”—I was on a Lord of the Rings riff in my head, rhyming the acronym for the North Koreans with Tolkien’s “Orcs.”)
“. . . I would like to ask you to replace Ryan Crocker in Baghdad.”
My mind raced forward. Oh my God, Iraq, the real fire of Mordor, wait! I thought dealing with North Korea was the fire of Mordor!?
I snapped out of it and said, “I’m very honored you would ask. I know the importance of this, but I am going to have to think about it.”
“Of course, of course,” she replied with a graciousness that was a pleasure to hear. She explained that she would back me up, including through the Senate confirmation process, which was increasingly looking more like a gauntlet than a process. I knew, and she knew as well, that there were several senators who did not support the negotiations with the North Koreans and held me personally responsible, as if I were merrily conducting my own foreign policy without any instructions from above.
Secretary Clinton knew (and I knew as well) that the negotiating process with the North Koreans had become an emotion-laden exercise, with the opponents regarding it as a dangerous violation of the theory of the case that “bad guys” (and who on earth fits the description better than the North Koreans?) are people one should never talk to. My instructions for my Six Party negotiating sessions in Beijing forbidding me to join in any toasts in the presence of the North Koreans had become a source of amusement around the department.
Clinton went on to explain that this would be a critical year for the United States in Iraq. It would represent a moment when the United States would be “civilianizing” its mission. She said the situation required a strong presence, someone who could in effect wrest control from the military and explain to the media and the public what we were doing. She noted that Ryan Crocker would be leaving in a matter of days and that I would have to be prepared to move quickly. I told her I understood but nonetheless would need to sleep on it.
I staggered back to my office, and Evelyn, joined by the bureau’s special assistant, Yuri Kim, asked me what it had been about. Evelyn had never believed it was about North Korea.
“If you go, I’ll go,” Evelyn said.
“Hey, me too,” Yuri chimed in. Actually, Yuri was already set to go out to a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Anbar Province in western Iraq, but I knew that if I went to Baghdad she was going to work there in a senior position in the political section. I told them I really needed to think about all this. I had never thought about going to Iraq, but I knew that tonight I would be doing just that.
That night, I thought long and hard. Service in Iraq was not popular in the State Department. The war had started on a very wrong note, with the sidelining of the State Department’s role in favor of a civilian mission that was inspired and directed by the Pentagon. The Foreign Service was vilified for not “stepping up,” even though the role it was asked to play was a very subservient one, that of civilian avatars for the military. The embassy I knew was the largest in the world, but it had a reputation for being supersized out of a misplaced need to keep pace with the military personnel system whose appetite for sending more people seemed endless. Story after story came back from Iraq of people having little to do, of sitting around in endless meetings and writing telegrams that no one wanted to read. Most of the Near Eastern Bureau’s Arabists had gone for their service there, come back having checked the box, and vowed not to go again.
The people who served repeated tours in Iraq, as opposed to those who simply wanted to check that box, were often seen as those who could not get jobs elsewhere, or who viewed Iraq as a place to go to line up a next assignment to a cozy job in Europe. The State Department’s personnel system had been skewed as a result of Iraq, with those who had returned being offered jobs ahead of everyone else. I had dealt with some of the distortions in our own personnel exercises in the East Asian Bureau when we were told that we had to accept a person for a position in Bangkok solely for the reason that he or she had served in Iraq. Iraq, it was said, had also become a kind of French Foreign Legion, where after a particularly unsuccessful assignment somewhere, a person could wipe the slate clean and start afresh.
I later learned how complex the picture was. Some of the criticism was well deserved, but much was not. No doubt a very few of those assigned to Iraq and especially to some of its Provincial Reconstruction Teams—our presence in the provinces, sort of proto-consulates—were unfit for other assignments, but others were doing their best in the worst of circumstances, where venturing outside the barbed wire was a difficult and courageous effort.
The nadir of this dismal dynamic had come earlier in 2008 when the Foreign Service’s director general, the person responsible for assignments, had hosted a “town hall” meeting in the State Department at noontime to discuss assignments in Iraq (and Afghanistan) and why all Foreign Service officers should expect to serve a tour there. The meeting was, for reasons no one can now recall or understand, caught on video by CNN as employee after employee posed hostile and provocative questions to the embattled director general. A Foreign Service officer who gave the appearance of never having served east of the Rhine River posed the one melodramatic question that was played over and over again on CNN. “If we must go, who will take care of our children?”
At precisely the time the director general was answering those questions, eight floors above, Secretary of State Rice was bidding farewell to her undersecretary for public affairs, Karen Hughes, who was returning to Texas. The highlight of that gentle affair was the secretary telling the polite audience that Karen made a great sacrifice in coming to Washington all the way from Texas and disrupting her children’s lives. It was a kind of upstairs, downstairs story.
I shuddered as I remembered those meetings, and how the press covered the downstairs meeting as a sample of the Foreign Service’s lack of dedication, while on the eighth floor the self-congratulatory talk of sacrifice and service in Washington was celebrated. Global service was something every Foreign Service officer agreed to on entering the service, and essentially, I was now being asked to fulfill that obligation.