MEMORANDUM ON THE ‘DOUBLE AGENT’ SYSTEM
A fairly extensive ‘double agent’ system has been built up by M.I.5. and M.I.6., but there is considerable difficulty in keeping it in existence, mainly because the Service Departments (for obvious reasons) are chary of releasing sufficient information to the enemy for him to retain confidence in the agents. We submit, however, that it is possible to secure that the losses involved in releasing information are outweighed by the gains accruing from the successful working of the system.
ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED FROM THE ‘DOUBLE AGENT’ SYSTEM
(1) For Counter-Espionage
During 1914-1918 the Censorship and the British Intelligence Service abroad provided the bulk of the information for counterespionage work. Postal communication has now ceased to play quite so important a part in espionage work, whilst, since the German conquest of the Continent, the British Secret Service operates under grave difficulties. In these circumstances the ‘double agent’ system has acquired a new and greater importance in counter-espionage work. It enables us to gain an insight into the personnel, methods, and means of communication of the German espionage organization in this country, while we are also led to the discovery of other agents supplied to the ‘double agent’ as contacts. These at a chosen moment can be eliminated or brought under our control.
By building up a ‘double agent’ organization and establishing the enemy’s confidence in it, we limit other enemy espionage activities. Incidentally, as the enemy is forced to run the system on a cash basis, funds are diverted which might otherwise be expended on enterprises not under our control.
(2) For Cypher Work
When ‘double agents’ carry out wireless transmission in cipher the enemy is encouraged to believe in the security of his Secret Service ciphers. It is particularly important at the present time, when we are far advanced in the understanding of certain German cyphers, to retain these cyphers in use. Messages from a whole network of German Secret Service wireless stations (used both for espionage and operations) have become comprehensible in the course of the last few months and M.I.5. and M.I.6. have in consequence been enabled to build up a picture of the enemy organization on the Continent and to gain advanced information of intended enterprises against this country.
It is also possible that new German cyphers may be broken if we are able through our ‘double agents’ to ‘plant’ information which comes back to us in cypher through the German Secret Service wireless.
(3) For Operations
From the questionnaires, some of which are supplied in great detail to ‘double agents’, Service experts can sometimes comprehend how much information is already at the disposal of the enemy, and can sometime make accurate guesses at his intended objectives.
More important still is the fact that if, and only if, confidence on the enemy’s side has been established in a particular ‘double agent’, it will be possible at the appropriate moment to mislead the enemy as to large scale military operations. When such a moment arrives M.I.5. and M.I.6. will not hesitate to sacrifice their ‘double agent’ or group of ‘double agents’ if important operational results are to be expected from the sacrifice.
THE PRESENT PROBLEM
M.I.5. and M.I.6. must emphasize that only by constant planning in advance and by the maintenance of an adequate flow of consistent and plausible reports to the enemy can the ‘double agent’ system be kept in being and made available for effective use. This policy, no doubt, involves the taking of certain risks, but we submit that the advantages, actual and prospective, which may be gained are sufficient justification for taking these risks.
We have at the moment two main groups of ‘double agents’ working from this country. The first and more important is in wireless communication with the German Secret Service abroad. The second communicates by personal contact and by secret writing by air mail, mainly to the German organization in Lisbon. There are also other agents working abroad.
From our experience of these two systems we can say that most of the information required by the German Secret Service relates to air matters. Latterly, and doubtlessly in view of German air attacks and the projected invasion of this country, the German Secret Service has been asking specific questions about the location of factories, military movements, air-raid damage and the like. Such questions raise the issue of risk to life and property versus Intelligence value in its most direct form. Are we really securing sufficient advantages to compensate for the information which we give to the enemy? The present problem is, in fact, to find a suitable plan which will ensure that we gain more (or with good fortune much more) on the swings than we lose on the roundabouts.
POSSIBLE FUTURE LINES OF DEVELOPMENT
1. The ‘double agents’ could be graded and developed in accordance with the importance attached to them. Subsidiary and less important agents could then be used on a short term basis with the expectation of their early eclipse and for the deliberate and immediate misleading of the enemy in matters of detail. The very few really important agents – especially those who have been in the confidence of the German Secret Service for some time – should be the ones entrusted with the handling over of such accurate information as can, after due consideration by the Service Departments, be released. These agents should be held in readiness and at the disposal of the Service Departments for a large scale deception which would at a critical moment be of paramount operational importance.
2. In order to build up the important agents into positions whence at a given moment they can mislead the enemy with the greatest effect, it is necessary to have some idea of the form which this deception will have to take. If, for example, the handing over of false battle positions or large-scale troop movements is contemplated, our most important ‘double agents’ must gradually be provided with suitable military contacts from whom they could derive important military information; if a political deception is contemplated they would have to be provided with political contacts. In any case a condition of success would be that all such contacts were made gradually and over a fairly long period.
3. Information relating to factory sites, military defence positions and bombing targets of all kinds, would mainly be entrusted to Grade 2 ‘double agents’. It should then be possible to apply several kinds of devices to mislead the enemy. For example apparently accurate information could be given which would in fact refer to dummy targets in the vicinity of a site, whose exact position had been asked for by the German Secret Service. For this purpose the co-operation of Colonel Turner’s department would be essential. Alternatively really accurate information about a site might be provided, and a hot reception prepared for the expected German raiders. In any case it is suggested that dummy sites which are prepared to attract German raiders should be pin-pricked on the maps which the German Secret Service has provided to certain ‘double agents’.
Up to the present the chief function of M.I.5. and M.I.6. in this matter has been to provide the machinery with which to mislead the enemy and to invite the Service Departments to plan for its use. But there is a real danger that the ‘double agent’ system which has been built up may be allowed to collapse because no adequate use is made of it. The present committee are to co-ordinate suggestions from its members for making full use of the machinery provided; to construct plans developed from these suggestions and, if necessary, to press for the putting of these plans into operation.
M.I.5. (B.2a)
27th December, 1940
(KV 4/63 Formation and minutes of meetings of the Twenty Committee in connection with traffic for special agents.)